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Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts 13 new cases

Madison, Wisconsin - October 21, 2014

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has voted to accept 13 new cases and has acted to deny review in a number of other cases. The case numbers, issues, and county of origin are listed below. The Court of Appeals' opinions for the newly accepted cases are hyperlinked where available. Visit the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Access website for more information about the status of any particular case.

2012AP2552 Holman v. Harvey
This case examines the "known and compelling danger" exception to the governmental immunity doctrine under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).

Some background: On Jan. 4, 2011, Michael S. Harvey, the highway superintendent for the town of Washburn in Bayfield County, backed a grader into an intersection while scraping ice from the highway. While blocking the intersection, the grader was struck by a mini-van, resulting in injuries to three brothers (the Holmans), including the driver and two passengers.

The Holmans sued Harvey for damages. Harvey moved for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to governmental immunity under § 893.80(4), Stats. He also asserted that the Holmans' claims were subject to the $50,000 per person damage cap for claims against governmental subdivisions and their employees under § 893.80(3). The Holmans conceded that their claims were capped at $50,000. The Holmans argued Harvey was not entitled to governmental immunity because the ministerial duty and known and compelling danger exceptions to immunity applied.

The circuit court denied Harvey's summary judgment motion, concluding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harvey was confronted with a known and compelling danger. The circuit court did not address the ministerial duty exception. The parties stipulated to entry of judgment against Harvey in the amount of $50,000 for Brody Holman, $5,000 for Hunter Holman, and $16,500 for Jordan Holman. They also agreed the claims of the Holman brothers' parents could be dismissed with prejudice. The stipulation preserved Harvey's right to appeal the circuit court's denial of his summary judgment motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that Harvey was entitled to summary judgment on his governmental immunity claim.

The Holmans have asked the Supreme Court to review:

  • Did Harvey exercise "legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) when he violated Wisconsin's rules of the road, including Wis. Stat. § 346.87, mandating safe backing, and Wis. Stat. § 346.46(1), the Stop Sign Statute, requiring stopping and yielding the right-of-way to vehicles approaching on a through highway?
  • Does the known danger exception to governmental immunity apply to the hazard created by blindly backing a motor grader into an intersection in front of an approaching vehicle?

From Bayfield County.

2013AP591 Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay
This case involves a dispute over the City Council of Green Bay's revocation of a conditional-use permit (CUP) for a subsidiary of the Oneida tribe, Oneida Seven Generations Corp., to operate a waste-to-energy facility that would use "pyrolysis" to vaporize waste with intense heat.

The Supreme Court examines two issues:

  • Under precedent establishing certiorari review standards, should the Court of Appeals have remanded the case back to the municipality once it concluded that the municipality failed to articulate the rationale for its decision?
  • Did the Court of Appeals' "substantial evidence" review conflict with controlling decisions of this Court addressing the substantial evidence standard to be applied in certiorari actions by equating the substantial evidence standard with the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence standard and substituting its judgment for that of the municipality?

Some background: The city's plan commission had twice approved issuing the permit – once before and once after opponents objected at a public hearing. However, the council ultimately voted to deny the permit after opponents contended at a city council meeting that the tribe misrepresented the potential for pollution from the facility.

The city notified Seven Generations of its decision by letter on Nov. 1, 2012. The city advised that the CEO of Seven Generations made untruthful statements in response to questions or concerns related to the public safety and health aspect of the project. The city did not identify exactly what information it considered false or how it determined the falsity of the information. The city denied Seven Generations' request for a ch. 68, Stats. administrative appeal.

Seven Generations filed a certiorari action in circuit court. The City filed a brief in opposition in which it identified the alleged misrepresentations for the first time. The City claimed that Seven Generations had misrepresented at the Plan Commission's Feb. 21, 2011 hearing that the facility would be a closed system with no emissions, smokestacks, or hazardous material, and that the technology was proven. The circuit court agreed, concluding that the City's revocation of the CUP was not arbitrary and was based on substantial evidence. Seven Generations appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Court of Appeals noted that certiorari is a means by which a court may test the validity of a decision rendered by a municipality. It also noted that municipal decisions are entitled to a presumption of correctness and validity, and it said its review is limited.

While the Court of Appeals said the decision to grant or revoke a CUP involves the exercise of a municipality's discretion and it is hesitant to interfere with discretionary determinations, discretion is not synonymous with decision making and a municipality misuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable or without a rational basis. It noted that in Westring v. James, 71 Wis. 2d 462, 476-77, 238 N.W.2d 695 (1976), this court said a flagrant misuse of discretion has been described as capricious, meaning "a whimsical, unreasoning departure from established norms or standards; it describes action which is mercurial, unstable, inconstant, or fickle."

The Court of Appeals said it was "disappointed" that the City did not mention the Plan Commission's conclusions in rendering its decision to revoke the CUP. The court said even more dismaying was the city's failure to articulate any rationale for its decision to revoke, and the court said the absence of any identifiable false statements in the city's decision was "troubling." The court said to properly review the city's action, the basis for that action must be known because without a statement of reasoning, it is impossible to meaningfully review a board's decision and the value of certiorari review becomes worthless. See Lamar Cent. Outdoor, Inc. v. board of Zoning Appeals of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 117, ¶32, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 87

The Court of Appeals said the city did not identify Seven Generations' allegedly false statements prior to the commencement of the certiorari action. The court said the exercise of discretion must be evident from the municipal record, to which the court's review is confined. The court went on to say that even if were to allow the city to "fill in" its rationale on certiorari review, none of the allegedly false statements belatedly identified by the city constitute substantial evidence of misrepresentation.

While the City also claimed that Seven Generations misrepresented that the facility would have no smokestacks, the Court of Appeals said none of the statements on which the city relied could be reasonably interpreted as a promise that there would be no stacks or vents. The court said, "again, no reasonable person could believe that a gas-burning engine would not produce exhaust, which must be expelled from the facility." The court also said Seven Generations informed the Common Council before the CUP was granted that the facility would require exhaust outlets. The court said the final design for the facility was fully consistent with the fact sheet and presentation Seven Generations submitted to the Plan Commission, which said there would be "no smokestacks such as those associated with coal-fired power plants."

While the city argued that Seven Generations misrepresented the technology used in the proposed facility as proven, the Court of Appeals said it perceived no misrepresentations in Seven Generations' statement with respect to the state of pyrolysis technology. The city argues that supreme court review is needed because rather than remanding the matter back to the city to give it a chance to more explicitly articulate its rationale for the revocation decision, the Court of Appeals proceeded to review the evidence in the record and make its own determination as to whether Seven Generations made any misrepresentations. The city argues the Court of Appeals' handling of this case is contrary to prior decisions saying that when a decision-maker has not properly explained its decision, remand is the appropriate remedy.

Seven Generations says the unpublished Court of Appeals' decision rests on the well established legal principle that a municipality may not act arbitrarily or without substantial evidence. From Brown County.

2013AP197-CR State v. Herrmann
The issue raised in this case is whether the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion and violated the defendant's due process rights when it allegedly exhibited bias in sentencing him.

Some background: The Supreme Court is reviewing a Court of Appeals' decision affirming Jesse Herrmann's conviction for one count of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, two counts of injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, two counts of operating while intoxicated causing injury, and one count of hit-and-run involving death and an order denying a motion seeking resentencing.

Specifically, the question posed is whether, when sentencing the defendant for homicide and injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, the sentencing court's remarks, which spoke of losing a sister to a drunk driver in 1976, demonstrated an appearance of bias.

Herrmann pled guilty to the charges and was found to be a repeat offender on all counts and all but the hit-and-run count were charged with him already having one or more prior OWI offenses. The court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences totaling 31 years of initial confinement and 40 years of extended supervision, with an additional consecutive probation term.

Herrmann says the judge in this case made statements that indicated the emotional pain she suffered when her sister was killed by a drunk driver, and she suggested that she felt a certain sense of mission to make the defendant pay that would not likely be felt by a judge who was less emotionally involved. Herrmann says the judge made it clear that she wanted him to remain on supervision for the rest of his life, and when the prosecutor expressed concern that the defendant would not start his probation term until he was nearly one 100 years old, the judge said, "I want to make sure that he's under supervision until he dies."

The court denied Herrmann's post-conviction motion, saying it properly exercised its discretion by ensuring that the sentencing record identified the objectives of the sentence and demonstrated how the relevant facts and factors furthered those objectives. The court said the defendant "took the court's comments out of context in an attempt to suggest judicial bias." The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals noted that there are two types of judicial bias: subjective and objective. It noted that subjective bias refers to the judge's own determination of his or her bias and objective bias occurs in two forms: when there is an appearance of bias and when there are objective facts showing that the judge in fact treated the defendant unfairly. State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶9, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. The court said the defendant did not claim subjective bias.

The state asserts that the judge's remarks about her personal experience as a crime victim did not create an appearance of bias because the judge's remarks were not tied to the length of the defendant's sentence, which was substantially shorter than the sentence recommended by the Pre-sentence Investigation (PSI) report's author. Rather, the state argues that the judge's remarks were merely an effort to show sympathy for the victims in the case. The state says the Court of Appeals correctly noted that it is not uncommon for judges or their family members to have been victims of the types of crime for which they pass sentence, and a rule mandating recusal in such cases disregards the strong presumption that judges are impartial. From La Crosse County.

2013AP265 Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc.
This labor law case has a lengthy and somewhat complicated legal history, including consideration at the administrative level and in the state courts.

The Supreme Court reviews a series of questions arising from a dispute between Husco International, Inc. and a labor union over how break times are to be treated under the terms of a faulty contract provision and in context of state and federal labor laws. The union in this case is District No. 10 (the union) of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.

Some background: Since 1981, District 10 has been the collective bargaining representative for a bargaining unit of production and maintenance employees at Husco. In 1983, Husco and District 10 agreed to implement some changes into the employees' collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided for a paid 10 minute break, an unpaid 20-minute break, and paid wash-up periods totaling five minutes per eight-hour and 20-minute shift. This meant employees would work a total of seven hours and 45 minutes for every eight hours of pay.

At the time, neither party was aware that the unpaid 20-minute breaks were unlawful under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD § 274.02(3), which provides that all breaks under 30 minutes must be paid.

The parties worked to resolve issues that arose from the situation on their own and with the help of arbitrators and administrators before the case worked its way into the state courts, ultimately now landing before the Supreme Court.

Husco has asked the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which reversed a circuit court order denying cross motions for summary judgment filed by Husco, its employees, and the union. The Court of Appeals remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the employees and District 10.

The questions before the Supreme Court include:

  • Did plaintiff employees "earn" wages for their 20-minute meal breaks, where it is undisputed that their union negotiated collective bargaining agreements that call for the breaks to be unpaid and the employees ratified those agreements?
  • Has there been substantial compliance by Husco with DWD § 274.02, the regulation adopted by the state Department of Workforce Development (DWD) to protect workers from unhealthy and unsafe work hours where DWD interprets DWD § 274.02 as permitting employees to agree to $0.00/hour as the rate of pay for 20-minute meal breaks; where DWD has expressly found that the 20-minute meal breaks – agreed to by District 10 and the employees – have not endangered the health or safety of the employees; and where DWD § 274.05 expressly permits employers and unions to agree to such meal breaks and where DWD would formally approve these meal breaks if District 10 would simply join with Husco in seeking such formal approval?
  • Are Husco's defenses of waiver, unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel and failure to mitigate damages barred by Wisconsin law?
  • Are Husco's state law defenses to plaintiff employees' state law claims barred by federal law?
  • Do the state law defenses of unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, waiver and failure to mitigate damages bar plaintiff employees from pursuing state law claims for the 20-minute breaks, where it is undisputed that District 10 negotiated contracts that call for the breaks to be unpaid, the employees ratified the contracts, the employees receive additional monetary benefits and a shorter workday in exchange for the 20-minute breaks, and where it is undisputed that employees' union refused to seek formal DWD approvals of the 20-minute unpaid breaks, which approvals it is undisputed the DWD would grant?
  • Is Husco's third-party claim under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act against District 10 for breach of the federally recognized contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing barred by that same federal law?
  • Are Husco's state law third-party claims against District 10 for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment barred by federal law?
  • Is Husco entitled to summary judgment on its third-party claims against District 10 for breach of the federally recognized contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, for unjust enrichment and for promissory estoppel where it is undisputed that District 10, over a span of 15 years, negotiated a series of contracts that all unequivocally provide for 20-minute unpaid meal breaks, but then refused to seek waivers from DWD formally approving those breaks, which waivers DWD would grant, and instead tried to extract other financial concessions from Husco and then orchestrated this class action lawsuit?

