District II
May 15, 2013
To:
Hon. Barbara H. Key
Circuit Court Judge
Winnebago County Courthouse
P.O. Box 2808
Oshkosh, WI 54903-2808
Melissa M. Konrad
Clerk of Circuit Court
Winnebago County Courthouse
P.O. Box 2808
Oshkosh, WI 54903
Mark Tyczkowski
Remley & Sensenbrenner, S.C.
219 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Neenah, WI 54956
Neenah Foundry Company
2121 Brooks Ave.
Neenah, WI 54956
Debra L. Schnell
905 E. Snell Rd.
Oshkosh, WI 54901
Robert Schnell
905 E. Snell Rd.
Oshkosh, WI 54901
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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Mona M. Eaton v. Robert Schnell (L.C. #1986PA167) |
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Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Reilly, J.
Mona Eaton appeals from
the portion of an order that denied her statutory interest on a 1999 money
judgment for the interest Robert Schnell still owed on a satisfied
child-support obligation. The circuit
court ruled that Wis. Stat. § 767.511(6)
(2011-12)[1] does not
authorize the accrual of interest on interest.
We agree and affirm. Based on our
review of the briefs and the record, we conclude that summary disposition is
appropriate. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21.
Eaton and Schnell had a
child together in 1986. Winnebago county
ordered Schnell to pay child support.
When Schnell voluntarily terminated his parental rights in 1989, there
existed a child-support arrearage consisting of both principal and
interest. The county collected only the
principal arrears. Schnell became a
California resident in 1990 and the Winnebago county child support order was
transferred to Shasta county in California.
Schnell made payments there until the Shasta county child support office
sent Schnell an affidavit of completion in November 1998. After Schnell paid for previous blood test
fees, Winnebago county also advised him that his account was satisfied.
In 1999, Eaton filed a
contempt action claiming that Schnell owed interest arrearages. A family court commissioner (FCC) determined
that Schnell indeed owed $9,694.00 in interest.
The FCC reduced it to a money judgment under Wis. Stat. § 767.30(3)(c) (1997-98), the analog to
current § 767.77(3)(c). By 2002,
Schnell had paid $1,462.58 through a wage garnishment.
In 2010, Eaton again
asked an FCC to determine the amount owed and to order and enforce a collection
mechanism. In July 2111, the FCC
determined that, under Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8)
(2009-10), Eaton was entitled to interest on the $9,694.00 interest, compounded
at twelve percent since 1999, for a total of $22,270.22. It granted Eaton’s request for a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order. On de novo
review, the circuit court overturned the FCC’s decision, holding that the
statute governing interest on child-support arrearages, Wis. Stat. § 767.511(6), does not authorize interest on
interest. Eaton appeals.
Resolving the appellate
issue requires that we construe Wis.
Stat. § 767.511(6). We begin
by giving the language of the statute its common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We interpret the language in the context in
which it is used, as part of a whole, and in relation to the language of
surrounding or closely related statutes, interpreting it to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results. Id.,
¶46.
Wisconsin
Stat. § 767.511(6) provides that
once a child support obligation ceases, “interest shall accrue on the total amount of child support in
arrears, if any.” (emphasis added).
Here, no child support remained in arrears. We agree with the circuit
court that the statute does not authorize allowing interest to accrue solely on
unpaid interest.
Still, Eaton argues
that, since a money judgment is an allowable remedy for recouping past due
payments, see Wis. Stat. § 767.77(3)(c), interest collection under
the money judgment statute, Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8)
(2009-10), flows from there. We disagree.
The interest at issue
here is premised on a judgment entered under Wis.
Stat. § 767.511. Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) establishes
the postjudgment interest rate for a judgment for which the legislature has not
explicitly provided a different interest rate. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. City of
Superior, 159 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 464 N.W.2d 643 (1991). In § 767.511(6), however, the
legislature has set a simple interest rate of one percent monthly, presumably
as a balance between encouraging payors to make timely payments and not
overwhelming those may who fall behind. Significantly,
subsec. (6) also provides that “[i]nterest under this subsection is in lieu of
interest computed under s. 807.01 (4), 814.04 (4), or 815.05 (8).”
Furthermore, Wis. Stat. ch. 767 defines and treats
“payment obligations” and “financial obligations” separately. See Wis. Stat. §§ 767.77(1) and
767.78(1). The legislature is presumed
to choose its terms carefully and precisely to express its meaning. Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of
Vocational, Technical and Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d
389 (1984). As it is undisputed that Schnell
no longer owes child support, the interest he does owe more aptly is termed a
financial obligation. If the prior wage
assignment has proved “inapplicable, impractical, or unfeasible,” Eaton’s
remedy is a contempt proceeding. See § 767.78(2).
Upon the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the
order of the circuit court is summarily affirmed, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals