2009 WI 83
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Case No.: |
2008AP1913-CQ |
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Bruce A. Tammi, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. |
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CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE 7TH CIRCUIT |
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Opinion Filed: |
July 17, 2009 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
February 4, 2009
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Attorneys: |
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For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey S. Fertl and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
For the plaintiff-appellee there was a brief by Bruce A. Tammi, and oral argument by Bruce A. Tammi.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Frank J. Daily, Mitchell S. Moser, and Quarles & Brady LLP,
2009 WI 83
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
CERTIFICATION of questions of law from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Certified
questions answered, in part, and cause remanded.
¶1 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This case is before the court on certification
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pursuant to
Wis. Stat. § 821.01
(2007-08)[1]
and Circuit Rule 52 (Circuit Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit). The four certified questions
relate to damages permitted in a suit under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171,
1. When a consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute Section 218.0171(1)(b)4[.] brings an action pursuant to subsection (7), if that consumer, after making his Lemon Law demand, then exercises an option to purchase and buys the vehicle as provided in the lease, is the consumer then entitled to recover the amount of the purchase price?
2. If the consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute Section 218.0171(1)(b)4[.] is entitled to recover the vehicle purchase price when he exercises the purchase option provided in the lease, does the purchase amount qualify as pecuniary loss subject to the doubling provision in subsection (7)?
3. If the answers to questions 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, is the consumer permitted to keep the purchased vehicle in addition to the receipt of the damage award or must the vehicle be returned to the manufacturer?
4. Is a damage award under subsection (7) subject to a reduction for reasonable use of the vehicle?
Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am.,
Inc., 536 F.3d 702, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2008).
¶2 We answer the first certified question as
follows: No. When a consumer who is
leasing a motor vehicle brings an action against the manufacturer of the
vehicle pursuant to subsection (7) of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, and then exercises his option to
purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, the consumer is not entitled
to damages for the price of his voluntary purchase because his purchase was not
"caused" by any violation of the statute by the manufacturer. See
¶3 Because
our answer to the first certified question is "no," it is unnecessary
for us to reach the second and third certified questions, as they depend upon a
"yes" answer to the first question.
A discussion of certified questions two and three would devolve into an
impermissible discussion of a hypothetical situation, because this case does
not implicate a consumer who is entitled to recover his vehicle purchase
price. As the resolution of those issues
"depends on hypothetical or future facts, [they are] not ripe for
adjudication and will not be addressed by this court." State v. Armstead, 220
¶4 We
answer the fourth certified question as follows: The plain language of the
statute makes clear that a consumer's refund under Wis. Stat.
§ 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. or 3.a. is subject to a reasonable allowance for
use. Because we read subsection (7) in
conjunction with the rest of the statute, we conclude that the amount of
"pecuniary loss" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) must incorporate
a reasonable allowance for use before the pecuniary loss is doubled.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[3]
¶5 On May 30, 2003, Bruce A. Tammi (Tammi) entered into a 36-month
lease with Zimbrick Inc. Hyundai & European of Madison (Zimbrick) for a
2003 Porsche 911 Turbo Coupe.[4] Tammi was an avid car enthusiast and member
of the Porsche Club of
¶6 Tammi's payment obligations under the 36-month lease amounted to $69,327.10. This total included an initial payment of $1,999.85, 35 monthly payments of $1,912.35 ($66,932.25), and a termination fee of $395.00.
¶7 Tammi had significant experience purchasing expensive cars, and he frequently purchased vehicles via lease contracts containing options to purchase. In this case, he negotiated a sophisticated lease under which he could purchase the Porsche at the end of the lease or at any time during the lease. The negotiated purchase price at the end of the lease was $64,344.10, plus taxes and fees. If Tammi decided to exercise his option to purchase prior to the expiration of 36 months, the $64,344.10 purchase price would be increased pro rata based upon the previously negotiated residual value of the vehicle, namely $63,994.10.
¶8 Approximately eight months after Tammi took possession of the Porsche,
he began to encounter mechanical problems with the vehicle. See id. Tammi's Porsche was equipped with a rear
spoiler that was "designed to deploy automatically when the vehicle
exceeded 75 m.p.h."
¶9 Between March and August 2004, Tammi took his vehicle to a
certified Porsche service provider for repairs at least eight times.[5] See id. at 705. He always brought the vehicle to certified
Porsche service providers so that he would not violate any provisions of his
lease.
¶10 On September 7, 2004, Tammi submitted the requisite notice under
¶11 On October 14, 2004, following Porsche's denial of his claim, Tammi filed a Lemon Law complaint in Waukesha County Circuit Court, seeking double damages for his lease payments in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7). See id. Citing diversity jurisdiction, Porsche removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See id. A month or so later, on December 6, 2004, Tammi filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Tammi's motion, finding that there were issues of material fact that remained unresolved: specifically, whether the vehicle had a substantial impairment that would constitute a nonconformity under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(f).
¶12 Tammi filed Federal Rule 26[6] disclosures on January 14, 2005, alleging damages for the amount of his lease, his tire rack and floor mat purchases, and his insurance expenditures. His initial damages disclosure did not include the purchase price of the vehicle. Following Tammi's disclosures, the district court ordered that discovery be completed by September 1, 2005.
¶13 In December 2005, while the case was pending, Tammi exercised his option to purchase the Porsche vehicle for $75,621.88. Tammi, 536 F.3d at 705. Because Tammi's purchase occurred after his initial lease payment of $1,999.85, plus 29 subsequent monthly lease payments of $1,912.35, his payments under the lease totaled $57,458.00.[7] Despite his ongoing claim that the vehicle was a lemon, Tammi testified that he had fixed the spoiler malfunction on his own, see id. at 705 n.1, and decided to purchase the vehicle because he felt it was worth more than the lease buyout amount.
¶14 On April 12, 2006, the district court held a scheduling conference during which it referred the case to mediation and set a final pretrial conference for August 3, 2006. Tammi subsequently revised his Rule 26 disclosures to include a claim of damages for the purchase price of the vehicle. In response, Porsche filed several motions in limine asking the court to limit Tammi's damages to his lease payments. The district court denied these motions.
¶15 Ultimately, Tammi sought the following in damages:
[R]ecovery of his lease payments ($57,458.00), the amount he paid for the purchase of the car under the [buyout] option of the lease ($75,621.88), insurance ($2,457.85), winter tires ($2,044.11) and floor mats and an auto manual ($788.71), for a total of $138,370.55. [He also wanted] to retain ownership of the car.
¶16 On August 24, 2006, the jury determined that Tammi had suffered a
"nonconformity covered by the manufacturer's express warranty which
substantially impaired the use, value or safety of his vehicle."
¶17 Following the verdict, Tammi renewed his pre-trial position that
the court should have given a specific Lemon Law damages instruction, not a
general damages instruction, and he asked that the damage award be changed as a
matter of law. After hearing argument
and taking the issue of damages under advisement, the district court revised
the jury award, concluding as a matter of law that Tammi was entitled to
reimbursement for his lease payments ($57,458.00) and the purchase price he
paid for the vehicle ($75,621.88). See
id. Pursuant to the Wisconsin
Lemon Law, the court doubled the "pecuniary loss" for a total award
of $266,159.76, plus costs.[8] See id. The district court also allowed Tammi to keep
the Porsche.
¶18 In holding that Tammi was entitled to the return of his lease
payments, the district court stated that, because Tammi was obligated to make
those payments under the lease, those payments should be refunded. See Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am.,
No. 04-C-1059, 2007 WL 777522, *4 (E.D.
¶19 As to the return of Tammi's purchase price, the district court
relied on this court's opinion in Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197
¶20 The
district court declined to include Tammi's costs for winter tires, a tire rack,
or insurance in the revised damages award because these items were not
"purchased at or near the time of delivery of the car."
¶21 Finally,
the district court ruled that Tammi could keep the Porsche and refused to
reduce the damage award based on Tammi's reasonable use of the vehicle prior to
his Lemon Law complaint. The court
stated that Tammi would not receive "twice the amount of any pecuniary
loss," as required under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7), "[i]f the
court requires that [he] return the car."
¶22 Following the district court's modification of the damages award, Porsche appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[10] Tammi, 536 F.3d at 706-07. Porsche presented three arguments: (1) "there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the vehicle had a nonconformity" that violated the Lemon Law; (2) the jury's verdict was against the "overwhelming weight of the evidence" regarding any substantial impairment of the vehicle's use, value, or safety; and (3) the district court erred in calculating Tammi's damage award. See id.
¶23 On August 4, 2008, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "there
was sufficient evidence presented that the vehicle Tammi leased suffered a
nonconformity that substantially impaired its use," thereby rejecting
Porsche's argument that the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the
evidence.
¶24 This court accepted certification on September 11, 2008.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶25 The issues in this case require us to determine damages under
III. DISCUSSION
¶26 To answer the questions certified by the Seventh Circuit, we must
interpret
We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language. Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the primary focus of inquiry. It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public. Therefore, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.
¶27 Therefore, we start with the language of the statute.