From Milwaukee County.

2013AP557-CR State v. Kucharski
This case involving a double homicide examines the standards for granting a new trial in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court reviews a Court of Appeals' decision reversing a judgment convicting the defendant, Corey Kucharski, of two counts of first-degree intentional homicide with the use of a dangerous weapon.

Some background: It is undisputed that in February of 2010 the defendant, Corey R. Kucharski, shot and killed both of his parents. He called police and turned himself in. He entered a special plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) and later pled no contest during the first phase of the NGI trial. He elected to have a court trial on the criminal responsibility phase.

At the court trial, Kucharski introduced reports from two psychiatrists, who testified that he was suffering from schizophrenia when he killed his parents and that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts and to conform his behavior to the requirements of law. The psychiatrists testified that Kucharski reported having heard voices telling him what to do, and that he was unable to distinguish between real voices and those heard only in his head.

The circuit court concluded that the defendant met his burden to prove that he had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. Although the court termed it a "close call," it concluded the defendant failed to meet his burden to prove that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offenses.

The circuit court said the defendant did appear to understand that his actions were illegal and at one point he mentioned that he would be "rotting in jail." The court concluded that doctors who testified were "speculating" when they opined that the defendant was in a state of psychosis before, during and after the shootings.

The court found Kucharskie guilty and sentenced him to two terms of life in prison with eligibility for extended supervision in 30 years. Following denial of a post-conviction motion, the defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeals granted a discretionary reversal under § 752.35, Stats. It held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility because there was a substantial probability that a new trial could produce a different result. A divided Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the mental responsibility phase.

The court noted that it may grant a discretionary reversal "if it is likely for any reason that justice has miscarried." State v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶31, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175. It may conclude that justice has miscarried if it determines there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result.

The appellate court agreed with the defendant that there was a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result. It said the evidence showing he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was very strong and "certainly comprised 'the greater weight of the credible evidence.

In bringing the case to the Supreme Court, the state raises the following issues:

  • In granting Kucharski a new trial on the issue of mental responsibility under the miscarriage-of-justice prong of Wis. Stat. § 752.35, did the Court of Appeals substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues that are within the sole province of the finder of fact, so that the appellate court's decision conflicts with this court's decision in State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979)?
  • Should a defendant ever be entitled to a new trial on the affirmative defense of insanity under the miscarriage-of-justice prong of Wis. Stat. § 752.35 where the Court of Appeals does not find any error or unfairness at his trial, but determines that there is a substantial probability of a different result on retrial only by substituting its judgment for that of the fact-finder on issues that are the province of the fact-finder alone? From Milwaukee County.

2013AP558-CR State v. Hurley
This case examines the standards courts should use in evaluating due process notice challenges to complaints that allege the crime of repeated sexual assault of a child.

A decision by the Supreme Court also may resolve a possible conflict between two Court of Appeals' decisions, State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988), and State v. R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 435 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1988).

See also the synopsis for State v. Kempainen, 2013AP1531-CR, which examines some similar issues.

Some background: The Court of Appeals reversed in part a post-conviction order vacating a judgment of conviction against Joel M. Hurley for one count of repeated sexual assault of the same child. The Court of Appeals also granted Hurley a new trial and denied postconviction motions, including his claim that he was entitled to a new trial based on an improper remark made by the prosecutor during his closing argument. The Court of Appeals remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the charge without prejudice. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the circuit court erred in admitting other acts evidence, and it concluded the error was not harmless so even absent dismissal of the charge, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial.

In July 2011 an amended complaint was filed charging Hurley with one count of repeated sexual assault of the same child, contrary to § 948.025, Stats. The charging section of the amended complaint alleged that the assaults occurred "on and between 2000 and 2005." As probable cause for the charge, the amended complaint alleged that a 15-year-old girl that Hurley had placed his fingers inside her vagina approximately several times when she between the ages of six and 11. She could not say in which months, seasons, or years the assaults occurred, or how much time passed between the individual assaults. The court found probable cause and bound the defendant over for trial.

Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking leave to introduce other acts evidence. The state sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had sexually assaulted another girl during the mid-1980s when that girl was 8 to 10 years old and the defendant was 12 to 14 years old. That girl's testimony was admitted as "other acts" evidence.

The jury found Hurley guilty of the charged offenses. The circuit court, following an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion, ordered a new trial. The decision to order a new trial was based on a statement made by the prosecutor during his closing argument to the effect that the defendant did not make a strong denial of the second girl's allegations at trial, and instead testified he did not recall the alleged incidents.

The circuit court rejected Hurley's claim that the complaint violated his right to due process by failing to provide adequate notice to prepare a defense. The Court of Appeals did not address whether the lower court erred in ordering a new trial based on the prosecutor's closing argument remarks. Instead, it concluded that the criminal complaint violated the defendant's right to due process and that the circuit court erred in admitting the other acts testimony. The Court of Appeals remanded for the circuit court to enter an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

Hurley argued that the amended complaint violated his right to due process because the time period in which it alleged the sexual assaults occurred was not specific enough to give him adequate notice of the charge so that he could mount a defense.

