NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The
final
version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
No. 95-05
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN SUPREME
COURT
In the Matter of the Amendment
of
FILED
the Supreme Court Rules: SCR
Chapter 60 -
Code of Judicial Ethics
JULY 1, 1996
Marilyn
L. Graves
Clerk of
Supreme Court Madison. WI
Rule amendment proceeding; Code of Judicial Ethics
repealed and recreated.
PER CURIAM.
On
the petition of the Committee
of Chief Judges filed December
29, 1994, the court has re-examined the report of the Code of Judicial
Ethics Review Committee
filed October 15, 1991 proposing the revision of the Code of Judicial
Ethics, chapter 60 of the Supreme Court Rules.
By order of June 24, 1992, the court had declined
to adopt the proposed revision.
169 Wis. 2d XV.
Following reconsideration of the Review
Committee's report and
the materials submitted to the court
and presented at the two public hearings
previously held in the matter, the court has determined that the current
Code of Judicial Ethics should be revised
to provide a more comprehensive statement of the ethical
No. 95-05
standards that guide and govern
the judges and other judicial officers of the Wisconsin
court system 1n their personal
and professional conduct. Accordingly, the court adopts and promulgates the Code of Judicial
Ethics set forth in the attached
order, to become effective January 1, 1997.
The court's revision
of the Code of Judicial
Ethics does not include that portion of the Review
Committee's proposal addressing the political activity of judges and judicial candidates. Because the Wisconsin judiciary is elective and nonpartisan, the court
considers that the Review Committee's recommended provisions governing political and campaign
activity require additional attention and formulation. The court has determined to refer the matter of political and campaign activity
to a committee the court will appoint in the coming months,
composed of judges,
lawyers and public members,
to examine the ethical and practical issues involved and to consult persons and entities
experienced in judicial
ethics pertaining to political and campaign activity. The committee will submit for the court's consideration proposed ethical rules addressing judges'
and candidates' political and campaign activity, and the court
will invite comment on them from the judiciary and from the public and will hold
a public hearing
in the matter. For the interim, the court promulgates as part of the
revised Code of Judicial Ethics
those provisions of the predecessor Code that deal with political
and campaign activity.
No. 95-05
Changing circumstances over the three years since
the last public hearing on the proposal
to revise the Code of Judicial Ethics may have an unanticipated effect
on the provisions adopted in
the revised Code. In order to be fully advised of the efficacy
of the revised Code and of
any theoretical or practical problems
in its enforcement, the court invites the members of the judiciary and other judicial
officers governed by it, as well
as the public, to file comments with the court expressing their concerns.
Comments should be filed by November 1, 1997 so that the court may give prompt
consideration to those concerns and take remedial
action as needed.
In addition to the revision
of the Code of Judicial
Ethics, the Review Committee recommended the creation of a committee
to render opinions
on the propriety of judicial
conduct under the Code
of Judicial Ethics.
The court accepts
that recommendation and will establish by court rule a Judicial
Ethics Advisory Committee to be in place when the revised
Code of Judicial Ethics becomes effective January 1, 1997. The rule will specify, among other things,
the committee's composition and authority, the procedure for its operation, and the effect
and dissemination of its opinions.
The revised Code of Judicial
Ethics here adopted
is the culmination of the work begun 11 years ago when the court, on July
1, 1985, created the Code of Judicial Ethics
Review Committee,
chaired by retired Chief
Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss, to review the current Code and make recommendations for its revision.
The Review
No. 95-05
Committee, chaired by Attorney Jack DeWitt
following the death of
Justice Beilfuss, filed its report
and recommendations May 11,
1987, and the court held a public hearing
on them November
17,
1987.
At that public
hearing, the Review
Committee requested and was given
the opportunity to address comments to its report that had
been filed by the Wisconsin
Judicial Commission. Before
it could do so, it was learned that the American Bar Association, whose
1972
Code of Judicial Conduct had served as the basis for the Review
Committee's recommendations,
was conducting a study of its own Code.
Consequently, the court withheld
further action on the
Review Committee's report
pending the outcome
of the ABA study and directed the Review Committee to consider and make any revisions to its
recommendations that might
be necessitated by ABA action
on its Code.
After the ABA adopted a revised Code of Judicial
Conduct
August 7, 1990, the Review Committee filed a revised
report October
15, 1991, and the court
held a public hearing on it March
17, 1992. Upon consideration of the presentations made at that hearing and the
material filed with the court,
the court declined
to adopt the proposed revision of the Code
of Judicial Ethics.
In 1995, in response to the petition
of the Committee of Chief Judges, the court undertook a re-examination of the Review Committee's proposal. Following lengthy and intensive consideration and revisions to that proposal, the court has
No. 95-05
determined that a revised
Code of Judicial Ethics,
as set forth in the order attached
to this opinion, be adopted
for the guidance and regulation of the conduct
of Wisconsin judges.
SUPREME COURT OF
WISCONSIN In the Matter of the Amendment
of
FILED
JUL- 1 1996
Marjlyn Graves
Clerk
of Supreme Court
Madison, WI
the Supreme Court Rules:
SCR
Chapter 60 -- Code of Judicial Ethics
ORDER
No. 95-05
On December 29, 1994, the Committee
of Chief Judges filed a petition requesting
that the court re-examine the report and recommendations of the Code of Judicial Ethics Review Committee filed October 15, 1991 proposing the revision of the Code of Judicial
Ethics, SCR chapter 60.
By
order of June 24, 1992, the
court declined to adopt the proposed revision.
The court has reconsidered the report and recommendations of the Code of Judicial
Ethics Review Committee and the
materials submitted to the court and presented at two public
hearings previously held in the matter and the court has made revisions to the Review Committee's proposal.
IT IS ORDERED
that, effective January
1, 1997, chapter 60 of
the Supreme Court Rules is repealed and recreated to read as set
forth in the attachment to this order.
IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that notice
of the repeal
and recreation
of chapter 60 of the Supreme
Court Rules be given by a single
publication of a copy of this order and the attachment
in the official state newspaper and in an official
publication of the State
Bar of Wisconsin.
Dated at Madison,
Wisconsin, this 1st day
of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:
i I
I I ) ·'-. 'i '( ' (. .. '! \
Marilyn L. Marilyn L. Graves, Clerk
SCR CHAPTER
60
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
PREAMBLE
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts
of justice and the rule of law. Intrinsic to all provisions of this Code are the precepts that
judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the
judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and
maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter
of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly
visible symbol of government under the rule of law.
The rules of the Code of Judicial
Ethics are authoritative.
The Commentary, has three varying
functions: 1) to elaborate
a standard in the rules;
2) to set forth policy bases for the
rules; or 3) by explanation and example, to provide guidance
with respect to the purpose
and meaning of the rules.
