COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JULY 2, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3167
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
WISCONSIN STATE
TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF
WISCONSIN, AT&T
COMMUNICATIONS,
SCHNEIDER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Respondents-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: GEORGE NORTHRUP, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
LaROCQUE, J. The Wisconsin State Telephone Association
(WSTA) appeals a judgment and an order concluding that it lacks standing to
seek judicial review of a Public Service Commission order that requires local
telephone exchange carriers to remove restrictions on the resale of certain packages
of telecommunications services from their public tariffs. The circuit court held that the order
injured members of WSTA, but that WSTA lacked standing because its members'
interest is not protected by law.
WSTA argues that the
order violates its members' protected interest established by
§ 196.50(1)(b)2, Stats., to
a PSC hearing and relief of its members' other legal obligations.[1] We conclude that this statute does not apply
because the PSC order at issue did not grant a certificate, license, permit or
franchise. Alternatively, WSTA argues
that the order violates its members' protected interest to limit the use of
business line services as a substitute for access service established by
§ 196.219(3)(j), Stats.[2] We conclude that this statute does not
create a protected interest from PSC action because it unambiguously allows the
PSC to limit the members' ability to limit resale. Therefore, we affirm the judgment and the order.[3]
BACKGROUND
WSTA is a voluntary
association of companies that provide telecommunications services in
Wisconsin. Many of WSTA's members are
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Smaller
LECs, those with 150,000 or fewer access lines in Wisconsin, are the monopoly
service providers for every local exchange customer in their respective
franchise territories. See
§ 196.50(2), Stats.
The dispute in this case
involves the PSC's approval of a package of telecommunications services named
CENTREX for resale. CENTREX is offered
to LECs' business customers and allows the customers to combine and use a
variety of telephone features and lines for outside and interoffice calling.[4] A "reseller" can resell services
throughout the state that the PSC has approved for resale and has no specific
service territory or guaranteed customers.
Section 196.01(9), Stats.
Resellers purchase
CENTREX from LECs in bulk and, therefore, cheaper than other CENTREX
customers. The reseller then repackages
the service and resells it to an LEC's present or potential customers. Because CENTREX does not provide long
distance service, a reseller must also purchase "access" to tie
CENTREX to long distance.[5] A staff analysis contained in a departmental
correspondence of the PSC concluded that if CENTREX is resold, "LECs will
continue to collect revenue from their local customers, albeit through the
reseller rather than directly, and possibly at slightly reduced
levels."
The PSC issued a notice
inviting comments to a staff proposal to remove prohibitions restricting
CENTREX resale. Although some
commenting telecommunications companies, including some WSTA members, supported
the staff proposal, WSTA as an entity opposed allowing resale. The PSC approved CENTREX resale in a letter
order. WSTA petitioned for rehearing of
the PSC's order. The PSC denied WSTA's
petition. WSTA appealed the letter
order and the denial of its petition for rehearing to the Dane County Circuit
Court, which consolidated the two appeals.
The PSC, AT&T, and Schneider Communications, Inc., moved to dismiss
the petitions for lack of standing. The
trial court dismissed the petitions on the grounds that WSTA's claimed injury,
the loss of revenue from increased competition, was unprotected by law.
DISCUSSION
The issue of standing is
a question of law that we decide independently. State Public Intervenor v. DNR, 184 Wis.2d 407,
415, 515 N.W.2d 897, 901 (1994). When
evaluating a motion to dismiss in a ch. 227, Stats.,
proceeding, we assume the allegations are true and we entitle the allegations
to a liberal construction in favor of the petitioner. WED v. PSC, 69 Wis.2d 1, 8, 230 N.W.2d 243, 247 (1975). Further, the law of standing is to be
construed liberally. Id.
at 13, 230 N.W.2d at 249.
Section 227.53, Stats., allows any person aggrieved by
an agency decision to seek judicial review of that decision.[6] Section 227.01(9), Stats., defines "[P]erson aggrieved" as "a
person or agency whose substantial interests are adversely affected by a
determination of an agency."
Wisconsin courts use a two-part test to determine whether a party meets
this definition and thus has standing.
The party seeking review must establish that, first, it sustained an
alleged injury due to an agency decision and, second, that the injury is to an
interest "which the law recognizes or seeks to regulate or
protect." Public Intervenor,
184 Wis.2d at 416, 515 N.W.2d at 901.
"Thus, we examine a specific statute to determine standing rather
than consider all interests of the petitioner." MCI Telecommun. Corp. v. PSC, 164 Wis.2d 489, 493,
476 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1991).
Assuming without
deciding that WSTA members suffered an alleged injury from the loss of revenue
they will suffer as a result of competition from resellers,[7]
we must determine whether the law protects the members' right to be free from
competition. "There is no property
right to engage in a business free of competitors. However, if a statute indicates an intent to protect a
competitive interest, an injured competitor has standing to seek to require
compliance with the statute." Id. at 496, 476 N.W.2d at 578
(citations omitted). WSTA claims that
§§ 196.50(1)(b) and 196.219(3)(j), Stats.,
indicate an intent to protect its members' competitive interest in the resale
of CENTREX.