The Court of Appeals noted a defendant is entitled to be informed of the charges against him, including the time frame in which the offense allegedly occurred. The court went on to say while the girl's inability to provide specific dates for each of the assaults was understandable, her inability to narrow the five-year charging period was not. From Marinette County.

2013AP1531-CR State v. Kempainen
This case examines whether a trial court must apply the first three factors of State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988) to determine whether a complaint is sufficiently definite in a case involving delayed allegations of sexual assault.

(See also the synopsis for State v. Hurley, 2013AP558-CR, which examines some similar issues.)

The Fawcett court set forth seven factors that courts are to consider in determining whether the dates alleged in a criminal complaint are specific enough to satisfy due process:

(1) the age and intelligence of the victim and other witnesses; (2) the surrounding circumstances; (3) the nature of the offense, including whether it is likely to occur at a specific time or is likely to have been discovered immediately; (4) the length of the alleged period of time in relation to the number of individual criminal acts alleged; (5) the passage of time between the alleged period for the crime and the defendant's arrest; (6) the duration between the date of the indictment and the alleged offense; and (7) the ability of the victim or complaining witness to particularize the date and time of the alleged transaction or offense.

Some background: In December of 2012, the state charged Brian S. Kempainen with two counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of 13. In October of 2012, the child reported that the defendant had sexual contact with her "on or about Aug. 1, 1997 to Dec. 1, 1997," when she was eight years old, and "on or about March 1, 2001 to June 15, 2001," when she was 11 or 12.

The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges on the ground they violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with adequate notice. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.

The defendant argued that the circuit court correctly refused to apply the first three Fawcett factors because the defendant did not claim the state could have obtained a more definite date through diligent efforts.

The Court of Appeals concluded courts may consider all of the Fawcett factors in determining whether a charge was sufficiently pled. The Court of Appeals said to the extent State v. R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 435 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1988) suggests that courts may not consider the first three Fawcett factors unless a defendant claims a lack of prosecutorial diligence, such a reading would conflict with its earlier holding in Fawcett and only this court has the power to overrule, modify, or withdraw language from a published opinion of the Court of Appeals. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals said it must follow Fawcett and must consider all Fawcett factors that relate to this case.

After consideration of all of the Fawcett factors, the Court of Appeals concluded that the charges in this case were sufficiently pled.

Kempainen argues that the Court of Appeals' conclusion that all Fawcett factors must always be considered runs contrary to the holding of R.A.R. The defendant says as it now stands, R.A.R. and Fawcett are in direct conflict. It says as noted in Cook, the Court of Appeals is unable to resolve that conflict.

The state opposes review, saying nothing in the Court of Appeals' decision requires trial courts to apply the first three Fawcett factors. The state says instead, the Court of Appeals simply reiterated that trial courts may apply all seven factors if it deems them helpful. The state argues the Court of Appeals' decision simply reiterates and reinforces its earlier decision in Fawcett. From Sheboygan County.

2013AP2107-CR State v. Blatterman
This case examines the community care doctrine and the probable cause necessary to arrest a person for a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration violation when the threshold level is the 0.02-percent standard.

Some background: Dane County Sheriff's Deputy James Nisius was on duty at approximately 8:47 a.m. on March 19, 2013, when he was dispatched to a home in response to a call from the defendant, Dean Blatterman's wife, that he was "putting gas in [a] house . . . through a stove or a fireplace." The defendant's wife said she thought the defendant was trying to blow up the house or light the house on fire by pulling gas or monoxide into the house.

While Nisius was en route to the home, dispatch informed him that the defendant was leaving the house in a white minivan and that he was possibly intoxicated. Dispatch provided the license plate number of the minivan. Soon thereafter, a vehicle matching that description passed Nisius's squad car, and Nisius followed it. Nisius testified that he did not immediately stop the minivan because dispatch had informed him the driver had historically mentioned "suicide by cop."

When backup officers arrived, Nisius stopped the defendant's vehicle, opened his door, drew his duty weapon, pointed it at the minivan, and told the defendant "to stick his hands up out the window." Nisius testified that the defendant "opened up the door right away and started walking back with his hands in the air." Nisius noticed the defendant had something in his hand. (The object was later identified as a cell phone.)

Nisius told the defendant to "turn away" and "stop walking" because it is not procedure to have someone get out of a car and walk back on a high-risk stop. In spite of these directives, and a warning that he may be "tased," the defendant kept walking toward the officers. One of the backup officers told the defendant to "get down" and "turn away." The defendant knelt down but did not turn away, so backup officers put him on the ground and placed him in handcuffs.

Nisius testified that when he got close to the defendant he detected an odor of intoxicants and noticed the defendant's eyes were watery. Nisius testified that he believed the defendant may have been operating while intoxicated because of the defendant's strange behavior of not responding to the officers, the odor of intoxicants, the watery eyes, and the fact that the person who had called dispatch said the defendant was intoxicated. Nisius did not ask the defendant to perform field sobriety tests at the scene of the stop.

Blatterman refused medical treatment from EMS. Nisius testified he thought the defendant "should get checked out at the hospital" because there was potentially an issue with carbon monoxide poisoning, the defendant was potentially suicidal, and he claimed that his chest hurt. Before leaving the scene of the stop, Nisius reviewed the defendant's driving record. He found that Blatterman had three prior convictions for operating while intoxicated, meaning he was unable to legally drive with a blood-alcohol content of 0.02 percent or more.

Nisius asked the defendant what hospital he would go to, and he replied St. Mary's. The defendant was transported to St. Mary's Hospital, approximately 10 miles away. Nisius informed the hospital staff that he had transported the defendant to the hospital for three reasons: (1) because he may have had carbon monoxide poisoning; (2) because he was potentially suicidal; and (3) because he said that his chest hurt. Nisius also told hospital staff that there was "potentially a need for a phlebotomist to do a legal blood draw."