The Commentary
1s not intended
as a statement of additional
rules.
When the text of a rule uses "shall," "shall not" or "may
not," it is intended to impose binding
obligations the violation
of which can result in disciplinary action.
For a judge's conduct to constitute a violation of a rule, the judge
must have known or reasonably should have known the facts giving rise to the violation.
The use of "should" or "should not" in the rules is intended
to encourage or discourage specific
conduct and as a statement
of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule under which
a judge may be disciplined. When "may" is used, it denotes permissible discretion or, depending on the context,
it refers to action that is not covered by specific proscriptions.
The provisions of the Code of Judicial
Ethics are rules
of reason. They should
be applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes,
other court rules and decisional law and in the context
of all relevant circumstances. The Code is to be construed so as not to impinge
on the essential independence of judges in making judicial
decisions.
The Code is designed
to provide guidance
to judges and candidates for judicial office
and to provide a structure
for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. It is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the purpose of the Code would be subverted if the Code were invoked
by lawyers or litigants for mere tactical
advantage in a proceeding.
The provisions of the Code are intended
to govern conduct
of judges and to be binding upon them. It is not intended,
however, that every transgression will result in disciplinary action.
Whether disciplinary action
is appropriate, and the degree
of discipline to be imposed,
should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should
depend on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper
activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial
system. See ABA Standards Relating
to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement.
Because it is not possible
to address every
conceivable conduct of a judge that might erode public
confidence in the integrity, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, some of the binding rules of the Code are cast in general terms setting forth the principles their specific provisions are intended to foster. See, for example,
SCR 60.02, 60.03(1)
and
60.05(1) and accompanying Comments. Those rules provide
a touchstone against
which judicial conduct,
actual or contemplated, is to be measured. Care must be taken that the
Code's necessarily general
rules do not constitute a trap for the
unwary judge or a weapon to be wielded unscrupulously against a
judge.
The Code of Judicial Ethics is not intended as an exhaustive
guide for the conduct of judges. They should also be governed in their judicial
and personal conduct
by general ethical
standards. The Code is intended,
however, to state basic standards which should govern
the conduct of all judges
and to provide guidance
to assist judges in establishing and maintaining high standards
of judicial and personal conduct.
SCR 60.01 Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Appropriate authority" means the chief judge of an offending judge's
district, the director
of state courts,
the judicial commission and the board of attorneys
professional responsibility.
(2) "Candidate" means a person seeking selection
for or retention of a judicial office
by means of election or appointment who makes a public announcement of candidacy,
declares or files as a candidate with the election
or appointment
authority, or authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions or support.
(3) "Court personnel" means the clerk of court and sheriff
department employes
providing staff services
to the court. "Court personnel" does not include
the lawyers in a judicial proceeding.
(4) "De minimis" means an insignificant interest that does
not raise reasonable question
as to a judge's impartiality or use of the prestige
of the office.
(5) "Economic interest" means ownership
of a more than de minimis legal or equitable
interest, or a relationship as officer, director, advisor or other active participant 1n the affairs
of a party, except that none of the following is an economic
interest:
(a) Ownership of an interest
in a mutual or common
investment fund that holds securities, unless
the judge
participates in the management of the fund or unless a proceeding
pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the value of the interest.
(b) Service by a judge as an officer,
director, advisor or other active
participant in an educational, religious,
charitable, fraternal or civic organization, or service by a
judge's spouse or child as an officer,
director, advisor or other
active participant in any organization.
(c) A deposit in a financial
institution, the proprietary
interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company,
of a depositor in a mutual savings
association or of a member in a credit union,
or a similar proprietary interest,
unless a proceeding pending or impending
before the judge could substantially affect the value
of the interest.
(d) Ownership of government securities, unless a proceeding pending or impending before
the judge could substantially affect the value of the securities.
(6) "Fiduciary" means a personal
representative, trustee,
attorney-in-fact, conservator or guardian.
(7) "Gift" means the payment
or receipt of anything of value without
valuable consideration.
(8) "Judge" means a justice
of the supreme court, a judge
of the court of appeals, a judge of the circuit
court, a reserve judge, a municipal judge,
a court commissioner, and anyone,
whether or not a lawyer,
who is an officer of the judicial
system and who performs judicial
functions.
(9) " Knowingly"
or
"knowledge" means actual
knowledge of the fact in question, which may be inferred from the circumstances.
(10) "Law" means court rules, statutes,
constitutional provisions and legal conclusions in published court decisions.
(11) "Member of the judge's
family" means the judge's
spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent and any other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial
relationship.
(12) " Member of the judge's family
residing in the judge's
household"
means a relative of the judge by blood or marriage
or a person treated by the judge as a member of the judge's
family who resides
in the judge's household.
(13) "Nonpublic information"
means information that, by law, is not available
to the public, including information that
is sealed
by statute or court order,
impounded or communicated in camera, offered
in grand jury proceedings or contained in presentencing reports,
dependency case reports
or psychiatric reports.
(14) " Part-time municipal judge" or " part-time court
commissioner"
means a judge or court commissioner who serves repeatedly on a part-time
basis by election
or under a continuing appointment.
(15) "Require" means the exercise of reasonable direction
and control
over the conduct
of those persons subject to the directions and control.
(16) "Third degree of kinship" means
a person who is
related as a great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle,
aunt, brother, sister,
child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew or niece.
SCR 60.02 A judge shall uphold the integrity
and independence of the judiciary.
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.
A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct and
shall personally observe
those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary
will be preserved. This chapter
applies to every aspect of judicial behavior
except purely legal
decisions. Legal decisions
made in the course of judicial duty on the record are subject solely
to judicial review.
COMMENT
Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public
confidence in the integrity and independence of the judges.
The integrity and independence of judges depend
in turn upon their acting
without fear or favor. Although judges
should be independent, they must comply
with the law, including the provisions of this chapter.
Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of
each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this
chapter diminishes public
confidence in the judiciary and thereby
does injury to the system
of government under law.
The role of the judicial conduct
organization like the
Wisconsin Judicial Commission is not that of an appellate court.
Wis. Admin. Code Sec. JC 3.06 (May 1979) states as follows:
"Commission not to act as appellate
court. The commission may
not function as an appellate
court to review the decisions
of a
court or judge or to exercise superintending or administrative
control over determinations of courts or judges." It is
important to remember this concept as one interprets this chapter, particularly in light of the practice
of some groups or individuals to encourage dissatisfied litigants to file simultaneous appeals
and judicial conduct
complaints.
SCR 60.03 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities.
(1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
COMMENT
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect
to be the subject of constant public
scrutiny. A judge must
therefore accept restrictions on the judge's
conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The prohibition against
behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies
to both the professional and personal conduct
of a judge. Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in general
terms that extend to conduct
by judges that is harmful although not specifically mentioned in the chapter.
Actual improprieties under this standard
include violations of law,
court rules or other specific
provisions of this chapter. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge's
ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity,
impartiality and competence is impaired.
Restrictions on the personal conduct
of judges cannot, however, be so onerous
as to deprive them of fundamental freedoms
enjoyed by other citizens. Care must be taken to achieve a balance
between the need to maintain
the integrity and dignity of the judiciary
and the right of judges to conduct their personal
lives in accordance
with the dictates
of their individual consciences.
In striking this balance the following factors
should be
considered:
(a) the degree
to which the personal conduct
is public or
private;
(b) the degree
to which the personal conduct
is a protected
individual
right;
(c) the potential for the personal
conduct to directly
harm or offend others;
(d) the degree to which the personal conduct
is indicative of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge;
(e) the degree to which the personal conduct
is indicative of the judge's
lack of respect for the public or the judicial/legal system.
See also Comment to sub. (3).
(2) A judge may not allow family, social,
political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial
conduct or judgment. A judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance
the private interests
of the judge or of others or
convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in
a special
position to influence
the judge. A judge may not testify voluntarily as a character
witness.
COMMENT
Maintaining the prestige of judicial office
is essential to a system of government in which the judiciary functions
independently of the executive and legislative branches. Respect for
the judicial office
facilitates the orderly
conduct of legitimate judicial functions. Judges should
distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all of their activities. For example,
it would be improper for a judge to allude
to his or her judgeship
to gain a personal advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped
by a police officer for a traffic
offense. Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge's personal
business.
A judge must avoid lending
the prestige of judicial office
for the advancement of the private
interests of others.
For
example, a judge must not use the judge's judicial
position to
gain advantage in a civil suit involving
a member of the judge's
family. As to the acceptance of awards, see SCR 60.05 (4) (e) 1.
Although a judge
should be sensitive
to possible abuse of the prestige of office, a judge may, based on the judge's
personal knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of recommendation. Such a letter should
not be written if the person who is the subject of the letter
is or is likely to be a litigant engaged
in a contested proceeding before
the court. However, a judge must not initiate the communication of information to a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections
officer but may provide to such persons
information for the record in response to a formal
request.
Judges may participate in the process
of judicial selection
by cooperating with appointing authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration and by responding
to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship.
A judge must not testify
voluntarily as a character witness
because to do so may lend to the prestige
of the judicial office
in support of the party for whom the judge testifies. Moreover,
when a judge testifies as a witness,
a lawyer who regularly
appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward position
of
cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however,
testify when
properly summoned. Except in unusual circumstances where the
demands of justice
require, a judge should discourage a party
from requiring the judge to testify as a character
witness.
(3) A judge may not hold membership in any organization
that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion or national
origin.
COMMENT
Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimination gives rise to perceptions that the judge's
impartiality is impaired.
Whether an organization practices invidious discrimination is often a complex
question to which judges should be sensitive.
The answer
cannot be
determined from a mere examination of an organization's current membership rolls
but rather depends
on how the organization selects members and other
relevant factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values
of legitimate common
interest to its members or that it is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations could not be constitutionally prohibited.
Whether an organization, club or group is "private" depends
on a review of the following factors:
1) size; 2) purpose;
3)
policies; 4) selectivity in membership; 5) congeniality; and 6) whether
others are excluded
from critical aspects
of the relationship. An organization that is not "private" is generally said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or national
origin persons who would otherwise
be admitted to membership. See, New York State Club Ass'n. Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225,
101 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), 95
L. Ed. 2d 474; Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Organizations dedicated
to the preservation of religious, fraternal, sororal, spiritual, charitable, civic or cultural
values which do not stigmatize any excluded persons
as inferior and therefore unworthy
of membership are not considered
to discriminate invidiously.
Public manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing
approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety and diminishes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
When a judge has reason
to believe that an organization to which the judge belongs
engages in invidious
discrimination that would
preclude membership under
sub. (3) or under SCR 60.03,
the judge may, in lieu of resigning,
make immediate efforts
to have the organization discontinue its invidiously discriminatory
practices but must suspend participation in any other activities of the organization. If the organization fails
to discontinue
its invidiously discriminatory practices as promptly as possible, the judge must resign
from the organization.
SCR 60.04 A judge shall perform
the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.
The judicial duties
of a judge take precedence over all the judge's other
activities. The
judge's judicial duties
include all the duties of the judge's
office prescribed by law.
(1) In the performance of the duties under this section,
the following apply to adjudicative responsibilities:
(a) A judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge, except
those in which recusal is required under sub. (4) or disqualification is required under section 757.19
of the statutes and except
when judge substitution is requested and granted.
(b) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it. A judge may not be swayed by partisan
interests, public clamor
or fear of criticism.
(c) A judge shall
require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.
(d) A judge shall be patient, dignified
and courteous to
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity
and shall require
similar conduct of lawyers, staff,
court officials and others subject
to the judge's direction and control. During trials
and hearings, a judge shall act so that the judge's attitude,
manner or tone toward counsel
or witnesses does not prevent
the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth.
A judge may properly
intervene if the judge considers
it necessary to clarify a point or expedite the proceedings.
COMMENT
The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose
promptly of the
business of the court.
Judges can be efficient
and businesslike while being patient
and deliberate.
In respect to sub. (c), by order of June 4, 1996, the
Supreme Court adopted
Standards of Courtesy
and Decorum for the
Courts of Wisconsin, chapter 62 of the Supreme
Court Rules.
(e) A judge shall perform judicial
duties without bias or prejudice. A judge may not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest
bias or prejudice,
including bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status,
and may not knowingly permit
staff, court
officials and others
subject to the judge's direction
and control
to do so.
COMMENT
A judge must refrain
from speech, gestures
or other conduct that could
reasonably be perceived
as sexual harassment and must require the same standard
of conduct of others subject
to the judge's direction and control.
A judge must perform judicial
duties impartially and fairly. A
judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding
impairs the fairness
of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute. Facial expression and body language,
in addition to oral communication, can give to parties or lawyers in the proceedings, jurors, the media and others
an appearance of judicial bias.
A judge must be alert to avoid behavior
that may be perceived as prejudicial.
(f) A judge shall require lawyers
in proceedings before
the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status against parties,
witnesses, counsel or others. This subsection
does not preclude legitimate advocacy
when race, gender,
religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status
or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding.
