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NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification. The final version will
appear in the bound volume of the official reports. |
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No.
93-1130
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
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Anthony C. Rockweit, a minor, by Jerald P. Donohue, his guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross
Respondents, United Wisconsin Proservices, Inc., Plaintiff, v. William Senecal, d/b/a Evergreen Campgrounds, Truck Insurance Exchange and Keith Rockweit, Defendants, Mary Rockweit, Defendant-Respondent, Ann Tynan and Wisconsin Farmers Mutual Insurance Group, Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross
Appellants-Petitioners, v. Christine Rockweit, Third Party
Defendant. |
FILED DEC
20, 1995 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI |
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of
Appeals. Reversed.
JON
P. WILCOX, J. This case involves a
review of a published decision by the court of appeals which reversed in part a
judgment of the circuit court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm,
Judge. See Rockweit v.
Senecal, 187 Wis. 2d 170, 522 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1994). The plaintiff-cross-respondent Anthony C.
Rockweit (Anthony), by his guardian ad litem, alleged that the
defendant-petitioner Ann Tynan (Tynan) was negligent in failing to extinguish
hot embers from a campfire contained in a fire pit into which he subsequently
fell, causing severe injuries.
Following a trial, a jury determined that Tynan was seven percent
causally negligent. On motions after
verdict, the trial court granted a directed verdict to Tynan and her insurer on
the ground that she had no duty to warn of or remedy the hazard presented by
the fire pit. The court of appeals
reversed, concluding that Tynan owed a common law duty to Anthony and
sufficient credible evidence existed for the jury to conclude that Tynan was
negligent in failing to extinguish the campfire.
On
review, we consider the following issue: Whether a guest at a campfire, who did
not participate in the creation or maintenance of the fire, could be held
negligent in failing to extinguish it.
We conclude that although Tynan owed
Anthony a duty of ordinary care which the jury determined was breached, we find
that imposing liability on Tynan in this case would contravene public
policy. We therefore reverse the court
of appeals on this issue. I.
The
relevant facts are as follows. The
minor, eighteen month old Anthony, sustained injuries when he fell into a fire
pit at the Evergreen Campgrounds located in Wild Rose, Wisconsin, on June 26,
1988. The campground was owned and
operated by William Senecal. Anthony
and his parents, Keith and Christine Rockweit, were camping at the Evergreen
Campgrounds during the weekend of June 24-26, 1988. The camping group consisted of various members of the
extended Rockweit family, as well as
several other families that were friends of the Rockweits. Several Rockweit family members were camped
in contiguous campsites at the Evergreen.
Tynan, a family friend of the Rockweits, was present at the same
campground with her husband and children.
The Tynans, however, occupied their own campsite several sites away from
the Rockweits and on the opposite side of the road.
All
of the members of the camping group, except the plaintiff Anthony and his
family, arrived at the Evergreen Campgrounds on Friday, June 24, 1988. The Rockweit families selected one of the
fire pits centrally located among the campsites to be utilized by the group
throughout the weekend. Although the
court of appeals termed this particular campfire a "communal fire
pit," it should be noted that
Tynan was not part of this communal camping group.[1] She did not participate in selecting this
site, nor did she exercise any control or maintenance over starting and
managing the fire itself. That night,
Tynan and her family stayed in their own campsite and maintained their own,
independent fire pit. Throughout the
weekend, Tynan and her family prepared all of their meals at their own
campsite, utilizing their own fire pit.
On Saturday, the Tynans spent a large portion of the day at the beach,
socializing with the Rockweits, most of whom they had known for several
years. At some point during the day, a
member of the Rockweit family invited the Tynans to their campsite that
evening.
The
Keith Rockweit family arrived at Evergreen on Saturday afternoon. Due to the overcrowded nature of the
campground that weekend, he shared a campsite with his brother's family. Keith Rockweit pitched the family tent
approximately 15-to-20 feet from the communal fire pit, which was already
burning upon their arrival.
While
some of the families cooked their dinner over the communal fire pit that night,
Tynan had dinner at her own campsite and later joined the rest of the Rockweit
group around the fire pit. She had no
connection to the communal fire pit other than as a guest of the Rockweits that
evening. Tynan did not maintain the
fire pit in any manner, nor provide any necessary materials to fuel it at any
time during her visit. Tynan remained
at the Rockweit campsite playing cards and socializing until nearly 4:00 a.m.
on Sunday. At this point, the only
campers remaining around the fire pit were Tynan, Keith Rockweit and the
defendant-respondent Mary Rockweit.
When Keith Rockweit announced that he was going to bed, the others also
left to return to their respective tents.
Tynan's campsite was a short walk down the road. As noted by the court of appeals,[2]
it was unclear as to the condition of the embers in the fire pit. Regardless, the three individuals left
without extinguishing the smoldering embers.
Several
hours later, Anthony got up with his mother, Christine Rockweit. As they walked across the campsite, he slid
into the fire pit and was severely injured.
The circular fire pit had been built into the ground, its rim flush to
the ground. There were no rocks or
other barriers around the fire pit for protective purposes.
A
personal injury action was brought against the Evergreen Campgrounds and its
insurer Truck Insurance Exchange, Keith Rockweit, Mary Rockweit, and Tynan and
her insurer, Wisconsin Farmers Mutual Insurance Group. Christine, Anthony's mother, was impleaded
as a third-party defendant by Tynan and her insurer. Prior to trial, Anthony executed a Pierringer release with
Evergreen and its insurer, settling the claim for maintaining an unsafe fire
pit for $50,000, releasing the campground from any further liability. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21
Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
Following
the trial, the defendants were found causally negligent, with liability
apportioned by the jury as follows:
William Senecal (Evergreen Campgrounds) 16%
Keith Rockweit 36%
Christine Rockweit 35%
Ann Tynan
7%
Mary Rockweit 6%
100%
The jury also found that the fire pit
constituted an open and obvious danger at the time of the accident.
Tynan
requested a directed verdict on the grounds that neither Wisconsin common law
nor statutory law imposed any duty to extinguish the embers in the fire pit. Although it found that no duty existed under
the common law, the circuit court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 895.525
(1987-88), the Recreational Use Statute, imposed a duty on Tynan, and therefore
Anthony could sustain an action in negligence.[3] See Rockweit, 187 Wis. 2d at
179, 522 N.W.2d at 579. The court of
appeals disagreed with the circuit court's interpretation that § 895.525
went beyond the common law to impose a greater duty of care. We agree that the statute does not impose a
greater duty on an individual than that which exists under the common law. Id. at 194, 522 N.W.2d at 585.
The
court of appeals held that Tynan owed a common law duty of ordinary care to
Anthony. Depicting her failure to
extinguish the hot embers in the fire pit as an affirmative act, the court of
appeals found that such conduct constituted negligent management or control of
a fire. Id. at 188-90, 522
N.W.2d at 583.
On
appeal, Tynan disputes the court of appeals' finding of a common law duty as
well as the holding that sufficient credible evidence existed to support the
jury's determination that such duty had been breached by failing to extinguish
the campfire.[4]
II.
In
order to maintain a cause of action for negligence in this state, there must
exist: (1) A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an
actual loss or damage as a result of the injury. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 531, 247
N.W.2d 132, 135 (1976) (citing Falk v. City of Whitewater, 65
Wis. 2d 83, 85, 221 N.W.2d 915, 916 (1974)). In Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 251-52, 278 N.W.2d
238, 250 (Ct. App. 1979), the court articulated that:
Where the
facts alleged to give rise to a duty are agreed upon, the question of the
existence of a duty is one of law. This
question is closely related to the question of whether a defendant is not
negligent as a matter of law, i.e., based on the facts presented, no
properly instructed, reasonable jury could find the defendant failed to
exercise ordinary care. Generally, this
question is for the jury and should be decided as a matter of law before trial
only in rare cases.
The
first issue to be discussed is whether Tynan owed Anthony a duty of care.[5] "Each individual is held, at the very
least, to a standard of ordinary care in all activities." Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 537, 247
N.W.2d at 138. As this court stated in A.E.
Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 N.W.2d
764, 766 (1974), the proper analysis of duty in Wisconsin is as follows:
The duty of
any person is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act which will
cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of that harm and the
identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the
act . . . .
This passage represents the minority
viewpoint in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting), which this court adopted in Pfeifer
v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952). The minority rationale in Palsgraf
was expressly adopted by this court in Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.,
273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). See
also, Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 531, 133 N.W.2d 335
(1965) (capsulizing the history of this court's rejection of the no-duty,
no-liability concept of the majority in Palsgraf).
The
concept of a common law duty was further refined in our decision in Rolph v.
EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991), where we stated: "A defendant's duty is established when
it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may
cause harm to someone. A party is
negligent when he commits an act when some harm to someone is
foreseeable." Id. at 532,
464 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223,
235, 424 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1988)); see
also Lloyd v. S.S. Kresge Co., 85 Wis. 2d 296, 305, 270 N.W.2d 423,
427 (Ct. App. 1978).
Anthony
argues that Tynan, as one of the last campers to go to bed, had a duty to
extinguish the fire because it was foreseeable to a reasonable person that
someone could be hurt if she did not do so.
Further, he asserts that this duty existed irrespective of where Tynan
was camping that weekend, as she shared in the communal fire and the
accompanying responsibility to douse its embers at night's end. Relying upon the decision in DeBauche v.
Knott, 69 Wis. 2d 119, 122-23, 230 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1975) and Winslow
v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 331, 371 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 1985),
Tynan argues that she did not have a duty to Anthony to extinguish the fire
because Wisconsin law does not impose a duty to assist or preserve a person
from a risk of injury or a hazardous situation created by another. While recognizing that she could have
extinguished the fire, she argues that she had no legal obligation to do
so. She was not the owner or possessor
of the land on which the fire pit was located, nor did she do anything to
create or maintain the fire.
The
court of appeals agreed with Tynan's argument that she did not have a duty to
protect Anthony from a hazardous situation, but concluded that her
"failure to extinguish hot embers in a fire pit may be considered
negligent management or control of a fire." Rockweit, 187 Wis. 2d at 190, 522 N.W.2d at 583. Classifying her conduct as an affirmative
act, the court of appeals reasoned that leaving the hot embers in the fire pit
created the dangerous situation which could foreseeably cause harm to someone.
We
disagree with the court of appeals' suggestion that by socializing around the
fire pit that evening, Tynan assumed an affirmative obligation to extinguish
the embers. To the contrary, the record
demonstrates that this is a case of inaction, where a social guest was merely
present several hours prior to the accident.
Furthermore, we find that Tynan's assertion that she did not owe Anthony
a duty to exercise ordinary care is incorrect.
Although individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to all
persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect to the imposition
of a legal duty in some cases. McNeese
v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 632, 497 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1993)(citing Erickson
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 479
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also Zelco v. Integrity Mut.
Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 74, 78,
527 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 1994).
Our review of the record reveals that Tynan's only connection to the
fire pit was her mere presence as a guest of the Rockweits.
Citing
Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 124 Wis. 2d
275, 369 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1985), Tynan also maintains that the fire pit
presented an open and obvious danger to a "reasonable person,"
thereby relieving her of liability, as she simply had no duty to act to remedy
or warn of an open and obvious condition.
Anthony argues that Tynan lacked the requisite "owner" or
"possessor" status necessary to rely on the open and obvious danger
doctrine to bar the plaintiff's negligence claim. Anthony further argues that the defense is not available to Tynan
because Wis. Stat. § 891.44 (1987-88) conclusively establishes that a
minor under the age of seven cannot be found to be negligent as a matter of
law.