I
WSTA argues that
§ 196.50(1)(b)2, Stats.,
indicates an intent to protect LECs from competition in the sale of
CENTREX. That section requires the PSC
to hold a hearing and to relieve WSTA members of their obligation to be the
provider of last resort if the PSC grants an applicant "a certificate,
license, permit or franchise to own, operate, manage or control any plant or
equipment for the furnishing of local exchange service ...."[8] See supra note 1.
The respondents counter
that this section does not indicate an intent to protect LECs from the resale
of CENTREX because the resellers have not been granted a "certificate,
license, permit or franchise."
Section 196.01(9), Stats.,
defines a "reseller" as a telecommunications utility that resells
services "which have been approved for reselling by the
commission." (Emphasis
added.) The respondents conclude that
§ 196.50, Stats., does not
protect WSTA members' interest to be free from resale competition because
"approval" does not constitute a "certificate, license, permit
or franchise." WSTA responds that
the PSC's approval of the resale of CENTREX constitutes either a
"license" or a "certificate."
WSTA relies on the
definition of license in § 227.01(5), Stats. That section defines a license as "all
or any part of an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter
or similar form of permission required by law ...." WSTA argues that this definition includes
PSC approval to resell CENTREX. We
reject WSTA's argument because the definitions in § 227.01 unambiguously
apply only to ch. 227.[9] Therefore, the definition of
"license" in § 227.01(5) does not apply to ch. 196, Stats.
Chapter 196, Stats., does not specifically define
license. We conclude that the term is
ambiguous. A statutory term is
ambiguous if reasonably well-informed persons could understand it in more than
one way. See Falk v. Falk,
158 Wis.2d 184, 188, 462 N.W.2d 547, 548 (Ct. App. 1990). One could reasonably interpret the term
"license" broadly, like the definition provided by § 227.01(5), Stats.
However, one could also reasonably interpret license to mean a formal,
individualized authorization in the form of a license. We adopt the latter definition.
Section 196.50(1)(b)2, Stats., applies when the PSC grants any
person a "certificate, license, permit or franchise." If we were to interpret license broadly, it
would render "certificate," "permit" and "franchise"
surplusage because those terms are included in the broad definition of license. A statute should be construed so as not to
render any portion or word surplusage. In
re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis.2d 492, 506, 516 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1994).
Using our definition, we
conclude the PSC did not grant the resellers a license. The PSC lifted a broad-based restriction on
reselling; it did not grant formal, individualized authorization.
We also conclude that
the PSC did not grant the resellers a certificate by allowing them to resell
CENTREX. Resellers are
"[a]lternative telecommunications utilit[ies]" (ATUs). Section 196.01(1d), Stats.
Pursuant to § 196.50(2)(a), Stats.,
"[a]lternative telecommunications utilities shall be certified under s.
196.203." Section 196.203, Stats., regulates the procedure the PSC
and the ATU must follow for the ATU to become certified, i.e., obtain a
certificate, to commence service as an ATU.
WSTA does not allege that § 196.203 procedures were followed. Further, the PSC order does not allow any
ATUs to commence service; it merely allows existing ATUs to expand their
service. Therefore, the PSC's approval
of CENTREX for resale does not constitute granting the resellers a certificate.
In 1993 Wis. Act 496 §
50, the legislature redirected the PSC's primary regulatory focus in
telecommunications from the control of providers to serving the public's needs
for adequate telecommunications at reasonable and just prices. For example, in that Act, the legislature
created § 196.03(6), Stats.,
which provides in part: "In
determining a reasonably adequate telecommunications service or a reasonable
and just charge for that telecommunications service, the commission shall
consider at least the following factors in determining what is reasonable and
just, reasonably adequate, convenient and necessary, or in the public interest:
(a) Promotion and preservation of competition .... " Our conclusion fosters increased competition
in the telecommunications industry because a finding of public convenience and
necessity is not required each time the PSC approves a service for resale.[10]
II
Next, WSTA argues that
§ 196.219(3)(j), Stats.,
indicates an intent to protect its small members from competition in the resale
of CENTREX. That section provides that
small LECs "may limit the use of extended community calling or business
line and usage service within a local calling area as a substitute for access
service, unless the commission orders the limitation to be lifted."[11]
We reject WSTA's
argument. LECs only have the right to
limit the use of services "unless the commission orders the limitation to
be lifted." Assuming without
deciding that CENTREX is a "business line and usage service" that
acts as a "substitute for access service," the statute does not
indicate an intent to protect WSTA members from the PSC's power to lift any
limitations on use.[12]
WSTA argues that the PSC
can only order the limitation to be lifted for a service "which the PSC
believes acts as a substitute for access service," citing § 196.219(3)(j),
Stats. We disagree. Per a plain
reading of the statute, no such requirement exists. Other sections of ch. 196 require the PSC to make a finding or a
determination before taking action, see, e.g., §§ 196.203(1m) and
196.50(2)(d), Stats. The Legislature would have explicitly
required the PSC to make a determination or finding before lifting the
limitation if the Legislature adjudged it was necessary to do so.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that WSTA
lacks standing because any injury its members suffered resulting from the PSC
order is not protected by the law. The
alleged injury is not protected under § 196.50(1)(b)2, Stats., because the PSC did not grant
the resellers a "certificate, license, permit or franchise." Section 196.219(3)(j), Stats., does not provide WSTA members
any legally protected rights against PSC actions because that section
unambiguously allows the PSC to remove all rights the section confers to small
LECs.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.
