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NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification. The final version will
appear in the bound volume of the official reports. |
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No.
95-0856
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
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Richard Kleinke, Sr., Verna Kleinke, Richard Kleinke, Jr., and Karen Redmann, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross
Respondents, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company,, Involuntary-Plaintiff, v. Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants, William F. Risch d/b/a Risch's Heating and Air Conditioning, and American Family Insurance Co., Defendants-Respondents-Cross
Appellants. |
FILED JUN
25, 1996 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court
for La Crosse County, Michael J. Mulroy, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
DONALD
W. STEINMETZ, J. This case presents the following three
issues: (1) can a party recover for
emotional distress due to the negligent damage to his or her property; (2) did
the trial court err in awarding costs to the plaintiffs for mediation fees; and
(3) did the trial court err in awarding costs to the plaintiffs for the
expenses they incurred photocopying medical records, appraisals, and
exhibits. We hold that the public
policy criteria of legal causation preclude the plaintiffs in this case from
recovering for their emotional distress.
Furthermore, we find it unlikely that legal causation will ever be
present in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress that is based
upon property damage. In addition, we
hold that the trial court erred in awarding costs as to both the mediation fees
and photocopying expenses since there is no statutory authority allowing either
taxation.
Plaintiffs,
Richard Kleinke, Sr., Verna Kleinke, Richard Kleinke, Jr., and Karen Redmann
filed suit against the defendants, Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping (Farmers
Coop.), Farmland Mutual Insurance Company (Farmland), Risch's Heating & Air
Conditioning (Risch's), and American Family Insurance Co. (American Family)
alleging property damage, loss of out-of-pocket expenses, and severe emotional
distress. The pleadings alleged that
Risch's removed a fuel oil tank from the basement of the residence of Richard
Kleinke, Sr. and his wife, Verna Kleinke, but left the exterior fill pipe in
place. The defendant Farmers Coop. subsequently
pumped 300 gallons of fuel oil directly into the Kleinkes' basement. Minutes later, the Kleinkes discovered the
oil after Farmers Coop. gave them the bill.
During the following months, in addition to physical problems due to oil
fume inhalation, Richard Kleinke, Sr. and Verna Kleinke allegedly suffered
severe emotional distress and depression from being forced to abandon their
home of over 42 years.
Relying
on the public policy grounds set forth in Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994), the La Crosse County Circuit
Court, Judge Michael J. Mulroy, dismissed plaintiffs' claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress at the pleadings stage. After settling with Farmers Coop. and
Farmland, the plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried, and Risch's, found to be
25 percent negligent, was ordered to pay the plaintiffs its proportionate share
of the damages. The trial judge also
granted the plaintiffs costs and disbursements in the amount of $2,412.55,
including a $606.25 award for mediation fees incurred prior to trial and
$554.80 for the photocopying of medical records, appraisals, and exhibits. The plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's
dismissal of their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and the
defendants cross-appealed on the costs issues.
The court of appeals certified all three issues to this court pursuant
to Wis. Stat. § 821.08 (1993-94).
We
first turn to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. The
determination of whether public policy precludes liability in a negligence
claim is a question of law solely for judicial decision. Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co.,
87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979). This court decides questions of law without deference to the
trial court. Ball v. District No. 4,
Area Board, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Under Wisconsin's liberal construction of
pleadings, however, a claim will be dismissed on the pleadings only if
"'it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff
recover.'" Morgan, 87 Wis.
2d at 731 quoting Clausen and Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil
Procedure, Chapters 801-03, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1976). In making or reviewing a judgment on the
pleadings, a court must view the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff and
accept its allegations as true.
In
Bowen, this court reexamined the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress and traced the development of the tort in Wisconsin over the
last 60 years. This court ultimately
decided to institute a new framework for determining the validity of such
claims that was more in keeping with the traditional negligence analysis that
has existed in Wisconsin since Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273
Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). Bowen
held that a viable complaint for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
need only set forth the traditional elements of a negligence case: negligent conduct, causation, and injury
(severe emotional distress). Bowen,
183 Wis. 2d at 654. This court went on
to state, however, that:
It does not
necessarily follow that [a claim meeting these three requirements] must be
allowed to go forward. A court may
decide, as a matter of law, that considerations of public policy require
dismissal of the claim. These public
policy considerations are an aspect of legal cause, although not a part of the
determination of cause-in-fact.
Id.
As such, although all three of the negligence requirements are present,
a court may still dismiss a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress
if legal causation is lacking.
