2008 WI 87
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Supreme Court of |
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Case No.: |
2006AP939 |
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Complete Title: |
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Estate of James B. Sustache, by its Special Administrator, James Sustache, and Antoinette Sustache, Plaintiffs, v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant-Respondent, Carrie A. Roman, Defendant, Larry Mathews and Jeffrey W. Mathews, Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. |
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REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 2007 WI App 144 Reported at: 303 (Ct. App. 2007-Published) |
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Opinion Filed: |
July 10, 2008 |
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Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
February 29, 2008
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Source of Appeal: |
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Court: |
Circuit |
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County: |
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Judge: |
Wilbur W. Warren III
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Justices: |
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Concurred: |
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). |
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Dissented: |
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Not Participating: |
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Attorneys: |
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For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were
briefs by John V. O’Connor and O’Connor, Dumez,
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Terry J. Booth and Piper & Schmidt,
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, Katherine Stadler, and
2008 WI 87
notice
This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.
¶1 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals,[1] which affirmed an order of the Kenosha County Circuit Court, Wilbur W. Warren III, Judge.
¶2 In this insurance coverage dispute, the circuit court entered summary judgment dismissing defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family), which insured, under separate policies: (1) defendants Larry Mathews (Mathews) and Jeffrey W. Mathews (Jeffrey),[2] and (2) defendant Carrie A. Roman (Roman). American Family provided an initial defense to the Mathewses and Roman under a reservation of rights and moved to stay the proceeding on liability until the issue of coverage was resolved. In this review, only the dismissal of American Family with respect to the defense of the Mathewses is before us.
¶3 The issue presented is whether an insurer has a duty to defend an
insured, under the liability coverage provisions of a homeowner's insurance
policy, when the plaintiffs' complaint asserts that the insured "without warning
or provocation, punched decedent out, causing him to fall into a curb thereby
causing serious injuries and ultimately death," leading to a count of
"battery . . . by intentionally
causing bodily harm . . . thereby causing
decedent's death." Relying on Berg
v. Fall, 138
¶4 After carefully considering the facts and circumstances of this case, especially the allegations of the complaint and the pertinent homeowner's policy, we conclude that the Mathewses' homeowner's policy does not provide coverage for the plaintiffs' claims. Consequently, American Family has no duty to continue to defend the Mathewses. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
¶5 James B. Sustache (Sustache) died from injuries sustained after an altercation at an underage drinking party hosted by Roman and her minor son, Anthony Fuller. During this altercation, Jeffrey punched Sustache in the face, causing him to fall to the curb and sustain severe injuries that ultimately led to his death. The altercation stemmed from events earlier that evening when "a number of [party attendees] started calling [Jeffrey] on his cell phone," harassing and goading him to "come over to the party to engage in a fight with [Sustache]." There is no dispute that Jeffrey intended to strike Sustache; there is also no dispute that Jeffrey did not intend his blow to be fatal.[3]
¶6 Sustache's estate and his parents, James and Antionette Sustache, sued Jeffrey, Mathews, Roman, and American Family, which had issued separate homeowner's insurance policies to Roman and Mathews. The plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleged five causes of action, four of which relate to the defendants participating in this appeal.[4] Count 2 alleged that Jeffrey negligently failed to inquire into the true source of the phone calls before striking Sustache. Count 3 alleged that "[Jeffrey] committed battery without provocation by intentionally causing bodily harm to [Sustache] without [his] consent thereby causing [his] death." Count 4 sought to hold Mathews vicariously liable for Jeffrey's "willful, malicious and wanton" acts pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.035.[5] Count 5 sought punitive damages for Jeffrey's "willful, wanton and malicious" acts.[6]
¶7 Although the plaintiffs' opening complaint did not identify American Family as the Mathewses' insurer, American Family provided a defense under a reservation of rights. The assigned attorney filed an answer to the plaintiffs' first amended complaint denying all allegations against the Mathewses and affirmatively defending, in part, on the ground that Jeffrey acted in self-defense.
¶8 The Mathewses' American Family homeowner's policy provides personal liability coverage for an "insured," which includes both Mathews and Jeffrey. Specifically, the policy states: "We will pay, up to our limit, compensatory damages for which any insured is legally liable because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence covered by this policy."
¶9 The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period, in: a. bodily injury; or b. property damage." The term "accident" is not defined in the policy.
¶10 The policy enumerates the following exclusions from coverage:
8. Illegal Consumption of Alcohol. We will not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of the insured's knowingly permitting or failing to take action to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by an underage person.
9. Imputed Liability. We will not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of any liability imputed to any insured which is otherwise excluded in this policy.
10. Intentional Injury. We will not cover bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of any insured even if the actual bodily injury or property damage is different than that which was expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured.
The policy also provides that personal liability coverage does not extend to punitive damages.
¶11 The policy includes a defense provision that also references an "occurrence." The defense provision states:
Defense Provision.
If a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this policy applies, we will provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We will defend any suit or settle any claim for damages payable under this policy as we think proper. (Emphasis added.)
¶12 On December 27, 2005, American Family moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that its policy did not cover the plaintiffs' claims and that it
had no duty to continue to defend the Mathewses because: (1) the plaintiffs'
damages were not caused by an "occurrence" covered under the policy;
(2) the policy expressly excluded coverage for punitive damages; (3) the policy
expressly excluded coverage for imputed liability——such as vicarious liability under Wis. Stat. § 895.035——"which is otherwise
excluded in th[e] policy"; and (4) the policy expressly excluded coverage
for intentional injury. American Family
asserted that the four-corners rule, which provides that an insurer's duty to
defend is determined solely on the allegations in the complaint, not extrinsic
facts, precluded any inquiry into Jeffrey's self-defense claim.
¶13 The Mathewses opposed American Family's motion by relying upon the
court of appeals' opinion in Berg, which carved out an exception to the
four-corners rule in a situation where the insured's claim of self-defense
renders an intentional acts exclusion ambiguous. Berg, 138
¶14 While acknowledging the similarities between Berg and the
case at bar, the circuit court concluded that the four-corners rule "has
been well settled law in the State of
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed in a published opinion. Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 2007 WI App 144, ¶21, 303
¶16 The Mathewses petitioned this court for review, which we granted on September 13, 2007.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
¶17 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, relying on the same
methodology as the circuit court. Doyle,
219
¶18 This case requires us to interpret an insurance contract to
determine the scope of an insurer's duty to defend its insureds. This involves a question of law that we
review de novo. Everson v. Lorenz,
2005 WI 51, ¶10, 280
B. Discussion
1. General Principles
¶19 An insurance policy functions as a contract between the insured and
the insurer. Smith, 226
¶20 An insurer's duty to defend its insured is determined by comparing
the allegations of the complaint to the terms of the insurance policy. School Dist. of Shorewood v.
¶21 Courts liberally construe the allegations in the complaint and
assume all reasonable inferences. Fireman's
Fund, 261
¶22 In determining whether there is a duty to defend, the court first
considers whether the insuring agreement makes an initial grant of coverage——i.e., whether the insurer
has a duty to indemnify its insured——for
the claims asserted. See Am.
Girl, 268
¶23 Only after concluding that coverage exists does the court examine
the policy's exclusions to determine whether they preclude coverage. Am. Girl, 268
¶24 The Mathewses contend that their case requires this court to
evaluate whether
¶25 When an insurer contests whether there is a contractual obligation
to indemnify its insured, it has several options.[8] One of the insurer's options is to provide a
defense to the insured on the merits, under a reservation of rights, until the
coverage issue is resolved. Baumann
v. Elliott, 2005 WI App 186, ¶8,
286
¶26 Both the insurer and the insured have the right to have the court
resolve the issue of coverage separate from any trial on liability. See 2 Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin
Insurance Law §§ 7.51-52,
at 38-40 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing alternatives for both the insurer and the
insured when coverage is alleged or disputed).
¶27 The four-corners rule is normally stated as a rule in which the
insurer's duty to defend is determined "without resort to extrinsic facts
or evidence." Fireman's Fund,
261
¶28 Here, however, we are beyond the initial duty to defend stage of the proceedings. American Family satisfied its duty to defend by providing the Mathewses with an attorney. It then moved the court to stay the proceedings on liability so that it could contest the issue of coverage. It moved for summary judgment and asked for a coverage hearing. It presented the court with affidavits. These affidavits included more evidence than the insurance policies and the complaint; they included transcripts of the depositions of Jeffrey and Anthony Fuller, Roman's son. The Mathewses did not submit affidavits. The circuit court was not oblivious to this additional evidence when it concluded that the facts were "relatively clear and for the most part not in dispute."
¶29 Where the insurer has provided a defense to its insured, a party has provided extrinsic evidence to the court, and the court has focused in a coverage hearing on whether the insured's policy provides coverage for the plaintiff's claim, it cannot be said that the proceedings are governed by the four-corners rule. The insurer's duty to continue to defend is contingent upon the court's determination that the insured has coverage if the plaintiff proves his case.
2. "Occurrence"
¶30 We turn to comparing the coverage provided by the homeowner's policy to the allegations in the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, supplemented by affidavits. With respect to personal liability coverage and defense of claims, the Mathewses' American Family homeowner's policy states:
COVERAGE D – PERSONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
We will pay, up to our limit, compensatory damages for which any insured is legally liable because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence covered by this policy.
Defense Provision.
If a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this policy applies, we will provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We will defend any suit or settle any claim for damages payable under this policy as we think proper. (Emphasis added.)
¶31 To determine whether the policy provides coverage for the
plaintiffs' claims, the court must first consider whether the facts in the
complaint allege an "occurrence" covered under the policy. See Everson, 280
¶32 As stated above, the Mathewses' policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period, in: a. bodily injury; or b. property damage." The term "accident" is not defined in the policy.
¶33 This court has construed the undefined term "accident" in
an insurance policy on a number of occasions.
For example, in Doyle v. Engelke, we reviewed an insurer's duty
to defend a claim alleging negligent supervision. Doyle, 219
¶34 The Doyle court noted that "accident" was
undefined in the policy and that words in insurance policies are given their
"common, everyday meaning."
¶35 In American Girl this court reviewed a coverage dispute
between a liability insurer and a general contractor over whether the general
contractor's CGL policy provided coverage for "property damage"
resulting from an alleged "occurrence." Am. Girl, 268
¶36 The court construed "occurrence."
The dictionary definition of "accident" is: "an event or condition occurring by chance or arising from unknown or remote causes." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 11 (2002). Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as follows: "The word 'accident,' in accident policies, means an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation. A result, though unexpected, is not an accident; the means or cause must be accidental." Black's Law Dictionary 15 (7th ed. 1999).
Am. Girl,
268
¶37 The
court concluded that the circumstances of the plaintiff's claim fell within the
definition of "occurrence" because the property damage that occurred
was "clearly not intentional," nor was it "anticipated by the
parties."
¶38 In Everson v. Lorenz this court reviewed whether strict
responsibility misrepresentation and/or negligent misrepresentation in a real
estate transaction constituted an "occurrence" for purposes of a CGL
insurance policy, triggering the insurer's duty to defend. Everson, 280
¶39 In Everson, defendant Lorenz owned land in a subdivision,
and plaintiff Everson bought a lot in the subdivision for the purpose of
constructing a single-family home.
¶40 Lorenz had a CGL liability policy that covered "property
damage" caused by an "occurrence."
¶41 The Everson court evaluated whether Lorenz's alleged
misrepresentation constituted an "accident" for purposes of
coverage.
¶42 The Everson court concluded that Lorenz's misrepresentation
could not be considered an "accident" for purposes of liability
coverage.
¶43 The volitional nature of Lorenz's act was key. The court determined that "where there
is a volitional act involved in such a misrepresentation, that act removes it
from coverage as an 'occurrence' under the liability insurance
policy."
¶44 Finally,
we revisited the issue of whether misrepresentations constitute an
"accident" in Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc.,
2008 WI ___, ___
¶45 Stuart
involved allegations of misrepresentations by WSGI personnel, made in violation
of the Home Improvement Trade Practices Act,[11]
to induce the homeowners to enter into contracts for home remodeling and
design.
¶46 In
concluding that the misrepresentations to the homeowners were not accidental,
and therefore not covered as an "occurrence" under WSGI's CGL policy,
this court consulted dictionary definitions and past decisions in Doyle,
Everson, and American Girl and concluded that an
"accident" "is an event or condition occurring by chance or one
that arises from unknown causes, and is unforeseen and unintended."
¶47 Keeping
these analyses of "accident" in mind, we turn to the Mathewses' case.
¶48 The
plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleged that during the underage drinking
party at Roman's house "a number of the attending teenagers started
calling [Jeffrey] on his cell phone" to harass him and bait him to come to
the party "to engage in a fight with [Sustache]." The complaint further alleged that
"[s]hortly thereafter, defendant [Jeffrey] showed up at the party, asked
for [Sustache] and without warning or provocation, punched [Sustache] out,
causing him to fall into a curb thereby causing serious injuries and ultimately
death."
¶49 Count
2 alleged that Jeffrey "was negligent in not asking [Sustache] whether or
not he was the person that had been calling him on his cell phone and baiting
him into a fight." If Jeffrey had
asked Sustache whether he was the person calling, Jeffrey allegedly would have
learned that Sustache had not called him.
Count 2 alleged that Jeffrey's failure to take the "reasonable
step" of ascertaining whether Sustache called him "was a proximate
cause of the damages sustained by plaintiffs and resulted in [Sustache's]
death." Although claims of negligence
normally qualify for coverage, this negligence claim dropped out of
consideration in circuit court when the Mathewses conceded that it was
insufficient.
¶50 Count
3 of the complaint alleged that "[Jeffrey] committed battery without
provocation by intentionally causing bodily harm to [Sustache] without
[his] consent thereby causing [Sustache's] death." (Emphasis added.) This count prompted Jeffrey's claim of
self-defense.
¶51 We
conclude that the allegations in the plaintiffs' first amended complaint,
supplemented by Jeffrey's deposition,[12]
cannot reasonably be construed to constitute a covered claim under the
Mathewses' homeowner's policy. The
American Family policy provides indemnity coverage and a duty to defend for an
"occurrence," defined as an "an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results during the
policy period, in: a. bodily injury; or b. property damage." Once again, the term "accident" is
not defined.
¶52 Considering
the discussion of "accident" in Doyle, we cannot conclude that
an allegation that Jeffrey "intentionally caus[ed] bodily harm to
[Sustache]" could reasonably be "characterized by a 'lack of
intention.'" Doyle, 219
¶53 The American
Girl court's discussion of "accident" also buttresses our
conclusion. The court referred to Black's
Law Dictionary for the notion that "[a] result, though unexpected, is
not an accident; the means or cause must be accidental." Am. Girl, 268
¶54 Like the allegation of a pre-sale misrepresentation of fact in Everson,
the allegations of intentional battery here evince a degree of volition
inconsistent with the term "accident." See Everson, 280
¶55 Finally, there is nothing in Stuart that is inconsistent with this analysis.
¶56 We conclude that no reasonable person would regard the alleged intentional battery perpetrated by Jeffrey against Sustache as an "unexpected . . . event," or an "unforeseen incident . . . characterized by a lack of intention,"[14] or "an event . . . occurring by chance or arising from unknown or remote causes."[15] Striking the words "without provocation" from the complaint would not alter the essence of the complaint: that Jeffrey intentionally caused bodily harm to Sustache. Accordingly, we hold that the Mathewses' policy does not cover the plaintiffs' claims because Jeffrey's actions were not accidental and, thus, did not give rise to an "occurrence."
