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NOTICE This opinion is
subject to further editing and modification.
The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official
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No. 93-1929
STATE OF WISCONSIN
: IN SUPREME COURT
In re the paternity of Tukker M.O.: |
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Mary L.O., Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Tommy R.B., Jr., Respondent-Appellant. |
FILED FEB 15,
1996 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI |
REVIEW
of a decision of the court of appeals. Affirmed
in part and reversed in part and cause remanded.
ROLAND B. DAY,
C.J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of
appeals, Mary L.O. v. Tommy R.B., Jr., 189 Wis. 2d 440, 525 N.W.2d
793 (Ct. App. 1994), reversing in part and affirming in part a judgment of the
circuit court for Sheboygan County, John B. Murphy, Judge, that ordered Tommy
R.B., Jr. (Tommy) to pay seventeen percent of his income as child support and
creating a trust for a portion of the child support payments. This case presents two issues. First, whether a family court in a paternity
action may award child support according to the percentage standards in order
to assure payment throughout the child's minority when the payor currently has
a high income, but may soon undergo a substantial loss of income; second,
whether a family court may establish a trust for a child's post-minority
educational expenses from funds paid for child support. We answer both questions in the affirmative
and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.
Mary L.O. (Mary) was a
twenty-two-year-old college student in August 1990 when she met and spent an
evening with Tommy. Mary gave birth to
a child, Tukker M.O. (Tukker) in May of 1991, and named Tommy as the child's
father. Tommy admitted paternity. Mary and Tommy have never lived together as
a family, and Tommy had never seen Tukker as of the time of the trial court
proceedings in this case.
Tommy has been a punter in
the National Football League (NFL) since 1987, and as of the February 1993
court proceedings had played on the same team since 1989. His income has ranged from approximately
$70,000 in 1989 to approximately $430,000 at the time of the family court
proceedings to determine child support for Tukker in February, 1993. At the time of the proceedings, Tommy was
not under contract to a football team, although he testified that his
performance during the previous year made him confident that he would be
playing during the following season.
Tommy's financial advisor testified that the average career of an NFL
punter is 4.03 years. The advisor also
testified that he was not aware of any other skills or abilities on Tommy's
part that would allow him to find employment other than as a football
player. Tommy has a four-year college
degree in business. Before becoming a
punter, he worked as a shoe salesman.
Under Wis. Stat. § 767.51(4m) (1993-94),[1]
a family court shall determine the amount of child support payments according
to percentage standards established by the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHSS). In this case, the
applicable percentage was seventeen. See
Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 80.03(1)(a) (June 1994). Tommy asked the family court to deviate from this amount, as
allowed under Wis. Stat. § 767.51(5) (1993-94).[2] Tommy argued that applying the seventeen
percent standard in this case would result in an award much greater than
required to support Tukker. Mary
expressed concern that Tommy's career as a special-teams player might suddenly
end, and he would thus be unable to meet his child support obligations due to a
substantially lower income.
The family court stated:
[I]f
we have, as the evidence clearly did demonstrate, . . . an earner, a
payor, whose income stream, as it stands, is short-lived. . . . [I]t's an important idea. Because it shows us that we really do have
to take some steps to capitalize on what he's got for right now and in the
future hope that he works, but if he doesn't, insure that his child is well
cared for.
The family court then determined that applying the seventeen percent
standard was not unfair, discussing each of the factors listed in Wis. Stat.
§ 767.51(5). Mary had acknowledged
that her current child support needs were $1500 per month. The court awarded child support in the
amount of $1500 per month to be paid to Mary.
The remaining portion of the seventeen percent was to be placed in a
trust fund. The family court stated its
purpose in creating the trust fund as follows: "[T]o provide the cash flow
for the support of [Tukker], a minor, over the period of time to meet the
statutory criteria of child support and to meet the post-minority
responsibilities of going off to college."
The trust fund, as
established by the family court, has two components. The first component is a liquid "discretionary fund" with
a continuously maintained balance of $20,000.
