District IV
October 29, 2013
To:
Hon. Diane M. Sorensen
Reserve Judge
Carlo Esqueda
Clerk of Circuit Court
Room 1000
215 South Hamilton
Madison, WI 53703
Michael P. Finley
Assistant District Attorney
Rm. 3000
215 South Hamilton
Madison, WI 53703
Jeffrey W. Jensen
735 W. Wisconsin Ave., 12th Fl.
Milwaukee, WI 53233
Sandra L. Tarver
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
Madison, WI 53707-7857
William T. McCoy Jr. 07001-089
Federal Correctional Institution
P. O. Box 4000
Manchester, KY 40962-4000
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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State of Wisconsin v. William T. McCoy, Jr. (L.C. # 2006CF881) |
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Before Lundsten, Higginbotham and Sherman, JJ.
William McCoy appeals a judgment convicting him of
first-degree intentional homicide, contrary to Wis.
Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) (2011-12).[1] On appeal, McCoy challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction and argues that he was denied his
right to a public trial. Based upon our
review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this case is
appropriate for summary disposition. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.21. We summarily
affirm.
We turn first to McCoy’s challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the test is whether “the
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking
in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507,
451 N.W.2d 752 (1990); see also Wis.
Stat. § 805.15(1).
McCoy was convicted, after a jury trial, of
first-degree intentional homicide for the beating and fatal shooting of Adrian
Bowdry, who had attempted to rob McCoy’s brother. McCoy concedes on appeal that there was enough
evidence to permit the jury to conclude that the pistol was in McCoy’s hand at the
time it fired, but he argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury
to find that McCoy acted with the intent to kill Bowdry. Specifically, McCoy
asserts that there was no evidence that, at the instant the shot was fired,
McCoy was aiming the pistol at Bowdry’s chest.
This argument does not hold up under State v. Webster, 196
Wis. 2d 308, 315, 538 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1995).
In Webster, the defendant was
convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree
reckless injury for a close-range shooting that caused the victim to suffer
serious injuries. Id. at 314-15. Pertinent to this case, on appeal, Webster
argued that he aimed the shotgun at his victim’s armpit and that the armpit is
not a vital area of the body and, thus, there was insufficient evidence of an
intent to kill. Id. at 322-23. The court rejected that argument, concluding
that the jury could determine that Webster intended to kill his victim when
Webster fired a gun at the victim’s upper torso from close range. Id. at 322.
McCoy attempts to distinguish Webster by arguing that,
in that case, the aiming of the weapon was the essential fact from which intent
could be inferred. McCoy asserts that
there is no evidence that he aimed the gun at Bowdry and that, therefore, the
jury could not reasonably conclude that McCoy formed the intent to kill. We are not persuaded. In Webster, the jury heard defense evidence
of aiming at an armpit, but necessarily rejected this non-lethal aiming
testimony. Id. at 323-34. Thus, what the jury was left with was
evidence that the defendant was involved in a close-range shooting that
resulted in injury to a vital area of the victim’s body, from which the jury was
able to infer intent to kill. Id. In
the instant case, we have those same facts: a gun shot in close proximity to a vital
area of the victim’s body, resulting in gunshot wounds to the chest. The jury could reasonably find from these
facts that McCoy had the requisite intent to kill. No direct evidence of
whether the gun was aimed directly at or near Bowdry’s chest is necessary to uphold
the jury’s finding.
We turn next to McCoy’s argument that he was denied
the right to a public trial. McCoy
asserts that critical parts of his trial took place outside the time frame of
the courthouse’s normal business hours of 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The State correctly argues in its brief that
this issue is forfeited because McCoy did not object in the trial court at the
time the alleged violation occurred. See State v. Ndina, 2007 WI App 268, ¶11,
306 Wis. 2d 706, 743 N.W.2d 722, aff'd on
other grounds, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612. McCoy also did not file a motion for a new
trial based on an alleged violation of the right to a public trial. Only insufficiency of the evidence or issues
previously raised may be pursued on appeal as of right without first filing a
postconviction motion in the circuit court.
See Wis. Stat. §§ 809.30(2)(h), 974.02(2). McCoy did not raise, through a timely
objection or postconviction motion in the circuit court, the issue of whether
his right to a public trial was violated and, thus, we will not review the issue
for the first time on appeal.
Finally, we will address McCoy’s assertion, made in a
footnote in his brief, that pursuing a postconviction motion for a new trial
would have waived the double jeopardy protection that attaches when an
appellate court finds that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction. The notion that McCoy was
somehow forced to pursue the sufficiency issue first, on its own, is
misguided. Nothing prevented McCoy from
pursing both the sufficiency of the evidence issue and the public trial issue
at the same time. If both issues had
been pursued, the circuit court would have been required to decide the
sufficiency issue first. If McCoy prevailed
on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, then the circuit court would have
reversed the conviction and dismissed the case with prejudice, even though
there may have been other grounds for reversal.
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment is summarily affirmed under Wis. Stat. Rule 809.21(1).
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Court of Appeals