SCR CHAPTER 20
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
ATTORNEYS
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities
1.0
Terminology
CLIENT-LAWYER
RELATIONSHIP
1.1 Competence
1.2 Scope of representation and allocation of authority
between lawyer and client
1.3 Diligence
1.4 Communication
1.5 Fees
1.6 Confidentiality
1.7 Conflicts
of interest current clients
1.8 Conflict
of interest: prohibited transactions
1.10 Imputed disqualification: general rule
1.11 Special conflicts of interest for
former and current government officers and
1.12 Former judge, arbitrator, mediator or other
3rd-party neutral
1.14 Client with diminished capacity
1.15 Safekeeping property; trust accounts and
fiduciary accounts
(a) Definitions
(cm) Interest on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements
(d) Prompt notice and
delivery of property
(e) Operational
requirements for trust accounts
(f) Record-keeping
requirements for trust accounts
(g) Withdrawal of
non-contingent fees from trust account
(h) Dishonored instrument
notification; (Overdraft notices)
(i) Certification
of compliance with trust account rules
(k) Exceptions to this
section
1.16 Declining or terminating representation
1.17 Sale of law practice
1.18 Duties to prospective client
PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.
[2] As a representative of clients, a
lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with
an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts
the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by
examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to
others.
[3] In addition to these
representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a 3rd-party neutral, a
nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other
matter. Some of these rules apply directly to lawyers who are or have served as
3rd-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rule 1.12 and Rule 2.4. In addition, there are
rules that apply to lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to
practicing lawyers even when they are acting in a nonprofessional capacity. For
example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to
discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation. See Rule 8.4.
[4] In all professional functions a
lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain
communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep
in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far
as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
[5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to
the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the
lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's
procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others.
A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who
serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a
lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action,
it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
[6] As a public citizen, a lawyer should
seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a
member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work
to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should further the
public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice
system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on
popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should
be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact
that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate
legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of
justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford
or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in
pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public
interest.
[7] Many of a lawyer's professional
responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well
as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to
attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession
and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.
[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a
lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time
assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving
client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are
more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations,
when they know their communications will be private.
[9] In the nature of law practice,
however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult
ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional
Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the
framework of these rules, however, many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the rules. These principles include the lawyer's obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the
bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil
attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.
[10] The legal profession is largely
self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of
self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the
close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and
law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate
authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the
obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government
regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse
of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are
not dependent on government for the right to practice.
[12] The legal profession's relative
autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The
profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in
the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by
other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence
of the profession and the public interest which it serves.
[13] Lawyers play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding
by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional
Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.
[14] The Rules of Professional Conduct
are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes
of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are
imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not."
These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others,
generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas
under the rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional
judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to
act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other rules define the nature
of relationships between the lawyer and others. The rules are thus partly
obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they
define a lawyer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term
"should." Comments do not add obligations to the rules but provide
guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules.
[15] The rules presuppose a larger legal
context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and
statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations
of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are
sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.
[16] Compliance with the rules, as with
all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and
finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The
rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by
legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of
law.
[17] Furthermore, for purposes of
determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of
substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer
relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render
legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties,
such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that attach when the lawyer agrees
to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule
1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can
depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.
[18] Under various legal provisions,
including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of
government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that
ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For
example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the
government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse
judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the
attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their
federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law
officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be
authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal
controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent
multiple private clients. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. Similarly, there are federally recognized
Indian tribes with tribal governments in the State of Wisconsin and these
tribes have rights of self-government and self-determination. It is not the intent of these rules to
abrogate any such authority of tribal governments.
[19] Failure to comply with an
obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the
disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a
lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as
they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the
fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of
the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline
should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on
all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the
violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.
[20] Violation of a rule should not
itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any
presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition,
violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a
basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be
subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The
fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has
standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Nevertheless, since the rules do
establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a rule may
be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.
[21] The comment accompanying each rule
explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The Preamble and
this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as
guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
In addition to the ABA Comments, SCR Chapter 20 includes Wisconsin Committee Comments, which were proposed by the Wisconsin Ethics 2000 Committee, and Wisconsin Comments added by the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the court deemed additional guidance appropriate. These comments are not adopted, but will be published and may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys.
(ag) "Advanced fee"
denotes an amount paid to a lawyer in contemplation of future services, which
will be earned at an agreed-upon basis, whether hourly, flat, or another
basis. Any amount paid to a lawyer in
contemplation of future services whether on an hourly, flat or other basis, is
an advanced fee regardless of whether that fee is characterized as an
"advanced fee," "minimum fee," "nonrefundable
fee," or any other characterization.
Advanced fees are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, SCR
20:1.15(b)(4) or (4m), SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)h., SCR 20:1.15(g), and SCR 20:1.16(d).
(ar) "Belief" or
"believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed the
fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from
circumstances.
(b) "Consult" or
"consultation" denotes communication of information reasonably
sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question.
(c) "Confirmed in
writing," when used in reference to the informed consent of a person,
denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing
that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed
consent. See par. (f) for the definition of "informed consent." If it
is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives
informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a
reasonable time thereafter.
(d) "Firm" or "law
firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional
corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice
law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal
department of a corporation or other organization, including a government
entity.
(dm) "Flat fee" denotes
a fixed amount paid to a lawyer for specific, agreed-upon services, or for a
fixed, agreed-upon stage in a representation, regardless of the time required
of the lawyer to perform the service or reach the agreed-upon stage in the
representation. A flat fee, sometimes
referred to as "unit billing," is not an advance against the lawyer's
hourly rate and may not be billed against at an hourly rate. Flat fees become the property of the lawyer
upon receipt and are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, SCR
20:1.15(b)(4) or (4m), SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)h., SCR 20:1.15(g), and SCR 20:1.16(d).
(e) "Fraud" or
"fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive
or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.
(f) "Informed consent"
denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct.
(g) "Knowingly,"
"known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
(h) "Misrepresentation"
denotes communication of an untruth, either knowingly or with reckless
disregard, whether by statement or omission, which if accepted would lead
another to believe a condition exists that does not actually exist.
(i) "Partner" denotes a
member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a
professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice
law.
(j) A "prosecutor"
includes a government attorney or special prosecutor (i) in a criminal case,
delinquency action, or proceeding that could result in a deprivation of liberty
or (ii) acting in connection with the protection of a child or a termination of
parental rights proceeding or (iii) acting as a municipal prosecutor.
(k) "Reasonable" or
"reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
(l) "Reasonable belief"
or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes
that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are
such that the belief is reasonable.
(m) "Reasonably should
know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of
reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
(mm) "Retainer" denotes
an amount paid specifically and solely to secure the availability of a lawyer
to perform services on behalf of a client, whether designated a
"retainer," "general retainer," "engagement retainer,"
"reservation fee," "availability fee," or any other
characterization. This amount does not
constitute payment for any specific legal services, whether past, present, or
future and may not be billed against for fees or costs at any point. A retainer becomes the property of the lawyer
upon receipt, but is subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5 and SCR
20:1.16(d).
(n) "Screened" denotes
the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely
imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the
circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to
protect under these rules or other law.
(o) "Substantial" when
used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and
weighty importance.
(p) "Tribunal" denotes
a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative
body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A
legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative
capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal
argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly
affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.
(q) "Writing" or
"written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication
or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, Photostating,
photography, audio or video recording and e-mail. A "signed" writing
includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically
associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent
to sign the writing.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee has added definitions of "consult," "misrepresentation," and "prosecutor" that are not part of the Model Rule. In the definition of "firm," the phrase "including a government entity" is added to make the coverage more explicit. Because the provisions of the rule are renumbered to preserve the alphabetical arrangement, caution should be used when referring to the ABA Comment.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
The definition of flat fee specifies that flat fees "become the property of the lawyer upon receipt." Notwithstanding, the lawyer must either deposit the advanced flat fee in trust until earned, or comply with the alternative in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), alternative protection for advanced fees. In addition, as specified in the definition, flat fees are subject to the requirements of all rules to which advanced fees are subject.
ABA COMMENT
Confirmed in Writing
[1] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.
Firm
[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (c) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.
[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates.
[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.
Fraud
[5] When used in these Rules, the terms "fraud" or "fraudulent" refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.
Informed Consent
[6] Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent.
[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of "writing" and "confirmed in writing," see paragraphs (n) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For a definition of "signed," see paragraph (n).
Screened
[8] This definition applies
to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted
to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11, 1.12 or 1.18.
[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel.
[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.
CLIENT-LAWYER
RELATIONSHIP
A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Wisconsin Committee Comment
When
a lawyer is providing limited scope representation, competence means the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
limited scope representation.
ABA COMMENT
Legal Knowledge and Skill
[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.
[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.
[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest.
[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.
Thoroughness and Preparation
[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).
Maintaining Competence
[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.
SCR 20:1.2 Scope of
representation and allocation of authority between lawyer and client
(a) Subject to pars. (c) and (d),
a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and, as required by SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a
matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in deprivation
of liberty, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of
a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the scope
of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances
and the client gives informed consent. The client’s informed consent must be in
writing except as set forth in sub. (1).
(1)
The client’s informed consent need not be given in writing if:
a. the representation of the client consists
solely of telephone consultation;
b. the representation is provided by a lawyer
employed by or participating in a program sponsored by a nonprofit
organization, a bar association, an accredited law school, or a court and the
lawyer’s representation consists solely of providing information and advice or
the preparation of court-approved legal forms;
c.
the court appoints the lawyer for a limited purpose that is set forth in the
appointment order;
d.
the representation is provided by the state public defender pursuant to Ch.
977, stats., including representation provided by a private attorney pursuant
to an appointment by the state public defender; or
e.
the representation is provided to an existing client pursuant to an existing
lawyer-client relationship.
(2) If the client gives informed
consent in writing signed by the client, there shall be a presumption that:
a.
the representation is limited to the lawyer and the services described in the
writing, and
b.
the lawyer does not represent the client generally or in matters other than
those identified in the writing.
Wisconsin Committee Comment
With
respect to subparagraph (c), a lawyer providing limited scope representation in
an action before a court should consult s. 802.045, stats., regarding notice
and withdrawal requirements.
The
requirements of subparagraph (c) that
require the client’s informed consent, in writing, to the limited scope
representation do not supplant or replace the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(b).
(cm) A lawyer may
prepare pleadings, briefs, and other documents to be filed with the court so
long as such filings clearly indicate thereon that “This document was prepared
with the assistance of a lawyer.” A lawyer shall advise the client to whom the
lawyer provides assistance in preparing pleadings, briefs, or other documents
for filing with the court that the pleading, brief, or other document must
contain a statement that it was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer.
Wisconsin Committee Comment
A lawyer may
prepare pleadings, briefs, and other documents to be filed with the court so
long as such filings clearly indicate thereon that said filings are “prepared
with the assistance of a lawyer.” Such actions by the lawyer shall not be
deemed an appearance by the lawyer in the case.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.
(e) When a lawyer has been
retained by an insurer to represent an insured pursuant to the terms of an
agreement or policy requiring the insurer to retain counsel on the client's
behalf, the representation may be limited to matters related to the defense of
claims made against the insured. In such cases, the lawyer shall, within a
reasonable time after being retained, inform the client in writing of the terms
and scope of the representation the lawyer has been retained by the insurer to
provide.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
The Model Rule does not include paragraph (e). Paragraph (e) was added to clarify the obligations of counsel for an insurer, in conjunction with the decision to retain Wisconsin's "insurance defense" exception in SCR 20:1.8(f).