Mary can obtain money from this fund without prior approval from Tommy
"for child support when the $1500 per month is not immediately forthcoming
from the payor and for reasonable costs of [Tukker's] minority
education." Each year, Tommy has a
right to review distributions from the fund.
The second component of the
trust, funded from the remaining monies, is to be invested in
"highly-secured, high-yield, and long-term types of securities." Upon their mutual agreement, Mary and Tommy
may make withdrawals from this component of the trust for "big expenses,
for college tuition, etc." If Mary
and Tommy do not agree, then withdrawal can occur by court order.
Both Tommy and Mary are
cotrustees. Mary is to provide an
annual accounting of the trust to Tommy.
The family court "will review and examine the trust corpus on or
about the Nineteenth (19th) birthday of [Tukker] to determine what, if
anything, needs to be paid to bring the child support up to date and review
what is necessary for the future educational needs of the child at that
time." The family court judgment
further provides: "The trust shall terminate in its entirety on and no
later than the twenty‑fifth (25th) birthday of [Tukker] by order of the
Court, or upon the earlier death of [Tukker]." Upon termination of the trust, the remaining monies in the trust,
including both principal and interest, will revert back to Tommy.
Tommy appealed the circuit
court's order. A two-to-one majority of
the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The majority of the court of appeals held
that the circuit court had not erroneously exercised its discretion in creating
a trust; however, the circuit court had erred in calculating child support
based on the percentage standards and in providing for the educational needs of
Tukker after he had reached the age of majority. Mary L.O., 189 Wis. 2d at 443. Mary sought review.
The determination of
appropriate child support is committed to the discretion of the family
court. Weidner v. W.G.N., 131
Wis. 2d 301, 315, 388 N.W.2d 615 (1986).
An appellate court will sustain a discretionary act if it finds that the
family court examined relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and,
using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion a reasonable judge
could reach. Id. (citing Loy
v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)).
The first question is did the
family court err in using the percentage standards to determine Tommy's child
support obligation. The family court is
required to determine child support according to the percentage standards, see
Wis. Stat. § 767.51(4m), although the court may modify the award if it
finds by the greater weight of the credible evidence that the use of the
standards would be unfair to the child or the party requesting a modification, see
Wis. Stat. § 767.51(5).
The court of appeals has
considered the difficulties created by high-income payors in child support
cases. The application of the
percentage standards in such cases may produce incongruous results. In Parrett v. Parrett, 146
Wis. 2d 830, 432 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App.), review denied, 147
Wis. 2d 888 (1988), a business owner with a gross income of approximately
$16,500 per month and his spouse were divorced. The family court concluded that the use of the percentage
standards would "result in a figure so far beyond the child's needs as to
be irrational" and instead set child support payments at $1000 per
month. Id. at 837. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's judgment, holding "[i]t is reasonable to refuse to apply guidelines
based on statistical generalities when the facts before the court bear little
relationship to a statistical norm."
Id. at 842.
In Hubert v. Hubert,
159 Wis. 2d 803, 465 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1990), a cardiac surgeon with an
annual income of over $1,000,000 and his wife were divorced. The wife asked that child support payments
for the couple's two children be determined according to the percentage
standards, i.e., twenty-five percent of the husband's income, or approximately
$20,000 per month. Id. at
813. The trial court found that
applying the percentage standard would be unfair to the husband, and instead
set child support payments at $4000 per month.
Id.
The court of appeals
reversed. The court of appeals first
noted that Parrett did allow a court to deviate from the percentage
standards when the payor's high income would result in unnecessarily high
payments: "We agree that in cases where the parties have a substantial
marital estate and income far beyond the average income of most people, the
robotistic utilization of the percentage standards may give absurd
results." Id. at 814. Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded
that the family court had failed to consider several factors weighing against
deviation, including the best interests of the children and the children's
educational needs. Id. at
815. In ruling that the percentage
standards would result in an absurdly high child support award, the family
court had not considered that the children would have enjoyed an extremely high
standard of living had the marriage continued: "The family court erred
when it failed to articulate why the children should not be supported `at the
economic level they would have enjoyed had there been no divorce.'" Id. at 816.
In the present case, the family
court considered the factors listed under § 767.51(5) in making its
determination that imposing the seventeen percent standard would not be unfair
to Tommy. The court discussed each
factor individually and at length. The
court thus addressed Tukker's needs; the physical, mental, and emotional health
needs of Tukker's parents; the relative financial means of the parents; the
earning capacity of each parent, based on each parent's education, training,
and work experience; the need and capacity of Tukker for education, including
higher education; Tukker's age; Tukker's financial resources and earning
capacity; the custody arrangement; extraordinary travel expenses; the
responsibility of Tukker's parents for the support of others; the value of
services contributed by Tukker's mother, as the custodial parent; Tukker's best
interests; and any other factors the court found relevant to Tukker's best
interests. See Wis. Stat.
§ 767.51(5)(a)-(j).
The court's discussion of
these fourteen factors spans thirteen pages of the trial transcript. Among its determinations, the court found
that Tommy was able to pay seventeen percent of his income for child support
without hardship. The court observed,
however, that this situation would not last: "[Tommy's] future as a
special teams player has limitations, and probably in the near future, he won't
be doing that any more." The court
had heard testimony showing that Tommy had already had a longer-than-average
career as a punter, and that he did not have a contract as of the time of
trial. The court had expressed its
concern that Tommy would not be able to meet his child support obligation in
the future, and stated "it shows us that we really do have to take some
steps to capitalize on what he's got for right now and in the future hope that
he works, but if he doesn't, insure that his child is well cared
for." Thus the court concluded
that applying the percentage standards was not unfair in this case.
Judge Nettesheim, dissenting
to the court of appeals opinion in the instant case, described the family
court's decision as "a textbook example of a proper exercise of judicial
discretion." Mary L.O., 189
Wis. 2d at 466 (Nettesheim, J., dissenting). We agree. The family
court reached a reasoned conclusion that the use of the percentage standards in
this case would not be unfair to Tommy.
The use of the percentage standards was not "robotistic." See Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d
at 814. Rather, the court considered
all applicable factors and made a "wise, prudent and creative" determination
that the percentage standards should still apply in this case because, unlike
the high-income payor in Hubert, Tommy's income may suddenly and
drastically change, and he ultimately may not be able to satisfy his child
support obligation. See Mary
L.O., 189 Wis. 2d at 468, 469 (Nettesheim, J., dissenting).
Judge Nettesheim also
observed that the base support award of $1500 per month, which Tommy did not
contest on appeal, would result in direct payments to Mary of $324,000 during
Tukker's minority. Id. at
467. If, however, Tommy's career as a
punter should end after another two years, he would only have paid $136,000 in
child support—assuming he keeps his present salary of $400,000 per year. Should Tommy find work or have an investment
income of $50,000 per year thereafter, he would pay $8500 each year under the
seventeen percent standard, resulting in another $136,000 of total
payments. The end result, as Judge
Nettesheim noted, would be a total of $272,000 in child support payments, or $52,000
less than Tukker's needs as determined by the family court. Id. at 468. Finally, we also agree with Judge Nettesheim's observation that
Tommy can always seek modification of the family court's support order if
Tommy's future income does not conform to the projections made by the family
court. Id. at 469.
The majority of the court of
appeals, however, expressed concern that the family court's order misused the
percentage standards by applying the standards to determine Tukker's future
needs, that is, to "generate money for future support." Id. at 449. The majority explicitly acknowledged that a family court may set
aside money for the future support of the child when the money is available at
the present time but may not be available later. See id. at 451.
The majority also concluded that Wis. Stat. §§ 767.475(7) and
767.51(3) (1993-94),[3]
allow the family court in a paternity action to use a trust to accomplish this
goal. Mary L.O., 189
Wis. 2d at 450. We agree with that
portion of the court of appeals opinion.
However, the majority's
disagreement with the trial court was its use of the percentage standards to
accomplish its goal. The majority read Weidner,
131 Wis. 2d at 318, as requiring the percentage standards to be employed
only to measure present needs of the child.
The court in Weidner stated that the percentage standards are an
"evidentiary shortcut for establishing the need of the child for
support," and that the standards determine the percentage of a parent's
income and assets that he or she shares with children in his or her
custody. Id. at 318. The majority in Mary L.O. also
referred to an article, Jacques van der Gaag, On Measuring the Cost of
Children, 4 Children & Youth
Servs. Rev. 77 (1982), on which DHSS based its choice of a percentage
standard:
The
majority has read and reread the primary work which culminated in the enactment
of the percentage standards by the legislature. . . . The majority reads this work to say that the percentage standards
compute the bundle of consumer goods needed for present support only. The dissent believes, however, that because
the percentage standards presume a higher standard of living commensurate with
higher income, the higher-income payee is entitled to left over dollars, over
and above present support, because that is the way of high-income families.
Mary L.O., 189
Wis. 2d at 447. We agree with the
dissent that the percentage standards, as applied in this case, may be used to
fund future support. As we have already
noted, the family court here did not simply apply the percentage standard
unthinkingly, but instead determined that the percentage standard was still appropriate
after its consideration of the various factors listed under
§ 767.51(5). The family court
concluded that Tukker's best interests would be served by Tommy paying child
support according to the percentage, because the funds might not be available later. The judgment or order of the family court in
a paternity action must serve the best interests of the child. See Wis. Stat. § 767.51(3)
(1993-94); Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 317. We find that the application of the percentage standard in this
case was within the family court's discretion to fashion an order serving
Tukker's best interests.
Furthermore, we do not find
the distinction between present and future support in our child support law
that the court of appeals majority does.
A child support order, as Judge Nettesheim observes, always
"reaches into the future." Mary
L.O., 189 Wis. 2d at 470.
Every child support order is premised on present needs, but extends into
the future because it anticipates future needs and continues until a change in
circumstances requires a modification in the order. The description of the percentage standards in Weidner,
131 Wis. 2d at 318, on which the majority relies, is inapposite. The court in Weidner was simply
noting that the percentage standards serve as a shortcut to establishing the
need for support, not that a court must look only to the present need for
support. The court of appeals thus
erroneously concluded that the percentage standards must be strictly limited to
the calculation of present support.
Next is the question, did the
family court err in establishing a trust for Tukker's child support payments in
excess of $1500 each month.[4] The court of appeals held that the creation
of the trust was an erroneous exercise of discretion because it would compel
Tommy to pay support for Tukker after the age of majority. See Mary L.O., 189
Wis. 2d at 453 (citing Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 638,
178 N.W.2d 35 (1970); Resong v. Vier, 157 Wis. 2d 382, 391, 459
N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1990)).
We conclude that the trust is
permissible under Wis. Stat. § 767.51(5)(e) (1993-94). This section, which allows the family court
in a paternity action to consider the "need and capacity of the child for
education, including higher education," supports the actions of the family
court in the present matter. After
directing the family court to look to a child's need and capacity for higher
education in setting support, which the family court in the present matter
properly did, the legislature must mean to permit courts to undertake efforts
in appropriate circumstances to see that a child's capacity for higher
education is served by making preparations, including financial preparations,
for attendance at an institution of higher learning. A trust is a logical and feasible device to accomplish this end.
We note that, so as not to
conflict with Bliwas, any payments to a trust must be made from child
support payments paid while the child is still a minor. The family court's order in this case
requires exactly that. We conclude that
the family court in this paternity action acted within its discretion and
within Wis. Stat. § 767.51(5)(e) in its creation of a trust in which some
portion of the payments (assuming that the potential shortfall in funds which we
have already noted does not come to pass) may go towards Tukker's higher
education.[5] We therefore reverse the portion of the
court of appeals decision disallowing the trust for Tukker's child support
payments in excess of $1500 per month.
The court of appeals majority
also found that the family court erroneously exercised its discretion in
creating the "discretionary fund" component of the trust. The court of appeals stated:
Creation
of a "discretionary fund" that authorizes different investment
options than the trust, allows withdrawal from the fund by the custodial parent
at the expense of the trust without cotrustee approval, and has different
notice and review provisions than the trust effectively creates two separate
entities—a trust and a fund. As we see
it, the trial court may impose a trust, but may not thereafter impose a fund
that has separate components than the trust.
Mary L.O., 189
Wis. 2d at 460 (footnote omitted).
The majority held that the language of Wis. Stat. § 767.25(2)
(1993-94)[6]
allows the creation of a "separate fund or trust," but not both. Id. at 460 n.8. We do not agree with this reading of
§ 767.25(2). First, this section
does not apply to paternity actions.
Second, we see no reason why a family court in a paternity action may
not structure a trust in any manner serving the best interests of the child,
including the creation of a trust with a separate fund component. We therefore also reverse this portion of
the court of appeals decision.
In conclusion, we hold that
the family court in the present matter did not abuse its discretion in its
determination not to deviate from the percentage standards in awarding child
support, and in creating a trust for future support and possible higher
education expenses. We reverse those
portions of the decision of the court of appeals which reversed the circuit
court's judgment. We affirm that
portion of the court of appeals decision which affirmed the circuit court's
judgment.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed
in part and reversed in part and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 93-1929
Complete Title
of Case: In re the Paternity of Tukker M.O.:
Mary L.O.,
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Tommy R.B., Jr.,
Respondent-Appellant.
______________________________________
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at: 189 Wis. 2d
440, 525 N.W.2d 793
(Ct. App. 1994)
PUBLISHED
Opinion Filed: February 15, 1996
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument: October
31, 1995
Source of APPEAL
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Sheboygan
JUDGE: JOHN B. MURPHY
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
93-1929 Mary L.O. v. Tommy R.B., Jr.
ATTORNEYS: For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner
there was a brief by Carl K. Buesing, Robert H. Halvorsen and Halvorsen,
Buesing & Seymour, S.C., Sheboygan and oral argument by Carl K.
Buesing.
For the
resondent-appellant there was a brief by James J. Podell, Carlton D.
Stansbury and Law Offices of Podell & Podell, Milwaukee and oral
argument by Carlton D. Stansbury.
Amicus
curiae brief was filed by Sherwood K. Zink, counsel, Madison for the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services.
[1] Section
767.51(4m) provides:
Except as provided in sub. (5), the court shall determine child support payments by using the percentage standard established by the department of health and social services under s. 46.25(9).
[2] Section
767.51(5) provides:
Upon
request by a party, the court may modify the amount of child support payments
determined under sub. (4m) if, after considering the following factors, the
court finds by the greater weight of the credible evidence that use of the
percentage standard is unfair to the child or to the requesting party:
. . . .
[3] Section 767.475(7) provides that, in paternity actions, "[t]he court may appoint a trustee or guardian to receive and manage money paid for the support of a minor child." Section 767.51(3) provides that the judgment or order in a paternity action may include "any other provision directed against the appropriate party . . . concerning the duty of support . . . ."
[4] We reach this issue despite Mary's argument that Tommy waived any challenge to a post-majority trust by including a trust to fund Tukker's post-secondary education in his proposals for settlement during the trial. As did the court of appeals majority, we conclude that Tommy's proposals were not a concession of the family court's authority to create such a trust, but rather a model on which to base settlement negotiations. See Mary L.O., 189 Wis. 2d at 453 n.5.
[5] We note there is an apparent discrepancy between paternity and divorce actions in the factors a court must consider when setting child support. In divorce actions, the court is to consider "[t]he child's educational needs," see Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m)(g) (1993-94), whereas in paternity actions the court is to consider "[t]he need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education," see Wis. Stat. § 767.51(5)(e). This difference has existed since 1979, when the legislature changed the paternity statute to its present wording. See § 25, ch. 352, Laws of 1979. We direct the legislature's attention to this discrepancy. We do not attempt to resolve the discrepancy in this case because the issue is not before the court.