Supreme
Court of Wisconsin
Judicial
Conduct Advisory Committee OPINION
98-1
Date
Issued: February 19, 1998
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ISSUE
May a judge participate as a
celebrity judge in a fund-raising event for a charitable organization?
ANSWER
No.
FACTS
A judge has been asked to serve as a
“VIP Celebrity Judge” at a fund-raising event for a non-profit charity. Eight or more prominent citizens, who are
designated “Celebrity Judges,” attend a “VIP Reception” at the start of this
event. At this reception, the celebrity
judges sample cuisine entered by participating restaurants, and award first,
second, and third places to the restaurant chefs’ entries. Photographs of the celebrity judges may be
taken during the VIP reception.
Immediately following the VIP reception, the fund-raising event continues
with a public reception and an auction of food and entertainment packages
provided by the same restaurants to raise money for the charity. The entire event is advertised to the
public, takes place at a public location, and has corporate sponsorship. A program distributed to persons in
attendance lists the celebrity judges by name, but not by title. It is the stated desire of the charity to
promote this event through advertising and publicity.
DISCUSSION
The Committee concludes that the
issue presented involves provisions of SCR 60.05(3)(c), 60.01(4), and
60.03(2).
A. SCR 60.05 and 60.01
SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.a states that:
2. A judge, in any capacity:
a. May assist ... [a nonprofit charitable]
organization in planning fund-raising activities ... but may not personally
participate in the solicitation of funds or other fund-raising activities....
Participation as an invited “VIP
Celebrity Judge” at the “VIP Reception” constitutes personal participation in a
fund-raising activity, since this reception is part of the same event whose
main purpose is to raise funds for the organization. The only discernible purpose of the judge’s participation in the
“VIP Reception” is to enhance the prestige and public relations value of the
event as a whole, thus improving the ability of the charity to raise
money. Further, because those in
attendance at the auction event immediately following the “VIP Reception” will
be asked for contributions by purchasing the auctioned items, there is a
linkage between the “VIP Reception” and subsequent solicitation of
contributions.
SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.d states that:
2. A judge, in any capacity:
...
d. May not use or permit the use of the
prestige of judicial office for fund raising....
The judge has been invited to attend
this “VIP Reception” and is listed in the program because, in the words of the
letter of invitation, he is one of a number of “high profile people.” The Committee interprets this to mean that
the judge has earned the invitation because of his status as a judge. Thus, participation in this activity would
constitute use of the prestige of judicial office to enhance a fund-raising
event. The lengthy Comment to SCR
60.05(3)(c)2.d states, in part, that:
SCR
60.05 should not be read as proscribing participation in de minimis
fund-raising activities so long as a judge is careful to avoid using the
prestige of the office in the activity.
The term
“de minimis” is defined in SCR 60.01(4):
“De
minimis” means an insignificant interest that does not raise reasonable
question as to a judge’s impartiality or use of the prestige of the office.
Admittedly, the proposed activity
will not per se significantly enhance the ability of the organization to raise
funds. However, to constitute a “de
minimis” activity, use of the prestige of the judicial office must be
avoided. Therefore, the proposed
activity does not constitute a “de minimis fund-raising activity,” and is
proscribed.
A later portion of the Comment to
SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.d states that:
A
judge may be a speaker or guest of honor at an organization’s fund-raising
event provided there is no advertising of the judge as speaker or guest of
honor in order to encourage people to attend and make contributions and
provided that any contributions at the event are made prior to the judge’s
speech or presentation as guest of honor....
Participation as a “VIP Celebrity
Judge” is equivalent to being a guest of honor. Contributions at the event are solicited through the auction
subsequent to the judge’s presentation at the “VIP Reception” as a guest of
honor; the above comment thus indicates that the proposed participation is
proscribed.
For the variety of reasons presented
in the preceding analysis, the Committee concludes that the proposed activity
is proscribed by SCR 60.05(3)(c).
B. SCR 60.03
SCR 60.03(2) states, in part, that:
A
judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interests of the judge or of others or convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge....
At the “VIP Reception,” the
“Celebrity Judges” participate in the awarding of first, second, and third
places to participating restaurants.
Receipt of such recognition could reasonably be acknowledged by the
restaurants at a future time, since they are commercial enterprises and the
fund-raising event is intended to be prestigious. In the analysis in Part A, the Committee has established its
belief that participation as a celebrity judge constitutes use of the prestige
of judicial office. The Committee
further concludes that the circumstances of the event could also result in use
of the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
restaurants receiving recognition.
Although the awards are made as a result of the consensus of a group, of
which the judge is part, the Committee does not believe that a judge may
participate in an activity in a group when the same activity would be proscribed
if the judge participated in it individually.
CONCLUSION
The Committee concludes that a judge
may not participate in a “VIP Reception” as a “VIP Celebrity Judge” as part of
a fund-raising event for a charitable organization.
APPLICABILITY
This opinion is advisory only, is
based on the specific facts and questions submitted by the petitioner to the
Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee, and is limited to questions arising under
the Supreme Court Rules, Chapter 60 -- Code of Judicial Conduct. This opinion is not binding upon the
Wisconsin Judicial Commission or the Supreme Court in the exercise of their
judicial discipline responsibilities.
This opinion does not purport to address provisions of the Code of
Ethics for Public Officials and Employees, subchapter III of Ch. 19 of the
statutes.
I hereby certify that this is Formal
Opinion No. 98-1 issued by the Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee for the
State of Wisconsin this 19th day of February, 1998.
_________________________________
Thomas
H. Barland
Chair