A. Overview of
¶28 The Wisconsin Lemon Law is one of
¶29 Subsection (1) of
¶30 Subsection
(2) imposes obligations upon motor vehicle manufacturers and their agents. The first obligation is the obligation of
repair located in paragraph (a):
(a) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to an applicable express warranty and the consumer [1] reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, the motor vehicle lessor or any of the manufacturer's authorized motor vehicle dealers and [2] makes the motor vehicle available for repair [3] before the expiration of the warranty or one year after first delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is sooner, the nonconformity shall be repaired.
¶31 Under subsection (2)(a), the manufacturer or the manufacturer's
agent has an obligation to repair a "nonconformity," which is
defined as a "condition or defect which substantially impairs the use,
value or safety of a motor vehicle."
¶32 "Recovery under the statute is provided in both subsection
(2)(a) and (2)(b)." Kletzien v.
Ford Motor Co., 668 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Wis. 1987). Subsection (2)(a) was discussed by the court
of appeals in Vultaggio v. General Motors Corp., 145
Subsection (2)(a) protects the consumer from those instances in which the consumer is unable to establish the "reasonable attempt to repair" necessary under sec. [218.0171(2)(b)], but can show that the dealer has not, cannot, or will not repair a nonconformity brought to its attention during the warranty period. In accord with the remedial purpose of sec. [218.0171], that consumer should still be afforded relief.
¶33 If the remedies of refund or replacement are not available for a
violation of subsection (2)(a) alone, the consumer may recover "any
damages caused by a violation" of subsection (2)(a) and collect twice the
amount of that "pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and
reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable relief the court determines
appropriate."
¶34 The point of this discussion is that the Wisconsin Lemon Law has been interpreted for more than 20 years as providing recovery for a violation of subsection (2)(a). If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that when damages "caused by a violation of this section" are determined under subsection (7), they should be linked to a specific violation of the statute and vary based on the facts of each case.
¶35 Subsections (2)(b) and (c) impose additional obligations on manufacturers and their agents:
(b) 1. If after a reasonable attempt to repair the nonconformity is not repaired, the manufacturer shall carry out the requirement under subd. 2. or 3., whichever is appropriate.
2. At the direction of a consumer described under sub. (1)(b)1., 2. or 3., do one of the following:
a. Accept return of the motor vehicle and replace the motor vehicle with a comparable new motor vehicle and refund any collateral costs.
b. Accept return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the consumer's motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the full purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, amount paid by the consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use.
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)
(emphasis added). Subdivision b. then
continues on, creating a ceiling on the amount that may be deducted as "a
reasonable allowance for use" from a refund of the full purchase price.[15] Reasonable allowance for use is not a factor
under subdivision a. See
¶36 Plainly, subsection (2)(b)2. applies to purchasers and
others who acquire title to a new motor vehicle. See
¶37 A manufacturer's failure to comply with the obligations set out in
subsection (2)(b)2. permits the consumer to file suit under subsection (7).
See Gosse v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8,
¶12, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 N.W.2d 896 (recognizing that Wis.
Stat. § 218.015(7) (1997-98), now Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7),
"allows the consumer to enforce the statute by bringing legal
action"). The consumer's
"pecuniary loss" in subsection (7) is the loss "caused by a
violation of this section."
¶38 A consumer acting under subsection (2)(b)2. may receive a
comparable new motor vehicle or a refund of the full purchase price, as
provided, but the consumer does not get double his purchase price, or
attorney fees, or other add-ons not contemplated by (2)(b)2., as long as the
manufacturer complies timely with the demand.
A manufacturer that fails to comply timely with a consumer's demand
under (2)(b)2. assumes the risk of paying twice the vehicle's full purchase
price and other items mentioned in (2)(b)2.b.——namely, "any sales tax, finance charge[s], amount
paid by the consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs"——plus the consumer's
reasonable attorney fees, plus other "costs" and
"disbursements" and even possible "equitable relief," plus
its own attorney fees, if any. See
¶39 Subsection (2)(b)3. applies to lessees. See
3. a. With respect to a consumer described in sub. (1)(b)4., [namely, a lessee,] accept return of the motor vehicle, refund to the motor vehicle lessor and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the current value of the written lease and refund to the consumer the amount the consumer paid under the written lease plus any sales tax and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use.
b. Under this subdivision, the current value of the written lease equals the total amount for which that lease obligates the consumer during the period of the lease remaining after its early termination, plus the motor vehicle dealer's early termination costs and the value of the motor vehicle at the lease expiration date if the lease sets forth that value, less the motor vehicle lessor's early termination savings.
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)
(emphasis added).