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
The Committee has retained in
paragraph (a) the application of the duties stated to "any proceeding that
could result in deprivation of liberty."
The Model Rule does not include this language.
ABA COMMENT
Allocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer
[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.
[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3).
[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time.
[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.
Independence from Client's Views or Activities
[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities.
Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation
[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.
[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.
[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6.
Criminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions
[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.
[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1.
[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.
[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.
[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).
A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.
ABA COMMENT
[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.
[2] A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.
[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.
[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. See Rule 1.4(a)(2). Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.
[5] To prevent neglect of client matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that each sole practitioner prepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action. Cf. Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R. 28 (2002) (providing for court appointment of a lawyer to inventory files and take other protective action in absence of a plan providing for another lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabled lawyer).
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly inform the client of
any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed
consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is required by these rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with
reasonable requests by the client for information; and
(5) consult with the client about
any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the
client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph
(a)(4) differs from the Model Rule in that the words "by the client"
are added for the sake of clarity.
ABA COMMENT
[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.
Communicating with Client
[2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).
[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations — depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client — this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.
[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.
Explaining Matters
[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e).
[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.
Withholding Information
[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.
(a) A lawyer shall not make an
agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount
for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent
to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the
results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed
by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation,
and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
(b)(1) The scope of the
representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the
client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client in writing, before
or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when
the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate
as in the past. If it is reasonably
foreseeable that the total cost of representation to the client, including
attorney's fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be oral or in
writing. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be
communicated in writing to the client.
(2) If the total cost of
representation to the client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000,
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee that is paid to the
lawyer shall be communicated in writing.
(3) A lawyer shall promptly
respond to a client's request for information concerning fees and
expenses.
(c) A fee may be contingent on
the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter
in which a contingent fee is prohibited by par. (d) or other law. A contingent
fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client, and shall state the method
by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages
that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated. The agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for
which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing
party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the
client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and if there
is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its
determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into
an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee:
(1) in any action affecting the
family, including but not limited to divorce, legal separation, annulment,
determination of paternity, setting of support and maintenance, setting of
custody and physical placement, property division, partition of marital
property, termination of parental rights and adoption, provided that nothing
herein shall prohibit a contingent fee for the collection of past due amounts
of support or maintenance or property division.
(2) for representing a defendant
in a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in deprivation of
liberty.
(e) A division of a fee between
lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is
reasonable and:
(1) the division is based on the
services performed by each lawyer, and the client is advised of and does not
object to the participation of all the lawyers involved and is informed if the
fee will increase as a result of their involvement; or
(2) the lawyers formerly
practiced together and the payment to one lawyer is pursuant to a separation or
retirement agreement between them; or
(3) pursuant to the referral of a
matter between the lawyers, each lawyer assumes the same ethical responsibility
for the representation as if the lawyers were partners in the same firm, the
client is informed of the terms of the referral arrangement, including the
share each lawyer will receive and whether the overall fee will increase, and
the client consents in a writing signed by the client.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (b) differs from the Model Rule in requiring that fee and expense information usually must be communicated to the client in writing, unless the total cost of representation will be $1000 or less. In instances when a lawyer has regularly represented a client, any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses may be communicated in writing to the client by a proper reference on the periodic billing statement provided to the client within a reasonable time after the basis or rate of the fee or expenses has been changed. The communication to the client through the billing statement should clearly indicate that a change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses has occurred along with an indication of the new basis or rate of the fee or expenses. A lawyer should advise the client at the time of commencement of representation of the likelihood of a periodic change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses that will be charged to the client.
In addition, paragraph (b) differs from the Model Rule in requiring that the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in writing and that a lawyer shall promptly respond to a client's request for information concerning fees and expenses. The lawyer should inform the client of the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee. Specifically, the lawyer should identify whether any portion, and if so what portion, of the fee is a retainer. A retainer is a fee that a lawyer charges the client not for specific services to be performed but to ensure the lawyer's availability whenever the client may need legal services. These fees become the property of the lawyer when received and may not be deposited into the lawyer's trust account. In addition, they are subject to SCR 20:1.15 and SCR 20:1.16. Retainers are to be distinguished from an "advanced fee" which is paid for future services and earned only as services are performed. Advanced fees are subject to SCR 20:1.5, SCR 20:1.15, and SCR 20:1.16. See also State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. E-93-4 (1993).
Paragraph (d) preserves the more explicit statement of limitations on contingent fees that has been part of Wisconsin law since the original adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct in the state.
Paragraph (e) differs from the Model Rule in several respects. The division of a fee "based on" rather than "in proportion to" the services performed clarifies that fee divisions need not consist of a percentage calculation. The rule also recognizes that lawyers who formerly practiced together may divide a fee pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement between them. In addition, the standards governing referral arrangements are made more explicit.
Dispute Over Fees
Arbitration provides an expeditious, inexpensive method for lawyers and clients to resolve disputes regarding fees. It also avoids litigation that might further exacerbate the relationship. If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. See also ABA Comment [9].
Fee Estimates
Compliance with the following guidelines is a desirable practice: (a) the lawyer providing to the client, no later than a reasonable time after commencing the representation, a written estimate of the fees that the lawyer will charge the client as a result of the representation; (b) if, at any time and from time to time during the course of the representation, the fee estimate originally provided becomes substantially inaccurate, the lawyer timely providing a revised written estimate or revised written estimates to the client; (c) the client accepting the representation following provision of the estimate or estimates; and (d) the lawyer charging fees reasonably consistent with the estimate or estimates given.
ABA COMMENT
Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses
[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer.
Basis or Rate of Fee
[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.
[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees in certain tax matters.
Terms of Payment
[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.
[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.
Prohibited Contingent Fees
[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.
Division of Fee
[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.
[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.
Disputes over Fees
[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar, the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation, and except as stated in pars. (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another.
(c) A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably likely
death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another
that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services;
(3) to secure legal advice about
the lawyer's conduct under these rules;
(4) to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client; or
(5) to comply with other law or a
court order.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
The rule retains in paragraph (b) the mandatory disclosure requirements that have been a part of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules since their initial adoption. Paragraph (c) differs from its counterpart, Model Rule 1.6(b), as necessary to take account of the mandatory disclosure requirements in Wisconsin. The language in paragraph (c)(1) was changed from "reasonably certain" to "reasonably likely" to comport with sub. (b). Due to substantive and numbering differences, special care should be taken in consulting the ABA Comment.
ABA COMMENT
[1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating to the representation of a client during the lawyer's representation of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer's duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer's prior representation of a former client and Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients.
[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope.
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved.
Authorized Disclosure
[5] Except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.
Disclosure Adverse to Client
[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims.
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) is a limited exception to the rule of confidentiality that permits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud, as defined in Rule 1.0(d), that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services. Such a serious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits the protection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to reveal the client's misconduct, the lawyer may not counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2(d). See also Rule 1.16 with respect to the lawyer's obligation or right to withdraw from the representation of the client in such circumstances, and Rule 1.13(c), which permits the lawyer, where the client is an organization, to reveal information relating to the representation in limited circumstances.
[8] Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the situation in which the lawyer does not learn of the client's crime or fraud until after it has been consummated. Although the client no longer has the option of preventing disclosure by refraining from the wrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by the affected person can be prevented, rectified or mitigated. In such situations, the lawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extent necessary to enable the affected persons to prevent or mitigate reasonably certain losses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Paragraph (b)(3) does not apply when a person who has committed a crime or fraud thereafter employs a lawyer for representation concerning that offense.
[9] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these Rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(5) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend also applies, of course, where a proceeding has been commenced.
[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the Rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.
[12] Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representation appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must discuss the matter with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4. If, however, the other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order.
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
[15] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client's representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising the discretion conferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer's decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other Rules. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b), 8.1, and 8.3. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality
[16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1, and 5.3.
[17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.
Former Client
[18] The duty of confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(2). See Rule 1.9(c)(1) for the prohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the former client.
SCR 20:1.7
Conflicts of interest current clients
(a) Except as provided in par.
(b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one
client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence
of a concurrent conflict of interest under par. (a), a lawyer may represent a
client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably
believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not
prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not
involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a
tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives
informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in requiring informed consent to be confirmed in a writing "signed by the client."
ABA
COMMENT
General Principles
[1]
Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's
relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person
or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain
concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of
interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective
clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and
"confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b).
[2] Resolution of a conflict of
interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: (1) clearly identify
the client or clients; (2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; (3)
decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a
conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and (4) if so, consult
with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed
consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include
both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients
whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3] A conflict of interest may
exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation
must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client
under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of
interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for
the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and
non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to
Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not
excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer
relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see
Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4] If a conflict arises after
representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from
the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the
client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than
one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the
clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed
to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the
remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client.
See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].
[5] Unforeseeable developments,
such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the
addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the
midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of
one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an
unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the
option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict.
The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize
harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the
confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn.
See Rule 1.9(c).
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse
[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.
[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other
Third Persons
[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.
Personal Interest Conflicts
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.
Prohibited Representations
[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.
[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.
[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).
Informed Consent
[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.
Consent Confirmed in Writing
[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.
Revoking Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.
Consent to Future Conflict
[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).
Conflicts in Litigation
[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.
Nonlitigation Conflicts
[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.
[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.
Special Considerations in Common Representation
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.
[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing Rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
Organizational Clients
[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.
SCR 20:1.8
Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into
a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on
which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in
writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to
seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer
is representing the client in the transaction.
(b) A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or
required by these rules.
(c) A lawyer shall not solicit
any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, nor prepare
an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any
substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where (1)
the client is related to the donee, (2) the donee is a natural object of the
bounty of the client, (3) there is no reasonable ground to anticipate a
contest, or a claim of undue influence or for the public to lose confidence in
the integrity of the bar, and (4) the amount of the gift or bequest is
reasonable and natural under the circumstances.
For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the
lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement
giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in
substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide
financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court
costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on
the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an
indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the
client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept
compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed
consent or the attorney is appointed at government expense; provided that no
further consent or consultation need be given if the client has given consent
pursuant to the terms of an agreement or policy requiring an organization or
insurer to retain counsel on the client's behalf;
(2) there is no interference with
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation
of a client is protected as required by SCR 20:1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two
or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement
as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall
include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not:
(1) make an agreement
prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice
unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or
(2) settle a claim or potential
claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless
that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in
connection therewith; or
(3) make an agreement limiting
the client's right to report the lawyer's conduct to disciplinary authorities.
(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a
proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the
lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien authorized by
law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract
with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
(j) A
lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current client unless a
consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer
relationship commenced.
(1) In this paragraph,
"sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or any other intentional
touching of the intimate parts of a person or causing the person to touch the
intimate parts of the lawyer.
(2) When the client is an
organization, a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside
counsel) shall not have sexual relations with a constituent of the organization
who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the
organization's legal matters.
(k) While lawyers are associated
in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing pars. (a) through (i) that applies to
any one of them shall apply to all of them.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
This rule differs from the Model Rule in four respects. Paragraph (c) incorporates the decisions in State v. Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968), and State v. Beaudry, 53 Wis. 2d 148, 191 N.W.2d 842 (1971). Paragraph (f) adds a reference to an attorney retained at government expense and retains the "insurance defense" exception from prior Wisconsin law. But see SCR 20:1.2(e). Paragraph (h) prohibits a lawyer from making an agreement limiting the client's right to report the lawyer's conduct to disciplinary authorities. Paragraph (j)(2) includes language from ABA Comment [19].
ABA COMMENT
Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer
[1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.
[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).
[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.
[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.
Use of Information Related to Representation
[5] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1, and 8.3.
Gifts to Lawyers
[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).
[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.
[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.
Literary Rights
[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraphs (a) and (i).
Financial Assistance
[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is warranted.
Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services
[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).
[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.
Aggregate Settlements
[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The Rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.
Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims
[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.
[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.
Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation
[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.
Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships
[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.
[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).
[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.
Imputation of Prohibitions
[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.
SCR 20:1.9 Duties
to former clients
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented
a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same
or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in a writing signed by the client.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a
firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a
client:
(1) whose interests are
materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by sub. (c) and SCR 20:1.6 that is material to
the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in a
writing signed by the client.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to
the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these
rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information
has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating
to the representation except as these rules would permit or require with respect
to a client.
WISCONSIN COMMENT
The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule differs from the Model Rule in requiring informed consent to be confirmed in a writing "signed by the client."
ABA COMMENT
[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.
[2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.
[3] Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.
Lawyers Moving
Between Firms
[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the Rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the Rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel.
[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm.
[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought.
[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).
[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client.
[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Comment [22] to Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.
SCR 20:1.10 Imputed disqualification: general rule
(a) While lawyers are associated
in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by SCR 20:1.7 or SCR 20:1.9
unless:
(1) the prohibition is based on a
personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant
risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining
lawyers in the firm; or
(2) the prohibition arises under
SCR 20:1.9, and
(i) the personally
disqualified lawyer performed no more than minor and isolated services in the
disqualifying representation and did so only at a firm with which the lawyer is
no longer associated;
(ii) the personally
disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and
is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(iii) written notice is
promptly given to any affected former client to enable the affected client to
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(b) When a lawyer has terminated
an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter
representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client
represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by
the firm, unless:
(1) the matter is the same or
substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer
represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the
firm has information protected by SCR 20:1.6 and SCR 20:1.9(c) that is material
to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed
by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated
in SCR 20:1.7.
(d) The disqualification of
lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers is
governed by SCR 20:1.11.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (a) differs from the Model Rule in not imputing conflicts of interest in limited circumstances where the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from the matter.
ABA COMMENT
Definition of "Firm"
[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term "firm" denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(c). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2]—[4].
Principles of Imputed Disqualification
[2] The Rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b).
[3] The Rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. On the other hand, if an opposing party in a case was owned by a lawyer in the law firm, and others in the firm would be materially limited in pursuing the matter because of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyer would be imputed to all others in the firm.
[4] The Rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) and 5.3.
[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c).
[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comment [22]. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(e).
[7] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer.
[8] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer.
SCR
20:1.11 Special conflicts of interest
for former and current government officers and employees
(a) Except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or
employee of the government:
(1) is subject to SCR 20:1.9(c);
and
(2) shall not otherwise represent
a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing,
to the representation.
(b) When a lawyer is disqualified
from representation under par. (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer
is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a
matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is
timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly
given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance
with the provisions of this rule.
(c) Except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is
confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was
a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests
are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used
to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this rule, the term
"confidential government information" means information that has been
obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is
applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or
has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to
the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely
screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the
fee therefrom.
(d) Except as law may otherwise
expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee:
(1) is subject to SCR 20:1.7 and
SCR 20:1.9; and
(2) shall not:
(i) participate in a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in
private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate
government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or
(ii) negotiate for
private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney
for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other
adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as
permitted by SCR 20:1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in SCR
20:1.12(b).
(e) As used in this rule, the
term "matter" includes:
(1) any judicial or other
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract,
claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other
particular matter involving a specific party or parties, and
(2) any other matter covered by
the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.
(f) The conflicts of a lawyer
currently serving as an officer or employee of the government are not imputed
to the other lawyers in the agency. However, where such a lawyer has a conflict
that would lead to imputation in a nongovernment setting, the lawyer shall be
timely screened from any participation in the matter to which the conflict
applies.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (f) has no counterpart in the Model Rules, although it is based on statements made in paragraph [2] of the ABA Comment.
ABA COMMENT
[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent.
[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.
[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a later private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so by paragraph (d). As with paragraphs (a)(1) and (d)(1), Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest addressed by these paragraphs.
[4] This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. Thus a former government lawyer is disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) to matters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.
[5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13 Comment [9].
[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). These paragraphs do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.
[7] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.
[8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.
[9] Paragraphs (a) and (d) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government agency when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.
[10] For purposes of paragraph (e) of this Rule, a "matter" may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.
SCR
20:1.12 Former judge, arbitrator,
mediator or other 3rd-party neutral
(a) Except as stated in par. (d),
a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other
adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator,
mediator or other 3rd-party neutral.
(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate
for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a
party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator,
mediator or other 3rd-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge
or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or
lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and
substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge or other
adjudicative officer.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified
by par. (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may
knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is
timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly
given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain
compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a
partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from
subsequently representing that party in the matter, provided that all parties
to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (a) differs from the Model Rule in that the conflict identified is not subject to waiver by consent of the parties involved. As such, paragraph [2] of the ABA Comment should be read with caution. Paragraph (d) differs in that written consent of the parties is required.
ABA COMMENT
[1] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term "personally and substantially" signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term "adjudicative officer" includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2), and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not "act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto." Although phrased differently from this Rule, those Rules correspond in meaning.
[2] Like former judges, lawyers who have served as arbitrators, mediators or other third-party neutrals may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consent, confirmed in writing. See Rule 1.0(e) and (b). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.
[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not have information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Thus, paragraph (c) provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.
[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k). Paragraph (c)(1) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.
[5] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer's prior representation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.
SCR 20:1.13
Organization as client
(a) A lawyer employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an
organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with
the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization.
Unless
the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of
the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to
the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined
by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in par.
(d), if,
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts
in accordance with par. (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate
manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably
believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the organization,
then
the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not
SCR 20:1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply
with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an
organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the
organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the
organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably
believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions
taken pursuant to pars. (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that
require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs,
shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the
organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or
withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an
organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an
organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of SCR
20:1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by
SCR 20:1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
(h) Notwithstanding other
provisions of this rule, a lawyer shall comply with the disclosure requirements
of SCR 20:1.6(b).
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (h) differs from the Model Rule and calls attention to the mandatory disclosure provisions contained in Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1.6(b).
ABA COMMENT
The Entity as the Client
[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious.
[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.
[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.
Relation to Other Rules
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1)—(6). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyer's representation of the organization. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) may permit the lawyer to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required.
[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.
[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.
Government Agency
[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [18]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope.
Clarifying the
Lawyer's Role
[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.
[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case.
Dual Representation
[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder.
Derivative Actions
[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.
[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.
SCR 20:1.14 Client
with diminished capacity
(a) When a client's capacity to
make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is
diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other
reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial
physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately
act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have
the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases,
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the
representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by SCR 20:1.6.
When taking protective action pursuant to par. (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized
under SCR 20:1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the
extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.
ABA COMMENT
[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions.
[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person has a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication.
[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf.
[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).
Taking Protective Action
[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections.
[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.
[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.
Disclosure of the Client's Condition
[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one.
Emergency Legal Assistance
[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client.
[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.
SCR 20:1.15 Safekeeping property; trust accounts
and fiduciary accounts.
In this section:
(1m) "Draft
account" means an account upon which funds are disbursed through a
properly payable instrument.
(2) "Fiduciary"
means an agent, attorney-in-fact, conservator, guardian, personal
representative, special administrator, trustee, or other position requiring the
lawyer to safeguard the property of a 3rd party.
(3) "Fiduciary
account" means an account in which the lawyer deposits fiduciary property.
(4) "Fiduciary
property" means funds or property of a client or 3rd party that is in the
lawyer's possession in a fiduciary capacity that directly arises in the course
of, or as a result of, a lawyer-client relationship or an appointment by a
court. Fiduciary property includes, but
is not limited to, property held as agent, attorney-in-fact, conservator, guardian,
personal representative, special administrator, or trustee, subject to the
exceptions identified in sub. (k).
(5) "Financial
institution" means a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit union,
savings and loan association, or investment institution, including a brokerage
house.
(6) "Immediate
family member" means the lawyer's spouse, child, stepchild, grandchild,
sibling, parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew.
(7) "Interest
on Lawyer Trust Account or "IOLTA account"" means a pooled interest-bearing
or dividend-paying draft trust account, separate from the
lawyer's business and personal accounts.
An IOLTA account must be established in an IOLTA participating
institution pursuant to SCR 20:1.15 (cm) (1) and (2), and may contain only funds
that cannot earn income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party in excess of
the costs to secure that income. Typical funds that would be placed in an IOLTA
account include earnest monies, loan proceeds, settlement proceeds, collection
proceeds, cost advances, and advance payments for fees that have not yet been
earned. An IOLTA account is subject to
the provisions of SCR Chapter 13 and the trust account provisions of subs. (a)
to (i), including the IOLTA account provisions of sub. (cm).
(7m) “IOLTA participating
institution” means a financial institution that voluntarily offers IOLTA
accounts and certifies to WisTAF annually that it meets the IOLTA account
requirements of SCR 20:1.15 (cm) (3) to (6) and that it reports overdrafts on
draft trust accounts and draft fiduciary accounts of lawyers and law firms to
the office of lawyer regulation, pursuant to the financial institution's
agreements with those lawyers and law firms.
WisTAF shall confirm the accuracy of the certifications and publish, at
least annually, a list of IOLTA participating institutions.
(8) "Properly
payable instrument" means an instrument that, if presented in the normal
course of business, is in a form requiring payment pursuant to the laws of this
state.
(9) "Trust
account" means an account in which the lawyer deposits trust property.
(10) "Trust
property" means funds or property of clients or 3rd parties that is in the
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation, which is not fiduciary
property.
(11) “WisTAF” means the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation, Inc.
(b) Segregation of
trust property.
(1) Separate account. A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd parties that is in
the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation. All funds of clients and 3rd parties paid to
a lawyer or law firm in connection with a representation shall be deposited in
one or more identifiable trust accounts.
(2) Identification of account.
Each trust account shall be clearly designated as a "Client Account,"
a "Trust Account," or words of similar import. The account shall be identified as such on
all account records, including signature cards, monthly statements, checks, and
deposit slips. An acronym, such as
"IOLTA," "IOTA," or "LTAB," without further
elaboration, does not clearly designate the account as a client account or
trust account.
(3) Lawyer funds.
No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably
sufficient to pay monthly account service charges, may be deposited or retained
in a trust account.
(4) Unearned fees and cost advances.
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees and advanced payments of
fees shall be held in trust until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant
to sub. (g). Funds advanced by a client or
3rd party for payment of costs shall be held in trust until the costs are
incurred.
(4m) Alternative protection for advanced fees. A lawyer who accepts advanced payments of
fees may deposit the funds in the lawyer's business account, provided that review
of the lawyer’s fee by a court of competent jurisdiction is available in the
proceeding to which the fee relates, or provided that the lawyer complies with
each of the following requirements:
a. Upon accepting any advanced payment of fees pursuant to this
subsection, the lawyer shall deliver to the client a notice in writing
containing all of the following information:
1. the
amount of the advanced payment;
2. the
basis or rate of the lawyer's fee;
3. any expenses for which the client will be
responsible;
4. that the lawyer has an obligation to
refund any unearned advanced fee, along with an accounting, at the termination
of the representation;
5. that the lawyer is required to submit any
unresolved dispute about the fee to binding arbitration within 30 days of
receiving written notice of such a dispute; and
6. the ability of the client to file a claim
with the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection if the lawyer fails to
provide a refund of unearned advanced fees.
b. Upon termination of the representation, the lawyer shall
deliver to the client in writing all of the following:
1. a final accounting, or an accounting from
the date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end of the
representation, regarding the client's advanced fee payment with a refund of
any unearned advanced fees;
2. notice that, if the client disputes the
amount of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to binding
arbitration, the client must provide written notice of the dispute to the lawyer
within 30 days of the mailing of the accounting; and
3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to
resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client within 30 days after
receiving notice of the dispute from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute
to binding arbitration.
c. Upon timely receipt of written notice of a dispute from the
client, the lawyer shall attempt to resolve that dispute with the client, and
if the dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the dispute to binding
arbitration with the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program or a similar local bar
association program within 30 days of the lawyer's receipt of the written
notice of dispute from the client.
d. Upon receipt of an arbitration award requiring the lawyer to
make a payment to the client, the lawyer shall pay the arbitration award within
30 days, unless the client fails to agree to be bound by the award of the
arbitrator.
(6) Trust property other than funds.
Unless the client otherwise directs in
writing, a lawyer shall keep securities in bearer form in a safe deposit box at
a financial institution authorized to do business in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be clearly
designated as a "Client Account" or "Trust Account." The lawyer shall clearly identify and
appropriately safeguard other property of a client or 3rd party.
(7) Multi-jurisdictional practice.
If a lawyer also licensed in another state is
entrusted with funds or property in connection with a representation in the
other state, the provisions of this rule shall not supersede the applicable
rules of the other state.
(1) IOLTA accounts. A lawyer or law firm who receives client
or 3rd-party funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to be nominal in
amount or that are expected to be held for a short period of time such that the
funds cannot earn income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party in excess
of the costs to secure that income, shall maintain a pooled interest-bearing or
dividend-paying draft trust
account in an IOLTA participating institution.
(2) Non-IOLTA
accounts. A lawyer or law firm who receives client or 3rd-party
funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to be capable of earning income
for the benefit of the client or 3rd party shall maintain an interest-bearing
or dividend-paying non-IOLTA trust account.
A non-IOLTA trust account shall be established as any of the following:
a. a separate interest-bearing or dividend-paying trust account maintained for the
particular client or 3rd party, the interest or dividends on which shall be
paid to the client or 3rd party, less any transaction costs;
b. a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying trust
account with sub-accounting by the financial institution, the lawyer, or the
law firm that will provide for computation of interest or dividends earned by
each client's or 3rd party’s funds and the payment of the interest or dividends
to the client or 3rd party, less any transaction costs;
c. an income-generating investment vehicle selected by
the client and designated in specific written instructions from the client or
authorized by a court or other tribunal, on which income shall be paid to the
client or 3rd party or as directed by the court or other tribunal, less any
transaction costs;
d. an income generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer
to protect and maximize the return of funds in a bankruptcy estate, which
investment vehicle is approved by the trustee in bankruptcy and by a bankruptcy
court order, consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 345; or
e. a draft
account or other account that does not bear interest or pay dividends
because it holds funds the lawyer has determined are not eligible for deposit
in an IOLTA account because they are neither nominal in amount nor expected to
be held for a short term such that the funds cannot earn income for the client
or 3rd party in excess of the costs to secure the income, provided that such
account has been designated in specific written instructions from the client or
3rd party.
(3) Selection of account. In deciding whether to use the account
specified in par. (1) or an account or investment vehicle specified in par.
(2), a lawyer shall determine, at the time of the deposit, whether the client
or 3rd party funds could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the
client or 3rd party by taking into consideration all of the following:
a. the amount of interest, dividends, or other income
that the funds would earn or pay during the period the funds are expected to be
on deposit;
b. the cost of establishing and administering a
non-IOLTA trust account, including the cost of the lawyer's services and the cost
of preparing any tax reports required for income accruing to a client's or 3rd
party’s benefit;
c. the capability of the financial institution, lawyer,
or law firm to calculate and pay interest, dividends, or other income to
individual clients or 3rd parties; and
d. any other circumstance that affects the
ability of the client’s or 3rd party’s funds to earn income in excess of the
costs to secure such income for the client or 3rd party.
(4) Professional judgment. The determination whether funds to be
invested could be utilized to provide a positive net return to the client or 3rd
party rests in the sound judgment of the lawyer or law firm. If a lawyer acts in good faith in making this
determination, the lawyer is not subject to any charge of ethical impropriety
or other breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(cm) Interest
on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) requirements.
An IOLTA account must meet the
following requirements:
(1) Location. An IOLTA account shall be held in an IOLTA
participating institution that shall comply with location requirements of sub.
(e) (1).
(2) Certification by IOLTA participating institutions.
a. Each IOLTA participating institution shall certify to WisTAF
annually that the financial institution meets the requirements of sub. (cm) (3)
to (6) for IOLTA accounts and that it reports overdrafts on draft trust
accounts and draft fiduciary accounts of lawyers and law firms to the office of
lawyer regulation, pursuant to the institution’s agreements with those lawyers
and law firms. WisTAF shall by rule
adopted under SCR 13.03 (1) establish the date by which IOLTA participating
institutions shall certify their compliance.
b. WisTAF
shall confirm annually, by a date established by WisTAF by rule adopted under
SCR 13.03 (1), the accuracy of a financial institution’s certification under
sub. (cm) (2) a. by reviewing one or more of the following:
1. the IOLTA comparability rate information
form submitted by the financial institution to WisTAF;
2. rate and product information published by
the financial institution; and
3. other publicly or commercially
available information regarding products and interest rates available at the
financial institution.
c. WisTAF shall publish annually, no later
than the date on which the state bar mails annual dues statements to members of
the bar, a list of all financial institutions that have certified, and have been
confirmed by WisTAF as IOLTA participating institutions. WisTAF shall update the published list located
on its website to add newly confirmed IOLTA participating institutions and to
remove financial institutions that WisTAF cannot confirm as IOLTA participating
institutions.
d. Prior
to removing any financial institution from the list of IOLTA participating
institutions or failing to include any financial institution on the list of
IOLTA participating institutions, WisTAF shall first provide the financial
institution with notice and sufficient time to respond. In the event a financial institution is
removed from the list of IOLTA participating institutions, WisTAF shall notify
the office of lawyer regulation and provide that office with a list of the lawyers
and law firms maintaining IOLTA accounts at that financial institution. The office of lawyer regulation shall notify
those lawyers and law firms of the removal of the financial institution from
the list, and provide time for those lawyers and law firms to move their IOLTA
accounts to an IOLTA participating institution.
e. Lawyers and law firms shall be entitled
to rely on the most recently published list of IOLTA participating institutions
for purposes of compliance with sub. (c) (1), except when the office of lawyer
regulation notifies the lawyer or law firm of removal, in accordance with sub.
(cm) (2) d.
(3) Insurance and safety requirements.
a. An
IOLTA participating institution shall comply with the insurance and safety
requirements of sub. (e) (2).
b. A
repurchase agreement utilized for an IOLTA account may be established only at
an IOLTA participating institution deemed to be “well-capitalized” or
“adequately capitalized” as defined by applicable federal statutes and
regulations.
c. An
open-end money market fund utilized for an IOLTA account may be established only at an IOLTA
participating institution in a fund that holds itself out as a money
market fund as defined under the Investment Act of 1940 and, at the time of
investment, has total assets of at least $250,000,000.
(4) Income requirements.
a. Beneficial owner. The interest or dividends accruing on an
IOLTA account, less any allowable reasonable fees, as allowed under par. (5),
shall be paid to WisTAF, which shall be considered the beneficial owner of the
earned interest or dividends, pursuant to SCR Chapter 13.
b. Interest and dividend requirements. An IOLTA account shall bear the highest non-promotional interest rate or
dividend that is generally available to non-IOLTA customers at the same branch or main office location when
the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same eligibility qualifications, if any, including a minimum balance, required at
that same branch or main office location. In determining the highest rate or dividend
available, the IOLTA participating institution may consider factors in addition
to the IOLTA account balance that are customarily considered by the institution
at that branch or main office location
when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers, provided the
institution does not discriminate between IOLTA accounts and accounts of
non-IOLTA customers and that these factors do not include that the account is
an IOLTA account. However, IOLTA participating
institutions may voluntarily choose to pay higher rates.
c. IOLTA account. An IOLTA participating institution may
establish an IOLTA account as, or convert an IOLTA account to, any of the
following types of accounts, assuming
the particular financial institution at that branch or main office location
offers these account types to its non-IOLTA customers, and the particular IOLTA
account meets the eligibility qualifications to be established as this type of
account at the particular branch or main office location:
1. a business checking account with an
automated or other automatic investment sweep feature into a daily financial
institution repurchase agreement or open-end money market fund. A daily financial institution repurchase
agreement must be invested in United States government securities. An open-end money market fund must consist
solely of United States government securities or repurchase agreements fully
collateralized by United States government securities, or both. In this subd. c. 1., "United States
government securities" include securities of government- sponsored
entities, such as, but not limited to, securities of, or backed by, the federal
national mortgage association, the government national mortgage association,
and the federal home loan mortgage corporation;
2. a checking account paying preferred
interest rates, such as money market or indexed rates;
3. an interest-bearing checking account such
as a negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account or business checking account
with interest; and
4. any other suitable interest-bearing or
dividend-paying account offered by the institution to its non-IOLTA customers.
d. Options
for compliance.
1. An
IOLTA participating institution may establish the comparable product for
qualifying IOLTA accounts, subject to the direction of the lawyer or law firm;
or,
2. an
IOLTA participating institution may pay the highest non-promotional interest
rate or dividend, as defined in sub. (cm) (4) b., less any allowable reasonable
fees charged in connection with the comparable highest interest rate or
dividend product, on the IOLTA checking account in lieu of actually
establishing the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product.
e. Paying
rates above comparable rates. An IOLTA participating institution may
pay a set rate above its comparable rates on the IOLTA checking account
negotiated with WisTAF that is fixed over a period of time set by WisTAF, such
as 12 months.
(5) Allowable reasonable fees on IOLTA
accounts.
a. Allowable reasonable fees on an IOLTA account
shall be as follows:
1.
per check charges;
2.
per deposit charges;
3.
fees in lieu of minimum balance;
4.
sweep fees;
5. an IOLTA administrative fee approved
by WisTAF; and
6.
federal deposit insurance fees.
b. Allowable
reasonable fees may be deducted from interest earned or dividends paid on an
IOLTA account, provided that such charges shall be calculated in accordance
with an IOLTA participating institution’s standard practice for non-IOLTA
customers. Fees in excess of the
interest earned or dividends paid on the IOLTA account for any month or quarter
shall not be taken from interest or dividends of any other IOLTA accounts. No fees that are authorized under this
subsection shall be assessed against or deducted from the principal of any
IOLTA account. All other fees are the
responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer or law firm maintaining
the IOLTA account. IOLTA participating
institutions may elect to waive any or all fees on IOLTA accounts.