Although
we decide the present case on different grounds, we presently take the
opportunity to address the apparent conflict of authority among the court of
appeals that exists with respect to the application of the open and obvious
danger doctrine. We expressly reaffirm
our prior holding in Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91
Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979) that a landlord owes his or her tenant
or anyone else on his or her premises a duty to exercise ordinary care. In Pagelsdorf, we held that
"[i]ssues of notice of the defect, its obviousness, control of the
premises, and so forth are all relevant only insofar as they bear on the
ultimate question: Did the landlord exercise ordinary care in the maintenance
of the premises under all the circumstances?" Id. at 745, 284 N.W.2d at 61. Our decisions in Pagelsdorf and Antoniewicz v.
Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975) abrogated the common
law immunity by subsuming the concept of open and obvious danger into the
consideration of common law negligence.
In the ordinary negligence case, if an open and obvious danger is
confronted by the plaintiff, it is merely an element to be considered by the
jury in apportioning negligence and will not operate to completely bar the
plaintiff's recovery.[6]
We
find Tynan's argument that she cannot be held liable for Anthony's injuries
because Wisconsin law does not impose a duty upon her to act to be without
merit. We conclude that while present
at the campfire prior to the accident, Tynan did owe Anthony a common law duty,
the duty to exercise ordinary care. We
now turn to the question of whether she breached that duty.
Negligence
is to be determined by ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of care
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co.,
87 Wis. 2d 723, 732, 275 N.W.2d 660, 665 (1979). "The risk need not be to the particular plaintiff. The test [in Wisconsin] is whether
unreasonable risk to the world at large is created by the conduct." Id.
The resolution of this mixed question of law and fact is ordinarily left
to the jury. Ceplina v. South
Milwaukee Sch. Bd., 73 Wis. 2d 338, 341-42, 243 N.W.2d 183, 185
(1976); Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 776, 203 N.W.2d 15, 18
(1973).
Our
decision in Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443-44, 442 N.W.2d
25, 30 (1989), supports the well recognized principle that negligence consists
of failing to use that degree of ordinary care which would be exercised by
"the great mass of mankind" under the same or similar circumstances
when it stated:
A
person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending to do any wrong,
he does an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or
omission will subject him or his property, or the person or property of
another, to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.
See also Peters v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 89
Wis. 2d 115, 122-23, 278 N.W.2d 208, 211-212 (1979); WIS JI-CIVIL 1005.[7]
The
jury determined that Tynan had breached her duty to Anthony to exercise
ordinary care, concluding that the failure to extinguish the hot embers in the
fire pit was a substantial factor in the resultant injuries suffered by the
child. The conclusion that Tynan's
conduct constituted negligence is supported by credible evidence within the
record.
Tynan
challenges this finding and relies upon our decision in McNeese to
support her argument that she did not breach a duty of exercising ordinary care
simply by being present at the fire pit.[8] Although the parties argue the significance
of our decision in McNeese, we find that our conclusion in the present
case is properly guided by considerations of public policy.
III.
As
we held in Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159
(1988), "once it is determined that a negligent act has been committed and
that the act is a substantial factor in causing the harm, the question of duty
is irrelevant and a finding of nonliability can be made only in terms of public
policy." Id. at 235, 424
N.W.2d at 164 (quoting A.E. Investment Corp., 62 Wis. 2d 479,
484-85, 214 N.W.2d 764, 767 (1974)); see also Haas v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 326, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970). A finding of nonliability made in terms of
public policy is a question of law which the court alone decides. Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co.,
87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660, 667 (1979); Pfeifer, 262 Wis.
at 240, 55 N.W.2d at 35.
We
held in Nelson v. Davidson, 155 Wis. 2d 674, 679-80, 456 N.W.2d
343, 345 (1990) that "the imposition of liability in a given situation is
a question of policy whether the liability is regulated by the notion of duty,
or whether liability is cut off after all the elements of negligence have been
established, as more recent cases of this court have stated." Some cases have held that the actor had no
"duty" to the injured party; however, the determination to deny
liability is essentially one of public policy rather than of duty or
causation. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas
Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 183-84, 77 N.W.2d 397, 402 (1956).
In our decision in Colla v. Mendella,
1 Wis. 2d 594, 598-99, 85 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1957), we provided a number of
factors for this court to consider in determining whether to limit liability on
the grounds of public policy:
It is
recognized by this and other courts that even where the chain of causation is
complete and direct, recovery against the negligent tort-feasor may sometimes
be denied on grounds of public policy because the injury is too remote from the
negligence or too `wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tort-feasor', or in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the
negligence should have brought about the harm, or because allowance of recovery
would place too unreasonable a burden upon users of the highway, or be too
likely to open the way to fraudulent claims, or would `enter a field that has
no sensible or just stopping point.'
Id. (citing Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935), overruled on other grounds by Bowen
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994); Osborne
v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 237, 234 N.W. 372, 377-78 (1931)).
In
this case, consistent with the rationale of the above decisions, the jury
determined that Tynan's alleged failure to extinguish the hot embers in the
fire pit when she retired for the evening was an omission that would
foreseeably cause harm to someone. The
duty was to refrain from such omission.
Although credible evidence existed to support the jury's finding that
Tynan's omission was negligent, this court believes that public policy requires
that she not be held responsible for the child's injuries. It is undisputed factually that Tynan did
not participate in the selection of the fire pit site, nor did she start,
maintain, or provide any necessary incendiary materials for the fire. The imposition of liability in this case,
under the given facts, would place an unreasonable burden upon a guest in
Tynan's position.
It
is clear from the record that Tynan never exercised custody or control of
Anthony[9]
and that her only connection with the fire pit was to sit beside it during the
early morning hours on Sunday, playing cards and socializing with the
Rockweits. She did not create the
hazard which caused Anthony's injuries, and at no time did she assume any
responsibility to maintain the fire pit.
The dangerous propensities akin to fire are commonplace to a
campsite. However, the responsibility
for maintaining the safe existence of the fire pit properly remains with the
possessor of the campsite. Those who
merely visit the site or are participants in a casual sense as was Tynan, but
who do not fuel or feed the fire, should not assume the burden of liability
that is improperly being shifted in this case.
Allowance of recovery under these facts would essentially require a
guest to remedy any allegedly unsafe condition over which he or she has
exercised no control, and did not create, or risk being saddled with unforeseen
financial responsibility.
The
injuries sustained by Anthony are wholly out of proportion to the alleged
culpability of Tynan. Regardless of
what had been done to the fire pit on the prior evening, or whether, in fact,
there were hot coals in the fire pit, a fire pit is an unsafe place for a small
child. Anthony's exposure to the hazard
in this case, and his resultant injuries would have occurred in exactly the
same manner even if Tynan had never been present at the campground. Keith Rockweit, as one of the last three
campers to retire, had pitched the family tent 15-to-20 feet from the fire
pit. Not only had he exercised control
over the fire pit prior to the accident, he also chose not to extinguish the
embers, concluding that the fire pit did not pose an unreasonable risk to any
member of the camping group, including Anthony. Further, Christine Rockweit testified that she was fully aware
that the fire pit constituted a hazard at the time of the accident and had not
relied on a supposition that someone the night before might have doused the
embers, including Tynan. As the jury
concluded, it was Christine who failed to exercise supervisory responsibility
over Anthony at the time of the accident, not Tynan. Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the injury that
Anthony suffered several hours later outside Tynan's presence is too remote
from any alleged negligence on her part to impose liability.
We
conclude that imposing liability in this case would unnecessarily allow the law
of negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point. We are particularly persuaded by
the reasoning of Judge Grimm with respect to this policy consideration where he
states:
I think this
factor is likewise met, because there are numerous examples that have been
cited as to where one would draw the line on negligence in a camping situation.
And when it comes to fires, there is that same difficult issue, is it the last
adult to leave, the last person to put a log in the fire? Or is it the owner of
the campsite? Or the person who started the campfire? And this Court feels that
it is best handled by the owner of the fire, by whose campsite it is.
We see no sensible stopping point if
liability were to be imposed on someone in Tynan's position, as she merely
visited the campsite, played cards and socialized as a guest of the Rockweits.
After considering the various policy factors
provided by this court in Colla and its progeny, we decline to impose
liability in this case. We therefore
reverse the court of appeals on this issue.
By
the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
SHIRLEY
S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). I write separately to
address the defendant's claim that "Wisconsin law does not impose a duty
upon one person to actively assist or preserve a person from a risk of injury
created by another." Brief for
Petitioner at 23. This argument frames
the issue incorrectly under Wisconsin tort law. A person is negligent who "does something or fails to do
something under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee that
by his or her action or failure to act, he or she will subject a person or
property to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage." Wis JI—Civil 1005 (1993).[10] "Wisconsin law considers conduct to be
negligent if it involves a foreseeable risk of harm to anyone." Bowen v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,
183 Wis. 2d 627, 644, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).
As
the majority notes, Majority op. at 9, Wisconsin has long followed the view of
duty advanced by Judge Andrews in his Palsgraf dissent: "Every one owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety
of others." Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). Duty, therefore, is no
more than "an ingredient in the determination of negligence." A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders,
Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974). See also Bowen, 183
Wis. 2d at 644 ("[i]n Wisconsin, the doctrine of public policy, not
the doctrine of duty, limits the scope of the defendant's liability"); Ollerman
v. O'Rourke, 94 Wis. 2d 17, 28, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
On
careful review, the cases the defendant cites for the proposition that she owed
the plaintiff no duty of care, Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, do not support
her position. The defendant relies upon
Fitzgerald v. Ludwig, 41 Wis. 2d 635, 165 N.W.2d 158 (1969), which
states that "[o]ne person does not owe to all other persons a general duty
of care unattached to some other conduct." Id. at 638. But Fitzgerald
addresses the attractive nuisance doctrine.
As the court explained in A.E. Investment, Fitzgerald is
"concerned with special types of legal relationships" and therefore
"out of the mainstream of negligence law in Wisconsin." A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at
486; see also Ceplina v. South Milwaukee School Board, 73
Wis. 2d 338, 343, 243 N.W.2d 183 (1976).
Therefore, reliance upon Fitzgerald is "inappropriate in
describing the general duty that an alleged tortfeasor has in the ordinary
negligence case." A.E.
Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 486.
The
defendant also relies on language in De Bauche v. Knott, 69 Wis. 2d
119, 230 N.W.2d 158 (1975), which states that "[a]s a general rule, the
law imposes no duty on one person actively to assist in the preservation of the
person or property of another from injury, even though the means by which harm
can be averted are in his possession."
Id. at 122-23. But in
this passage, the De Bauche court was merely recapitulating the argument
of the tortfeasor in that case. Finding
the tortfeasor liable, the De Bauche court expressly refused to adopt
the tortfeasor's proposed statement of law discussed above, noting instead that
under Wisconsin law the tortfeasor owed the plaintiff a duty whenever "it
can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause
harm to someone." Id. at
123-24.
Given
the De Bauche court's refutation of the "no duty" standard,
the defendant's reliance on Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 371
N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985) to bolster her "no duty" argument is
infirm. In stating that "generally
no duty exists to protect others from hazardous situations," Id. at
331, the Winslow court cited the same language from De Bauche
which the De Bauche court itself had discredited. Furthermore, Winslow was a summary
judgment case in which the complaint was dismissed because the complainants'
affidavits neither stated nor allowed a reasonable inference that the alleged
tortfeasors were negligent. Winslow,
125 Wis. 2d at 329-330.[11]
Paradoxically,
then, the cases cited by the defendant in advocating a different interpretation
of Wisconsin negligence law confirm the extent to which that law nevertheless
has remained the same: it imposes a
general duty of care on all persons to the world at large. Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 644 n.12
(quoting Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 350 (Andrews, J. dissenting)).
Citing
McNeese v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 497 N.W.2d 124 (1993), the
defendant also argues that "a person does not breach a duty of exercising
reasonable care simply by being present."
Brief for Petitioner at 23. The McNeese
court, applying the customary standard of review, see Weiss v. United
Fire & Casualty Co., ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (1995),
merely determined that there was no credible evidence supporting the jury
finding that the alleged tortfeasor had breached her duty of care to the
plaintiff. McNeese, 174
Wis. 2d at 631. In contrast, the
record in the case before us demonstrates that (1) the defendant failed to
extinguish the embers in the firepit, even though she admitted knowing that
they could still be hot in the morning; (2) as an experienced camper, the
defendant knew that it was a good safety practice to extinguish embers before
retiring to bed; (3) the water necessary to douse the embers was readily
available and the defendant conceded that it would have been easy to do so; and
(4) the defendant had no expectation that her two companions would do so. The defendant also admitted knowing that
these dangers were exacerbated by both the presence of little children in the
camping party and the fact that the firepit was flush with the ground.
These
facts constitute credible evidence allowing a reasonable jury to conclude that
the defendant breached her duty of care.
Although the court nevertheless concludes that the defendant is not
liable, it is not because she had no duty of care but rather because of public
policy. Majority op. at 15-19. The two concepts‑‑duty and
public policy‑‑should not be confused. In Wisconsin, one always owes a duty of care to the world at
large, which is why "[t]he consistent analyses of this court reveal that
the question of duty is not an element of the court's policy
determination." A.E. Investment,
62 Wis. 2d at 484.
For
the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.
I
am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this opinion.
DONALD
W. STEINMETZ, J. (concurring). I
agree with the majority in applying the public policy rationale to this
case. However, my preference would have
been to find that there was no credible evidence for a reasonable jury to find
that Ann Tynan breached her duty with the facts in this record. See Johnson v. Misericordia
Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 744, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
I
would, therefore, apply the rationale of McNeese v. Pier, 174
Wis. 2d 624, 632, 497 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1993) to this case.
I
am authorized to state that Chief Justice Roland B. Day joins this concurring
opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 93-1130
Complete Title
of Case: Anthony C. Rockweit,
a minor, by Jerald P. Donohue, his
guardian ad litem,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross
Respondents,
United Wisconsin Proservices, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
William Senecal, d/b/a Evergreen
Campgrounds,
Truck Insurance Exchange and Keith
Rockweit,
Defendants,
Mary Rockweit,
Defendant-Respondent,
Ann Tynan and Wisconsin Farmers Mutual
Insurance Group,
Defendants-Third
Party Plaintiffs-Respondents-
Cross
Appellants-Petitioners,
v.
Christine Rockweit,
Third
Party Defendant.
____________________________________________________
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Reported at: 187 Wis. 2d 170, 522 N.W.2d 575
(Ct. App. 1994)
PUBLISHED
Opinion Filed: December 20, 1995
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument: September 6,
1995
Source of APPEAL
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Fond du Lac
JUDGE: PETER L. GRIMM
JUSTICES:
Concurred: ABRAHAMSON and BRADLEY, J.J., concurs
(Opinion
filed)
STEINMETZ, J., and DAY, C.J., concurs
(Opinion
filed)
Dissented:
Not Participating:
93-1130 Rockweit v. Senecal
ATTORNEYS: For the defendants-third party plaintiffs-respondents-cross
appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Thomas A. Lorenson, David J.
Colwin and Colwin & Lorenson, S.C., Fond du Lac, and oral
argument by Thomas A. Lorenson.
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross
respondents there was a brief by Jerald P. Donohue and Donohue,
Sharpe & Casper, S.C., Fond du Lac and oral argument by Jerald P.
Donohue.
[1] Rockweit, 187 Wis. 2d at 177, 522
N.W.2d at 578. While acquainted with
the various Rockweit families, Tynan was merely a guest with respect to the
"communal fire" that had been selected by the extended Rockweit
families. In fact, a review of the
record reveals that the concept of a "communal fire" was introduced
at trial by counsel for the plaintiff, and was subsequently adopted by the
court of appeals. Id.
[2] Rockweit, 187 Wis. 2d at 178 n.1, 522
N.W.2d at 578 n.1. The testimony among
the three principals regarding the state of the embers is conflicting. Keith Rockweit testified that the embers
were still glowing when he left the fire pit; Mary Rockweit stated that she
could not recall whether the embers were glowing; and Tynan testified that the
embers were not glowing but were gray and smoldering. Id.