In
this case, the trial court dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim on the pleadings. This
court has recognized that it is usually better to allow the jury to answer the
questions of negligence and cause-in-fact before a court addresses the public
policy concerns associated with legal causation. See Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 779-80, 203
N.W.2d 15 (1973). However, when the
pleadings clearly present a question of public policy and the factual issues
are simple and clear, it may be advantageous for a trial court to make a
determination regarding legal causation at the pleadings stage. Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 654-55. This case presents such a situation. The facts are relatively simple and the
question of legal causation is determinative as to whether the claim is viable.
In
Bowen, we recognized that a claim for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress created problems of claim authentication and unlimited
liability. This court concluded that
these problems were best solved in negligent infliction of emotional distress
bystander cases through the application of the traditional negligence public
policy criteria:
(1) Whether the injury is too remote from
the negligence; (2) whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; (3) whether in retrospect it appears
too extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; (4)
whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the
negligent tortfeasor; (5) whether allowance of recovery would be too likely to
open the way to fraudulent claims; or (6) whether allowance of recovery would
enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 655. Although Bowen discussed these public
policy factors in the context of a bystander who witnessed or was involved in
the loss of a close family member, they are equally applicable to the alleged
emotional distress caused by the negligent damage to property.
An
evaluation of these public policy criteria leads us to conclude that it is
unlikely that a plaintiff could ever recover for the emotional distress caused
by negligent damage to his or her property.
First, emotional distress based on property damage is the type of injury
that will usually be wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
party. The emotional pain that is
recoverable in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases must be related
to an extraordinary event. Having one's
property damaged is not nearly as devastating as witnessing or being involved
in the loss of a close relative, such as in Bowen. This is not to say that people cannot become
extremely distraught when they learn of damage to their property, especially
property which is quite significant to them personally. However, as this court stated in Bowen,
such types of distress are not "compensated because [they are] life
experience[s] that all [unfortunately] may expect to endure." Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 660.
Second,
allowing recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent actors in
property damage cases. The defendants
are already liable for the cost of the damage to the property. It would be unfair to also hold them liable
for the emotional distress that the damage caused the owners. This is particularly true when the property
involved has some sentimental value. In
such cases the value of the property itself could be quite small while the
recovery for the distress could be significant. Allowing recovery for emotional distress in such cases would be a
windfall to the plaintiff and unfair to the defendant.
Third,
allowing recovery in such cases creates the possibility of future fraudulent
claims. The greater a plaintiff's
attachment or sentimental feeling toward the property in question, the greater
his or her claim for damages could be.
To determine when such an attachment to property is real and when it is
false, and to determine exactly how significant the attachment is, would be
difficult, if not impossible. Every
plaintiff in a negligent property damage case would be encouraged to claim an
extreme emotional attachment to the damaged property.
Finally,
allowing recovery in such cases would remove any logical stopping point to a
tortfeasor's liability. Each and every
plaintiff in any property damage claim could assert an emotional distress claim
based not on the effect of the incident itself, but on how their lives had
changed since the underlying incident.
Such an allowance could open the way to recovery for stress incurred by
any amount of damage to any type of property.
We next turn to the two issues relating to
the trial court's award of costs to the plaintiffs. Although the questions are distinct, our standard of review for
both questions is the same. In State v. Foster, 100 Wis. 2d 103,
106, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981) we stated:
The
terms 'allowable costs' or 'taxable costs' have a special meaning in the
context of litigation. The right to
recover costs is not synonymous with the right to recover the expense of
litigation. This right is statutory in
nature, and to the extent that a statute does not authorize the recovery of
specific costs, they are not recoverable. . . . Many expenses of litigation are
not allowable or taxable costs even though they are costs of litigation.
Thus, any award of a "cost"
which is not specifically authorized by a Wisconsin statute constitutes an
error of law that must be reversed.
Under
this standard, we hold that the trial court erred in taxing the defendant for
the pretrial mediation fees. There is
no Wisconsin statutory provision which authorizes such fees as a taxable
cost. Although there is a statutory
reference to "the compensation of referees," statutorily, and
historically, a referee is a third party asked to prepare a report pursuant to
an order of reference and does not include a mediator. Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2),[1]
see also generally Wis. Stat. § 805.06. (the referee
statute); Winnebago Co. v. Dodge Co., 125 Wis. 42, 103 N.W. 255
(1905). Neither party asserts that an
order of reference was ever issued in this case. Furthermore, even Wisconsin's new alternative dispute resolution
statute makes no mention of mediation fees as an appropriate litigation cost
award. See generally Wis.
Stat. § 802.12. In fact, the only
statute authorizing an award of fees for mediation deals specifically and
exclusively with family law disputes. See
Wis. Stat. § 814.615.[2]
We
also hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing as taxable
costs the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in photocopying medical records,
appraisals, and exhibits. In Ramsey
v. Ellis, 163 Wis. 2d 378, 386, 471 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1991), the
court of appeals held that photocopies could not be taxed against a party
pursuant to the costs statute. It ruled
that the only statutory authorization for an award of copying costs is
"for certified copies of papers and records in any public office." Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2). The court of appeals' interpretation of Wis.
Stat. § 814.04(2) comports with its plain meaning and is correct.
As
to both costs issues, plaintiffs cite Zintek v. Perchik, 163 Wis. 2d
439, 476-77, 471 N.W. 2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991), which held that when Wis. Stat.
§ 814.04(2), which grants all necessary costs and disbursement allowed by
law to a prevailing plaintiff, is read
together with Wis. Stat. § 814.036,[3]
the omnibus costs provision, they grant a trial judge complete discretion
regarding what costs can be taxed against a party. The court of appeals, however, incorrectly interpreted these two
statutes and ignored their plain meaning.
The omnibus costs provision simply grants a trial court the discretion
to allow costs even "if a situation arises in which the allowance of costs
is not covered by secs. 814.01 to 814.035." Wis. Stat. § 814.036.[4] The omnibus costs provision, therefore, only
gives the court discretion as to when it may allow costs, not as to what
costs may be allowed. Neither the
omnibus cost provision nor the catch-all provision in Wis. Stat. § 814.02
grants the trial court the power to allow costs which are not explicitly
authorized by statute.
By the Court.—The judgment
of the circuit court for La Crosse
County is affirmed in part and reversed in
part.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 95-0856
Complete Title
of Case: Richard Kleinke, Sr., Verna Kleinke, Richard
Kleinke, Jr. and Karen Redmann,
Plaintiffs‑Appellants‑
Cross Respondents,
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company,
Involuntary‑Plaintiff,
v.
Farmers Cooperative Supply & Shipping
and Farmland Mutual Insurance Company,
Defendants,
William F. Risch d/b/a Risch's Heating and
Air
Conditioning and American Family Insurance
Co.,
Defendants‑Respondents‑
Cross Appellants.
____________________________________
ON
CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
Opinion Filed: June 25, 1996
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument: May 30, 1996
Source of APPEAL
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: LaCrosse
JUDGE: MICHAEL J. MULROY
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS: For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross
respondents there were briefs (in the Court of Appeals) by William P. Skemp
and William Skemp Law Firm, S.C., LaCrosse and oral argument by William
P. Skemp.
For the defendants-respondents-cross
appellants there were briefs (in the Court of Appeals) by Robert D. Johns,
Jr., Michael L. Stoker, and Johns & Flaherty, S.C.,
LaCrosse and oral argument by Robert D. Johns, Jr.
[1] Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2) provides as
follows:
(2)
Disbursements. All the necessary disbursements and fees allowed by law; the
compensation of referees; a reasonable disbursement for the service of process
or other papers in an action when the same are served by a person authorized by
law other than an officer, but the item may not exceed the authorized sheriff's
fee for the same service; amounts actually paid out for certified copies of
papers and records in any public office; postage, telegraphing, telephoning and
express; depositions including copies; plats and photographs, not exceeding $50
for each item; an expert witness fee not exceeding $100 for each expert who
testifies, exclusive of the standard witness fee and mileage which shall also
be taxed for each expert; and in actions relating to or affecting the title to
lands, the cost of procuring an abstract of title to the lands. Guardian ad litem fees shall not be taxed as
a cost or disbursement.
[2] Wis. Stat. § 814.615 provides as
follows:
814.615 Fees for mediation and studies. . . .
(3) The court
or family court commissioner shall direct either or both parties to pay any
applicable fee under this section. If
either or both parties are unable to pay, the court shall grant a separate
judgment for the amount of the fees in favor of the county and against the
party or parties responsible for the fees.
[3] Wis. Stat. § 814.036 provides as
follows:
814.036
Omnibus costs provision. If a situation arises in which the allowance of costs
is not covered by ss. 814.01 to 814.035, the allowance shall be in the
discretion of the court.
[4] Wisconsin
Statutes §§ 814.01-814.035 simply set forth the following situations where
a trial court may award costs: (1) to a
prevailing plaintiff; (2) in circumstances involving consolidation/equitable
action (special proceedings); (3) where there are frivolous claims and
counterclaims; (4) defendants; or (5) where there are counterclaims and cross
countersuits.