¶40 These provisions, providing explicit protections for lessees, were
approved in 1987. 1987
B. Certified Question One
¶41 In its first certified question, the Seventh Circuit asked the following:
When a consumer defined in Wisconsin Statute Section 218.0171(1)(b)4[.] brings an action pursuant to subsection (7), if that consumer, after making his Lemon Law demand, then exercises an option to purchase and buys the vehicle as provided in the lease, is the consumer then entitled to recover the amount of the purchase price?
Tammi, 536 F.3d at 713. For the reasons stated, we believe the answer is no.
¶42 A purchaser obtains title to a motor vehicle. A purchaser is obligated to pay for the
entire motor vehicle. A purchaser will
typically be required to pay the institution that provided financing for the
vehicle so that the purchaser could purchase the vehicle from the manufacturer. In this scenario, the manufacturer has been
fully paid and the consumer is fully obligated unless and until the contract is
rescinded. Hence, a remedy that returns
the vehicle to the manufacturer and requires the manufacturer to make a full
refund of the consumer's purchase price, including taxes and finance charges,
attempts to restore the parties to the situation they were in before the
purchase. Hughes, 197
¶43 In a typical lease situation, a financial institution——the lessor——has paid the manufacturer, and the lessor holds title to the motor vehicle during the term of the lease.[18] The lessee has financial obligations to the lessor for a specific term. Depending upon the terms of the lease, the lessee may purchase the vehicle from the lessor at or before the end of the lease, or may walk away at the end of the lease. In short, the financial obligation of the lessee is not as great as the financial obligation of a purchaser. This is why Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. provides that the manufacturer must refund "to the motor vehicle lessor"——not the consumer lessee——"the current value of the written lease" and why the consumer lessee receives a refund of only "the amount the consumer paid under the written lease plus any sales tax and collateral costs [as defined], less a reasonable allowance for use."
¶44 Both the consumer and the lessor have obligations to the manufacturer
that must be satisfied to receive a refund.
The consumer lessee must offer to return the motor vehicle to the
manufacturer.
¶45 Logically, if the manufacturer violates the statute by failing to
provide a refund, then the consumer's damages caused by the violation
are equal to the consumer's total financial obligation under the lease,
not the lease payments to date, "plus any sales tax and collateral costs,
less a reasonable allowance for use."
See
¶46 Put differently, when a lessee receives a refund under § 218.0171(2)(b)3., the
lease becomes unenforceable against the consumer because the consumer has
returned the vehicle.
¶47 The facts in this case present an additional wrinkle. In the midst of the dispute over the manufacturer's obligations to the lessee, the lessee opted to become a purchaser——opted to change his status. Tammi asserts that he was entitled to purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, and he contends that he is not only entitled to a refund of his reduced lease obligation but also a refund of his entire purchase price. Both, he contends, are measures of his "pecuniary loss," which should be doubled by the court as a matter of law.
¶48 This is not how we read the statute. A consumer may be entitled to purchase
the vehicle under his lease, but he is not required to purchase the
vehicle. An option is not the same as an
obligation. See, e.g., Clear
View Estates, Inc. v. Veitch, 67
¶49 The consumer also may keep the vehicle when the consumer has opted to purchase the vehicle.
¶50 Although we believe this policy is clear, we base our conclusion on
the statutory language. Subsection (7)
provides that "a consumer may bring an action to recover for any damages caused
by a violation of this section."
¶51 Subsection (7) provides that "[t]he court shall award a
consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of any pecuniary
loss."
¶52 In this case, the district court submitted the question of damages to the jury. The jury awarded damages of $26,600.00. The court modified these damages. The court was required to have some basis in law for modifying the verdict. The basis in law is found in the statute. Subsection (7) cannot be viewed as wholly separate from the rest of the statute.[21] The subsections of the statute must be reconciled.
C. Certified Question Four
¶53 The fourth certified question reads as follows: "Is a damage award under subsection (7) subject to a reduction for reasonable use of the vehicle?" Tammi, 536 F.3d at 714.
¶54 As noted, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7)
cannot be viewed as wholly separate from the rest of the statute. It is very clear from the statute that a purchaser-consumer
who demands a refund of the full purchase price is subject to "a
reasonable allowance for use."
¶55 Under subsection (7), a lessee-consumer is entitled to a refund of
his entire lease obligation. In a normal
situation, we see no reason in equity or in the statute to disregard "a
reasonable allowance for use" to reduce the amounts used in determining
"pecuniary loss." We note that
"reasonable allowance for use" is not a precise term. The ceilings provided in the statute are not
inflexible. See
¶56 The statute provides ample penalties for violation——namely, a doubling of the
consumer's "pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and
reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable relief the court determines
appropriate."