(6) Remittance
and reporting requirements. A lawyer
or law firm shall direct the IOLTA participating institution at which the
lawyer or law firm’s IOLTA account is located to do all of the following, on at
least a quarterly basis:
a. Remit
to WisTAF the interest or dividends, less allowable reasonable fees as allowed
under par. (5), if any, on the average monthly balance in the account or as
otherwise computed in accordance with the IOLTA participating institution’s
standard accounting practice.
b. Provide
to WisTAF a remittance report showing for each IOLTA account the name of the
lawyer or law firm for whose IOLTA account the remittance is sent, the rate and
type of interest or dividend applied, the amount of allowable reasonable fees
deducted, if any, the average account balance for the period for which the
report is made, and the amount of remittance attributable to each IOLTA
account.
c. Provide
to the depositing lawyer or law firm a remittance report in accordance with the
participating institution’s normal procedures for reporting account activity to
depositors.
d. Respond
to reasonable requests from WisTAF for information needed for purposes of confirming the accuracy of an IOLTA
participating institution’s certification.
(d) Prompt
notice and delivery of property.
(1) Notice and disbursement. Upon receiving funds or other property in
which a client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has received notice that
a 3rd party has an interest identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or 3rd party in
writing. Except as stated in this rule
or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any funds or other property that the
client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
(2) Accounting. Upon final distribution of any trust property
or upon request by the client or a 3rd party having an ownership interest in
the property, the lawyer shall promptly render a full written accounting
regarding the property.
(3) Disputes regarding trust property. When the lawyer and another person or the
client and another person claim ownership interest in trust property identified
by a lien, court order, judgment, or contract, the lawyer shall hold that
property in trust until there is an accounting and severance of the
interests. If a dispute arises regarding
the division of the property, the lawyer shall hold the disputed portion in
trust until the dispute is resolved.
Disputes between the lawyer and a client are subject to the provisions
of sub. (g)(2).
(e) Operational
requirements for trust accounts.
(1) Location.
a. Each trust account shall be
maintained in a financial institution that is authorized by federal or state
law to do business in Wisconsin and that is located in Wisconsin or has a
branch office located in Wisconsin, and which agrees to comply with the overdraft
notice requirements of sub. (h).
b. In addition to the requirement of subd. a., IOLTA accounts
shall be maintained only at IOLTA participating institutions that meet the
IOLTA account requirements under sub. (cm).
(2) Insurance and safety requirements.
a. Each trust account shall be
maintained at a financial institution that is insured by the federal deposit
insurance corporation, the national credit union share insurance fund, the
securities investor protection corporation, or any other investment institution
financial guaranty insurance. Except as
provided in subs. (b) (6) and (cm) (3) b. and c., trust property shall be held
in an account in which each individual owner’s funds are eligible for
insurance.
b. IOLTA accounts shall also comply with the requirements of sub.
(cm) (3).
(3) Interest requirements.
a. Non-IOLTA accounts shall bear
interest at a rate not less than that applicable to individual interest-bearing
accounts of the same type, size, and duration.
All trust accounts shall allow withdrawals or transfers to be made
without delay when funds are required, subject only to any notice period that
the depository institution is required to observe by law.
b. IOLTA
accounts shall comply with the requirements of sub. (cm) (4) b.
(4) Prohibited transactions.
a. Cash.
No disbursement of cash shall be made from a trust account or from a
deposit to a trust account, and no check shall be made payable to
"Cash."
b. Telephone transfers. No deposits or disbursements shall be made to
or from a pooled trust account by a telephone transfer of funds. This section does not prohibit any of the
following:
1. wire transfers.
2. telephone transfers between non-pooled draft
and non-pooled non-draft trust accounts that a lawyer maintains for a
particular client.
c. Internet transactions. A lawyer shall not make deposits to or
disbursements from a trust account by way of an Internet transaction.
d. Electronic transfers by
3rd parties. A lawyer shall not
authorize a 3rd party to electronically withdraw funds from a trust
account. A lawyer shall not authorize a
3rd party to deposit funds into the lawyer's trust account through a form of
electronic deposit that allows the 3rd party making the deposit to withdraw the
funds without the permission of the lawyer.
e. Credit card
transactions. A lawyer shall not
authorize transactions by way of credit card to or from a trust account. However, earned fees may be deposited by way
of credit card to a lawyer's business account.
f. Debit card
transactions. A lawyer shall not use
a debit card to make deposits to or disbursements from a trust account.
g. Exception: Collection
trust accounts. Upon demonstrating
to the office of lawyer regulation that a transaction prohibited by sub.
(e)(4)c., e., or f., constitutes an integral part of the lawyer's practice, a
lawyer may petition that office for a separate, written agreement, permitting
the lawyer to continue to engage in the prohibited transaction, provided the
lawyer identifies the excepted account, provides adequate account security, and
complies with specific record-keeping and production requirements.
h. Exception: Fee and cost
advances by credit card, debit card or other electronic deposit. A lawyer may establish a trust account,
separate from the lawyer's IOLTA account, for the purpose of receiving legal
fees and costs by credit card, debit card or other electronic deposit, provided
that the lawyer complies with all of the following:
1. the separate trust account shall be
entitled: "Credit Card Trust Account";
2. lawyer or law firm funds, reasonably
sufficient to cover all monthly account fees and charges and, if necessary, any
deductions by the financial institution or card issuer from a client's payment
by credit card, debit card, or other electronic deposit, shall be maintained in
the credit card trust account, and a ledger for account fees and charges shall
be maintained;
3. each payment of legal fees or costs by
credit card, debit card or other electronic deposit, including, if necessary, a
reimbursement by the lawyer or law firm for any deduction by the financial
institution or card issuer from the gross amount of each payment, shall be
transferred from the credit card trust account to the IOLTA account immediately
upon becoming available for disbursement subject to the following requirements:
a. All advanced
costs and advanced fees held in trust under sub. (b)(4) shall be transferred by
check to the IOLTA account.
b. Earned fees, cost reimbursements, and
advanced fees that are subject to the requirements of sub. (b)(4m) shall be
transferred by check into the business account.
4. within 3 business days of receiving
actual notice that a chargeback or surcharge has been made against the credit
card trust account, the lawyer shall replace any and all funds that have been
withdrawn from the credit card trust account by the financial institution or
card issuer; and shall reimburse the account for any shortfall or negative
balance caused by a chargeback or surcharge.
The lawyer shall not accept new payments to the credit card trust
account until the lawyer has reimbursed the credit card trust account for the
chargeback or surcharge.
(5) Availability of funds for disbursement.
a. Standard for trust account transactions. A lawyer shall not disburse funds from any
trust account unless the deposit from which those funds will be disbursed has
cleared, and the funds are available for disbursement.
b. Exception:
Real estate transactions. In closing
a real estate transaction, a lawyer's disbursement of closing proceeds from
funds that are received on the date of the closing, but that have not yet
cleared, shall not violate sub. (e)(5)a. if those proceeds are deposited no
later than the first business day following the closing and are comprised of
the following types of funds:
1. a certified check;
2. a cashier's check, teller's check, bank
money order, official bank check or electronic transfer of funds, issued or
transferred by a financial institution insured by the federal deposit insurance
corporation or a comparable agency of the federal or state government;
3. a check drawn on the trust account of any
lawyer or real estate broker licensed under the laws of any state;
4. a check issued by the state of Wisconsin,
the United States, or a political subdivision of the state of Wisconsin or the
United States;
5. a check drawn on the account of or issued
by a lender approved by the federal department of housing and urban development
as either a supervised or a nonsupervised mortgagee as defined in 24 C.F.R.
s. 202.2;
6. a check from a title insurance company
licensed in Wisconsin, or from a title insurance agent of the title insurance company,
if the title insurance company has guaranteed the funds of that title insurance
agent;
7. a non-profit organization check in an
amount not exceeding $5000 per closing if the lawyer has reasonable and prudent
grounds to believe that the deposit will be irrevocably credited to the trust
account; and
8. a personal check or checks in an
aggregate amount not exceeding $5000 per closing if the lawyer has reasonable
and prudent grounds to believe that the deposit will be irrevocably credited to
the trust account.
bm. Without limiting the rights of the lawyer against any person, it
shall be the responsibility of the disbursing lawyer to reimburse the trust
account for any funds described in sub. (e)(5)b. that are not collected and for
any fees, charges, and interest assessed by the financial institution on
account of the funds being disbursed before the related deposit has cleared and
the funds are available for disbursement.
The lawyer shall maintain a subsidiary ledger for funds of the lawyer
that are deposited in the trust account to reimburse the account for
uncollected funds and to accommodate any fees, charges, and interest.
c. Exception: Collection
trust accounts. When handling
collection work for a client and maintaining a separate trust account to hold
funds collected on behalf of that client, a lawyer's disbursement to the client
of collection proceeds that have not yet cleared, does not violate sub.
(e)(5)a. so long as those collection proceeds have been deposited prior to the
disbursement.
(6) Record retention. A lawyer shall maintain complete records of
trust account funds and other trust property and shall preserve those records
for at least 6 years after the date of termination of the representation.
(7) Production of records. All trust account records have public aspects
related to a lawyer's fitness to practice.
Upon request of the office of lawyer regulation, or upon direction of
the supreme court, the records shall be submitted to the office of lawyer
regulation for its inspection, audit, use, and evidence under any conditions to
protect the privilege of clients that the court may provide. The records, or an audit of the records,
shall be produced at any disciplinary proceeding involving the lawyer, whenever
material. Failure to produce the records
constitutes unprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary action.
(8) Business account. Each lawyer who receives trust funds shall
maintain at least one draft account, other than the trust account, for funds
received and disbursed other than in the lawyer's trust capacity, which shall
be entitled "Business Account," "Office Account,"
"Operating Account," or words of similar import.
(f) Record-keeping
requirements for all trust accounts.
(1) Draft accounts. Complete records of a trust account that is a
draft account shall include a transaction register; individual client ledgers
for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts; a ledger for account fees
and charges, if law firm funds are held in the account pursuant to sub. (b)(3);
deposit records; disbursement records; monthly statements; and reconciliation
reports, subject to all of the following:
a. Transaction register. The transaction register shall contain a
chronological record of all account transactions, and shall include all of the
following:
1. the date, source, and amount of all
deposits;
2. the date, check or transaction number,
payee and amount of all disbursements, whether by check, wire transfer, or other
means;
3. the date and amount of every other
deposit or deduction of whatever nature;
4. the identity of the client for whom funds
were deposited or disbursed; and
5. the balance in the account after each
transaction.
b. Individual client
ledgers. A subsidiary ledger shall
be maintained for each client or 3rd party for whom the lawyer receives trust
funds that are deposited in an IOLTA account or any other pooled trust account.
The lawyer shall record each receipt and
disbursement of a client's or 3rd party's funds and the balance following each
transaction. A lawyer shall not disburse
funds from an IOLTA account or any pooled trust account that would create a
negative balance with respect to any individual client or matter.
c. Ledger for account fees
and charges. A subsidiary ledger
shall be maintained for funds of the lawyer deposited in the trust account to
accommodate monthly service charges.
Each deposit and expenditure of the lawyer's funds in the account and
the balance following each transaction shall be identified in the ledger.
d. Deposit records. Deposit slips shall identify the name of the
lawyer or law firm, and the name of the account. The deposit slip shall identify the amount of
each deposit item, the client or matter associated with each deposit item, and
the date of the deposit. The lawyer
shall maintain a copy or duplicate of each deposit slip. All deposits shall be made intact. No cash, or other form of disbursement, shall
be deducted from a deposit. Deposits of
wired funds shall be documented in the account's monthly statement.
e. Disbursement records.