The defendant was transferred to an exam room. A nurse checked his vitals and monoxide levels, which were within normal limits. Hospital staff questioned the defendant about whether he was suicidal, and he said he was not. The defendant was handcuffed during the examinations. After the exams were completed, Nisius removed the handcuffs and had the defendant perform field sobriety tests. A blood sample was drawn, which showed a blood alcohol content of 0.118-percent. The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was arrested without probable cause and seeking suppression of all evidence gathered subsequent to the illegal arrest. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion.

The defendant subsequently pled guilty to fourth offense drunk driving. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the trial court's explicit finding that the hospital to which the defendant was transported was within the vicinity of the stop.

The state says previous cases set precedent that the police can legitimately pursue a community caretaker agenda while at the same time also pursuing investigatory objectives.

The defendant says the community caretaker exception argument was not specifically developed by the state either in the trial court or the Court of Appeals such that the issue should be deemed waived. From Dane County.

2013AP1303 Acuity v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co.
This is a dispute between two insurance companies, Acuity and Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., about whether or not they shared a duty to defend and indemnify their respective insured, Dorner, Inc., in four consolidated lawsuits.

Some background: The lawsuits were filed as a result of a serious natural gas explosion that occurred when, during excavation, Dorner employees disturbed an underground natural gas line. The explosion from the ruptured gas line destroyed a church, damaged nearby houses, and seriously injured two Wisconsin Electric employees. Acuity did not contest its duty to defend and indemnify Dorner, pursuant to the commercial general liability policy it issued to Dorner. However, Acuity asserted that Chartis also had a duty to defend and indemnify Dorner pursuant to a Contractor Pollution Liability (CPL) policy. Chartis disagreed, asserting that it was liable for bodily injury and property damage only if caused by pollution conditions, and maintained that neither the explosion, the bodily injury, nor the property damage was a "pollution condition" under the terms of the policy.

In the circuit court, both Acuity and Chartis moved for summary judgment. On January 28, 2011, the circuit court concluded that Chartis breached its duty under the CPL policy and ordered Chartis to defend Dorner. The court did not allocate the defense and indemnity payments at that time.

Subsequently, the court ordered the insurers to share defense costs and indemnity settlements or judgments on a fifty-fifty basis. The last of the underlying cases was settled in May 2013. The parties stipulated that: (1) Dorner's defense costs were $283,073.94; (2) Chartis already had paid Acuity $141,486.08, its 50-percent share; (3) the indemnity settlements Acuity had paid on Dorner's behalf amounted to $1,531,761.80; (4) Chartis' 50-percent share of the settlements was $765,880.90; and (5) taxable costs were $905.75. Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order for judgment against Chartis and in favor of Acuity in the amount of $766,786.65, Chartis' fifty-percent share of the indemnity settlements plus taxable costs. Chartis appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Chartis had no duty to defend or indemnify Dorner.

The Court of Appeals noted an insurer's duty to defend its insured is determined by comparing the allegations of the complaint to the terms of the insurance policy. Estate of Sustache v. American Fam. Mutual Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845. The duty to defend "is necessarily broader than the duty to indemnify because the duty to defend is triggered by arguable, as opposed to actual, coverage." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶20, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666.

The duty is triggered if the allegations, if proved, "give rise to the possibility of recovery" under the policy. Id., ¶19. The existence of coverage under the facts in the complaint need only be "fairly debatable." See Baumann v. Elliott, 2005 WI App 186, ¶118-19, 286 Wis. 2d 667, 704 N.W.2d 361. If even one theory in a complaint appears to fall within the policy's coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire action. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Acuity, 2005 WI App 77, ¶8, 280 Wis. 2d 624, 695 N.W.2d 883.

Acuity appealed to the Supreme Court, which has been asked to decide if Chartis breached its duty to defend and indemnify its insured. From Waukesha County.

2014AP160 Mary E.B. v. Cecil M.
This termination-of-parental-rights case examines Section 48.415(6), which sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors a court may consider in evaluating whether a person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child.

Some background: Mary, the mother of a child, initiated a termination-of-parental-rights case against Cecil, the father of the child so that their baby could be adopted by the foster parents with whom he has resided since birth.

Mary and Cecil met as high school students and had an on-again/off-again relationship for seven years. Between March and June 2012, while they were living in another state, Mary became pregnant. Mary learned she was pregnant at the end of June, when she was back in Wisconsin. She immediately advised Cecil of the pregnancy. Paternity was not a question.

Mary contends that Cecil never helped her during the pregnancy, which was considered high risk. Cecil conceded that he was not aware of who was paying for Mary's prenatal care or the eventual child birth expenses, and didn't ask.

Mary requested that Cecil come to Wisconsin to help her but Cecil claimed he could not leave the other state due to the criminal action against him. After continued fighting over Cecil's lack of interest in the pregnancy, Mary discontinued phone contact with Cecil in October, although it is undisputed that he had enough contacts with her friends and family that he could have reached her.

In November, while living in a homeless shelter, Mary contacted an adoption agency and expressed interest in placing her unborn child for adoption.

In January 2013, Cecil received a letter from an agency caseworker, whom Cecil later contacted by telephone. During the conversation Mary claims Cecil (1) never inquired about the child's health, (2) never inquired about Mary's health and well-being, (3) never asked if he could do anything for Mary or the child and (4) never offered to send money to assist with birthing expenses or Mary's living expenses.

The child was born on Feb. 7, 2013. He was immediately placed with the foster parents who wish to adopt him. Mary filed the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights on February 11, 2013, seeking to terminate Cecil's parental rights on the grounds that he did not have a substantial parental relationship with the child. Cecil opposed termination of his parental rights.

The circuit court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that Mary had not provided clear and convincing evidence that Cecil failed to assume parental responsibility within the meaning of § 48.415, which defines "Substantial parental relationship" as:

(b) In this subsection, "substantial parental relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child. In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child, the court may consider such factors, including, but not limited to, whether the person has expressed concern for or interest in support, care or well-being of the child, whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child and whether, with respect to a person who is or may be the father of the child, the person has expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the mother during her pregnancy. See § 48.415(6)(b).