[1]
Section 196.50(1)(b), Stats.,
provides in relevant part:
(b)2. ... [T]he commission may
not grant any person a certificate, license, permit or franchise to own,
operate, manage or control any plant or equipment for the furnishing of local
exchange service in a municipality, if there is in operation under an indeterminate
permit a public utility engaged in similar service in the municipality under an
indeterminate permit, unless any of the following conditions is met: ...
....
d. The commission, after investigation and opportunity for hearing, finds that public convenience and necessity requires the delivery of service by the applicant, in which case the holder's obligation to be the provider of last resort is eliminated.
[2]
Section 196.219(3)(j), Stats.,
provides in part:
A telecommunication utility may
not do any of the following with respect to regulated services:
....
(j) Restrict resale or
sharing of services, products or facilities, except basic local exchange
service other than extended community calling, unless the Commission orders the
restriction to be lifted. A
telecommunications utility that has 150,000 or less access lines in use in this
state may limit the use of extended community calling or business line and
usage service within a local calling area as a substitute for access service,
unless the commission orders the limitation to be lifted. (Emphasis added.)
The parties do not dispute that some of WSTA's members are small local exchange carriers (LECs) with 150,000 or less access lines.
[3] After completion of filing briefs for this case, the PSC informed us that the case may be moot due to the enactment of The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stats. 56. The provisions created by the Act in 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 253 are relevant to the duty of all providers of local exchange service to provide resale of their services. WSTA does not agree that the federal Act makes this appeal moot. After a teleconference with the parties on the matter, we decided to proceed with the appeal as it was originally presented to us.
[4]
In a departmental correspondence, the PSC defined CENTREX as follows:
CENTREX service combines local
service with a number of special features, including custom calling features,
distinctive ring patterns for calls originated and terminated at the same
customer premises, and free calling between a customer's stations. CENTREX provides both a local loop and local
switching. CENTREX functions by
dedicating a partitioned portion of a local exchange carrier's (LEC) central
office switch to the typical large customer's in-house needs.
According to another PSC departmental correspondence "CENTREX is a trademark, owned by the Regional Bell Operating Companies ... for a central-office-based service which provides the same functions as a private branch exchange." The same service is offered by other independent local exchange carriers under a variety of names. As used in this opinion, CENTREX refers to the generic service.
[5] Resellers can purchase access in two ways. First, a reseller can pay for actual time used, measured in "minutes of use." Alternatively, a customer can pay a fixed monthly charge for special, private access.
[6] Section 227.53(1), Stats., provides "Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, any person aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.52 shall be entitled to judicial review thereof as provided in this chapter."
[7] The respondents argue that WSTA was not injured and that it does not have associational standing to represent its members. We will not address these issues because our holding that WSTA's injury is not protected at law is dispositive of the appeal. See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis.2d 61, 67, 334 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 1983) (if decision on one point disposes of appeal, appellate court will not decide other issues raised).
[8] The legislature has mandated that all LECs provide service to any entity that requests service within its service area. This requirement is known as the "provider of last resort obligation." See § 196.219(3), Stats.
[9] Section 227.01(5), Stats. provides in part: "In this chapter: ... 'License' includes ...." (Emphasis added.)
[10]
A letter to the PSC from an LEC supporting CENTREX resale stated:
In an increasingly complex telecommunications environment, it is very difficult for any company to be all things to all consumers. The additional competition that CENTREX resale brings forth serves to enhance most customer solutions, generally brings better customer service and brings lower prices to most customers.
[11] Section 196.01(1b), Stats., defines "[a]ccess service" as "the provision of switched or dedicated access to a local exchange network for the purpose of enabling a telecommunications provider to originate or terminate telecommunications service."
[12] The respondents also argue that CENTREX is not a "business line and usage service," that CENTREX is not a "substitute for access service," and that § 196.219(3)(j), Stats., only allows small telephone companies to limit the use, but not the resale, of services. If we accepted any of these arguments, the statute would not give WSTA members a legally protected interest to limit CENTREX resale. However, we do not address these arguments because even if we accept WSTA's premise, the statute does not create a legally protected interest because it unambiguously gives the PSC the power to lift the limitation.