[3] In addition, Tynan filed the following
post-verdict motions: (1) motion for directed verdict; (2) motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict; and (3) motion to change the answers to the
special verdict questions finding her negligent, on a similar theory of
insufficiency of the evidence. See
Wis. Stat. § 805.14(5)(b)-(d) (1987-88).
On March 8, 1993, the circuit court's initial response to its motions
after verdict was that Tynan was negligent because she violated Wis. Stat.
§ 895.525(4)(a)(4) (1987-88) in that she failed to refrain from activity
in a manner that may contribute to injury to other persons while participating
in a recreational activity (camping).
The circuit court later reversed itself and granted a directed verdict
to Tynan. The circuit court reasoned
that since Tynan was being held to the standards of the possessor or occupant
of land, she had no duty to warn of or remedy the hazard presented by the fire
pit since it was an open and obvious danger, thus barring Anthony's negligence
claim. The circuit court denied
Anthony's Motion for Reconsideration on March 29, 1993. See Rockweit, 187 Wis. 2d at
180 n.4, 522 N.W.2d at 579 n.4.
[4] Inasmuch as the closing arguments were not
recorded, the facts of this particular case are somewhat confusing. As a reviewing court, it is unclear to us
what theories the parties relied upon in their respective closing
arguments. We note that it would be a
better practice for courts, in the future, to require the recording of closing
arguments.
[5] The general duty imposed by the common law
is aptly described in Fitzgerald v. Ludwig, 41 Wis. 2d 635, 639,
165 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1969) where it states that "[e]very person owes to
all others a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury which may
naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of his
act." (citing Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill.2d 614, 622, 126
N.E.2d 836, 840 (1955)); see also Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70
Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975)(abolishing the common law distinction
between licensees and invitees, and holding that "[t]he duty toward all
persons who come upon property with the consent of the occupier will be that of
ordinary care. By such standard of
ordinary care, we mean the standard that is used in all other negligence cases
in Wisconsin"). Id. at 857,
236 N.W.2d at 11.
[6] See also WIS JI-CIVIL 8020 and
accompanying COMMENT (discussing the contrary holdings of the court of appeals
in applying the open and obvious danger doctrine).
[7] WIS JI-CIVIL 1005 NEGLIGENCE: DEFINED
A person fails to exercise ordinary care,
when, without intending to do any harm, he or she does something or fails to do
something under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee that
by his or her action or failure to act, he or she will subject a person or
property to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.
[8] See also Winslow v. Brown, 125
Wis. 2d 327, 371 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985)(holding that because there is
no general duty to intervene, mere presence at the commission of a tort, or the
failure to object, is insufficient to constitute concerted action for purposes
of establishing liability).
[9] See generally Restatement (Second) of
Torts, sec. 314A(4) (1965) (special relation giving rise to duty to aid or
protect when one "voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for
protection...")
[10] See also Rolph v. EBI Cos.,
159 Wis. 2d 518, 532, 464 N.W.2d 518 (1991) (quoting Schuster v.
Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 235, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988) and applying
the same standard); LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 330
N.W.2d 555 (1983) (collecting cases); A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders,
Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) (collecting cases).
[11] Further compounding the Winslow
court's misplaced reliance on De Bauche, subsequent decisions relied
upon by the defendant, Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, 34-35, and by the
majority, Majority op. at 11, demonstrate an equally misplaced reliance upon Winslow
and its progeny. In Erickson v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 479 N.W.2d 552 (1991), the court
of appeals cited Winslow and echoed the discredited language from De
Bauche, stating that "Wisconsin does not generally impose a duty upon
persons to protect others from hazardous situations." Zelco v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 190
Wis. 2d 74, 527 N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1994) also quotes the same sentence from De
Bauche, citing Erickson. Zelco,
190 Wis. 2d at 79. Finally, McNeese
v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 497 N.W.2d 124 (1993), quotes the same
discredited sentence from De Bauche as well, citing both Winslow
and Erickson. McNeese,
174 Wis. 2d at 632.