Mary argues that the effect of the Court of Appeals' decision is such that a petitioner can't use Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) as a ground to terminate a parent's rights if the other parent even appears in court to contest the termination of parental rights proceeding.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Cecil, concluding that the circuit court was not clearly wrong in its ruling and that "[d]uring the fact-finding stage of a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the parent's rights are paramount" (citing State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264, ¶19, 288 Wis. 2d 485, 709 N.W.2d 879). Cecil contends that Mary had the burden of proving grounds to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1) and that the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings made by the trial court.

Mary raises the following issues for review by the Supreme Court:

  • Did the circuit court apply the proper standard of law when it held that a parent's demonstration of an interest in the child was sufficient to comport with the statutory definition of "substantial parental relationship" set forth under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)?
  • Does the circuit court's decision, based on a demonstration of an interest in the child, alone, effectively eviscerate the statutory mandate of demonstrating a "substantial parental relationship" and exercising "significant responsibility" for the child, thereby undermining the legislative purpose and policy of Wisconsin's children's code?

Justice David T. Prosser did not participate. From Kenosha County.

2012AP2692-CR State v. Daniel
This case examines the correct burden of proof applicable when a criminal defendant's competency is raised in a post-conviction proceeding.

Some background: The factual background is not in dispute. Roddee W. Daniel was 15 years old when the crimes at issue – including the murder of Capri Walker – were committed. Pretrial, Daniel, a diagnosed schizophrenic, was charged with being a party to the crime of first-degree intentional homicide and of burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon. Daniel was found competent to stand trial. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, without extended supervision.

Daniel's lawyer on appeal proceedings contends this case is "replete with potential issues of arguable merit on appeal, including contested motions for reverse waiver, to dismiss the criminal complaint for the unconstitutionality of the statute, to sever defendants for trial, for change of venue, to suppress statements, to determine competency, etc., which were all decided against the Defendant." Appellate counsel states that he has been unable to address those appellate issues because Daniel has inconsistently wanted to terminate representation. He questioned Daniel's ability to understand his § 809.30 appellate rights and also questioned Daniel's ability to effectively communicate with his counsel.

The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and asked Daniel directly if he was competent to make decisions related to his appeal, and Daniel answered, "Yeah." Daniel's counsel then asked Daniel a number of questions seeking to elicit Daniel's understanding (or lack thereof) of the appeal process. The court denied the State's request for a directed verdict on the issue of Daniel's competence after Daniel's counsel stated that he wished to provide further evidence. The court initially placed the burden on Daniel's counsel to prove Daniel's incompetence by the "preponderance of the evidence."

Daniel's counsel called a number of witnesses, including competing experts, whose testimony weighed both for and against Daniel's post-conviction competency.

Following testimony, the court directed the parties to submit closing arguments in writing. Daniel's counsel argued that he had proved Daniel's incompetence "beyond any reasonable doubt" and that the statute established the burden for showing incompetency was by the "clear and convincing" evidence standard.

The State agreed that the standard required of Daniel's counsel was the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. In its oral ruling, the court concluded that Daniel was competent as "the defense had not met their burden to prove that he is incompetent by clear and convincing evidence."

The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed. The Court of Appeals ruled that a court may allocate the burden of persuasion to the defendant (or defense counsel) in a post-conviction competency proceeding, but must utilize a "preponderance/greater weight of the evidence" burden of proof when doing so. The Court of Appeals ruled that the circuit court erred by imposing a higher middle "clear and convincing" evidence standard. The Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings (restoring Daniel's Wis. Stat. § 809.30 time limits).

Daniel presents the following issues to the Supreme Court:

  • Should a defendant bear the burden of proving incompetency in a post-conviction proceeding in Wisconsin?
  • What procedure should be employed when a defendant and defense counsel disagree as to the defendant's competency?
  • What standard of review should be applied to a circuit court's postconviction competency determination?

From Kenosha County.

2013AP1205 First Weber Group, Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Group LLC
This real estate case examines procedures to compel arbitration under Wis. Stat. § 788.03.

Some background: First Weber Group, Inc. and James Imhoff, Jr. (hereafter "First Weber"), seek review of a Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed a circuit court order denying First Weber's petition to compel arbitration of a dispute with Synergy Real Estate Group, LLC and James Graham (hereafter "Graham").

This case stems from a 2012 circuit court decision denying First Weber's request to compel arbitration. The same parties were involved in arbitration in 2009 that is also relevant to this case. In the 2009 case, the parties had a dispute over a commission. An arbitration panel issued an award in favor of First Weber in the amount of $5,440, which Graham paid only after First Weber sought enforcement of the award in circuit court.

In the second arbitration at issue, on June 5, 2012, First Weber filed a new Request and Agreement to Arbitrate and/or Attend Mediation Proceedings form, seeking to initiate an arbitration regarding the costs and fees it claimed from the underlying confirmation proceeding.

First Weber asserts that this request to arbitrate was filed on May 8, 2012. The Court of Appeals noted that a dated document, which was plainly created after the request to arbitrate was filed, appears to establish that the request was filed sometime in the weeks before June 5, 2012.

This form request included the same italicized language reciting the 180-day time limit on arbitration requests as had been included on First Weber's initial request for arbitration. This time, Graham simply e-mailed in response that he would not be participating and declined to attend the scheduled arbitration. The Association took the position that this second arbitration could not occur without Graham's signed agreement to arbitrate or his appearance, absent court action.

Accordingly, on Nov. 2, 2012, First Weber filed in the circuit court a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to § 788.03. The circuit court concluded that First Weber should have sought arbitration within 180 days of March 10, 2011 (the date Graham wrote a letter indicating disagreement with fees and costs sought), "rather than continuing to pursue fees in litigation," and that the time limit expired [180 days later] on Sept. 6, 2011. Under the agreement to arbitrate, the court concluded, "[a]fter Sept. 6, 2011 the dispute was no longer arbitrable."