(g) A judge shall accord
to every person
who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, or to that person's lawyer,
the right to be heard according to law. A judge may not initiate, permit,
engage in or consider ex parte communications concerning a pending
or impending action
or proceeding except
that:
1. A judge may initiate,
permit, engage in or consider
ex
parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters
or issues on the merits
if all of the following conditions are met:
a. The judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication.
b. When the ex parte communication may affect the substance of the action or proceeding, the judge promptly
notifies all of the other parties of the substance of the ex parte communication
and allows each party an opportunity to respond.
2. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding
before the judge
if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person
consulted and the substance of the advice
and affords the parties reasonable
opportunity to respond.
3. A judge may consult with other judges or with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying
out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities.
4. A judge may, with the consent
of the parties, confer separately with the parties
and their lawyers
in an effort to mediate or settle matters
pending before the judge.
5. A judge may initiate, permit,
engage in or consider ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law.
COMMENT
The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes
communications from lawyers,
law teachers, and other persons
who are not participants in the proceeding,
except to the limited extent permitted.
To the extent reasonably possible, all parties
or their lawyers shall be included in communications with a judge.
Whenever presence
of a party or notice to a party is required by SCR 60.04 (1) (g), it is the party's
lawyer, or if
the party is unrepresented, the party, who is to be present
or to whom notice is to be given.
An appropriate and often desirable
procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite
the expert to file a brief amicus curiae.
Certain ex parte communication is approved by SCR 60.04
(1) (g) to facilitate scheduling and other administrative purposes
and
to accommodate emergencies. In general,
however, a judge
must discourage ex parte communication and allow it only if all the criteria stated in SCR 60.04 (1) (g) are clearly met. A judge must disclose
to all parties all ex parte communications
described in SCR 60.04 (1) (g) 1 and 2 regarding a proceeding pending or impending before
the judge.
A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case
and must consider
only the evidence
presented.
A judge may request
a party to submit proposed
findings of
fact and conclusions of law, so long as the other parties are
apprised of the request and are given an opportunity to respond
to the proposed
findings and conclusions.
A judge should not accept trial briefs that are not
exchanged with adversary parties unless all parties agree
otherwise in advance
of submission of the briefs.
A judge must make reasonable efforts,
including the
provision of appropriate supervision, to ensure that SCR 60.04
(1) (g) is not violated
through law clerks or other personnel on
the judge's staff.
If communication between
the trial judge and the appellate
court with respect
to a proceeding is permitted,
a copy of any
written communication or the substance
of any oral communication
should be provided
to all parties.
The prohibition of a lawyer's
ex parte communication with a
judge and others is set forth in SCR 20:3.5.
(h) A
judge shall dispose of all judicial
matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.
COMMENT
In disposing of matters promptly,
efficiently and fairly,
a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights
of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved
without unnecessary cost or delay.
Containing costs while preserving fundamental rights of parties also protects the interests of witnesses and the
general public.
A judge should monitor
and supervise cases so as to reduce
or eliminate dilatory
practices, avoidable delays and unnecessary costs. A judge should
encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties
should not feel coerced into
surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved
by the courts.
Prompt disposition of the court's
business requires a judge to devote adequate
time to judicial duties, to be punctual
in attending court and expeditious in determining matters
under submission, and to insist that court officials, litigants and their lawyers
cooperate with the judge to that end.
(j) A judge may not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment
that may reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of the proceeding. The judge shall require
court personnel subject
to the judge's direction and control to similarly abstain
from comment. This subsection does not prohibit a judge from making public
statements in the course of his or her official
duties or from explaining for public
information the procedures of the court.
This paragraph does not
apply to proceedings in which the judge is a litigant
in a personal capacity.
COMMENT
The requirement that judges abstain
from public comment
regarding a pending or impending proceeding continues during any appellate process and until final disposition. This paragraph
does not prohibit
a judge from commenting on proceedings in which the
judge is a litigant in a personal
capacity, but in cases such as a writ of mandamus where the judge is a litigant
in an
official capacity, the judge must not comment
publicly.
(k) A judge may not commend
or criticize jurors
for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion
in a proceeding but may express appreciation to jurors for their service
to the judicial system and the community.
COMMENT
Commending or criticizing jurors
for their verdict
may imply a judicial expectation in future cases
and may impair a juror's
ability to be fair and impartial in a subsequent
case.
(m) A judge may not disclose
or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties,
nonpublic information acquired
in a judicial capacity.
(n) A judge may discuss nonpublic
information regarding a case that has exhausted its appellate remedies.
(o) A judge shall
cooperate with other judges as members of a common
judicial system to promote the satisfactory administration of justice.
(2) In the performance of the duties under this section,
the following apply to administrative responsibilities: (a) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's
administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial
administration, and should
cooperate with other judges and court officials
in the administration of court business.
(b) A judge shall
require staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction and control
to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and
to refrain
from manifesting bias or prejudice
in the performance of their official duties.
(c) A judge may not make unnecessary appointments. A judge shall exercise
the power of appointment impartially and on the
basis of merit. A judge shall avoid nepotism
and favoritism. A judge may
not approve compensation of appointees
beyond the fair value of services rendered.
COMMENT
Appointees of a judge include assigned
counsel, officials such as referees, commissioners, special masters, receivers
and guardians and personnel such as clerks,
secretaries and bailiffs.
Consent by the parties to an appointment or an award of compensations does not relieve
the judge of the obligation
prescribed by SCR 60.04 (2) (c).
(3) In the performance of the duties under this section the following apply to disciplinary responsibilities:
(a) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that another
judge has committed a violation of this chapter
should take appropriate action. A judge having personal
knowledge that another
judge has committed
a violation
of this chapter that raises
a substantial question
as to the other judge's
fitness for office
shall inform the appropriate authority.
(b) A judge who receives information indicating a
substantial likelihood that a lawyer
has committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct for attorneys
should take appropriate action. A judge having
personal knowledge that a lawyer
has committed a violation of the rules of professional
conduct for attorneys
that raises a substantial question
as to
the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in
other respects shall inform
the appropriate authority. This
paragraph does not require
a judge to report conduct
disclosed through a judge's participation in a group to assist ill or disabled judges
or lawyers when such information is acquired in the course of assisting an ill or disabled judge or lawyer.
(c) Acts of a judge, in the discharge
of disciplinary
responsibilities, required
or permitted under par. (a) or (b) are part of a judge's judicial
duties and shall be absolutely
privileged and no civil action
predicated on those acts may be instituted against the judge.
COMMENT
Appropriate action
may include direct
communication with the judge or lawyer who has committed
the violation, other direct action if available, and reporting the violation to an
appropriate
authority or other agency or body.