1. Checks.
Checks shall be pre-printed and pre-numbered. The name and address of the lawyer or law
firm, and the name of the account shall be printed in the upper left corner of
the check. Trust account checks shall
include the words "Client Account," or "Trust Account," or
words of similar import in the account name.
Each check disbursed from the trust account shall identify the client
matter and the reason for the disbursement on the memo line.
2. Canceled
checks. Canceled checks shall be
obtained from the financial institution.
Imaged checks may be substituted for canceled checks.
3. Imaged
checks. Imaged checks shall be
acceptable if they provide both the front and reverse of the check and comply
with the requirements of this paragraph.
The information contained on the reverse side of the imaged checks shall
include any endorsement signatures or stamps, account numbers, and transaction
dates that appear on the original.
Imaged checks shall be of sufficient size to be readable without
magnification and as close as possible to the size of the original check.
4. Wire
transfers. Wire transfers shall be
documented by a written withdrawal authorization or other documentation, such
as a monthly statement of the account that indicates the date of the transfer,
the payee, and the amount.
f. Monthly statement. The monthly statement provided to the lawyer
or law firm by the financial institution shall identify the name and address of
the lawyer or law firm and the name of the account.
g. Reconciliation reports. For each trust account, the lawyer shall
prepare and retain a printed reconciliation report on a regular and periodic
basis not less frequently than every 30 days.
Each reconciliation report shall show all of the following balances and
verify that they are identical:
1. the balance that appears in the
transaction register as of the reporting date;
2. the total of all subsidiary ledger
balances for IOLTA accounts and other pooled trust accounts, determined by
listing and totaling the balances in the individual client ledgers and the
ledger for account fees and charges, as of the reporting date; and
3. the adjusted balance, determined by
adding outstanding deposits and other credits to the balance in the financial
institution's monthly statement and subtracting outstanding checks and other
deductions from the balance in the monthly statement.
(2) Non-draft accounts. Complete records of a trust account that is a
non-draft account shall include all of the following:
a. all monthly or other periodic statements provided by the
financial institution to the lawyer or law firm; and
b. all transaction records, including passbooks, records of
electronic fund transactions, duplicates of any instrument issued by the
financial institution from funds held in the account, duplicate deposit slips
identifying the source of any deposit, and duplicate withdrawal slips
identifying the purpose of any withdrawal.
(3) Tangible trust property and bearer
securities.
a. Property ledger. A lawyer who receives, in trust, tangible
personal property or securities in bearer form shall maintain a property ledger
that identifies the property, date of receipt, owner, client or matter, and
location of the property. The ledger
shall also identify the disposition of all of the trust property received by
the lawyer.
b. Receipt upon taking
custody. Upon taking custody, in
trust, of any tangible personal property or securities in bearer form, the
lawyer shall provide to the previous custodian a signed receipt, with a
description of the property and the date of receipt.
c. Dispositional receipt. Upon disposition of any tangible personal
property or securities in bearer form held in trust, the lawyer shall obtain a
signed receipt, with a description of the property and the date of disposition,
from the recipient.
(4) Electronic record retention.
a. Back-up of records. A lawyer who maintains trust account records
by computer shall maintain the transaction register, client ledgers, and
reconciliation reports in a form that can be reproduced to printed hard copy. Electronic records must be regularly backed
up by an appropriate storage device.
b. IOLTA account records. In addition to the requirements of sub.
(f)(4)a., the transaction register, the subsidiary ledger, and the
reconciliation report shall be printed every 30 days for the IOLTA
account. The printed copy shall be
retained for at least 6 years, as required under sub. (e) (6).
(g) Withdrawal
of non-contingent fees from trust account.
(1) Notice to client. At least 5 business days before the date on
which a disbursement is made from a trust account for the purpose of paying
fees, with the exception of contingent fees or fees paid pursuant to court
order, the lawyer shall transmit to the client in writing all of the following:
a. an itemized bill or other accounting showing the services
rendered;
b. notice of the amount owed and the anticipated date of the
withdrawal; and
c. a statement of the balance of the client's funds in the lawyer
trust account after the withdrawal.
(1m) Alternative notice to client. The lawyer may withdraw earned fees on the
date that the invoice is transmitted to the client, provided that the lawyer
has given prior notice to the client in writing that earned fees will be
withdrawn on the date that the invoice is transmitted. The invoice shall include each of the
elements required by sub. (g) (1) a., b., and c.
(2) Objection to disbursement. If a client makes a particularized and
reasonable objection to the disbursement described in sub. (g)(1), the disputed
portion shall remain in the trust account until the dispute is resolved. If the client makes a particularized and
reasonable objection to a disbursement described in sub. (g)(1) or (1m) within
30 days after the funds have been withdrawn, the disputed portion shall be
returned to the trust account until the dispute is resolved, unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client's objections do not present a basis to hold
funds in trust or return funds to the trust account under this subsection. The lawyer will be presumed to have a
reasonable basis for declining to return funds to trust if the disbursement was
made with the client's informed consent, in writing. The lawyer shall promptly advise the client in
writing of the lawyer's position regarding the fee and make reasonable efforts
to clarify and address the client's objections.
(h) Dishonored
instrument notification (Overdraft notices).
All draft trust accounts and draft
fiduciary accounts are subject to the following provisions on dishonored
instrument notification:
(1) Overdraft reporting agreement. A lawyer shall maintain draft trust accounts
only in a financial institution that has agreed to provide an overdraft report
to the office of lawyer regulation under par. (3).
(2) Identification of accounts subject to this
subsection. A lawyer or law firm
shall notify the financial institution at the time a trust account or fiduciary
account is established that the account is subject to this sub. (h) and shall
provide the financial institution with a list of all existing accounts at that
institution that are subject to this subsection.
(3) Overdraft report. In the event any properly payable instrument
is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds,
whether or not the instrument is honored, the financial institution shall
report the overdraft to the office of lawyer regulation.
(4) Content of report. All reports made by a financial institution
under this subsection shall be substantially in the following form:
a. In the case of a dishonored instrument, the report shall be
identical to an overdraft notice customarily forwarded to the depositor or
investor, accompanied by the dishonored instrument, if a copy is normally
provided to the depositor or investor.
b. In the case of instruments that are presented against
insufficient funds and are honored, the report shall identify the financial
institution involved, the lawyer or law firm, the account number, the date on
which the instrument is paid, and the amount of overdraft created by the
payment.
(5) Timing of report. A report made under this subsection shall be
made simultaneously with the overdraft notice given to the depositor or
investor.
(6) Confidentiality of report. A report made by a financial institution
under this subsection shall be subject to SCR 22.40, Confidentiality.
(7) Withdrawal of report by financial
institution. The office of lawyer
regulation shall hold each overdraft report for 10 business days to enable the
financial institution to withdraw a report provided by inadvertence or
mistake. The deposit of additional funds
by the lawyer or law firm shall not constitute reason for withdrawing an
overdraft report.
(8) Lawyer compliance. Every lawyer practicing or admitted to
practice in Wisconsin shall comply with the reporting and production
requirements of this subsection, including filing of an overdraft notification
agreement for each IOLTA account, each draft-type trust account and each
draft-type fiduciary account that is not subject to an alternative protection
under sub. (j) (9).
(9) Service charges. A financial institution may charge a lawyer
or law firm for the reasonable costs of producing the reports and records
required by this rule.
(10) Immunity of financial institution. This subsection does not create a claim
against a financial institution or its officers, directors, employees, or
agents for failure to provide a trust account overdraft report or for
compliance with this subsection.
(i) Certification
of compliance with trust account rules.
(1) Annual requirement. A member of the state bar of Wisconsin shall
file with the state bar of Wisconsin annually, with payment of the member's
state bar dues or upon any other date approved by the supreme court, a
certificate stating whether the member is engaged in the practice of law in
Wisconsin. If the member is practicing
law, the member shall state the account number of any trust account, and the
name of each financial institution in which the member maintains a trust
account, a safe deposit box, or both, as required by this section. The state bar shall supply to each member,
with the annual dues statement, or at any other time directed by the supreme
court, a form on which the certification must be made.
(2) Trust account record compliance. Each state bar member shall explicitly
certify on the state bar certificate described in par. (1) that the member has
complied with each of the record-keeping requirements set forth in subs. (f)
and (j)(5).
(3) Certification by law firm. A law firm shall file one certificate on
behalf of the lawyers in the firm who are required to file a certificate under
par. (1). The law firm shall give a copy
of the certificate to each lawyer in the firm.
(4) Suspension for non-compliance. The failure of a state bar member to file the
certificate is grounds for automatic suspension of the member's membership in
the state bar in the same manner provided in SCR 10.03(6) for nonpayment of
dues. The filing of a false certificate
is unprofessional conduct and is grounds for disciplinary action.
(1) Separate account. A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the
lawyer's own funds or property, those funds or that property of clients or 3rd
parties that are in the lawyer's possession when acting in a fiduciary capacity
that directly arises in the course of, or as a result of, a lawyer-client
relationship or by appointment of a court.
(1m) Other fiduciary accounts. A lawyer shall deposit all fiduciary funds
specified in par. (1) in any of the following:
a. a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying fiduciary account
with sub-accounting by the financial institution, the lawyer, or the law firm
that will provide for computation of interest or dividends earned by each
fiduciary entity's funds and the proportionate allocation of the interest or
dividends to each of the fiduciary entities, less any transaction costs;
b. an income-generating investment vehicle, on which income shall
be paid to the fiduciary entity or its beneficiary or beneficiaries, less any
transaction costs;
c. an income-generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer
and approved by a court for guardianship funds if the lawyer serves as guardian
for a ward under chs. 54 and 881, stats.;
d. an income-generating investment vehicle selected by the lawyer
to protect and maximize the return on funds in a bankruptcy estate, which
investment vehicle is approved by the trustee in bankruptcy and by a bankruptcy
court order, consistent with 11 U.S.C. s. 345; or
e. a draft account or other account that does not bear interest
or pay dividends when, in the sound professional judgment of the lawyer,
placement in such an account is consistent with the needs and purposes of the
fiduciary entity or its beneficiary or beneficiaries.
(2) Location. Each fiduciary account shall be maintained in
a financial institution as provided by the written authorization of the client,
the governing trust instrument, organizational by-laws, an order of a court or,
absent such direction, in a financial institution that, in the lawyer's
professional judgment, will best serve the needs and purposes of the client or
3rd party for whom the lawyer serves as fiduciary. If a lawyer acts in good faith in making this
determination, the lawyer is not subject to any charge of ethical impropriety
or other breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the fiduciary property is held in a draft
account from which funds are disbursed through a properly payable instrument
issued directly by the lawyer or a member or employee of the lawyer's firm and
the account is at a financial institution that is not located in Wisconsin or
authorized by state or federal law to do business in Wisconsin, the lawyer
shall comply with the requirements of sub. (j)(9)b. or c.
(3) Prohibited transactions.
a. Cash.
No disbursement of cash shall be made from a fiduciary account or from a
deposit to a fiduciary account, and no check shall be made payable to
"Cash."
b. Internet transactions. A lawyer shall not make deposits to or
disbursements from a fiduciary account by way of an Internet transaction.
c. Credit card
transactions. A lawyer shall not
authorize transactions by way of credit card to or from a fiduciary account.
d. Debit card
transactions. A lawyer shall not use
a debit card to make deposits to or disbursements from a fiduciary account.
(4) Availability of funds for disbursement. A lawyer shall not disburse funds from a
fiduciary account unless the deposit from which those funds will be disbursed
has cleared, and the funds are available for disbursement. However, the exception for real estate
transactions under sub. (e)(5)b. shall apply to fiduciary accounts.
