District III/II
May 22, 2013
To:
Hon. Rod W. Smeltzer
Circuit Court Judge
Dunn County Judicial Center
615 Stokke Parkway, Suite 1500
Menomonie, WI 54751
Clara Minor
Clerk of Circuit Court
Dunn County Judicial Center
615 Stokke Parkway, Suite 1500
Menomonie, WI 54751
Chris A. Gramstrup
Gramstrup Law Office
1409 Hammond Ave., Ste. 322
Superior, WI 54880
James M. Peterson
District Attorney
615 Stokke Parkway
Menomonie, WI 54751
Gregory M. Weber
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
Cesar D. Zepeda 584911
New Lisbon Corr. Inst.
P.O. Box 4000
New Lisbon, WI 53950-4000
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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State of Wisconsin v. Cesar D. Zepeda (L.C. # 2010CF67) |
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Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Gundrum, J.
Cesar Zepeda appeals from a judgment convicting him of
possessing tetrahydrocannabinols as party to the crime contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)2.
(2009-10). Zepeda’s appellate counsel
has filed a no-merit report pursuant to Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.32 (2011-12)[1] and Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Zepeda received a copy of the report and was advised of his right to
file a response. He has not done
so. Upon consideration of the report and
an independent review of the record as mandated by Anders and Rule 809.32, we summarily affirm the
judgment because there are no issues that would have arguable merit for
appeal. Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.21.
The no-merit report addresses the following possible
appellate issues: (1) whether Zepeda’s
no contest plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered and had a
factual basis; (2) whether the circuit court misused its sentencing discretion;
and (3) whether Zepeda received effective assistance from his trial
counsel.
Appellate counsel opines in the no-merit report that
the plea colloquy was adequate. Although
we disagree, we nevertheless conclude that the defect in the colloquy was an “insubstantial
defect” pursuant to State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶39, ___ Wis. 2d
___, ___ N.W.2d ___. Therefore, we
conclude that there would be no arguable merit to a claim that Zepeda’s no
contest plea was other than knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Id., ¶28.
Zepeda pled no contest to possession of tetrahydrocannabinols
with intent to deliver 200-1000 grams as party to the crime. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court did
not inform Zepeda of one of the elements of the crime: Zepeda had to know that he possessed
tetrahydrocannabinols. Wis JI—Criminal 6035. The circuit court asked Zepeda’s counsel if
she discussed the elements of the crime with Zepeda, and she responded that she
did. But, the court did not then ask counsel
to make a record of her discussion with Zepeda.
The plea colloquy is defective on its face because the
circuit court did not discuss the knowledge element of the crime. In State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d
246, 268, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), the court stated that the circuit court can
discharge its duties at the colloquy by asking defense counsel whether he or
she explained the required material to the defendant and having counsel
summarize the extent of explanation. Here, the court did not ask counsel to summarize
the elements discussion she had with Zepeda.
Despite this error, we conclude that the circuit
court’s failure to advise Zepeda of the knowledge element is an “insubstantial
defect” in the plea colloquy. In Taylor, the supreme court affirmed
the denial of a plea withdrawal motion without a hearing because the record
showed that the defendant knew he was exposed to an eight-year sentence as a repeater
even though the circuit court informed him at the plea colloquy that the
maximum penalty was six years. Taylor,
2013 WI 34, ¶¶1-8. The Taylor
court held that a Bangert plea colloquy violation exists only when
the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶39. Where the record reflects that the plea was
properly entered, no Bangert violation occurs. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶42.
We turn to the record in Zepeda’s appeal. Zepeda stipulated that the criminal complaint
was sufficient to support his plea. The
complaint alleged that Zepeda admitted in an interview with law enforcement
that he sold one pound of tetrahydrocannabinols to a confidential informant and
that he had another pound of tetrahydrocannabinols at the house where he was
staying. Zepeda did not challenge these
admissions in the circuit court. Therefore,
the record establishes that Zepeda knew that he possessed
tetrahydrocannabinols. Consequently, the
circuit court’s failure to advise Zepeda of this element did not render
Zepeda’s plea improper. There would be
no arguable merit to a motion to withdraw the no contest plea on this basis.
The record reveals that the circuit court did not
determine that Zepeda understood the party to the crime liability to which he
entered a no contest plea. We conclude
that the court’s omission did not render the plea colloquy defective. In State v. Brown, 2012 WI App 139, ¶1, 345
Wis. 2d 333, 824 N.W.2d 916, we held that a plea colloquy at which the circuit
court fails to explain party to the crime liability is not defective if the defendant
admits to directly committing the act. Such
an admission renders superfluous the explanation of party to the crime liability. Id. Here, Zepeda stipulated to a complaint that
alleged his admission that he sold one pound of tetrahydrocannabinols to a
confidential informant and possessed another pound, i.e., he directly committed
the crime of possession tetrahydrocannabinols with intent to deliver. Therefore, the circuit court’s failure to
explain party to the crime liability did not render the plea colloquy
defective.
We have reviewed the balance of the plea
colloquy. Zepeda answered questions
about the plea and his understanding of his constitutional rights. The balance of the plea colloquy complied
with State
v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶18, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794.[2] After considering the record and Taylor,
we conclude that Zepeda’s
no contest plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, State
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 260, and that the plea had a factual basis, State
v. Harrington, 181 Wis. 2d 985, 989, 512 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App.
1994). Additionally, the plea
questionnaire and waiver of rights form Zepeda signed is competent evidence of a
knowing and voluntary plea. State
v. Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 827-29, 416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App.
1987). Although a plea questionnaire and
waiver of rights form may not be relied upon as a substitute for a substantive
in-court personal colloquy, it may be referred to and used at the plea hearing
to ascertain the defendant’s understanding and knowledge at the time a plea is
taken. Hoppe, 317 Wis. 2d 161,
¶¶30-32. There would be no arguable
merit to a challenge to the entry of Zepeda’s no contest plea.
With regard to the sentence, the record reveals that
the sentencing court’s discretionary decision had a “rational and explainable
basis.” State v. Gallion,
2004 WI 42, ¶76, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. The court adequately discussed the facts and
factors relevant to sentencing Zepeda to a five-year term. In fashioning the sentence, the court
considered the seriousness of the offense, Zepeda’s character, and the need to
protect the public and rehabilitate and punish Zepeda. State v. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49,
¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 76.
The felony sentence complied with Wis.
Stat. § 973.01 relating to the imposition of a bifurcated sentence
of confinement and extended supervision.
We agree with appellate counsel that there would be no arguable merit to
a challenge to the sentence.
The no-merit report addresses whether Zepeda received
effective assistance from his trial counsel.
We normally decline to address claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel if the issue was not raised by a postconviction motion in the circuit
court. State v. Machner, 92
Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). However, because appointed counsel asks to be
discharged from the duty of representation, we must determine whether there
such a claim would have sufficient merit to require appointed counsel to file a
postconviction motion and request a Machner hearing.
The no-merit report does not relate any specific
complaint about trial counsel’s performance, and Zepeda has not responded to
the no-merit report to elaborate on any such claim. Our independent review of the record does not
reveal the existence of an ineffective assistance claim.
Our independent review of the record does not disclose
any potentially meritorious issue for appeal.
Because we conclude that there would be no arguable merit to any issue
that could be raised on appeal, we accept the no-merit report, affirm the
judgment of conviction, and relieve Attorney Chris Gramstrup of further
representation of Zepeda in this matter.
Upon the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the circuit court is
summarily affirmed pursuant to Wis. Stat.
Rule 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Chris Gramstrup is
relieved of further representation of Cesar Zepeda in this matter.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals