**COURT OF APPEALS**
**DECISION**
**DATED AND RELEASED**

July 10, 1997

**A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. *See* § 808.10 and RULE 809.62, STATS.**

**NOTICE**

**This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.**

**No. 96-1754-CR**

**STATE OF WISCONSIN** **IN COURT OF APPEALS**
**DISTRICT IV**

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**STATE OF WISCONSIN,**

**PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,**

**V.**

**CONRAD GOEHL,**

**DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.**

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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson County: JOHN M. ULLSVIK, Judge. *Affirmed.*

Before Eich, C.J., Dykman, P.J., and Roggensack, J.

PER CURIAM. Conrad Goehl appeals from a judgment of conviction. He challenges the propriety of a search that occurred while he was on parole. We affirm.

Goehl was convicted of one count of burglary, § 943.10(1)(f), STATS., as a repeater under § 939.62, STATS. Before trial, he moved to suppress certain evidence. The evidence was obtained during a search under WIS. ADM. CODE § DOC 328.21(3)(a), which provides:

> A search of a client's living quarters … may be conducted by field staff if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the quarters … contain contraband. Approval of the supervisor shall be obtained unless exigent circumstances, such as suspicion the parolee will destroy contraband or use a weapon, require search without approval.

The basic facts of the search are undisputed. Goehl had previously given his parole officer his purported address, but when the officer attempted to contact him there, he was unable to do so. Goehl's parole officer later received word from a police officer that a citizen witness saw Goehl involved in a burglary, and that another man involved in the burglary implicated Goehl. The police officer told the parole officer that Goehl might be living at a certain address. The parole officer recognized the address as also being that of another client. The officer contacted his supervisor and received permission for a search of the apartment. When the officers went to the apartment, Goehl was visible inside, once an occupant opened the door. The evidence Goehl sought to suppress was found in the apartment.

A warrantless search conducted in compliance with the above-quoted administrative rule satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. ***Griffin v. Wisconsin,*** 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). Thus, a warrantless search under this rule is valid if it is based on "reasonable grounds." ***State v. Martinez***, 198 Wis.2d 222, 231, 542 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Ct. App.1995).

Goehl argues that this search was not based on reasonable grounds because the parole officer did not know whether the apartment was indeed his living quarters; his co-actor was not a reliable informant; there were no exigent circumstances; and the parole officer misrepresented to his supervisor that the officer wanted to search a client's residence, by not mentioning that someone other than the client who was known to reside there was a target of the investigation.

We reject the arguments. The parole officer may not have known with certainty that the apartment was Goehl's residence, but he had reasonable grounds for such a belief. His co-actor was a sufficiently reliable source, and was not the only source of information about Goehl's involvement in the burglary. Exigent circumstances need not exist if the search was conducted with the approval of a supervisor, as this one was. The parole officer testified that he told his supervisor that Goehl had not informed him of his address and could possibly be at the apartment he wanted to search.

*By the Court.*—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. *See* RULE 809.23(1)(b)5., STATS.