(5) Records. For each fiduciary account, the lawyer shall
retain records of receipts and disbursements as necessary to document the
transactions. The lawyer shall maintain
all of the following:
a. all monthly or other periodic statements provided by the
financial institution to the lawyer or law firm; and
b. all transaction records, including canceled or imaged checks,
passbooks, records of electronic fund transactions, duplicates of any
instrument issued by the financial institution from funds held in the account,
duplicate deposit slips identifying the source of any deposit, and duplicate
withdrawal slips identifying the purpose of any withdrawal.
(6) Record retention. A lawyer shall maintain complete records of
fiduciary accounts and other fiduciary property during the course of the
fiduciary relationship. A lawyer shall
maintain a complete record of the fiduciary account for the 6 most recent years
of the account's existence and shall maintain, at a minimum, a summary
accounting of the fiduciary account for prior years of the account's
existence. After the termination of the
fiduciary relationship, the lawyer shall preserve complete records for at least
6 years.
(7) Production of records. All fiduciary account records have public
aspects related to a lawyer's fitness to practice. Upon request of the office of lawyer
regulation, or upon direction of the supreme court, the records shall be
submitted to the office of lawyer regulation for its inspection, audit, use,
and evidence under any conditions to protect the privilege of clients that the
court may provide. The records, or an
audit of the records, shall be produced at any disciplinary proceeding involving
the lawyer, whenever material. Failure
to produce the records constitutes unprofessional conduct and grounds for
disciplinary action.
(8) Tangible fiduciary property and bearer
securities.
a. Property ledger. A lawyer who, as a fiduciary, receives tangible
personal property or securities in bearer form shall maintain a property ledger
that identifies the property, date of receipt, owner, and location of the
property. The ledger shall also identify
the disposition of all such fiduciary property received by the lawyer.
b. Receipt upon taking
custody. Upon taking custody, as a
fiduciary, of any tangible personal property or securities in bearer form, the
lawyer shall provide to the previous custodian a signed receipt, with a
description of the property, and the date of receipt.
c. Dispositional receipt. Upon disposition of any tangible personal
property or securities in bearer form held by the lawyer as a fiduciary, the
lawyer shall obtain a signed receipt, with a description of the property and the
date of disposition, from the recipient.
(9) Dishonored instrument notification or
alternative protection. A lawyer who
holds fiduciary property in a draft account from which funds are disbursed
through a properly payable instrument issued directly by the lawyer or a member
or employee of the lawyer's firm shall take one of the following actions:
a. comply with the requirements of sub. (h) dishonored instrument
notification (overdraft notices); or
b. have the account independently audited by a certified public
accountant on at least an annual basis; or
c. hold the funds in a draft account, which requires the
approving signature of a co-trustee, co-agent, co-guardian, or co-personal
representative before funds may be disbursed from the account.
(10) Certification requirements. Funds held by a lawyer in a fiduciary account
shall comply with the certification requirements of sub. (i).
(k) Exceptions
to this section.
This rule does not apply in any of the
following instances in which a lawyer is acting in a fiduciary capacity:
(1) the
lawyer is serving as a bankruptcy trustee, subject to the oversight and
accounting requirements of the bankruptcy court;
(2) the
property held by the lawyer when acting in a fiduciary capacity is property
held for the benefit of an "immediate family member" of the lawyer;
(3) the
lawyer is serving in a fiduciary capacity for a civic, fraternal, or non-profit
organization that is not a client and has other officers or directors
participating in the governance of the organization; or
(4) the
lawyer is acting in the course of the lawyer's employment by an employer not
itself engaged in the practice of law, provided that the lawyer's employment is
not ancillary to the lawyer's practice of law.
WISCONSIN
COMMENT
A lawyer must hold the property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. All property that is the property of clients or 3rd parties must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust or fiduciary accounts.
SCR
20:1.15(b)(1) Separate accounts.
With respect to probate matters, a lawyer's role may be to represent the estate's personal representative, to serve as the personal representative, or to act as both personal representative and attorney for an estate. SCR 20:1.15(b) identifies the rules that apply when a lawyer holds trust property as the attorney for a client/personal representative. Those rules, SCR 20:1.15(b)-(i), also apply when the lawyer serves as both the attorney and personal representative for an estate. However, if the lawyer serves solely as an estate's personal representative, the lawyer acts as a fiduciary and is subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.15(j).
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) Advances for fees and costs.
Lawyers often receive funds from 3rd parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust, and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.
Lawyers also receive cost advances from clients or 3rd parties. Since January 1, 1987, the supreme court has required cost advances to be held in trust. Prior to that date, the applicable trust account rule, SCR 20.50(1), specifically excluded such advances from the funds that the supreme court required lawyers to hold in trust accounts. However, by order, dated March 21, 1986, the supreme court amended SCR 20.50(1) as follows:
All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm,
other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or
more identifiable trust accounts as provided in sub. (3) maintained in
the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be deposited in such an account except as follows . . .
.
This requirement is specifically addressed in SCR
20:1.15(b)(4).
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) Alternative protection for advanced fees.
This section allows lawyers to deposit advanced fees into the lawyer's business account, as an alternative to SCR 20:1.15(b)(4). The provision regarding court review applies to lawyers’ fees in proceedings in which the lawyer’s fee is subject to review at the request of the parties or the court, such as bankruptcy, formal probate, and proceedings in which a guardian ad litem’s fee may be subject to judicial review. In any proceeding in which the lawyer’s fee must be challenged in a separate action, the lawyer must either deposit advanced fees in trust or use the alternative protections for advanced fees in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m). The lawyer's fee remains subject to the requirement of reasonableness (SCR 20:1.5) as well as the requirement that unearned fees be refunded upon termination of the representation [SCR 20:1.16(d)]. A lawyer must comply either with SCR 20:1.15(b)(4), or with SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), and a lawyer's failure to do so shall be professional misconduct and grounds for discipline.
The writing required by SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)a. must contain language informing the client that the lawyer is obligated to refund any unearned advanced fee at the end of the representation, that the lawyer will submit any dispute regarding a refund to binding arbitration, such as the programs run by the State Bar of Wisconsin and Milwaukee Bar Association, within 30 days of receiving a request for refund, and that the lawyer is obligated to comply with an arbitration award within 30 days of the award. The client is not obligated to arbitrate the fee dispute and may elect another forum in which to resolve the dispute. The writing must also inform the client of the opportunity to file a claim in the event an unearned advanced fee is not refunded, and should provide the address of the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection.
If the client's fees have been paid by one other than the client, then the lawyer's responsibilities are governed by SCR 20:1.8(f). If there is a dispute as to the ownership of any refund of unearned advanced fees paid by one other than the client, the unearned fees should be treated as trust property pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(d)(3).
This alternative applies only to advanced fees for legal services. Cost advances must be deposited into the lawyer's trust account.
Advanced fees deposited into the lawyer's business account pursuant to this subsection may be paid by credit card, debit card, or an electronic transfer of funds. A cost advance cannot be paid by credit card, debit card, or an electronic transfer of funds under this section. Such payments are subject to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) or SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)h.
SCR 20:1.15(cm)(3)
Insurance and safety requirements.
Pursuant
to SCR 20:1.15 (cm) (3), IOLTA accounts are required to be held in IOLTA
participating institutions that are insured by the federal deposit insurance
corporation (FDIC), the national credit union share insurance fund (NCUSIF),
the securities investor protection corporation (SIPC) or any other investment
institution financial guaranty insurance.
However, since federal law dictates the amount of insurance coverage
available from the FDIC, the NCUSIF and the SIPC, funds in excess of those
limits are not insured. Federal law also
limits the types of losses that are covered by SIPC insurance. Consequently, the purpose of the insurance
and safety requirements is not to guarantee that all funds are adequately
insured. Rather, it is to assure that
trust funds are held in reputable IOLTA participating institutions and, as
specified in subsection (e) (2) a., that the funds are eligible for the
insurance that is available.
SCR
20:1.15 (e)(2)a. requires a lawyer to hold funds in an account where each
owner’s funds in an account where each owner’s funds are eligible for the
financial institution’s insurance coverage.
Practitioners should exercise care when placing trust funds in an IOLTA
or any other type of lawyer trust account at a credit union, because an
individual owner of funds held in any type of lawyer trust account (i.e., a
client of third party) is eligible for NCUSIF insurance only if that individual
owner is a member of the credit union, or if the credit union is designated by
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) as a “low-income” credit
union. The exceptions to the SCR
20:1.15(e)(2)a. requirement relate to trust property other than funds and to
IOLTA accounts that are subject to the safety requirements of SCR
20:1.15(cm)(3)b. and c.
SCR 20:1.15(cm)(4)
Risk associated with sweep accounts
Pursuant to SCR 20:1.15 (cm) (4),
IOLTA accounts shall bear the highest non-promotional interest rate or dividend
that is generally available to non-IOLTA customers at the same branch or main
office location when the IOLTA account meets or exceeds the same eligibility
qualifications, if any, including a minimum balance. Investment products, including repurchase
agreements and shares of mutual funds, are neither deposits nor federally or
FDIC-insured. An investment in a
repurchase agreement or money market fund may involve investment risk including
possible loss of the principal amount invested.
The rule, however, provides safeguards to minimize any potential risk by
limiting investment products to repurchase agreements and open-end money market
funds that invest in United States government securities only.
SCR 20:1.15(d) Interest of 3rd parties.
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law, including SCR 20:1.15(d), to protect such 3rd-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly, may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the 3rd party.
If a lawyer holds property belonging to one person and a second person has a contractual or similar claim against that person but does not claim to own the property or have a security interest in it, the lawyer is free to deliver the property to the person to whom it belongs.
SCR 20:1.15(e)(2)
Insurance and safety requirements.
Pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(e)(2), trust accounts are required to be held in financial, investment, or IOLTA participating institutions that are insured by the federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC), the national credit union share insurance fund (NCUSIF), the securities investor protection corporation (SIPC) or any other investment institution financial guaranty insurance. However, since federal law dictates the amount of insurance coverage available from the FDIC, the NCUSIF and the SIPC, funds in excess of those limits are not insured. Federal law also limits the types of losses that are covered by SIPC insurance. Consequently, the purpose of the insurance and safety requirements is not to guarantee that all funds are adequately insured. Rather, it is to assure that trust funds are held in reputable financial, investment, or IOLTA participating institutions and, as specified in subsection (e)(2)a., that the funds are eligible for the insurance that is available.
SCR 20:1.15 (e)(2)a. requires a lawyer to hold funds in an account where each owner’s funds in an account where each owner’s funds are eligible for the financial institution’s insurance coverage. Practitioners should exercise care when placing trust funds in an IOLTA or any other type of lawyer trust account at a credit union, because an individual owner of funds held in any type of lawyer trust account (i.e., a client of third party) is eligible for NCUSIF insurance only if that individual owner is a member of the credit union, or if the credit union is designated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) as a “low-income” credit union. The exceptions to the SCR 20:1.15(e)(2)a. requirement relate to trust property other than funds and to IOLTA accounts that are subject to the safety requirements of SCR 20:1.15(cm)(3)b. and c.
SCR
20:1.15(e)(4)d. Electronic transfers by
3rd parties.
Many forms of electronic deposit allow the transferor to remove the funds without the consent of the account holder. A lawyer must not only be aware of the bank's policy but also federal regulations pertaining to the specific form of electronic deposit, and must ensure that the transferor is prohibited from withdrawing deposited funds without the lawyer's consent.
SCR
20:1.15(e)(4)g. Exception: Collection
trust accounts.
This exception was adopted in response to concerns raised by members of the collection bar who presently rely on certain electronic banking practices that were not expressly prohibited prior to the adoption of this rule. The court acknowledges that electronic banking practices are increasingly used in the practice of law. However, the court also acknowledges that such transactions will require new approaches to alleviate legitimate concerns about the potential for fraud and risk of conversion with respect to their usage in connection with trust accounts. Collection lawyers may be able to satisfy these concerns because of security measures inherent in their practice. This exception is intended as a temporary measure, pending further consideration of the issue and eventual adoption of a rule that will permit electronic banking procedures in additional practice areas, conditioned upon the implementation of appropriate safeguards. The agreement referenced in the exception is available from the office of lawyer regulation.
SCR
20:1.15(e)(4)h.3. Exception: Fee and
cost advances by credit card, debit card or other electronic deposit.
Financial institutions, as credit card issuers,
routinely impose charges on vendors when a customer pays for goods or services
with a credit card. That charge is
deducted directly from the customer's payment.
Vendors who accept credit cards routinely credit the customer with the
full amount of the payment and absorb the charges. Before holding a client responsible for such
charges, a lawyer needs to disclose this practice to the client in advance, and
assure that the client understands and consents to the charges.
In addition, the lawyer needs to investigate the following concerns before accepting payments by credit card:
1. Does the credit card issuer prohibit a lawyer/vendor from requiring the customer to pay the charge? If a lawyer intends to credit the client for anything less than the full amount of the credit card payment, the lawyer needs to assure that this practice is not prohibited by the credit card issuer's regulations and/or by the agreement between the lawyer and the credit card issuer. Entering into an agreement with a credit card issuer with the intent to violate this type of requirement may constitute conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).
2. Does the credit card issuer require services to be rendered before a credit card payment is accepted? If a lawyer intends to accept fee advances by credit card, the lawyer needs to assure that fee advances are not prohibited by the credit card issuer's regulations and/or by the agreement between the lawyer and the credit card issuer. Entering into an agreement with a credit card issuer with the intent to violate this type of requirement may constitute conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).
3. By requiring clients to pay the credit cards charges, is the lawyer required to make certain specific disclosures to such clients and offer cash discounts to all clients? If a lawyer intends to require clients to pay credit card charges, the lawyer needs to assure that the lawyer complies with all state and federal laws relating to such transactions, including, but not limited to, Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. s. 206.
SCR
20:1.15(e)(5)b. Real estate
transactions.
SCR 20:1.15(e)(5)b. establishes an exception to the requirement that a lawyer only disburse funds that are available for disbursement, i.e., funds that have been credited to the account. This exception was created in recognition of the fact that real estate transactions in Wisconsin require a simultaneous exchange of funds. However, even under this exception, the funds from which a lawyer disburses the proceeds of the real estate transaction, i.e., the lender's check, draft, wire transfer, etc., must be deposited no later than the first business day following the date of the closing. In refinancing transactions, the lender's funds must be deposited as soon as possible, but no later than the first business day after the loan proceeds are distributed. Proceeds are generally distributed three days after the closing date.
SCR
20:1.15(e)(7) Inspection of records.
The duty of the lawyer to produce client trust account records for inspection under SCR 20:1.15(e)(7) is a specific exception to the lawyer's responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of the client's information as required by SCR 20:1.6.
SCR
20:1.15(g) Withdrawal of non-contingent
fees from trust account.
This section applies to attorney fees, other than contingent fees. It does not apply to filing fees, expert witness fees, subpoena fees, and other costs and expenses that a lawyer may incur on behalf of a client in the course of a representation.
In addition, this section does not require contingent fees to remain in the trust account or to be returned to the trust account if a client objects to the disbursement of the contingent fee, provided that the contingent fee arrangement is documented by a written fee agreement, as required by SCR 20:1.5(c). While a client may dispute the reasonableness of a lawyer's contingent fee, such disputes are subject to SCR 20:1.5(a), not to this subsection.
A client's objection under sub. (g)(3) must offer a specific and reasonable basis for the fee dispute in order to trigger the lawyer's obligation to keep funds in the lawyer's trust account or return funds to the lawyer's trust account. A generalized objection to the overall amount of the fees or a client's unilateral desire to abrogate the terms of a fee agreement should not ordinarily be considered sufficient to trigger the lawyer's obligation. A lawyer may resolve a dispute over fees by offering to participate and abide by the decision of a fee arbitration program. In addition, a lawyer may bring an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to s. 806.04, Wis. Stats. to resolve a dispute between the lawyer and a client regarding funds held in trust by the lawyer. The court of appeals suggested employment of that method to resolve a dispute between a client and a 3rd party over funds held in trust by the lawyer. See Riegleman v. Krieg, 2004 WI App 85, 271 Wis. 2d 798, 679 N.W.2d 857, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 229 (2004).
Additionally, when a lawyer's fees are subject to final approval by a court, such as fees paid to a guardian ad litem or lawyer's fees in formal probate matters, objections to disbursements by clients or 3rd party payors are properly brought before the court having jurisdiction over the matter. A lawyer should hold disputed funds in trust until such time as the appropriate court resolves the dispute.
SCR 20:1.15(i) and
SCR 20:1.15(j)(10) Certification of
compliance.
The current rule is intended to implement the supreme court's order of April 11, 2001; certification is required for "all trust accounts and safe deposit boxes in which the lawyer deposits clients' funds or property held in connection with a representation or held in a fiduciary capacity that directly arises in the course of or as a result of a lawyer-client relationship."
SCR
20:1.15(j) Lawyer as professional
fiduciary.
A lawyer must hold the property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. All property which is the property of clients or 3rd parties must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more segregated accounts. SCR 20:1.15(j) identifies the requirements and responsibilities of a lawyer with respect to the management of fiduciary property.
SCR
20:1.15(j)(1) Separate accounts.
With respect to probate matters, a lawyer's role may be to
represent the estate's personal representative, to serve as the personal
representative, or to act as both personal representative and attorney for an
estate. SCR 20:1.15(j) applies only when
the lawyer serves solely as an estate's personal representative. If the lawyer represents a client/personal
representative, or when the lawyer serves as both personal representative and
attorney for the estate, the lawyer is responsible for "trust"
property and is subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.15(b)-(i).
SCR 20:1.16 Declining or
terminating representation
(a) Except as stated in par. (c),
a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced,
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will
result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or
mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the
client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in par. (c),
a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;
(2) the client persists in a
course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the
lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(4) the client insists upon
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement;
(5) the client fails
substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's
services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw
unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(6) the representation will
result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered
unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(7) other good cause for
withdrawal exists.
(c) A lawyer must comply with
applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating
a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue
representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the
client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of
fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
With respect to subparagraph (c), a lawyer providing limited scope representation in a matter before a court should consult s 802.045, stats., regarding notice and termination requirements.
With respect to the last sentence of paragraph (d), it should be noted that a state bar ethics opinion suggests that lawyers in Wisconsin do not have a retaining lien with respect to client papers. See State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. E-95-4 (1995).
ABA COMMENT
[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5. See also Rule 1.3, Comment [4].
Mandatory Withdrawal
[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.
[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a
client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority.
See also Rule 6.2. Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often
required by applicable law before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation.
Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand
that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an
explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep
confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's
statement that professional considerations require termination of the
representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be
mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and
3.3.
Discharge
[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.
[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.
[6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14.
Optional Withdrawal
[7] A lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.
[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.
Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal
[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.15.
SCR 20:1.17 Sale of
law practice
A lawyer or a law firm may sell or
purchase a law practice, or an area of practice, including good will, if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The seller ceases to engage
in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold,
in the geographic area or in the jurisdiction in which the practice has been
conducted;
(b) The entire practice, or the
entire area of practice, is sold to one or more lawyers or law firms;
(c) The seller gives written
notice to each of the seller's affected clients regarding:
(1) the proposed sale;
(2) the client's right to retain
other counsel or to take possession of the file; and
(3) the fact that the client's
consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client
does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days
of receipt of the notice.
If
a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be
transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a
court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera
information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to
obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file.
(d) The fees charged clients
shall not be increased by reason of the sale.
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE COMMENT
Paragraph (c) requires notice only to "affected" clients, which is a limitation not contained in the Model Rule.
ABA COMMENT
[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, or ceases to practice in an area of law, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4 and 5.6.
Termination of Practice by the Seller
[2] The requirement that all of the private practice, or all of an area of practice, be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice, or the area of practice, available for sale to the purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances does not necessarily result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office or resigns from a judiciary position.
[3] The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.
[4] The Rule permits a sale of an entire practice attendant upon retirement from the private practice of law within the jurisdiction. Its provisions, therefore, accommodate the lawyer who sells the practice on the occasion of moving to another state. Some states are so large that a move from one locale therein to another is tantamount to leaving the jurisdiction in which the lawyer has engaged in the practice of law. To also accommodate lawyers so situated, states may permit the sale of the practice when the lawyer leaves the geographical area rather than the jurisdiction. The alternative desired should be indicated by selecting one of the two provided for in Rule 1.17(a).
[5] This Rule also permits a lawyer or law firm to sell an area of practice. If an area of practice is sold and the lawyer remains in the active practice of law, the lawyer must cease accepting any matters in the area of practice that has been sold, either as counsel or co-counsel or by assuming joint responsibility for a matter in connection with the division of a fee with another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by Rule 1.5(e). For example, a lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating on probate administration; however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate planning matters. Although a lawyer who leaves a jurisdiction or geographical area typically would sell the entire practice, this Rule permits the lawyer to limit the sale to one or more areas of the practice, thereby preserving the lawyer's right to continue practice in the areas of the practice that were not sold.
Sale of Entire Practice or Entire Area of Practice
[6] The Rule requires that the seller's entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchasers are required to undertake all client matters in the practice or practice area, subject to client consent. This requirement is satisfied, however, even if a purchaser is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest.
Client Confidences, Consent and Notice
[7] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Model Rule 1.6 than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The Rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed.
[8] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the Rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. (A procedure by which such an order can be obtained needs to be established in jurisdictions in which it presently does not exist).
[9] All elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice or area of practice.
Fee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser
[10] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing arrangements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser.
Other Applicable Ethical Standards
[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice or a practice area are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client's informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7 regarding conflicts and Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9).
[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16).
Applicability of the Rule
[13] This Rule applies to the sale of a law practice of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these Rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this Rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met.
[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this Rule.
[15] This Rule does
not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such
transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice or an area of practice.
SCR 20:1.18
Duties to prospective client
(a) A person who discusses with a
lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to
a matter is a prospective client.
(b) Even when no client-lawyer
relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client
shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as SCR
20:1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.
(c) A lawyer subject to par. (b)
shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a
prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer
received information from the prospective client that could be significantly
harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in par. (d). If a
lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue
representation in such a matter, except as provided in par. (d).
(d) When the lawyer has received
disqualifying information as defined in par. (c), representation is permissible
if:
(1) both the affected client and
the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or
(2) the lawyer who received the
information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying
information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the
prospective client; and
(i) the disqualified
lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(ii) written notice is
promptly given to the prospective client.
ABA COMMENT
[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's discussions with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients.
[2] Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer are entitled to protection under this Rule. A person who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective client" within the meaning of paragraph (a).
[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.
[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation.
[5] A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.
[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter.
[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 1.0(k) (requirements for screening procedures). Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified.
[8] Notice, including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted, and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.
[9] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.