2009 WI 92
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Supreme Court of |
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Case No.: |
2009AP941-D |
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In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against P. Nicholas Hurtgen, Attorney at Law: Office of Lawyer Regulation, Complainant, v. P. Nicholas Hurtgen, Respondent. |
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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HURTGEN |
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Opinion Filed: |
September 9, 2009 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
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Dissented: |
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Not Participating: |
PROSSER, J., did not participate. |
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Attorneys: |
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2009 WI 92
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license revoked.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney P. Nicholas Hurtgen has filed a petition for consensual license revocation pursuant to SCR 22.19.[1] He states he cannot successfully defend against pending charges of professional misconduct relating to his conviction, entered following a guilty plea, to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2 in connection with a long-running federal investigation of corruption in the administration of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich.
¶2 Attorney Hurtgen was admitted to practice law in
¶3 The facts from the indictment are complicated and will be only
briefly summarized by this court.
Attorney Hurtgen was a senior managing director in the
¶4 The indictment alleges that between early 2001 through at least
June 2004, the three men conspired to defraud
¶5 According to the indictment, Levine, Kiferbaum, and Attorney
Hurtgen agreed they would use Levine's position on the Planning Board to try to
force
¶6 According to the indictment, Attorney Hurtgen agreed to introduce
Kiferbaum to the CEO of Edward Hospital. Kiferbaum understood that Levine would direct
the CEO to provide him with a kickback.
According to the indictment, in mid-December 2003, Attorney Hurtgen
called
¶7 On January 8, 2004, Attorney Hurtgen met again with the CEO as
well as with
¶8 As of the April 21, 2004, Planning Board meeting,
¶9 Attorney Hurtgen eventually reached a plea agreement whereby he promised to cooperate with the investigation in return for a recommendation of a lighter sentence. He entered a guilty plea on February 25, 2009.
¶10 Attorney Hurtgen is a Wisconsin-licensed attorney who engaged in felonious behavior by participating in a pay-to-play scheme. Admittedly, Attorney Hurtgen was not acting as an attorney when he engaged in this scheme, but his participation in this scheme reflects serious misconduct that violates the public trust. The OLR recommends revocation as the appropriate sanction, and Attorney Hurtgen does not oppose this recommendation. He acknowledges he cannot successfully defend against the allegations of the pending disciplinary proceeding. He states that he is freely, voluntarily, and knowingly filing the petition for consensual license revocation. He notes that he is represented by counsel, and states that he knows he is giving up his right to contest the allegations of misconduct.
¶11 Therefore, we accept Attorney Hurtgen's petition for consensual
license revocation, and we revoke Attorney Hurtgen's license to practice law in
¶12 IT IS ORDERED that the license of P. Nicholas Hurtgen to practice
law in
¶13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not already done so, P. Nicholas Hurtgen shall comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an attorney whose license to practice law has been revoked.
¶14 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.
[1] SCR 22.19 provides, in
pertinent part:
(1) An attorney who is the subject of an investigation for possible misconduct or the respondent in a proceeding may file with the supreme court a petition for the revocation by consent [of] his or her license to practice law.
(2) The petition shall state that the petitioner cannot successfully defend against the allegations of misconduct.
. . .
(5) The supreme court shall grant the petition and revoke the petitioner's license to practice law or deny the petition and remand the matter to the director or to the referee for further proceedings.