District II
April 9, 2014
To:
Hon. Jason A. Rossell
Circuit Court Judge
Kenosha County Courthouse
912 56th St.
Kenosha, WI 53140
Rebecca Matoska-Mentink
Clerk of Circuit Court
Kenosha County Courthouse
912 56th St.
Kenosha, WI 53140
Urszula Tempska
Law Office of Urszula Tempska
P.O. Box 11213
Shorewood, WI 53211-0213
Gregory M. Weber
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
Robert D. Zapf
District Attorney
Molinaro Bldg
912 56th St.
Kenosha, WI 53140-3747
Gary A. Viera, #546751
Green Bay Corr. Inst.
P.O. Box 19033
Green Bay, WI 54307-9033
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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State of Wisconsin v. Gary A. Viera (L.C. #2010CF847) |
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Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Reilly, J.
Gary A. Viera appeals a judgment entered upon his
guilty plea to second-degree sexual assault by use of force, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2011-12),[1] as a
repeater and as party to a crime (PTAC).
Viera’s appellate counsel has filed a no-merit report pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.32 and Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Viera was advised of his
right to file a response but has elected not to do so. Upon
consideration of the no-merit report
and our independent review
of the record as mandated by Anders and Rule 809.32, we conclude there is no arguable merit to
any issue that could be raised on appeal and that the appeal may be disposed of
summarily. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21. We affirm the judgment of conviction and
relieve Attorney Urszula Tempska of further representing Viera in this
matter.
Viera and his cousin forcibly, repeatedly, and at
times simultaneously sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old girl. Viera was charged with four counts (counts
one through four) of first-degree sexual assault and one count (count five) of
PTAC false imprisonment. After some
negotiation, he entered a guilty plea to the amended count four, second-degree
sexual assault by use of force, as a repeater and as PTAC. The parties agreed that the remaining counts
would be dismissed and read in for sentencing.
Not a month later and still before sentencing, Viera
moved to withdraw his plea. He claimed
that he had not understood the severity of the charges or the elements of the
crime because, besides a “long history of social and learning disorders,” he
had not taken his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) medication on
the day of the plea hearing nor, in fact, at all during the twenty-one months
he had been in jail. He also asserted
that he felt pressured to plead and that the alleged victim had mutually
pursued the sexual activity.
A hearing was held on the motion. Jerold Breitenbach, Viera’s lawyer during the
plea negotiations, testified that neither Viera nor his family members ever
indicated that Viera took ADHD medication; that Viera never indicated he was
not thinking clearly or had difficulty understanding concepts; that Viera always
appeared “knowledgeable,” “sharp,” and “aware of what was going on”; that, as Viera
knew that his cousin was dealt a sentence of twenty years’ initial confinement (IC)
and fifteen years’ extended supervision (ES) after pleading guilty to two
similar counts, Viera wanted, but was not promised, a plea deal capping his
sentence at “ten years total” and that Viera knew that, to plead, Viera would
have to acknowledge that the sexual encounter was not consensual. Viera testified at the hearing that he signed
the plea agreement believing he would get a three-to-five-year sentence, and conceded
that he never requested ADHD medication.
The court denied the motion. It
later sentenced Viera to thirty years’ imprisonment—fifteen years each of IC
and ES. This no-merit appeal followed.
The no-merit report first considers whether the trial
court erred in denying Viera’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. A defendant should be allowed to
withdraw his or her plea before sentencing “for any fair and just reason,
unless the prosecution would be substantially prejudiced.” State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶28,
303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (citation omitted). The reason, which the court must find
credible, must be something other than the desire to have a trial or belated
misgivings about the plea. Id.,
¶¶32, 43. The defendant must prove the
reason by a preponderance of the evidence. Id., ¶32. Whether the reason given for the change of
heart is adequate lies within the discretion of the court. State v. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271,
284, 592 N.W.2d 220 (1999).
The trial court found Viera’s claims of confusion and
incomprehension and his belief that he would receive a sentence of three to
five years not credible. Noting that all
the evidence pointed to Viera simply being “scared,” the court concluded that
Viera had only had a change of heart and had not shown a fair and just reason
to withdraw his plea. Our review of the
record supports the trial court’s conclusion.
The plea colloquy was careful and thorough. Viera expressed understanding at every turn. No arguable issue of merit could be raised.
The no-merit report next considers whether Viera could
withdraw his plea postsentencing on grounds it was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
We agree with appellate counsel that there exists no issue of arguable
merit.
Our independent review of the record satisfies us that
Viera’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As noted, the trial court conducted a
thorough, careful colloquy and made the necessary advisements and findings
required by Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1),
State
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 266-72, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and State
v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶¶24, 33, 38, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d
14. Besides the substantive colloquy,
the court also properly looked to Viera’s signed plea questionnaire. See State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI
41, ¶¶30-32, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794. We also discern no viable claim that Viera
was denied the effective assistance of counsel leading up to and during the
plea taking so as to establish a “manifest injustice.” See
State
v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 558-59, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979). No issue of merit could arise in relation to
his pleas.
The report next addresses whether the sentence
represented a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Sentencing is left to the discretion of the
trial court and appellate review is limited to determining whether that
discretion was erroneously exercised. State
v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. The sentencing court must provide a “rational
and explainable basis” for the sentence imposed to allow this court to ensure
that discretion in fact was exercised. Id.,
¶¶39, 76 (citation omitted). The trial
court must consider the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender,
and the need to protect the public, State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495,
507, 596 N.W.2d 375 (1999), but the weight given to each factor is within the
court’s discretion, Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457
(1975).
No basis exists to disturb the sentence imposed. The court weighed proper sentencing factors,
applied them in a reasoned and reasonable manner, and provided a thorough and
rational explanation for imposing the sentences it did. The court addressed the seriousness of the
offense, the need to protect the public, and noted Viera’s lesser involvement relative
to that of his cousin. As Viera’s
exposure was forty years’ imprisonment (twenty-five years’ IC, fifteen years’
ES), his sentence is not so excessive or unusual so as to shock public
sentiment. See id.; see also State v.
Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶31,
255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507.
Further, any challenge to the court’s order that he pay the DNA
surcharge would be frivolous. The
surcharge is mandatory for his crime. Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r). Our review of the
record discloses no other potential issues for appeal.
Upon the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED
that the judgment of the circuit court is summarily affirmed, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Urszula Tempska is relieved of further representing Viera in this matter.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals