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NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification. The final version will
appear in the bound volume of the official reports. |
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No.
95-0304-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
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In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against WILLIAM A.
WENTZEL, Attorney at Law. |
FILED OCT 31, 1996 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI |
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license suspended.
PER
CURIAM. William A. Wentzel appealed from the report of the
referee in respect to several findings and conclusions concerning his
professional misconduct. Attorney
Wentzel did not appeal from the referee's recommendation that his license to
practice law be suspended for two years as discipline for the professional
misconduct established in this proceeding but contended that the suspension
should be made retroactive to the end of the six-month period of a prior
disciplinary license suspension, which remains pending. The Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility (Board) had asked the referee to recommend a three-year license
suspension for the misconduct established in this proceeding but did not appeal
from the referee's disciplinary recommendation.
We
determine that the seriousness of the misconduct established here calls for
discipline more severe than the two-year license suspension recommended by the
referee. That misconduct includes
Attorney Wentzel's failure to file income tax returns or estimated tax vouchers
for ten years, for which he was convicted of two misdemeanor counts, his
agreeing to represent clients and accepting retainers without informing the
clients that his license to practice law would soon be suspended and
subsequently refusing to return the retainers, failing to act promptly and
diligently in a client's matter and misrepresenting to clients his work on
their matters, continuing to render legal services to a client after his
license was suspended, and refusing to refund a client's advance payment of
fees he had not earned. In light of the
number and nature of the incidents of misconduct and in view of Attorney
Wentzel's having been disciplined for professional misconduct twice previously,
we suspend Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law for three years and, as
the referee has recommended, require him to make restitution to those clients
whose retainers he refused to return and whose advance fee he neither earned
nor returned.
Attorney
Wentzel was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1973 and practiced in
Milwaukee. In 1987, the court suspended
his license for 90 days as discipline for the following: failing to return a security deposit to a
couple who wanted to lease his home, using client trust account funds for
personal use and permitting the account to become overdrawn, failing to provide
information to a judge in support of his claim of illness to obtain an
adjournment of a trial date, and misrepresenting to a client that her personal
injury claim had been settled, failing to give notice of her automobile
accident promptly after being retained and failing to communicate with her
concerning the progress of the matter. Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Wentzel, 142 Wis. 2d 1, 416 N.W.2d 287. In 1993, the court imposed a six-month
license suspension, commencing June 21, 1993, for the following: failing to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in pursing two clients' legal matters, misrepresenting to a client
that he had commenced an action on the client's behalf, failing to deposit a
client's advance of costs into his trust account, failing to comply with
clients' reasonable requests for information concerning the status of their
legal matters, failing to turn over two clients' files upon demand and refund
unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the Board in its investigation of
client grievances. Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Wentzel, 176 Wis. 2d 40, 499 N.W.2d 166.
Toward
the end of the 1993 suspension, Attorney Wentzel petitioned for reinstatement
of his license, and the matter was referred to the district professional
responsibility committee for investigation and hearing. While that petition was pending, the Board
received grievances against Attorney Wentzel for conduct that previously had
not been considered, and witnesses involved in two of those matters testified
at the reinstatement hearing. The
district committee recommended to the Board that the reinstatement petition be
denied, primarily because of Attorney Wentzel's demonstrated lack of organization
in the conduct of his office, his failure to express any remorse for harm
caused his clients by his misconduct, his failure to return all client files
following his suspension, and his continuing to practice law during the period
of suspension.
The
Board recommended to the court that Attorney Wentzel's reinstatement petition
be denied on the grounds that he had not complied with the court's suspension
order in that he conducted legal research for a client while his license was
suspended, he admitted at the reinstatement hearing that he continued to drive
after his license was revoked following a DUI conviction some two months prior
to the suspension, he had not turned over two or three files requested by
former clients, he failed to respond promptly to Board requests for information
in the reinstatement proceeding, necessitating five letters from the Board
before a complete response was produced, he did not promptly refund unearned
fees to two clients, he misrepresented to the district committee that he had
not practiced law during the period of suspension, and he failed to notify at
least two clients of his license suspension either shortly before it was to
commence or once it had. Acting on the
Board's adverse recommendation, the court denied Attorney Wentzel's
reinstatement petition October 12, 1994.
Reinstatement of Wentzel, 187 Wis. 2d 297, 522 N.W.2d 216.
