District IV
September 18, 2014
To:
Hon. Stephen E. Ehlke
Circuit Court Judge
215 South Hamilton, Br.15, Rm. 7107
Madison, WI 53703
Carlo Esqueda
Clerk of Circuit Court
Room 1000
215 South Hamilton
Madison, WI 53703
Farheen M. Ansari
AF Law
P. O. Box 8822
Madison, WI 53708-8822
Paul L. Barnett
Assistant District Attorney
Rm. 3000
215 S. Hamilton St.
Madison, WI 53703-3211
Gregory M. Weber
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
Christopher C. Lane
909 South 4th Street
Stoughton, WI 53589
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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2013AP20-CRNM |
State of Wisconsin v. Christopher C. Lane (L.C. # 2011CF1308) |
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Before Lundsten, Sherman and Kloppenburg, JJ.
Christopher Lane appeals a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of child abuse contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b) (2011-12).[1] Attorney Farheen Ansari has filed a no-merit report seeking to withdraw as appellate counsel. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.32; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); and State ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 137 Wis. 2d 90, 403 N.W.2d 449 (1987), aff’d, 486 U.S. 429 (1988). The no-merit report addresses whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, whether there were any procedural errors that would entitle Lane to a new trial, and whether the sentence imposed was a proper exercise of the circuit court’s discretion. Lane was sent a copy of the report, but did not file a response. Upon reviewing the entire record, as well as the no-merit report, we conclude that there are no arguably meritorious appellate issues.
We
first address the issue of whether there was sufficient credible evidence to
support the guilty verdict. Our standard
of review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction is that “‘an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the
[S]tate and the conviction, is so [insufficient] in probative value and force
that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Hayes, 2004 WI
80, ¶56, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (citation omitted). The no-merit report discusses the evidence in
relation to the elements of child abuse, which are: (1) the defendant caused
bodliy harm to the child, (2) the defendant intentionally caused the bodily
harm, and (3) the victim was under 18 years of age. Wis.
Stat. § 948.03(2)(b).
Lane
was charged with child abuse with intentional causation of bodily harm for an
incudent that occured on July 2, 2011.
The criminal complaint alleged that Lane struck his girlfriend’s
daughter in the face and caused her face to swell and her lip to split. The daughter, who was ten years old at the
time of the incident, testified at trial.
She testified that she truthfully answered questions during her interview
with a trained forensic interviewer at Safe Harbor. A video of the interview was played for the
jury. Social worker Heather Stertz
testified to being present during the Safe Harbor interview of the child. Stertz also testfied that Lane told her he
had struck the child in the face on the day Stertz came to allow counsel to
investigate the matter on behalf of the county.
Stertz testified that, when she interviewed Lane, he demonstrated how he
had struck the child. In light of all
the evidence presented, we agree with counsel that there would be no arguable
merit to a claim that the evidence was insufficient.
Our
review of the trial record also discloses no procedural issues of arguable
merit. The rulings made on the motions
in limine were proper. There is no basis
to challenge jury selection. Evidentiary
objections throughout the trial were properly ruled upon and no potentially
objectionable testimony was elicited.
The trial court conducted a proper colloquy with Lane about his decision
to testify. The jury instructions
accurately conveyed the applicable law and burden of proof.
We also agree with counsel’s assessment that there would be no arguable merit to an argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. The court imposed three years of probation with the possibility of Lane terminating probation one year early upon meeting certain conditions. The components of the bifurcated sentence imposed were within the applicable penalty ranges. See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.03(2)(b) (classifying intentional child abuse as a Class H felony); 973.01(2)(b)8 and (d)5 (providing maximum terms of three years of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision for a Class H felony).
There is a presumption that a sentence “well within the limits of the maximum sentence” is not unduly harsh, and we are satisfied that the sentence imposed here was not “so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶¶31-32, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507.
Upon our independent review of the record, we have found no other arguable basis for reversing the judgment of conviction. See State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶¶81-82, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124. We conclude that any further appellate proceedings would be wholly frivolous within the meaning of Anders and Wis. Stat. Rule 809.32.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is summarily affirmed pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Farheen Ansari is relieved of any further representation of Christopher Lane in this matter pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.32(3).
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals