COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED November 14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 95-3173-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL G. KINCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Grant County: JOHN R. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J., Vergeront,
J., and Paul C. Gartzke, Reserve Judge.
PER
CURIAM. Michael G. Kinch appeals from a judgment of conviction
for carrying a concealed weapon, § 941.23, Stats.; resisting or obstructing an officer,
§ 946.41(1), Stats.; and for
escape, § 946.42(3)(a), Stats.;
and order denying postconviction relief.
Specifically, he argues that the circuit court erred in giving the falsus
in uno jury instruction under the facts, and that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to advise him of his right to
individually poll the jurors. Because
we conclude that no error occurred, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Kinch claims that on the
night of January 27, 1990, at a Muscoda tavern, a man threatened him and his
family. Kinch responded by going home,
arming himself with an antique pistol, and waiting outside the tavern for the
man to appear.
Two police officers
arrived in response to a report of an armed man outside the tavern. What happened next is disputed on two major
points.
First, Kinch claims that
the police officers asked him whether he had a gun in his pocket. At trial, Kinch testified that because the
gun was tucked into his waistband, he answered "no." However, a police officer testified that
Kinch was asked whether he had a gun, without specifying where he carried it,
and Kinch falsely responded that he had no gun.
The second point of
contention is whether, when frisked, Kinch broke away and ran, or whether the
police officers released him, and he initially hurried away, shortly slowing
into a walk. Specifically, Kinch
testified that the officers were pulling him in different directions, and
eventually released him as they slipped on a patch of ice. After being released, he jogged a half dozen
steps, then slowed and walked home where he waited outside to see if the
threatening man would show up. The
officers, on the other hand, testified that Kinch ran away "at full
speed," and that he "took off running." They also testified that they looked for
him, but could not find him that night.
ANALYSIS
Falsus in Uno
Kinch argues that the
different versions of the facts indicate variances in memory or
perception. On this basis, he argues
that the circuit court erred in giving a falsus in uno instruction.[1] See Pumorlo v. Merrill, 125
Wis. 102, 111, 103 N.W. 464, 467 (1905), and State v. Williamson,
84 Wis.2d 370, 394, 267 N.W.2d 337, 348 (1978) (falsus in uno not
favored in the law, should not be given where discrepancies of testimony can be
attributed to mistakes or imperfect recollection). We conclude that the court did not err.
A trial court has wide
discretion on what instructions will be given to the jury as long as the
instructions given accurately reflect the law applicable to the facts of the
specific case being tried. Vonch
v. American Standard Ins. Co., 151 Wis.2d 138, 149, 442 N.W.2d 598, 602
(Ct. App. 1989). A discretionary
decision will be reviewed to determine whether it is the "product of a
rational mental process whereby the facts of record and the law relied upon are
stated and are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and
reasonable determination." Hartung
v. Hartung, 102 Wis.2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1981).
The court here specifically found the two
versions of Kinch's parting with the police were irreconcilable, and held that
either Kinch or the police were lying.
Under these circumstances, the court properly stated its rationale for
giving the falsus in uno instruction.
Disfavored as it is, Kinch concedes that the instruction has not been
abrogated, and the circuit court's statement on the record demonstrates a
reasonable exercise of discretion to which we must defer. Id.
Jury Poll
Kinch
argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel
failed to advise Kinch that the right to request an individual jury poll was
his personal decision to make. Kinch
also argues ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's own failure to
request an individual jury poll. We
reject these arguments.
The right to poll a jury
individually can be both delegated to counsel and waived (personally or by
counsel). State v. Jackson,
188 Wis.2d 537, 543, 525 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 1994). Kinch attempts to distinguish Jackson
on the grounds that Jackson never claimed to have received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Kinch therefore
reads Jackson as a narrow holding that the circuit court itself
had no duty to engage defendant in a colloquy about jury polling. According to Kinch, Jackson
leaves open the question of whether counsel can be ineffective for failing to
discuss with defendant whether the jury should be polled.
Since Kinch has briefed
this issue, we have decided State v. Yang, 201 Wis.2d 721, 549
N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1996). We held
that "[b]ecause the decision whether to request an individual polling is
one delegated to counsel, we decline to hold that counsel's failure to inform a
defendant of the right to an individual polling is, in itself, deficient
performance." Id. at
740, 549 N.W.2d at 776-77.
To prevail on his second
claim that counsel was ineffective for himself failing to request an individual
jury poll, Kinch would have to show that (1) his counsel's performance was
deficient, and (2) that deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We scrutinize counsel's
performance to determine whether "counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness."
Id. at 688. See
also State v. Ambuehl, 145 Wis.2d 343, 351, 425 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Ct.
App. 1988). Whether counsel's failure
to request an individual polling is deficient representation "depends on
all the circumstances." Yang,
201 Wis.2d at 741, 549 N.W.2d at 777.
At a postconviction
hearing, trial counsel testified that he saw each juror raise their hand when
polled collectively by the court. He
further testified that he thought an individual poll would not gain anything,
that it would waste time, and that requesting an individual poll might cast the
defendant in a bad light with the court.
Also, as in Yang, there was no indication that the jury's
verdict was not unanimous. Id.
at 742, 549 N.W.2d at 777.
Although Kinch correctly
points to the benefits of individual jury polling, State v. Wojtalewicz,
127 Wis.2d 344, 379 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1985), the fact that benefits exist
does not mean that there is no downside risk to exercising them. These sorts of strategic trade-offs commonly
confront attorneys, and the United States Supreme Court has insulated attorneys
from second-guessing by holding that informed strategic choices "are virtually
unchallengeable." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690-91. Counsel's
determination to forego the benefits of individual jury polling to avoid
wasting time and casting defendant into a bad light falls into this category,
and hence is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] The instruction as given by the circuit
court was as follows:
If you become satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that any witness has, at trial, willfully testified falsely as to any material fact, you are at liberty, in your discretion, to disregard all the testimony of such witness except insofar as you find it corroborated by other evidence which is credible.