In
the instant proceeding, Attorney Wentzel stipulated to the misconduct
allegations of six of the eight counts set forth in the Board's complaint, and
a disciplinary hearing was held on the remaining two counts. Based on the parties' stipulation and the
evidence presented at the hearing, the referee, Attorney Charles Herro, made
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Attorney
Wentzel's professional misconduct in the following matters.
(1)
In March, 1994, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue informed the Board of
Attorney Wentzel's failure to file income tax returns or estimated tax vouchers
for ten years -- 1982 to 1992. In
October, 1995, Attorney Wentzel was convicted by a jury of two misdemeanor
counts of wilfully failing to file state income tax returns and make estimated
payments for 1990 and 1991, and he was sentenced to 90 days in jail for each
count, concurrent. The sentence was
stayed and he was placed on two years' probation.
The
referee concluded that by wilfully failing to file state and federal income tax
returns for calendar years 1982 through 1992, Attorney Wentzel engaged in
misconduct, defined in SCR 20:8.4(f)[1]
to include violation of a statute.
(2)
Toward the end of April, 1993, while the previous disciplinary proceeding was
pending and two weeks before the court issued its order suspending his license,
a client retained Attorney Wentzel to represent him in a divorce action and
paid him a $500 retainer. Prior to the
effective date of the suspension, Attorney Wentzel met with the client and
prepared a summons and divorce petition but never filed the action. He did not tell the client of the suspension
and that the client would have to obtain other counsel once the suspension
began on June 21, 1993.
During
June and July of 1993, the client made numerous attempts to contact Attorney
Wentzel by telephone, by leaving messages and by going to his office, but
Attorney Wentzel did not respond to any of those efforts. In August, 1993, the client retained another
attorney to represent him in the divorce action, and that attorney asked
Attorney Wentzel to return the client's $500 retainer. Attorney Wentzel did not respond or refund
the retainer.
In
February, 1994, the Board wrote Attorney Wentzel requesting a response to a
number of misconduct allegations in the client's grievance, including his
failure to return the client's retainer upon his license suspension, but
Attorney Wentzel did not respond to that letter. He did respond to a second letter from the Board, stating that he
intended to refund a portion of the retainer, as he had not filed the summons
and petition in the client's divorce matter.
During the district committee's investigation on his reinstatement
petition, Attorney Wentzel did not timely and fully respond to the committee's
inquiry and did not refund any portion of the divorce client's retainer.
The
referee concluded that by failing to refund a fee paid to him in advance for
representation in a divorce proceeding when the fee had not been earned,
Attorney Wentzel violated SCR 20:1.16(d).[2] He violated SCR 22.26(1)(a)[3]
by failing to notify his client of the license suspension and of his consequent
inability to represent him following the effective date of that
suspension. By failing to respond to
the Board's initial inquiry regarding the client's grievance and promptly and
fully respond to the district committee, Attorney Wentzel violated SCR 21.03(4)[4]
and 22.07(2) and (3).[5]
(3)
In May, 1993, several days after the court ordered the suspension of his
license commencing June 21, 1993, a client retained Attorney Wentzel to
represent him in a divorce proceeding and paid him a $500 retainer. Attorney Wentzel did not tell the client of
his impending license suspension and did not file the divorce action. He also did not notify the client of the
suspension after it began or tell him he needed to obtain other counsel.
During
June and July of 1993, the client left numerous messages inquiring into the
status of his case, but Attorney Wentzel did not respond. When the client learned from another source
in July, 1993 that Attorney Wentzel's license was suspended, he went to Attorney
Wentzel's home to ask him about the suspension and have his file and retainer
returned. Attorney Wentzel did not
return the file or any portion of the retainer but advised the client that the
suspension would not be a problem.
When
the client reported his failure to return the file and retainer, the Board
wrote to Attorney Wentzel in July, 1993 asking him to return them. Attorney Wentzel did not do so. In his response to a second letter from the
Board, Attorney Wentzel stated that the retainer fee barely covered the
preparation of the summons and petition and the filing fee, even though in fact
he had not filed any pleading. He did,
however, return the client's file and $350 of the $500 retainer.
The
referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel's failure to commence the client's
divorce action constituted a failure to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.[6] His failure to communicate with the client
and keep him informed of the status of the matter and promptly respond to
reasonable requests for information violated SCR 20:1.4(a).[7] His failure to return the client's file and
retainer upon request violated SCR 20:1.16(d), and his failure to tell the client
of the impending license suspension when he was retained constituted conduct
involving dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c).[8] Attorney Wentzel's misrepresentation to the
Board that the retainer paid by the client barely covered the filing fee and
preparation of documents, when in fact he did not file any documents, violated
SCR 20:8.1(a)[9] and
22.07(2). Finally, his failure to
notify the client of his license suspension once it commenced and of his
consequent inability to act as an attorney violated SCR 22.26(1)(a).
(4)
In July, 1990, a client retained Attorney Wentzel to pursue a collection
matter. Although retained on a
contingency basis, Attorney Wentzel never prepared a written contingent fee
agreement required by SCR 20:1.5(c).[10] Attorney Wentzel told the client he would
commence an action and that it would take up to six months to get a court
date. When the client contacted him
some six months later regarding the status of the matter, Attorney Wentzel
misrepresented to him that the case was going well and that the courts were
"booked up" for a year and a half.
The client contacted Attorney Wentzel every six months thereafter and,
when able to reach him, was assured that the case was going well. In fact, however, Attorney Wentzel never
filed an action.
The
referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel's failure to pursue litigation or take
other significant action regarding the collection matter from July, 1990 to
February, 1993, Attorney Wentzel failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. His failure to have a written contingent fee
agreement violated SCR 20:1.5(c). His
misleading the client into believing that an action had been filed and that the
court system was backlogged for a period of up to one and one-half years
constituted conduct involving dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation, in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).
(5)
In mid-February, 1992, a client retained Attorney Wentzel to represent him in
several matters, including a theft claim the client had filed with his
homeowner's insurer. The client paid
Attorney Wentzel $650 and gave him the written materials relating to each of
the matters. Prior to retaining
Attorney Wentzel, the client had submitted a $38,000 claim to his insurer in
the theft matter and was offered a settlement of $3800, which he rejected. When
the client first consulted Attorney Wentzel, the one-year period of limitation
on the theft claim under the insurance contract had not yet expired. Attorney Wentzel did not pursue the matter
timely, did not commence litigation, and allowed the period of limitation to
expire. Despite Attorney Wentzel's
insistence that he never agreed to represent the client on the insurance claim,
the referee found that the client reasonably believed Attorney Wentzel was
acting as his counsel because he had asked him to try to obtain a more
satisfactory resolution of the matter than he was able to achieve on his own,
he gave him all of the documents relating to his claim, and Attorney Wentzel
accepted those documents and said he would contact the insurer.
Attorney
Wentzel told the client he had contacted the insurer and that his claim had
been denied. However, the insurer had
no record of Attorney Wentzel's ever having contacted the claims adjuster
regarding the client's claim or the attorney representing the insurer in the
matter. During the Board's
investigation of this matter, Attorney Wentzel asserted that he had not been
retained to represent the client on the insurance claim but had contacted the
insurer as a personal favor.
Starting
in February, 1993, the client began making regular calls to Attorney Wentzel
regarding the status of his claim, and the calls continued until September,
1993. On August 19, 1993, the client contacted
the insurer's attorney regarding his claim and was told that the time to file
an action had expired August 11, 1992.
In August and September, 1993, the client tape recorded several
telephone conversations with Attorney Wentzel during which Attorney Wentzel
read him the language of a statute indicating that there was a six-year statute
of limitations on the client's claim and agreed to review and research a court
decision the insurer's counsel had cited to the client. The client then contacted the insurer's
attorney and reported what Attorney Wentzel had told him. In
one of those conversations with his client, Attorney Wentzel asked for another
copy of the client's insurance policy.
The client obtained a copy from the insurer's attorney and gave it to
Attorney Wentzel in September, 1993.
Attorney Wentzel then discussed the policy with the client and told him
that it contained a one year limitation on the client's claim, which already
had expired. When these conversations
took place, Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law was suspended.
The
referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel failed to act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in the client's matter, in violation of SCR 20:1.3, by not
pursuing any contact with the insurance company after receiving and accepting
documents from the client concerning his claim and by not commencing litigation
prior to the expiration of the applicable period of limitation. His misrepresentation to the client that he
had contacted the insurer when he had not done so violated SCR 20:8.4(c). His misrepresentation to the Board that he
had not been retained to handle the client's insurance claim and that he had
contacted the insurer violated SCR 20:8.1(a) and 22.07(2). By conducting legal research and giving
advice to the client following the effective date of his license suspension,
Attorney Wentzel violated SCR 22.26(2).[11]
In
this appeal, Attorney Wentzel first contended that the referee improperly
concluded that he failed to act with reasonable diligence in regard to his
client's theft claim, arguing that his client had not given him any
documentation on the claim until after the period of limitation specified in
the insurance policy had expired and the claim was barred. That contention has no merit. The referee's finding that the client had
given Attorney Wentzel the paperwork relating to the theft claim when he
retained him in the matter nine months before the claim was barred is not
clearly erroneous, and the referee properly rejected Attorney Wentzel's
contention that he was never retained to represent the client on the theft
claim.