3. Intentional Injury Exclusion
¶57 In determining whether there is a duty to defend, the court first
considers whether the insuring agreement makes an initial grant of
coverage. Am. Girl, 268
¶58 Since we concluded above that the plaintiffs' suit does not give rise to coverage for Jeffrey's actions, we need not consider the policy's intentional injury exclusion.
¶59 The language of the Mathewses' policy resolves the question of the duty to continue to defend once the question of coverage has been decided. The defense provision of the policy states that defense counsel will be provided by American Family "[i]f a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this policy applies." (Emphasis added.)
¶60 Since the plaintiffs' suit was not brought against the Mathewses for damages "caused by an occurrence to which th[e] policy applies," American Family has no duty to continue to defend.
III. CONCLUSION
¶61 After carefully considering the facts and circumstances of this case, especially the allegations of the complaint and the pertinent homeowner's policy, we conclude that the Mathewses' homeowner's policy does not provide coverage for the plaintiffs' claims. Consequently, American Family has no duty to continue to defend the Mathewses. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
¶62 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I agree with the majority that this is not a case in which the four corners rule is applicable. The majority aptly explains why this case does not present the issue of whether there are exceptions to the four corners rule.
¶63 I also agree with the majority that the conduct here does not constitute an accident or occurrence within the meaning of the Matthews' insurance policy. I write separately because of the majority's mixed analysis of "accident," and my belief that we should interpret "accident" as would the reasonable insured.
¶64 The majority fails to provide a clear statement of why Jeffrey's action does not constitute an accident, and hence an occurrence, within the meaning of the Matthews' insurance policy. Instead, it offers mixed rationales that lead to confusion rather than clarity. Ultimately, the majority proffers an understanding of "accident" that does not comport with the understanding of the reasonable insured.
¶65 The focus of this case is the conduct alleged in count 3 of the complaint, and supplemented by deposition testimony. See majority op., ¶¶50-51. Count 3 alleges that Jeffrey "committed battery without provocation by intentionally causing bodily harm . . . ." Specifically, Jeffrey punched Sustache in the face.
¶66 In determining that this case does not involve an accident, the
majority offers shifting rationales. The first rationale it offers is that
Jeffrey intentionally caused bodily harm to Sustache.
¶67 The majority's
second rationale is that Jeffrey "intended the punch" that caused
Sustache's injury and death.
¶68 The majority's
third rationale is that "Jeffrey voluntarily traveled to Sustache's
location . . . to confront him and intentionally punched
Sustache . . . ." Majority op., ¶54. According to the
majority, this constitutes "a pattern of volitional action."
¶69 My view is that we
should stick with this court's longstanding doctrine in interpreting
insurance policies. Language in an insurance policy should be construed as
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the insured. Frost v.
Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶20,
257
¶70 Thus, the majority's first rationale, the fact that Jeffrey intended harm to Sustache when he threw the punch, is sufficient to determine that there is no accident here. The analysis should end right there.
¶71 Accordingly, because of the majority's mixed analysis of "accident," and for the reasons set forth more fully in my concurrence in Stuart II, I respectfully concur.
[1] Estate of Sustache v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI App 144, 303
[2] Defendants Larry Mathews and Jeffrey W. Mathews will be referred to collectively as "the Mathewses."
[3] The record is silent regarding whether Jeffrey was criminally charged for the incident. Counsel for the Mathewses indicated at oral argument that Jeffrey has not been criminally charged.
[4] Count 1 of the plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleges that Roman was negligent per se for violating Wis. Stat. § 125.07 by failing to take action to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by underage persons on premises owned or under her control. The circuit court granted summary judgment to American Family on this count.
[5] All references to the
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated.
Wisconsin Stat. § 895.035(2)(a) provides in pertinent part: "The parent or parents with custody of a minor child, in any circumstances where he, she, or they may not be liable under the common law, are liable . . . for personal injury attributable to a willful, malicious, or wanton act of the child."
[6] To resolve this appeal, we need to consider only Count 3. Roman has not appealed, thereby eliminating the need to consider Count 1. The plaintiffs conceded below that Count 2 fails to give rise to coverage. We need not consider Count 4 because it involves the vicarious liability of Mathews, which hinges upon our determination of coverage under Count 3. Furthermore, the American Family policy unambiguously excludes coverage for imputed liability. Finally, Count 5 is also unambiguously excluded from coverage, and the Mathewses failed to rebut American Family's argument to that effect on summary judgment.
[7] "Once the circuit court
resolves the question of indemnity in the insurer's
favor . . . coverage is no longer open to debate. An insurer need not defend a suit in which it
has no economic interest." Baumann
v. Elliott, 2005 WI App 186, ¶10, 286
[8] In Baumann, the court
of appeals indicated that insurers may seek to resolve coverage issues in
several ways: (1) By seeking a declaratory judgment; (2) By entering into an
agreement with the insured to defend while retaining the right to challenge
coverage; (3) By affording a defense under a reservation of rights; and (4) By
seeking a bifurcated trial in which the court decides the coverage issue in a
separate action from the action on the merits of the complaint. Baumann, 286
[9] In American Girl, a
subcontractor's negligence led to the general contractor's faulty site preparation
for a construction project, excessive settlement of soil on the site, and the
building's foundation eventually sinking.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶3,
268
[10] Lorenz appeared to make a
negligent typographical error in the real estate condition report, typing lot
"21" instead of lot "31" before giving the report to
Everson. Everson then bought lot 31,
which had flood plain problems. Everson
v. Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶¶5,
16 n.3, 280
[11]
[12] Jeffrey testified regarding
the incident at a January 10, 2006, deposition.
He indicated that prior to hitting Sustache, the two individuals were
encircled by a group of people yelling and chanting for a fight. Jeffrey removed his shirt, despite the fact
it was the middle of winter, to avoid having the shirt get in the way during a
fight. Sustache, who appeared
intoxicated, had his fists clenched at his sides, stepped forward, and pushed
Jeffrey in the chest with both hands.
Someone in the circle yelled "cops," Jeffrey turned to look,
and a person standing behind Sustache blurted out "hurry up and hit him,
he's not looking." Jeffrey testified:
Q So did you——after you were pushed, did you stop your motion back and pause, or was it a fluid motion when you came back?
A Fluid motion.
Q Did you——ultimately you struck Mr. Sustache, correct?
A Yes.
Q At what point do you——did you strike him with a fist?
A Yes.
. . . .
Q Where did you first strike Mr. Sustache?
A In his left jaw.
Q To your knowledge, was he facing you squarely when you struck him?
A Yes.
. . . .
Q What happened after you struck Mr. Sustache in the left cheek?
A He fell to the ground.
Q Was it your intent to strike him in the left cheek?
A Yes. (Emphasis added.)
[13] One treatise observes:
In order to constitute an "accident" or "occurrence" under a policy of liability of insurance, an event must be unforeseen, unexpected, or unanticipated. The nature of an assault is such that the event itself is typically intentional in nature. On their face, therefore, assaults would appear to inherently fall outside of the coverage provided in a liability policy. . . .
If the insured is also the assailant, the result is that there is no coverage for the assault because the act was intentionally committed by the insured.
9 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F.
Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 127:21,
at 127-54——127-55 (3d ed. 2000).
However, even if privileged, "an injury deliberately caused by an act of self-defense is still not an injury that was caused by an accident." 2 Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.3, at 11-38——11-39 (5th ed. 2007).
[14] Doyle v. Engelke,
219
[15] Am. Girl, 268