First Weber appealed. It argued that the arbitration process, and not the court, should have been responsible for determining whether the dispute between First Weber and Graham regarding fees and costs was arbitrable.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the circuit court properly took up the time limitation issue, ruling that "First Weber has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating, by pointing to clear and unmistakable language in the agreement to arbitrate, an intent that the time limitation issue be decided as part of the arbitration process. Therefore, as a matter of law, the fees and costs dispute does not belong in arbitration."

First Weber presents the following issues to the Supreme Court:

  1. Was there an agreement to arbitrate and a dispute subject to that agreement (elements under sec. 788.03, Wis. Stats.)?
    a. Did the two courts err in failing to compel arbitration under sec. 788.03, Wis. Stats., given the above findings?
    b. Did the two courts err in refusing to handle an arbitration-forum time limitation rule as a "procedural" arbitrability issue instead of as a "substantive" arbitrability issue?
  2. May a court "re-decide" an arbitration-forum time limitation rule (during a proceeding under sec. 788.03, Wis. Stats.) that had already been decided in arbitration?
  3. If a court may "re-decide" an arbitration-forum time limitation rule already decided in arbitration, did the Courts here select the "correct" date?

An amicus brief filed by the Wisconsin Realtors Association contends the Court of Appeals' decision "allows a court to refuse to compel arbitration and substitute its own decision, contrary to the stricture of the statute, misapplying the case law on 'arbitrability,' reversing the presumption of arbitration, and otherwise misapplying federal and state law precedents."

Graham concedes that arbitration is a favored process in Wisconsin, but emphasizes that this does not imply that parties must arbitrate disputes already raised in litigation, or that parties must arbitrate disputes brought outside of the time parameters set by the arbitration agreement. To the contrary, he contends that it would frustrate the arbitration process to force parties to litigate the same disputes endlessly, first in court, then in arbitration. He contends that it also would frustrate the arbitration process to force parties to litigate claims outside of the agreed upon parameters for dispute resolution. From Dane County.

2013AP2207 Milwaukee City Housing Authority v. Cobb
The issue in this case is whether federal public housing law preempts Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b), which permits landlords to terminate tenancies upon lease breaches if the landlord gives the tenant notice allowing the tenant five days to remedy the default or vacate the premises.

Some background: Felton Cobb lived in an apartment he rented from the Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee. The Housing Authority is a public body, organized and chartered pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.1201, for the purpose of operating a low-income housing program under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq. It is funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and regulated by Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

A Public Safety Officer for the Housing Authority was patrolling the hallways of the building where Cobb lived when he detected the scent of smoked marijuana. The odor was strongest outside the door to the unit occupied by Cobb, who rents from the Housing Authority under the terms of a one-year lease. The officer knocked on the door, and Cobb opened it slightly. The officer noticed that the smell intensified when Cobb opened his door. The officer concluded that Cobb had been smoking marijuana in violation of his lease, although Cobb denied having done so.

The Housing Authority began an eviction action without first giving Cobb the five-day right-to-cure notice required by Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b).

Both Cobb and the public safety officer testified before the trial court, which determined that the officer was more credible and that Cobb had engaged in illegal drug-related activity. Citing certain federal cases, the trial court ruled that, where criminal activity is found by the trial court, there doesn't have to be a cure offered the tenant prior to eviction. The trial court entered judgment evicting Cobb from his apartment.

Cobb appealed, successfully. The specific question for the Court of Appeals was whether the Housing Authority's failure to provide the five-day right-to-cure notice required by Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b) deprived the trial court of competency to adjudicate the eviction action even though the federal public housing law (42 U.S.C. § 1437) does not require a five-day right-to-cure notice. The Court of Appeals answered "yes."

In its filings with the Supreme Court, the Housing Authority argues that § 704.17(2)(b)'s right-to-cure provision runs directly contrary to federal public housing law's objective of preventing crime in federally-assisted housing by permitting the prompt eviction of drug-using tenants. From Milwaukee County.

Review denied: The Supreme Court denied review in the following cases. As the state's law-developing court, the Supreme Court exercises its discretion to select for review only those cases that fit certain statutory criteria (see Wis. Stat. § 809.62). Except where indicated, these cases came to the Court via petition for review by the party who lost in the lower court:

2013AP2596 Behrndt v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co.

2013AP1929-CR State v. Vega
2013AP2109-CR State v. Jackson
2012AP1456 State v. Alexander
2013AP269 Green Bay Prof. Police Assoc. v. City of Green Bay
2013AP1014 Riverwalk Holdings v. Denis
2013AP1706-09-CR State v. Duarte
2013AP2112 Clean Water Action Council v. Northeast WI v. DNR
2014AP440 State v. Casteel - Justice N. Patrick Crooks did not participate.
2014AP1436-W Jackson v. COA, Dist. III

2014AP1024-W Sturdevant v. Hepp
2013AP2121 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Montesano

2012AP2598 Buckner v. Heidke
2013AP2147-CR State v. Moller
2012AP1297-CRNM State v. Solis-Fuentes
2012AP1490-91 State v. Ziegler
2012AP2332 Westerhof v. LIRC - Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2012A2587-88-CR State v. Moller
2013AP164-CR State v. Singleton
2013AP336-CR State v. Bass
2013AP418 Bank of America v. Grothman - Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler did not participate.
2013AP951 Mailen v. State
2013AP1124 Ripp v. McMillan Mortgage Group

2011AP1445-CR State v. Campbell
2012AP1010-CR State v. Montoya
2013AP1377-CR State v. Andrle

2013AP1458 West Capitol v. Village of Sister Bay

2014AP685-W Rachuy v. Douglas Co.

Eau Claire
2013AP2448 State v. Bush
2014AP172 Eau Claire County v. Grogan
2013AP2065-CR State v. Carlson

Fond du Lac
2012AP2754-CR State v. Glass
2013AP747-CR State v. Froust
2013AP2403-CRNM State v. Ebert

2013AP1492 Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville
2012AP2569-CR State v. Neevel

2012AP628 Town & Country Bank v. Buss|
2013AP1212-CR State v. Freeman
2014AP1403-W Hammer v. DOC

2013AP92-CR State v. Bennett

2013AP181 State v. Lewis
2013AP2186-CR State v. Gilmore
2012AP1942 Ries v. Village of Bristol
2013AP563 State v. Ramirez
2013AP1178-79-CR State v. Garrett
2013AP1560-61-CR State v. Burns
2013AP1910-CR State v. Oberst - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr. did not participate.
2013AP1940 State v. Terry
2013AP2291-CR State v. Turgeon

La Crosse
2013AP787-CR State v. Wall

2013AP1529 State v. Maus
2013AP1232 State v. Maus

2013AP2877-W Holmes v. Pugh

2013AP1252 Brickson v. O'Connell

2012AP2203-W State v. Ezell
2012AP2571-CR State v. Tate
2013AP706-CR State v. Greenwood
2013AP814-CR State v. Williams
2013AP1030-CR State v. Perry
2013AP1121 State v. West
2013AP1332-CR State v. Brown
2013AP1369 Crisanto v. Heritage Reloc. Serv. - Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent.
2013AP1425-CR State v. Hamilton
2013AP1447 State v. Franklin
2013AP1481 Becker v. Becker
2013AP1573-CR State v. Dengsavang - Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2013AP2052 Aesthetic and Cosmetic Plastic Surg. Center v. DOT
2013AP2854 State v. Connie P.
2014AP334 State v. Rickey V.
2014AP657 Hupy & Abraham, S.C. v. Barrock
2014AP841-W Simpson v. Boughton
2012AP1371-CR State v. Ordonia-Roman
2012AP1792-CR State v. Rivera
2012AP1928 Milw. Police Assoc. v. City of Milwaukee
2012AP2049-CR State v. Small
2012AP2488 State v. Bowens
2013AP99 State v. Ferguson
2013AP309-CR State v. James
2013AP351-CR State v. Scales
2013AP391 State v. Ward
2013AP1054-CR State v. Gates
2013AP1146-CR State v. Simpson - Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2013AP1292-W Mancha v. Pugh
2013AP1315-CR State v. Leiser
2013AP1382 Mareza L. v. Kim M.P.
2013AP1608-CR State v. Eichorn - Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2013AP1613 Milwaukee County v. LIRC
2013AP1650 Ardell v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors
2013AP1703 State v. Joseph
2013AP1722-23-CR State v. Foley
2013AP1782-CR State v. Jones
2013AP1810-CR State v. Williams
2013AP1878-CR State v. Gordon
2013AP1904-CR State v. Ward - Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did not participate.
2013AP2031 State v. Wingo
2013AP2500-CR State v. Williams
2013AP2563-CR State v. Duncan
2014AP37-W Lambert v. Westfield
2014AP110-13-NM State v. Perriona W.
2014AP595 State v. Dwayne F., Jr.
2014AP656-W Boyle v. Kemper (PRE)
2014AP1605-W Rogers v. McCulloch

2013AP1263 County of Oconto v. Hammersley

2013AP2537-FT Eesley v. The Howard Young Med. Center

2014AP410-W Buchanan v. Cir. Ct. Outagamie Co. - Justices David T. Prosser; Jr., Patience Drake Roggensack; and, Annette Kingsland Ziegler dissent.
2012AP2623 State v. Robles-Figueroa
2013AP150 Home Loan Svc. v. Jerusalem
2013AP1545 Swiderski Equipment v. Swiderski
2014AP692-W Bonnin v. Pugh
2014AP789-W Edmonson v. Foster
2014AP1528-W Dutton v. COA, Dist. III

2013AP1911-CR State v. Seiler

2013AP1134 Christiansen v. Bradford

2013AP2395 Larsen v. Wis. Co. Mutual Ins. Co.

2013AP2306-CR State v. Lewis
2013AP2546-CRNM State v. Duffie
2013AP1508-CR State v. Forester-Hoare
2013AP2000-CR State v. Navarrete
2014AP1025-W Sanders v. Cir. Ct. Racine Co.
2014AP1167-OA Sanders v. Cir. Ct. Racine Co.

2012AP2099-W Humphrey v. Pollard
2013AP541 Klisch v. Molaoli
2012AP1685-CR State v. Garcia
2012AP2147 State v. Taylor - Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent.
2013AP685-CR State v. Gearhart
2013AP2367-CR State v. Reggs

2013AP14 Fromm v. Village of Lake Delton
2013AP852-CR State v. Padley

2013AP2484-CR State v. Miller

2014AP208 Minniecheske v. Village of Tigerton

2013AP2783-CR State v. Rose - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., did not participate.

St. Croix
2013AP2422 Midland Funding v. Mizinski - Justices Patience Drake Roggensack and Annette Kingsland Ziegler dissent.
2013AP624 Vonfrick v. Vonfrick

2013AP1282-CR State v. Jackson 2013AP634-CR State v. Minett
2013AP1394-95-CR State v. Agnew
2013AP2184 Shi v. Behling

2013AP2134 State v. Hewitt
2013AP1171 Co. of Washington v. Bingen - Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissent.
2013AP1467-CR State v. Konicki

2013AP1772 Cordie v. Am. Family v. Mut. Ins. Co.
2012AP2016-CR State v. Lasanske
2013AP1326 Bell v. Bell
2013AP1397 State v. Sprewell
2013AP1989-CR State v. Krancki - Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., did not participate.
2014AP239-CRNM State v. Brown

2013AP205-CR State v. King
2013AP2017 Waupaca Coalition for Public Response v. DNR Waushara
2013AP518 Beck v. Mueller

2014AP947-49-W Rymer v. Cir. Ct. Winnebago Co.
2013AP1570 State v. Lamb
2014AP922-W Austin v. Smith
2014AP1483-W Edmonson v. Cir. Ct. Winnebago Co.

2011AP1997-CR State v. Buchanan
2013AP949 SunTrust Mortgage v. Schmidt

Tom Sheehan
Court Information Officer
(608) 261-6640



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