(4) Except as provided
in sub. (6) for waiver,
a judge shall recuse himself
or herself in a proceeding
when the facts and circumstances the judge knows
or reasonably should
know establish one of the following or when reasonable, well-informed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics
standards and the
justice system and aware of the facts and circumstances the judge
knows or reasonably should
know would reasonably question the judge's
ability to be impartial:
COMMENT
Under this rule, a judge must recuse himself
or herself whenever the facts and circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should know raise reasonable question
of the judge's ability to act impartially, regardless of whether
any of the
specific rules in SCR 60.04 (4) applies. For example,
if a judge
were in the process of negotiating for employment with a law
firm, the judge would
be required to recuse himself
or herself from any matters
in which that law firm appeared, unless
the recusal was waived by the parties
after disclosure by the judge.
Section 757.19 of the statutes
sets forth the circumstances
under which a judge is required by law to disqualify himself
or
herself from any civil or criminal action
or proceeding and
establishes
the procedures for disqualification and waiver.
A judge should
disclose on the record information that the
judge believes the parties or their lawyers
might consider
relevant to the question of recusal, even if the judge believes
there is no real basis
for recusal.
By decisional law, the rule of necessity
may override the
rule of recusal. For example,
a judge might be required
to
participate
in judicial review
of a judicial salary statute
or
might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate
judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or temporary
restraining order.
In the latter case, the judge must disclose
on the record
the basis for possible recusal
and use reasonable
efforts to transfer
the matter to another judge as soon as
practicable.
(a) The judge has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
COMMENT
As a general
matter, for recusal
to be required under this provision, the personal bias or prejudice
for or against a party or the personal knowledge of disputed facts
must come from an extrajudicial source. A bias or prejudice requiring
recusal most often
arises from a prior personal
relationship but may arise
from strong personal
feelings about the alleged conduct
of a
party. If a judge's personal
bias or prejudice concerning a
party's lawyer is of such a degree as to be likely
to transfer to
the party, the judge's recusal
is required under this provision.
(b) The judge of an appellate
court previously handled
the action or proceeding as judge of another court.
(c) The judge served
as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer
with whom the judge previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer
concerning the
matter, or the judge has been a material
witness concerning the matter.
COMMENT
A lawyer in a government agency
does not ordinarily have an association with other lawyers
employed by that agency within the meaning
of SCR 60.04 (4) (d); a judge formerly employed
by a government agency, however,
should recuse himself
or herself in a proceeding if the judge's
impartiality reasonably may be questioned because of such association.
(d) The judge knows
that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's
spouse or minor child wherever
residing, or any other member
of the judge's family residing
in the judge's household has an economic
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest
that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.
COMMENT
A financial interest
requiring recusal does not occur
solely because the judge is a member of a political or taxing body that is a party or is a ratepayer
to a party. The test then remains
whether the judge's
interest as a taxpayer or ratepayer could
be substantially affected
by the outcome.
(e) The judge or the judge's
spouse, or a person within
the third degree
of kinship to either of them, or the spouse
of such
a person meets one of the following criteria:
1. Is a party to the proceeding or an officer,
director or trustee
of a party.
2. Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
3. Is known by the judge
to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected
by the proceeding.
4. Is to the judge's knowledge
likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
COMMENT
The fact that a lawyer
in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm
with which a relative
of the judge is affiliated
does not of itself require
the judge's recusal.
Under appropriate
circumstances, the fact that the judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned or that the relative is known
by the judge to have an interest
in the law firm that could be "substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceeding" may require the judge's recusal.
Recusal is not required
under this provision
if the judge determines on the record that a subpoena purporting to make his or her relative a witness is false, sham or frivolous.
(5) A judge shall keep informed
of the judge's own personal
and fiduciary economic
interests and make a reasonable
effort to keep informed of the personal
economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor children
residing in the judge's household,
having due regard for the confidentiality of the spouse's
business.
(6) A judge required
to recuse himself
or herself under sub. (4) may disclose
on the record the basis
of the judge's recusal and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence
of the judge, whether to waive recusal.
If,
following disclosure of any basis for recusal
other than personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be required
to recuse himself
or herself and the judge
is then willing
to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated in the record
of the proceeding.
COMMENT
A waiver procedure
provides the parties
an opportunity to proceed without
delay if they wish to waive the recusal. To assure
that consideration of the question
of waiver is made independently of the judge,
a judge must not solicit,
seek or hear comments on a possible
waiver of the recusal unless
the lawyers jointly
propose a waiver after consultation as provided in
the rule. A party may act through counsel
if counsel represents on the record that the party has been consulted and consents. As a practical matter,
a judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers
sign the waiver agreement.
SCR 60.05 A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra- judicial activities as to minimize
the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
(1) Extra-judicial Activities in General. A judge shall
conduct all of the judge's extra-judicial activities so that they do none of the following:
(a) Cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity
to act
impartially as a judge.
(b) Demean the judicial office.
(c) Interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.
COMMENT
Complete separation of a judge from extra-judicial
activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should
not become isolated
from the community
in which the judge lives.
Expressions
of bias or prejudice by a judge,
even outside
the judge's judicial
activities, may cast reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge.
See SCR 60.03 (1) and (3).
(2) Avocational
Activities. A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach
and participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system,
the administration of justice and nonlegal subjects,
subject to the requirements of
this chapter.
COMMENT
As a judicial
officer and person
specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration
of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and juvenile justice.
To the extent that
time permits, a judge is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law. Judges may participate in efforts to promote the fair administration of justice, the independence of the judiciary
and the integrity of the legal profession and may express
opposition to the persecution of lawyers and judges in other countries
because of their professional activities.
In this and other
subsections of SCR 60.05, the phrase
"subject
to the requirements of this chapter" is used, notably
in
connection with a judge's governmental, civic or charitable
activities. This phrase is included
to remind judges
that the
use of permissive language in various provisions of the chapter
does not relieve
a judge from the other requirements of the
chapter that apply
to the specific conduct.
(3) Governmental,
Civic or Charitable Activities.
(a) A judge may not appear at a public hearing
before, or otherwise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official
except on matters
concerning the law, the legal system or
the administration of justice or except when acting pro se in a matter
involving the judge or the judge's interests.
COMMENT
See SCR 60.03 (2) regarding the obligation to avoid improper
influence.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (3)(a) does not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
(b) A judge may not accept
appointment to a governmental committee or commission or other governmental position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice. A judge may represent
a country, state or locality
on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical,
educational or cultural
activities and may serve on a governmental or private committee, commission or board
concerned with historical, educational or cultural
activities. A judge may serve
in any branch of miliary
reserves and be called to duty in the active
military.
COMMENT
A judge is prohibited from accepting any governmental position except one relating
to the law, legal system or administration of justice as authorized by par. (c). The appropriateness of accepting extra-judicial assignments must be assessed in light of the demands
on judicial resources created by crowded
dockets and the need to protect the courts from involvement in extra-judicial matters
that may prove to be controversial. Judges should
not accept governmental
appointments that are likely to interfere with the effectiveness
and independence of the judiciary.
This provision does not govern a judge's
service in a non governmental position. See par. (c) permitting service by a judge with organizations devoted
to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice and with educational, religious, charitable, fraternal
or civic organizations not conducted
for profit. For example,
service on the board of a public educational institution, unless it were a law school, would
be prohibited, but service on the board of a
public law school or any private educational institution would generally be permitted under par. (c).
As provided
in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (3)(b) does not apply to a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
(c) A judge may serve as an officer,
director, trustee or nonlegal advisor
of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice or of a nonprofit educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, sororal or civic organization, subject to the following
limitations and the other requirements
of this chapter:
COMMENT
This provision
does not apply to a judge's service
in a governmental position unconnected with the improvement of the law,
the legal system or the administration of justice; see par.
(b).
See Comment to SCR 60.05 (2) regarding use of the phrase
"subject to the following limitations and the other requirements
of this chapter." As an example of the meaning
of the phrase, a
judge permitted by this provision to serve on the board of a
fraternal institution may be prohibited from such service
by SCR
60.03 (1) or (3) or 60.05 (1) if the institution practices
invidious discrimination or if service
on the board otherwise
casts reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity
to act impartially
as a judge.
Service by a judge on behalf of a civic or charitable
organization
may be governed by other provisions of SCR 60.05 in
addition to sub. (3). For example, a judge is prohibited by sub.
(7) from serving
as a legal advisor to a civic or charitable
organization.
1. A judge may not serve as an officer,
director, trustee
or nonlegal
advisor if it is likely that the organization will do any of the following:
a. Engage in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the
judge.
b. Engage frequently in adversary proceedings in the court of which the judge
is a member or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a member.
COMMENT
The changing nature
of some organizations and of their relationship to the law makes it necessary for a judge to regularly re-examine the activities of each organization with which the judge is affiliated to determine if it is proper for the judge to continue
the affiliation. For example,
in many jurisdictions charitable hospitals are now more frequently in court than in the past. Similarly, the boards of some legal aid organizations now make policy
decisions that may have political
significance or imply commitment to causes that may come before the
courts for adjudication.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
par. (c) l.b. does not apply to
a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
2. A judge, in any capacity:
a. May assist the organization in planning fund-raising
activities and may participate in the management and investment
of the organization's funds
but may not personally participate in the solicitation of funds or other fund-raising activities,
except that a judge may solicit funds from other judges over whom
the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority;
COMMENT
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
par. (c) 2.a. does not apply to a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
b. May make recommendations to public and private fund- granting organizations on projects and programs concerning the law, the legal system
or the administration of justice;
c. May not personally participate in membership
solicitation if the solicitation reasonably may be perceived as coercive or, except as permitted in subd. 2 a, if the membership
solicitation is essentially a fund-raising mechanism; and
COMMENT
As provided in SCR 60.07(2), par. (c) 2.c. does not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
d. May not use or permit the use of the prestige of judicial office
for fund raising
or membership solicitation.
COMMENT
A judge may solicit membership or endorse or encourage membership efforts for an organization devoted
to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice or
a nonprofit educational, religious, charitable, fraternal
or civic organization as long as the solicitation cannot
reasonably be perceived
as coercive and is not essentially a fund-raising mechanism. Solicitation of funds for an organization and solicitation of memberships similarly
involve the danger
that the person solicited will feel obligated
to respond favorably to the solicitor if the solicitor is in a position of influence or control. A judge must not engage in direct, individual
solicitation of funds or memberships in person, in writing or by telephone except in the following cases:
1) a judge may solicit for
funds or memberships other judges over whom the judge does
not exercise supervisory or appellate authority, 2) a judge may
solicit other persons
for membership in the organizations
described above if neither those persons nor persons with whom
they are affiliated are likely ever to appear
before the court on
which the judge serves, and 3) a judge who is an officer of such
an organization may send a general membership solicitation
mailing over the judge's signature.
SCR 60.05 should
not be read as proscribing participation in
de minimis fund-raising activities so long as a judge is careful
to avoid using the prestige of the office in the activity. Thus,
e.g., a judge may pass the collection basket
during services at church, may ask friends
and neighbors to buy tickets
to a pancake breakfast for a local neighborhood center
and may cook the pancakes at the event but may not personally ask attorneys and others who are likely to appear before the judge to buy tickets
to it. Similarly,
SCR 60.05 should
not be read to prohibit
judges from soliciting memberships for religious
purposes, but
judges must nevertheless avoid using the prestige of the office
for the purpose
of such solicitation.
Use of an organization letterhead for fund raising or
membership solicitation does not violate
subd. 2 provided
the
letterhead
lists only the judge's name and office
or other
position in the organization and, if comparable designations are
listed for other persons,
the judge's judicial
designation. In
addition, a judge must make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the
judge's staff, court officials and others subject
to the judge's
direction and control
do not solicit funds on the judge's
behalf
for any purpose,
charitable or otherwise.
A judge may be a speaker or guest of honor at an
organization's fund-raising event provided
there is no
advertising
of the judge as speaker
or guest of honor in order to
encourage people to attend and make contributions and provided
that any contributions at the event are made prior to the judge's
speech or presentation as guest of honor. A judge's attendance
at such event is permissible if otherwise consistent with this
chapter.
(4) Financial Activities.
(a) 1. A judge may not engage in financial
or business dealings that could meet any of the following conditions:
a. Reasonably
be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial
position.
b. Involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing
business relationships with those lawyers
or other persons
likely to come before the court on which the judge serves.
COMMENT
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
sub. (4)(a)l.b. does not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
2. A judge shall
comply with sub. (4)(a)1 as soon as reasonably possible and, in any event, within one year of the applicability of this chapter
to the judge.
COMMENT
When a judge acquires in a judicial
capacity information, such as material contained
in filings with the court, that is not yet generally known, the judge must not use the information for private gain.
See SCR 60.03 (2) and 60.04 (1) (m).
A judge must avoid financial
and business dealings
that involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business
relationships with persons
likely to come either before
the judge personally or before
other judges on the judge's
court. In
addition, a judge should discourage members of the judge's family from engaging
in dealings that would reasonably appear to exploit the judge's
judicial position. This rule is necessary
to avoid creating an appearance of exploitation of office or favoritism
and to minimize
the potential for recusal or disqualification.