¶57 Here the consumer is an attorney who represented himself and did not ask for attorney fees. We were not asked to address this subject.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶58 The purpose of the Lemon Law is to ensure that manufacturers, who
almost always have superior bargaining power in consumer transactions, comply
speedily with its requirements to make the consumer whole. See Hughes, 197
¶59 There are, however, limitations to the penalties that may be imposed for a manufacturer's violations. Recognizing those limitations will not undermine the effectiveness of an important consumer protection statute.
¶60 When a consumer who is leasing a motor vehicle brings an action
against the manufacturer of the vehicle pursuant to subsection (7) of Wis.
Stat. § 218.0171,
and then exercises his option to purchase the vehicle under the terms of the
lease, the consumer is not entitled to damages for the price of his voluntary
purchase because his purchase was not "caused" by any violation of
the statute by the manufacturer. See
¶61 Furthermore, the plain language of the statute makes clear that a consumer's refund under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2.b. or 3.a. is subject to a reasonable allowance for use. Because we read subsection (7) in conjunction with the rest of the statute, we conclude that the amount of "pecuniary loss" under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7) must incorporate a reasonable allowance for use before the pecuniary loss is doubled.
¶62 By the Court.—Certified questions of law answered, in part, and the cause is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further proceedings.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.
[2]
[3] The facts and procedural history are based upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 536 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); the relevant order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge, Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., No. 04-C-1059, 2007 WL 777522 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2007); and the briefs and appendices of the parties.
[4] Zimbrick promptly assigned its interest in Tammi's lease to U.S. Bank (hereinafter "the lessor").
[5] Tammi first took his Porsche for repairs on March 2, 2004, by which time he had put about 6,500 miles on the car.
[6] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires each party to file certain pretrial disclosures, including "a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).
[7] The parties differ slightly as to the total lease payments made between May 30, 2003, and November 30, 2005. This is, of course, a question of fact. The district court calculated Tammi's lease payments to be $57,458.00. Tammi, 2007 WL 777522, *3. We accept this finding of fact. Any discrepancy as to the actual amount of payments made does not affect this court's discussion of the certified questions.
[8] In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer may bring an action to recover for any damages caused by a violation of this section. The court shall award a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate.
[9] See also Tammi, 2007 WL 777522, *9.
[10] The appeal was heard by Judge Joel M. Flaum, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple, and Judge Daniel A. Manion, who authored the court's opinion. Tammi, 536 F.3d at 704.
[11] See 1985
[12] The following persons are also identified as consumers under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(b):
2. A person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred for purposes other than resale, if the transfer occurs before the expiration of an express warranty applicable to the motor vehicle.
3. A person who may enforce the warranty.
The Lemon Law groups these consumers with consumers who purchase new motor vehicles under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(1)(b)1. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)2., (c), and (f).
[13] See also Dussault
v. Chrysler Corp., 229
[14] In its amicus curiae
brief in Vultaggio v. General Motors Corp., 145 Wis. 2d 874, 429 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1988), the
Wisconsin Department of Justice cited a Minnesota Law Review Note on a
Minnesota statutory provision similar to Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a).
See Julie A. Vergeront, Note, A Sour Note: A Look at the
[15] Under this subdivision, a
reasonable allowance for use may not exceed the amount obtained by multiplying
the full purchase price of the motor vehicle by a fraction, the denominator of
which is 100,000 or, for a motorcycle, 20,000, and the numerator of which is
the number of miles the motor vehicle was driven before the consumer first reported
the nonconformity to the motor vehicle dealer.
[16] The manufacturer is
expected to "refund to the consumer and to any holder of a perfected security
interest in the consumer's motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the
full purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, amount paid by the
consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance
for use."
[17] Kenny Rogers, The Gambler, on The Gambler (United Artists 1978).
[18] Leases are structured
so that lessees take possession of the property, but legal title remains with
the lessor. See
[19] Doubling the lessee's total financial obligation under the lease eliminates the disparities that would occur if the "pecuniary loss" were measured by the amount of lease payments actually made, on a case-by-case basis, depending upon when suit was filed and concluded during the course of a lease. The manufacturer is ultimately responsible for the current value of the written lease. The consumer should be credited with the full lease obligation because he assumes the burden of resolving the matter in court.
[20] If the lessee has voluntarily spent money to accessorize the leased vehicle and then must give the accessorized vehicle back to the manufacturer upon refund of the lease obligation, the lessee may be able to seek reimbursement of these costs. Whether such costs would be included in the lessee's "pecuniary loss" under the statute would depend on the facts.
[21] Contrary language is
found in Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 234, ¶10, 248