|
NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and
modification. The final version will
appear in the bound volume of the official reports. |
|
|
No.
93-0208
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
|
|
John L. Hughes, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Chrysler Motors
Corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
FILED JAN
17, 1996 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk of Supreme Court Madison, WI |
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming a circuit court judgment.
Affirmed.
WILLIAM
A. BABLITCH, J. Mr. Hughes bought
a new car in 1990. It was,
unfortunately, a lemon, a fact admitted by all parties. After the manufacturer failed to respond
within the time limits set by law, Mr. Hughes sued the manufacturer, Chrysler,
seeking among other things the amount of money he paid for the van as pecuniary
damages. Under Wisconsin's "lemon
law," any pecuniary damages awarded to a successful plaintiff are
doubled. Chrysler argues that the
purchase price of the car to the consumer is not a pecuniary damage within the
meaning of the lemon law. We disagree. One purpose of the law, among others, is to
provide an incentive for a manufacturer to put the purchaser of a new car back
to the position the purchaser thought he or she was in at the time they bought
the car. We conclude that the
legislature intended to include the purchase price of the car to the consumer
as pecuniary damages. Accordingly, we
affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. Hughes purchased a new Dodge Caravan on
January 11, 1990. During his first year
of ownership, Hughes took the vehicle to a dealer to repair transmission
defects on seven separate occasions.
Hughes retained counsel after the repair efforts proved to be
unsuccessful. On June 19, 1991, Hughes'
counsel wrote to CT Corporation Systems, Chrysler's registered agent in
Wisconsin, and demanded that Chrysler replace Hughes' car within 30 days with a
"comparable new motor vehicle" without any further charge to
him. Wisconsin Stat. § 218.015(2)(b)2.a
and (c).
Having
received no response within the 30 days provided by the statute, Hughes'
counsel contacted Chrysler on July 29, 1991, and at Chrysler's request, mailed
a copy of the June 19 demand letter.
After Chrysler received a copy of the letter, Chrysler attempted to
reach Hughes' counsel by telephone before discovering that Hughes had filed
suit on August 22, 1991. On August 23,
1991, Chrysler sent Hughes a letter offering to replace his vehicle without any
charge for a model year upgrade or the mileage on his vehicle.
The
circuit court granted Hughes' motion for summary judgment. The court then entered judgment for Hughes
in the amount of $74,371, which included double the amount he paid for the
vehicle, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. We granted Chrysler's petition for review.
The
first issue is whether the purchase price of the car to the consumer is
pecuniary damages within the meaning of Wisconsin's so-called lemon law, Wis.
Stat. § 218.015(7)(1993-94), the relevant part of which is cited below.[1] Statutory construction is a question of law
which this court decides de novo without deference to the decisions of the
lower courts. Eby v. Kozarek,
153 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990).
"The cardinal rule in all statutory interpretation, as this court
has often said, is to discern the intent of the legislature." Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155
Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990).
This court ascertains that intent by examining the language of the
statute and the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose of the
statute. Id; see also Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis.
2d 737, 749, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991). We
are also aware that remedial statutes should be liberally construed to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy that the statute intended to afford. Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73
Wis. 2d 364, 373, 243 N.W.2d 422 (1976).
Chrysler
argues that a buyer's pecuniary loss is limited to the buyer's out-of-pocket
expenses that were caused by the manufacturer's violation of the statute. Hughes disagrees. He argues that pecuniary loss within the meaning of the lemon law
includes the purchase price of the car.
Hughes contends that allowing the consumer to recover double the
purchase price of the automobile effectuates the purposes of the lemon law and
strengthens the rights of consumers in dealing with vehicle defects. We agree.
The
statute is silent as to whether pecuniary loss includes the purchase price of
the vehicle. To determine the
legislative intent behind the statute, we first examine the history of lemon
laws in general. Lemon laws were
enacted to deal with the increasing number of disputes between manufacturers
and consumers over automobile warranties.
Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers:
Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985
Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 589. Warranty
disputes were directly responsible for a considerable amount of litigation and
have led to numerous legislative proposals. Id. The underlying reason for such legislation
was clear. Harold Greenberg, The
Indiana Motor Vehicle Protection Act of 1988: The Real Thing For Sweetening the Lemon or Merely a Weak
Artificial Sweetener?, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 57, 57 (1989). For the average person, the purchase of an
automobile was one of the most important of all consumer purchases in terms of
significance and price. Id.
However, for thousands of purchasers each year, this highly significant
purchase became a virtual nightmare when the automobile refused to function
properly, and the seller was unable, or unwilling to take action to remedy the
situation. Julian B. Bell III, Ohio's
Lemon Law: Ohio Joins the Rest
of the Nation in Waging War Against the Automobile Limited Warranty, 57 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1015, 1015 (1989).
Prior
to the enactment of lemon laws, the only kinds of remedial relief available to
consumers were the statutory remedies of revocation of acceptance and breach of
warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. See Wis. Stat. §§ 402-602;
402-608; 402-313. Federal remedies also
existed through the Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1982). These state and federal
remedies, however, did not adequately protect the interests of the consumer in
a typical lemon vehicle claim. Clifford
P. Block, Arkansas's New Motor Vehicle Quality Assurance Act -- A Branch of
Hope for Lemon Owners, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L. J. 493, 493 (1994). Purchasers of defective cars had no recourse
other than to repeatedly bring their cars in for repairs.
The
problems faced by the automobile consumer were accurately described in the
following comments made at the hearings on a proposed federal Automobile and
Warranty Repair Act:
I think there
is probably no subject of more . . . emotional concern and
irritation, frustration, aggravation and outrage than the question of the
automobile that does not work. When the
consumer buys the car he thinks he is getting a car that will drive and that
will service him. He thinks his
warranty is going to mean that if anything goes wrong it will be fixed up well
and promptly. The fact is that in all
too many cases this does not happen . . . .
Automobile Warranty and Repair Act: Hearings on H.R. 1005 before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (introductory remarks of Rep. James H.
Scheuer, Subcommittee Chairman); see also Greenberg at 57. By 1993, 48 states, including Wisconsin, had
lemon laws available as remedial assistance to consumers who purchased
defective new automobiles. See
Block at 493.
Wisconsin's
lemon law, Wis. Stat. § 218.015, became effective on November 3, 1983. Prior to its passage, Wisconsin consumers
relied on the same inadequate, uncertain and expensive remedies of the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Stephen J. Nicks, Lemon Law II, Wis. Bar Bulletin, Vol.
60, No. 7, July 1987, at 8. Wisconsin's
lemon law provides that if a new motor vehicle does not conform to an
applicable express warranty, the nonconformity shall be repaired before the
expiration of the warranty or one year after delivery of the vehicle, whichever
is sooner. Section 218.015(2)(a). If the nonconformity is not repaired after a
reasonable attempt to repair, the manufacturer must accept return of the vehicle,
and at the direction of the consumer, either replace the vehicle or refund to
the consumer the full purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, costs,
less a reasonable allowance for use.
Section 218.015(2)(b)1 and 2. A
reasonable attempt to repair means either that the nonconformity is subject to
repair four times and the nonconformity continues or that the vehicle is out of
service for an aggregate of at least 30 days because of warranty
nonconformities. Section 218.015(1)(h)1
and 2.
The
Wisconsin lemon law is violated when the manufacturer fails to voluntarily replace
or repurchase the lemon vehicle within 30 days after receipt of the consumer's
Wis. Stat. § 218.015(2)(c) demand. This
failure to voluntarily comply with the lemon law establishes a violation of the
law and triggers the § 218.015(7) remedies of the law. Section 218.015(7) provides that:
The
court shall award a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of
any pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney
fees, and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate.
Wisconsin's
lemon law was created to be a self-enforcing consumer law that provides
"important rights to motor vehicle owners." Memorandum from Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General, to
Members of the Legislature, Re: AB 434,
Auto "Lemon Law" Changes, Oct. 14, 1985, Wis. Act 205. The intent behind the law was to
"improve auto manufacturers' quality control . . . [and] reduce the
inconvenience, the expense, the frustration, the fear and [the] emotional
trauma that lemon owners endure."
Statement by Vernon Holschbach, co-sponsor of the bill, "Lemon"
Car Bill Has Sweet, Sour Sides, Wisconsin State Journal, March 2,
1983. In Hartlaub v. Coachmen Ind.,
Inc., 143 Wis. 2d 791, 422 N.W. 2d 869 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of
appeals stated that, "[a]s to legislative object, Wisconsin's Lemon Law is
obviously remedial in nature. As such, we
should construe the statute with a view towards the social problem which the
legislature was addressing when enacting the law." Id. at 801.
In
the 1985-86 legislative session, Wis. Stat. § 218.015(7) was amended to make
the award of double damages and reasonable attorney fees mandatory rather than
discretionary. Nicks, Lemon Law II
at 11. In the initial section, the
statute stated that a consumer "may bring an action for twice the amount
of any pecuniary loss . . . ." Id. The amended
language states that the "court shall award a consumer who prevails
. . . twice the amount of any pecuniary loss . . . ." Section 218.015(7)(1985)(emphasis
added). This amendment clarified that
when a consumer prevails in a court action under the lemon law, the court must
award double damages and attorney fees.
Based
on this history, we conclude that the legislature intended to include the
purchase price of the car as pecuniary damages. We come to this conclusion for the following reasons.
First,
if we accept Chrysler's definition of pecuniary loss, then the remedy provided
by the statute does not significantly improve upon those remedies available to
the consumer before the enactment of the lemon law. See the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312. Certainly the law is intended to do more
than simply parrot the remedies previously available to the consumer.
Second,
by including the purchase price of the car as part of the pecuniary loss, the
statute provides an incentive to the manufacturer to promptly resolve the
matter by making it far more costly to delay.
If the only damages available were out of pocket costs, the statute
would provide scant incentive to move with dispatch. The imposition of double damages as punishment for a failure to comply
with the statute provides the necessary incentive.
Another reason
to allow double or triple damages is to persuade manufacturers to settle
legitimate warranty disputes so that consumers are not forced to litigate. The manufacturer will have to consider more
carefully the costs of litigating the dispute when there is the prospect of
double damages as well as attorney's fees and other costs.
Vogel, Squeezing Consumers at 662
(discussing the importance of Wisconsin's lemon law as the only lemon law to allow
for the recovery of double damages).
Third,
a potential recovery must be large enough to give vehicle owners the incentive
to bring suits against these corporations. Nicks, Lemon Law II at
48. The threat of double damages
increases the bargaining power of individual consumers.
These corporations not only have the wealth and will to exhaust an
individual litigant, but also control vast amounts of technical expertise on
the very mechanical aspects the consumer is challenging. Without the sweetener of double damages in a
sufficient amount and reasonable attorneys' fees, few consumers would bring
such actions.
Id. at 48.
The
only case to address the appropriate measure of damages under Wis. Stat. §
218.015(7) is Nick v. Toyota Motor Sales, 160 Wis. 2d 373, 466 N.W.2d
215 (Ct. App. 1991). The issue in Nick
was whether the term "pecuniary loss" included the purchase price of
the consumer's vehicle. The court of
appeals held that pecuniary loss included the amount of the purchase price he
actually paid, whether by down payment or loan payments. Id. at 383.
The
Nick rule produces anomalous results depending on whether a consumer
borrows money to buy a car or pays for the car entirely in cash. See Stephen J. Nicks, A New Twist
on the Lemon Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, Oct. 1991 at 25. For example, if a consumer pays $20,000 in
cash for a car and proves lemon law liability, Nick says that the
pecuniary loss of that consumer is $20,000 which is then doubled as damages of
$40,000. However, if this same consumer
did not pay cash but merely gave a down payment of $2,000, Nick says the
pecuniary loss would be $2,000 (the amount actually paid out by the consumer)
and only that amount would be subject to doubling. The consumer would then recover double damages of $4,000. The secured creditor would receive the
unpaid principal and any interest owed.
The amount owing to the secured creditor would not be subject to
doubling.
Therefore,
calculating damages under Nick produces major double damage differences,
depending on how the consumer paid for the vehicle. Id. Based on the above example, the first
consumer gets $40,000 ($20,000 doubled) and the second consumer gets $4,000
($2,000 doubled).
Nick
did not address this double damage disparity.
However, under Nick's rationale, a credit purchaser with little
down payment or trade-in is in a significantly weaker position with respect to
the manufacturer than is a consumer who pays the full purchase price of the
vehicle. The converse is equally
true. This result is inconsistent with
the legislative goal of encouraging manufacturers to deal promptly and fairly
with all purchasers of new vehicles.
For that reason, any language in Nick contrary to our holding
here that pecuniary loss includes the full purchase price of the vehicle to the
consumer is overruled.
We
realize that car manufacturers do not deliberately set out to manufacture a
lemon. Quite the opposite. In fact, it is in their own best interest
not to do so. However, an unfortunate
fact of life, seemingly as inevitable as night following day, is that
occasionally a "lemon" will slip through the line. And when that happens, another unfortunate
fact of modern day life is that the cost to the unlucky consumer who purchases
that "lemon" is far more than the cost of the car: interrupted, delayed, or even cancelled
schedules; the time and the trouble, as well as the anxiety and stress that
accompany those changes, the apprehensions that result every time the consumer gets
back into that automobile wondering "what next?" Dependability is a prime objective of every
new car buyer. When that is taken away,
the loss is far greater than the cost of the car. It is this fact that the legislature recognized when they enacted
the lemon law. Its principle motivation
is not to punish the manufacturer who, after all, would far prefer that no
"lemons" escape their line.
Rather, it seeks to provide an incentive to that manufacturer to
promptly return those unfortunate consumers back to where they thought they
were when they first purchased that new automobile.[2]
Chrysler
makes one further argument. Chrysler
contends that because it offered to give Hughes a new vehicle 35 days after the
deadline, Hughes' pecuniary loss should be limited to the out-of-pocket
expenditures Hughes made during those 35 days.
We find no merit in this argument.
If we were to accept Chrysler's approach, a manufacturer could routinely
refuse to provide a replacement vehicle to a consumer in order to wait and see
whether the consumer would actually file suit.
The statute demands that a manufacturer respond within 30 days. Wisconsin Stat. § 218.015(2)(c). Chrysler did not respond within the 30 days
required by the law. We will not
rewrite the statute.
Given
all the above, we hold that Hughes can recover double the amount of the
purchase price of his automobile. This
result is both consistent with the court of appeals' decision in Nick
and consistent with the underlying purposes and goals of the lemon law.
Chrysler
asks us to address one further issue:
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by
awarding Hughes $35,141 in attorney's fees.
Chrysler claims that Hughes' counsel spent an unreasonable amount of
time on the case, and that the total amount billed by Hughes' counsel exceeded
that charged by other attorneys doing similar work.
Appellate
review of an award of attorney's fees is limited to whether the circuit court
properly exercised its discretion. Chmill
v. Friendly Ford-Mercury, 154 Wis. 2d 407, 412, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App.
1990). A circuit court properly
exercises its discretion if it "employs a logical rationale based on the
appropriate legal principles and facts of record." Village of Shorewood v. Steinberg,
174 Wis. 2d 191, 204, 496 N.W.2d 57 (1993)(citing Petros v. City of
Watertown, 152 Wis.2d 692, 696, 449 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1989)).
In
this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion by determining and awarding attorney fees. The circuit court made an exhaustive, detailed review of the fees
as reflected in the record. Although we
might decide otherwise, this determination is discretionary with the circuit
court. A review of the extensive record
made by the court as to this issue precludes us from finding an erroneous
exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we
affirm the court of appeals in all respects.
By
the Court.- The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 93-0208
Complete Title
of Case: John L. Hughes,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Chrysler Motors Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
________________________________________
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Reported at: 188 Wis. 2d 1, 523 N.W.2d 197
(Ct. App. 1994)
PUBLISHED
Opinion Filed: January 17, 1996
Submitted on Briefs:
Oral Argument: September 5,
1995
Source of APPEAL
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Rock
JUDGE: J. R. LONG
JUSTICES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Not Participating:
ATTORNEYS: For the defendant-appellant-petitioner
there were briefs by Jeffrey S. Fertl, Susan R. Tyndall and Hinshaw
& Culbertson, Milwaukee and oral argument by Jeffrey S. Fertl.
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a
brief by Edward Grutzner, Christofer C. Helwig and Grutzner, Holland
& Vollmer, S.C., Beloit and oral argument by Edward Grutzner.
93-0208 Hughes v. Chrysler Motors
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Lawrence
Alan Towers, Milwaukee for The Center for Public Representation.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Dorothy
H. Dey and Quale, Feldbruegge, Calvelli, Thom & Croke, S.C.,
Milwaukee for the American Manufacturers Association and Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers.
[1] All future
statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume unless otherwise indicated. Wisconsin Stat. § 218.015(7) states:
In addition to pursuing any other remedy,
a consumer may bring an action to recover for any damages caused by a violation
of this section. The court shall award
a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of any pecuniary
loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any
equitable relief the court determines appropriate.
[2] In Hartlaub v. Coachman Ind., Inc.,
143 Wis. 2d 791, 422 N.W. 2d 869 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals stated
that the recovery of such "damages are imposed for punitive
purposes." Id. at 804.
Failure to comply, of course, results in the imposition of
punishment. The consumer's pecuniary
loss is doubled.