With respect to affiliation of relatives of a judge with law
firms appearing before
the judge, see Comment
to SCR 60.04 (4)
relating to recusal.
Participation
by a judge in financial
and business dealings
is subject to the general prohibitions in SCR 60.05 (1) against
activities
that tend to reflect adversely on impartiality, demean
the judicial office,
or interfere with the proper
performance of
judicial duties.
Such participation is also subject to the
general prohibition in SCR 60.03 against activities involving
impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety and the prohibition
in SCR 60.03 (2) against
the misuse of the prestige
of judicial
office. In addition,
a judge must maintain high standards of
conduct in all of the judge's activities, as set forth
in SCR
60.02. See Comment to SCR 60.05 (2) regarding use of the phrase
"subject
to the requirements of this chapter."
If engaged in a financial
or business activity
at the time
this chapter becomes
applicable to the judge, a judge may
continue to do so for a reasonable period not to exceed one year.
(b) A judge may, subject to the requirements of this chapter, hold and manage
investments of the judge and members of the judge's
family, including real estate, and engage in other remunerative activity.
COMMENT
Subject to the requirements of this chapter,
a judge may hold and manage investments owned solely by the judge, investments owned solely by a member or members
of the judge's
family, and investments owned jointly by the judge and members
of
the judge's family.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
sub. (4)(b) does not apply to a
judge serving on a part-time
basis.
(c) 1. A judge may not serve as an officer, director,
manager, general partner,
advisor or employe
of any business entity except that a judge may, subject to the requirements of this chapter,
manage and participate in any of the following:
a. A business closely
held by the judge or members of the judge's
family.
b. A business entity
primarily engaged in investment of the financial resources of the judge or members of the judge's
family.
2. A judge shall
comply with par. (c) 1 as soon as reasonably possible and, in any event, within one year of the applicability of this chapter
to the judge.
COMMENT
Subject to the requirements of this chapter,
a judge may participate in a business
that is closely
held either by the judge
alone, by members
of the judge's family, or by the judge and
members of the judge's family.
Also, subject
to the requirements of this chapter, a judge may participate in the activities of a "not for profit" (charitable) business.
Although participation by a judge
in a closely-held family business might otherwise be permitted by sub.
(4) (c), a judge may be prohibited from participation by other provisions of this
chapter when, for example,
the business entity
frequently appears before the judge's court or the participation requires
significant time away from judicial duties.
Similarly, a judge
must avoid participating in a closely-held family business if the
judge's participation would involve misuse
of the prestige of judicial
office.
A judge may continue
to serve under (c) 1 for the period of time necessary
to avoid serious adverse consequences to the business entity but in no event longer than one year.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (4)(c) does not apply to a
judge serving on a part-time
basis.
(d) A judge shall manage the judge's investments and other financial interests so as to minimize
the number of cases in which the judge's recusal
or disqualification is required.
COMMENT
As provided in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (4)(d) does not apply to a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
(e) A judge may not accept,
and shall urge members of the judge's
family residing in the judge's
household not to accept, a gift, favor or loan from anyone except for the following:
COMMENT
Sub. (4) (e) does not apply to contributions to a judge's campaign for judicial office.
Because a gift, favor or loan to a member of the judge's family residing
in the judge's household might be viewed
as intended to influence the judge, a judge must inform those
family members of the relevant
ethical constraints upon the judge in
this regard and discourage those family members
from violating
them. A judge cannot, however,
reasonably be expected
to know or
control all of the financial
or business activities of all family
members residing in the judge's
household.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
sub. (4)(e) does not apply to a
judge serving on a part-time
basis.
1. A gift incident
to a public testimonial, books, tapes and other resource
materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official
use, or an invitation to the
judge and the judge's
spouse or guest to attend a bar-related
function or an activity devoted
to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.
COMMENT
Acceptance of an invitation to a law-related function is governed
by sub. (4) (e) 1; acceptance of an invitation paid for by an individual lawyer or group of lawyers
is governed by sub. (4) (e) 8.
A judge may accept a public testimonial or a gift incident thereto only if the donor organization is not an organization whose members comprise or frequently represent
the same side in litigation, and the testimonial and gift are otherwise 1n compliance with other provisions of this chapter.
See SCR 60.05 ( 1) (a) and 60.03 (2).
2. A gift, award or benefit
incident to the business, profession or other separate
activity of a spouse or other family member of a judge residing in the judge's
household, including gifts, awards and benefits
for the use of both the spouse
or
other family member
and the judge,
provided the gift, award or
benefit could
not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.
3. Ordinary social
hospitality.
4. A gift from a relative.
5. A gift from a friend for a special occasion, such as a wedding, anniversary or birthday, if the gift is fairly commensurate with the occasion
and the relationship.
COMMENT
A gift to a judge, or to a member
of the judge's family living in the judge's
household, that is excessive in value
raises questions about
the judge's impartiality and the integrity
of the judicial
office and might require recusal
or disqualification of the judge where recusal
or disqualification would not otherwise be required. See, however,
par. (e) 5.
6. Anything of value if the activity or occasion for which it is given is unrelated
to the judge's use of the state's
time, facilities, services
or supplies not generally available to all citizens of this state and the judge can show by clear and convincing evidence
that it was unrelated to and did not arise from the judge's holding
or having held a public office.
7. A gift, favor or loan from a relative
or close personal
friend whose
appearance or interest
in a case would in any event require recusal
under SCR 60.04(4).
8. A loan from a lending institution in its regular
course of business
on the same terms generally
available to persons who are not judges.
9. A scholarship or fellowship awarded
on the same terms and based on the same criteria applied
to other applicants.
10. Any other gift, favor or loan, only if the donor is not a party or other person
who has come or is likely to come or
whose interests have come or are likely to come before
the judge.
COMMENT
Unless authorized by other provisions of sub. (4) (e), sub. (4)(e) 10 prohibits
judges from accepting
gifts, favors or loans from
lawyers or their
firms if they have come or are likely to come before
the judge; it also prohibits gifts, favors or loans from
clients of lawyers
or their firms when the clients' interests have come or are likely
to come before the judge.
See sec. 19.43 et seq., Stats.
(5) Fiduciary Activities.
(a) A judge may not serve as executor,
administrator or other personal representative, trustee, guardian, attorney-in-
fact or other fiduciary, except
for the estate, trust or person of a member of the judge's family,
and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his or her judicial duties.
(b) A judge may not serve as a fiduciary if it is likely that
the judge as a fiduciary
will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge or if the estate, trust or ward becomes involved
in adversary proceedings in the court on which
the judge serves or one under its appellate jurisdiction.
(c) The same restrictions on financial activities that
apply to a judge personally also apply to the judge while acting in a fiduciary capacity.
(d) A judge shall comply
with pars. (a) and (b) as soon as
reasonably possible
and, in any event, within
one year of the applicability of this chapter
to the judge.
COMMENT
A judge who is a fiduciary
at the time this chapter
becomes effective for the estate
or person of one who is not a member of the judge's family
may continue to act as such if the demands
on his or her time and the possibility of a conflict
of interest are not substantial and for the period of time necessary to avoid serious adverse consequences to the beneficiary of the fiduciary
relationship but in no event longer than one year.
The restrictions imposed
by SCR 60.05 may conflict
with the
judge's obligation as a fiduciary. For example,
a judge should
resign as trustee
if detriment to the trust would result
from
divestiture
of holdings the retention of which would
place the
judge in violation
of sub. (4) (d).
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
sub. (5) does
not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
(6) Service as Arbitrator or Mediator. A judge may not act as an arbitrator or mediator or otherwise perform
judicial functions in a private capacity unless expressly authorized by law.
COMMENT
Paragraph
(6) does not prohibit a judge from participating in arbitration, mediation or settlement conference performed as part of judicial
duties.
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
sub. (6) does not apply to a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
(7) Practice of Law. A judge may not practice
law. Notwithstanding this prohibition, a judge may act pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft
or review documents for a member of the judge's
family and represent
without compensation the estate of a person with whom the judge
maintains a close familial
relationship so long as the estate remains uncontested.
COMMENT
This prohibition refers
to the practice of law in a representative capacity
and not in a pro se capacity. A judge may act for himself
or herself in all legal matters, including
matters involving litigation and matters involving
appearances before or other dealings
with legislative and other governmental
bodies. However, in so doing,
a judge must not abuse the prestige of office to advance the interests of the judge or judge's
family. See SCR 60.03 (2).
The chapter allows
a judge to give legal advice
to and draft legal documents
for members of the judge's
family, so long as the judge receives
no compensation. A judge must not, however, act
as an advocate
for a member of the judge's family in a legal
matter.
The restraint against a judge giving advice to parties in matters
before the judge
does not prohibit
a judge from advising such parties to obtain
lawyers or medical
treatment and from advising such parties on similar matters
unrelated to the merits of
the matter before
the judge.
As provided
in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (7) does not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
(8) Compensation, Reimbursement and Reporting.
(a) Compensation
and Reimbursement. A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the extra-judicial
activities permitted by this chapter
if the source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge's performance of judicial duties
or otherwise give the appearance
of impropriety.
1. Compensation
may not exceed a reasonable amount nor may the compensation exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.
2. Expense reimbursement shall be limited
to the actual
cost of travel,
food and lodging
reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the occasion,
by the judge's spouse or guest. Any payment
in excess of that amount
is compensation.
(b) Financial Reports.
Except as provided in SCR 60.07,
a
judge shall file with the ethics board a timely
financial report as required by section 19.43 of the statutes. The report
shall also be filed by commissioners of the supreme
court, staff attorneys of the court of appeals, the director of state courts,
members of the board of attorneys professional responsibility and members
of the board of bar examiners.
COMMENT
The
chapter does not prohibit a judge from accepting honoraria or speaking fees provided that the compensation is reasonable and commensurate with the task performed. A judge should ensure,
however, that no conflicts are created by the arrangement. A judge must not appear to trade on the judicial
position for personal
advantage. Nor should a judge spend significant time away from court duties to meet speaking or writing commitments for compensation. In addition,
the source of the payment
must not raise any question
of undue influence or the judge's
ability or willingness to be impartial.
See SCR 60.05
(4) (e) and sec. 19.56,
Stats., regarding reporting of gifts and loans.
As provided
in SCR 60.07(2), sub. (8) does not apply to a judge serving on a part-time
basis.
SCR 60.06 A judge or judicial
candidate shall refrain
from inappropriate political
activity.
NOTE: Because the Wisconsin
judiciary is elective
and nonpartisan, rules governing a judge's political
and campaign activity that may be appropriate in other jurisdictions may not be responsive to the political
and campaign realities
in this state. Accordingly,
in order that due consideration be given to
the preparation and promulgation of such rules,
the Supreme Court will appoint a committee
composed of judges,
lawyers, and public members to consult persons
and entities experienced in the matter of judicial
ethics as it pertains to political and campaign activity and draft for the court's
consideration a comprehensive
set of ethical rules in this area. After the committee
files its recommendations with the court, the court will invite comment
and hold a public hearing
on the proposal.
Pending submission of that committee's report, the public
hearing and the court's action in the matter, the court
promulgates
the following provisions from the Supreme Court Rules
-- 1994.
(1) Candidate for office.
A judge shall not become a candidate for a federal,
state or local nonjudicial elective
office without first resigning his or her judgeship.
COMMENT
This rule was considered necessary because of the possibility that a candidacy
for an office to take effect after the expiration of the judicial
term would not be barred
by SCR
60.04. It was felt that the appeal
to the electorate by a
sitting judge for a nonjudicial office was inherently in conflict
with his or her duty to serve impartially all of the people.
(2) Party membership. Except for activities concerning his or her own election, a judge shall not be a member of any political party or participate in its affairs,
caucuses, promotions, platforms, endorsements, conventions or activities.
A judge shall not make or solicit
financial or other
contributions in support of its causes or publicly
endorse or speak on behalf
of its candidates or platforms.
COMMENT
As an individual, a judge is entitled to his or her personal
view on political questions and to rights
and opinions as a citizen.
However, as a member of Wisconsin's nonpartisan judiciary, a judge must avoid any conduct which associates him or her with any political party.
This rule does not preclude a
judge from attending a political meeting
as a member of the public, but he or she shall not attend
as a participant.
(3) Promises. A judge who is a candidate for judicial office shall not make or permit
others to make in his or her behalf promises
or suggestions of conduct in office which
appeal to the cupidity or partisanship of the electing
or appointing power. A judge shall not do or permit others to do in his or her behalf
anything which would commit the judge or appear to commit the
judge in advance with respect
to any particular case or controversy or which suggests
that, if elected
or chosen, the
judge would administer his or her office with partiality, bias or favor.
COMMENT
As provided in SCR 60.07(2),
SCR 60.06 does not apply to a judge serving
on a part-time basis.
SCR 60.07 Applicability.
(1) Subject to sub. (2), all judges shall comply with this chapter.
(2) A judge who serves
on a part-time basis, including
a
reserve judge,
a part-time municipal
judge and a part-time court commissioner, is not required
to comply with the following: SCR
60.05(3)(a), (b), (c)1.b., 2.a.and
c., (4)(a)1.b., (b),
(c), (d)
and (e), (5), (6), (7) and (8) and SCR 60.06.