Attorney
Wentzel also argued that the referee improperly found that he had engaged in
the practice of law while his license was suspended by doing research and
advising his client in respect to the applicable statute of limitations on the
theft claim. That argument is based on
Attorney Wentzel's contention that the only evidence supporting that finding
was the transcripts of alleged phone conversations between him and his client
taped by the client without his knowledge or permission, evidence he contends
was inadmissible. Contrary to that
contention, the record contains sufficient evidence in addition to the
transcripts to support the referee's finding, including the client's testimony
at the hearing and Attorney Wentzel's own testimony at a deposition that he had
advised his client concerning the applicable statute of limitations, reviewed
the insurance policy and researched the case cited to the client by the
insurer's attorney. The referee noted
in his report that he had considered that deposition testimony in making his
findings.
(6)
In July of 1991, a client retained Attorney Wentzel and paid him a $250
retainer to handle a civil claim against a former employee. Between then and October 20, 1992, Attorney
Wentzel did nothing of substance regarding the client's claim and did not
return his client's numerous calls or correspondence.
On
October 20, 1992, the client wrote Attorney Wentzel that he would file a
complaint against him with the Board unless his file were returned within the
week. Attorney Wentzel did not reply to
that letter and did not return the client's file. When he did produce it during the Board's investigation of the
client's grievance, the file contained no evidence that he had done any work in
the matter. Attorney Wentzel did not
file a claim or commence any legal action on behalf of the client.
The
referee concluded that by failing to notify his client of the merits of his
claim or take action on the claim for 15 months, Attorney Wentzel failed to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the client, in
violation of SCR 20:1.3. By failing to
respond to the client's calls concerning his claim and by failing to advise the
client of the results of his review of the file, Attorney Wentzel did not keep
his client reasonably informed or respond to reasonable requests for
information, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).
His failure to return the client's file upon request violated SCR
20:1.16(d).
(7)
In September, 1992, Attorney Wentzel filed a request for mediation of a client's
medical malpractice claim against a hospital and two doctors. A month later the mediation panel
administrator informed him that he needed to file a statement of the case, but
he did not respond and did not file that statement. He again was advised in mid-November, 1992 that the information
was needed, but he did not respond or file a statement of the case. He also failed to respond to a third letter
from the administrator in early December, 1992. The period for mediation expired on or about December 20, 1992,
and when Attorney Wentzel filed a statement of the case on February 24, 1993,
the mediation panel's jurisdiction had terminated and the request for mediation
was dismissed. Attorney Wentzel never
commenced any further action on behalf of the client regarding the claim.
Attorney
Wentzel represented the same client on another personal injury matter from
April, 1990 and assumed there was a contingency agreement because he obtained
the case from another attorney who had represented the client on a
contingency. Attorney Wentzel did not
prepare a written contingent fee agreement, as required by rule.
The
referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel failed to act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing this client on his malpractice claim, in
violation of SCR 20:1.3. His failure to
provide the client a written contingent fee agreement violated SCR
20:1.5(c).
(8)
On February 13, 1993, a couple retained Attorney Wentzel to represent the
husband in a bankruptcy, agreeing to a fee of $700. Attorney Wentzel accepted an initial payment of $300 and gave the
couple a blank bankruptcy petition on which they were to list their debts and
return it to him. The couple told
Attorney Wentzel the bankruptcy filing was urgent because of an ongoing
garnishment of the husband's wages.
The
clients also discussed with Attorney Wentzel a child support matter that was
pending against the husband, and Attorney Wentzel agreed to telephone the child
support agency to obtain a reduction in the amount of support. Attorney Wentzel made that telephone call
but did not make an appearance or communicate with the agency in writing. Later that month, the husband appeared at
the court hearing without counsel and reached a stipulation on the amount of
child support, but the stipulation was not based on the telephone call Attorney
Wentzel had made to the agency.
On
February 19, 1993, six days after they retained him, the couple met with
Attorney Wentzel and paid him the remaining $400 of his fee and returned the
completed bankruptcy forms to prepare and file. From that date until June, 1993, the couple made repeated
telephone calls to Attorney Wentzel regarding the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The woman called him two or
three times per week and left messages indicating the urgency of the matter
because of the $100 per week garnishments.
In
May, 1993, the husband went to Attorney Wentzel's home and signed undated
bankruptcy papers. Attorney Wentzel
subsequently dated them June 7, 1993, two weeks prior to the commencement of
his six-month license suspension, and had the petition filed four days after
the suspension commenced. Unbeknownst
to the clients, the petition set forth that it was being filed by the bankrupt
pro se. The couple did not learn of
Attorney Wentzel's license suspension until almost two years later.
After
the petition was filed, the couple was informed by the bankruptcy trustee that
some of the schedules Attorney Wentzel had prepared needed to be amended and
that a change of address form had to be filed.
Because of Attorney Wentzel's suspension and the need to revise the
schedules, the couple retained another attorney and paid him $500 to handle the
bankruptcy. That attorney had to revise
completely the bankruptcy schedules in order to conclude the matter. Attorney Wentzel did not refund any of the
unearned fees he had collected from the clients for his incompetent
representation or reimburse them for the cost of successor counsel. The
referee concluded that by failing to prepare complete and accurate schedules,
provide his clients' accurate address to the bankruptcy court and identify
appropriate exemptions, Attorney Wentzel failed to provide competent
representation to these clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.1.[12] By his failure to file a bankruptcy petition
until June 25, 1993, after being told by his clients that the filing was urgent
because of an ongoing garnishment, Attorney Wentzel failed to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in his representation of these clients, in
violation of SCR 20:1.3. His failure to
respond to numerous telephone calls from the clients for more than four months
regarding the status of the bankruptcy violated SCR 20:1.4(a). His failure to refund to the clients the
advance payment of fees that he had not earned violated SCR 20:1.16(d).
On
appeal, Attorney Wentzel contended that the referee improperly concluded that
he failed to act with reasonable diligence in representing his bankruptcy
clients, asserting that the evidence established that the papers and
documentation in the matter were not provided to him until shortly before he
filed the bankruptcy schedules. That
argument has no merit. The referee's
finding was based on his assessment of the credibility of conflicting
testimony, and the referee accepted the testimony of the clients that they had
completed the forms Attorney Wentzel had given them and returned them to him a
week later, at which time they paid him the balance of his retainer and advised
him of the urgency of filing the petition.
As
discipline for the totality of his misconduct, the referee recommended that
Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law be suspended for two years,
rejecting the Board's position that the misconduct warrants a three-year
license suspension. In making that
recommendation, the referee explicitly considered the extended period during
which Attorney Wentzel's license has remained suspended beyond the six-month
period that commenced in June, 1993, noting that five of the eight matters
considered here had been raised in the unsuccessful reinstatement proceeding
that resulted in the continuation of the suspension. In addition to the license suspension, the referee recommended
that Attorney Wentzel be required to settle all claims for unearned fees in
three of the matters, as well as the claims of any other persons harmed by his
misconduct, and pay the costs of this proceeding.
While
conceding that the two-year license suspension recommended by the referee is
appropriate discipline for his professional misconduct, Attorney Wentzel urged
on appeal that the suspension be made retroactive to the end of the six-month
period for which his license was suspended in 1993. He argued that the continuation of that suspension beyond those
six months resulted from the denial of his reinstatement petition, which was
based in large part on the matters considered in this proceeding.
In
support of his position, Attorney Wentzel cited prior cases in which the court
made license suspensions retroactive to the end of a prior suspension period or
included them in suspensions already being served. In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bengston, 124 Wis. 2d
770, 370 N.W.2d 269 (1985), the court imposed no additional discipline for the
attorney's misconduct because it had occurred during the same period as earlier
misconduct for which a suspension had been imposed and, had it been considered
in the prior proceeding, the totality of the misconduct would not have
warranted a suspension longer than that originally imposed. In a subsequent Bengston case, 127
Wis. 2d 456, 380 N.W.2d 673 (1986), the court, acting on the referee's
recommendation, made a one-year license suspension retroactive to the date on
which a prior six-month suspension would have ended, partly because the
misconduct had occurred some 13 years earlier and because the new proceeding
resulted in the attorney's license suspension continuing for more than 15
months beyond the original period.
In
addition to determining that the seriousness of Attorney Wentzel's misconduct
established in this proceeding warrants discipline more severe than the
two-year license suspension recommended by the referee, we determine that the
three-year license suspension we impose for it should not be made retroactive
but should commence the date of the order imposing it. A substantial portion of the misconduct
considered for the first time in this proceeding occurred after the 1993
license suspension and some of it was directly related to that suspension. In addition to conducting legal research and
advising a client while his license was suspended, Attorney Wentzel accepted
retainers from other clients knowing his license would be suspended and did not
tell his clients that fact and advise them that he would not be able to
complete their legal matters. In the
bankruptcy matter, he continued to act after the effective date of the
suspension, attempting to conceal that fact by setting forth on the bankruptcy
petition he filed that his clients were appearing pro se, which he did without
his clients' knowledge or consent.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that if the misconduct that
occurred prior to the 1993 suspension had been included in the earlier
disciplinary proceeding, more severe discipline would not have been
imposed.
We
adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and suspend
Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law for three years, effective the date
of this order, as discipline for professional misconduct. In addition, we order Attorney Wentzel to
make restitution as specified by the referee to clients from whom he accepted
retainers but failed to promptly and competently complete their legal work,
including reimbursement of his bankruptcy clients for the attorney fee they
incurred to have their matter completed by successor counsel.
IT
IS ORDERED that the license of William A. Wentzel to practice law in Wisconsin
is suspended for a period of three years, effective the date of this
order.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order William A.
Wentzel make restitution as specified in the report of the referee and as set
forth herein.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order William A.
Wentzel pay to the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility the costs of
this proceeding, provided that if the costs are not paid within the time
specified and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs
within that time, the license of William A. Wentzel to practice law in
Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the court.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that William A. Wentzel comply with the provisions of SCR
22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in
Wisconsin has been suspended.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 95-0304-D
Complete Title
of Case: In the Matter of Disciplinary
Proceedings Against
William Wentzel,
Attorney at Law.
___________________________________
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WENTZEL
Opinion Filed: October 31, 1996
Submitted on Briefs: September 10,
1996
Oral Argument:
Source of APPEAL
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS: For William A. Wentzel there were briefs by
William A. Wentzel, Nashotah.
For the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility there was a brief by Celia M. Jackson, counsel, Milwaukee.
[1] SCR 20:8.4
provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct
It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. . .
(f) violate a statute, supreme court rule,
supreme court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers;
[2] SCR 20:1.16 provides, in pertinent
part: Declining or terminating
representation
. . .
(d)
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.
[3] SCR 22.26
provides, in pertinent part: Activities
on revocation or suspension of license.
(1)(a) A
disbarred or suspended attorney on or before the effective date of disbarment
or suspension shall:
1. Notify, by certified mail, all clients being
represented in pending matters of the disbarment or suspension and consequent
inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of the disbarment or
suspension.
2. Advise the clients to seek legal advice of
the client's own choice elsewhere.
[4] SCR 21.03
provides, in pertinent part: General
principles.
. . .
(4)
Every attorney shall cooperate with the board and the administrator in the
investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances and complaints filed
with or by the board or administrator.
[5] SCR 22.07
provides, in pertinent part: Investigation.
. . .
(2) During the
course of an investigation, the administrator or a committee may notify the
respondent of the subject being investigated.
The respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts and
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct or medical incapacity within
20 days of being served by ordinary mail a request for response to a
grievance. The administrator in his or
her discretion may allow additional time to respond. Failure to provide information or misrepresentation in a
disclosure is misconduct. The
administrator or committee may make a further investigation before making a
recommendation to the board.
(3)
The administrator or committee may compel the respondent to answer questions,
furnish documents and present any information deemed relevant to the
investigation. Failure of the
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents or present relevant
information is misconduct. The
administrator or a committee may compel any other person to produce pertinent
books, papers and documents under SCR 22.22.
[6] SCR 20:1.3
provides: Diligence
A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.
[7] SCR 20:1.4
provides, in pertinent part: Communication
(a)
A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
[8] SCR 20:8.4
provides, in pertinent part: Misconduct
It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
[9] SCR 20:8.1
provides, in pertinent part: Bar
admission and disciplinary matters
An applicant
for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission
application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(a)
knowingly make a false statement of material fact;
[10] SCR 20:1.5
provides, in pertinent part: Fees
. . .
(c)
A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (d) or other law. A
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by
which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that
shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal,
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether
such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is
calculated. Upon conclusion of a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing
the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
[11] SCR 22.26
provides, in pertinent part: Activities
on revocation or suspension of license.
. . .
(2)
A suspended or disbarred attorney may not engage in the practice of law or in
any law work activity customarily done by law students, law clerks or other
paralegal personnel, except that he or she may engage in law related work for a
commercial employer not itself engaged in the practice of law.