COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 7, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3093
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
JENNIFER L. LYON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL R. MAX AND
FIDELITY & DEPOSIT
COMPANY
OF MARYLAND,
Defendants-Appellants,
AND
MCS CONTRACTING
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Barron County:
JAMES C. EATON, Judge. Modified
and, as modified, affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
MYSE, J. Michael R. Max and
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland appeal a default judgment entered on
behalf of Jennifer L. Lyon in the amount of $970,738.34. Max contends that the trial court had not
obtained personal jurisdiction over him because the substitute service of the
summons and complaint made at his home in Illinois failed to reflect the
exercise of due diligence to personally serve Max prior to effecting substitute
service. Fidelity contends that the
court erroneously exercised its discretion by granting the default judgment and
by refusing to vacate the default judgment where the complaint failed to state
a claim against Fidelity. Because we
conclude that the complaint properly stated a claim against Fidelity and that
Lyon concedes to dismissal of Max if the judgment against Fidelity is upheld,
we modify the judgment by dismissing Max and affirm the judgment as modified.
Lyon was a passenger on
a motorcycle that collided with a vehicle driven by Max. As a result of this accident, Lyon suffered
numerous injuries including partial loss of her right leg. Max is an Illinois resident and the vehicle
was owned by MCS Contracting Company, Inc., an Illinois corporation. Fidelity was an insurer of the vehicle. Lyon filed a complaint against Max, MCS and Fidelity
alleging that Max was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of her injuries. None of the
defendants filed a timely answer to the complaint.
Lyon moved for default
judgment based on her attorney's affidavit and affidavits of service on
file. Counsel for Fidelity appeared on
behalf of Fidelity, Max and MCS at the hearing for default judgment and
objected to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Max and MCS, but
did not move to extend the time for answering or allege that the failure to
timely respond to the complaint was due to excusable neglect. The trial court determined it had
jurisdiction, entered default judgment in favor of Lyon as to liability and set
the matter for trial on the issue of damages only.
The defendants
subsequently filed a motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to §§
806.07(1)(d) and (h), Stats. Max again contended that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him because substitute service rather than personal
service was used to effect service at his Illinois residence. Fidelity contended that its failure to
timely answer the complaint was due to excusable neglect based on a
misunderstanding between itself and its attorneys. The trial court denied the motions.[1]
After a jury trial on
damages, the jury returned a verdict of $900,000 compensatory damages. A judgment in the amount of $970,738.34 was
entered in favor of Lyon after including costs and disbursements. MCS and Fidelity subsequently filed motions
to vacate the default judgment because Lyon failed to allege sufficient facts
in her complaint to state a claim and support the default judgment against
them. The trial court granted MCS's
motion concluding that the allegations of ownership of the vehicle were
insufficient to state a claim against MCS to support the judgment. However, the trial court denied Fidelity's
motion concluding that the complaint was sufficient to state a claim against
it. Judgment was then entered on the
verdict as to Max and Fidelity.
Fidelity contends that
the complaint failed to state a claim against it and therefore the trial court
erroneously exercised its discretion by granting the default judgment and by
refusing to vacate the default judgment.[2] The failure to timely answer the complaint
absent excusable neglect does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to
default judgment. Davis v.
Elkhorn, 132 Wis.2d 394, 397, 393 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Ct. App. 1986). To secure a default judgment, the plaintiff
must first make two preliminary showings.
Id. at 398-99, 393 N.W.2d at 97. The moving party must show that the complaint was served in the
manner and within the time prescribed by statute. Id. In
addition, the complaint must contain allegations sufficient in law to state a
claim for relief against the defendant.
Id.
Because Fidelity does
not challenge the trial court's finding that Fidelity's failure to timely
answer was not the result of excusable neglect or that the complaint was
properly served on it, we need only address whether the complaint was
sufficient to state a claim against Fidelity.
This issue raises a question of law that we review de novo. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Spencer's
Kenosha Bowl, 137 Wis.2d 313, 317, 404 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Ct. App.
1987). Although the granting of a
default judgment is submitted to the trial court's exercise of discretion, Martin
v. Griffin, 117 Wis.2d 438, 443, 344 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1984),
an error of law is an erroneous exercise of discretion. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kleppe,
174 Wis.2d 637, 641, 498 N.W.2d 226, 227 (1993). Therefore, if the complaint fails to state a claim, the trial
court's erroneous conclusion of law would be a basis for reversal.
Wisconsin is a notice
pleading state. Under notice pleading,
"[t]he purpose of the complaint is to give notice of the nature of the
claim; and, therefore, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to set out in the
complaint all the facts which must eventually be proved to recover." Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co.,
87 Wis.2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979). Complaints are to be liberally construed in favor of stating a
cause of action. Id. Accordingly, a complaint must be construed
to state a claim "unless it appears to a certainty that no relief can be
granted under any set of facts that plaintiff can prove in support of his
allegations." Id. at
731-32, 275 N.W.2d at 664.
Sections 803.04, Stats., and 632.24, Stats., provide the basis to bring a
direct action against an insurer and to hold the insurer liable. Under § 803.04(2)(a), Stats., a plaintiff may join an insurer
as a proper party defendant in an action against the insured for damages
resulting from the negligence of the insured.
If the insurance policy was issued or delivered outside Wisconsin, the
insurer is made a proper party defendant only if the accident, injury or
negligence occurred in Wisconsin. Id. Further, § 632.24 provides:
Any
bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others for negligence makes
the insurer liable, up to the amounts stated in the bond or policy, to the
persons entitled to recover against the insured for the death of any person or
for injury to persons or property, irrespective of whether the liability is
presently established or is contingent and to become fixed or certain by final
judgment against the insured.
Lyon alleged in her
complaint that an automobile accident occurred in Barron County, Wisconsin,
that Max's negligence in driving his car proximately caused the accident and
that as a proximate result of Max's negligence, she suffered personal injuries
resulting in damage. Lyon also alleged
in her complaint as follows:
On
May 22, 1994, [date of accident] Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland had
in effect a liability insurance policy covering Michael R. Max and MCS
Contracting Co., Inc., under the terms of which it insured them against
liability imposed upon them by law for damages caused by their negligent
acts. Fidelity & Deposit Company of
Maryland is a proper party to this action pursuant to Wis. Stat. §
803.04(2).
We conclude that the
complaint sufficiently states a claim against Fidelity. The complaint alleges that Max was
negligent, his negligence proximately caused Lyon's injuries, Fidelity had in
effect an insurance policy covering Max on the date of the accident, and
Fidelity was a proper party pursuant to § 803.04(2), Stats. The complaint
is sufficient to give adequate notice of the nature of the claim against
Fidelity.
Fidelity contends that
the complaint must allege facts under § 631.01(1), Stats., before a cause of action is stated for direct
liability on an insurer. Section
631.01(1) provides that chs. 631 and 632, Stats.,
"apply to all insurance policies ... delivered or issued ... in this
state, on property ordinarily located in this state, on persons residing in
this state when the policy ... is issued, or on business operations in this
state, except; .... (c) As otherwise provided in the statutes." Fidelity argues that Lyon's complaint fails
to allege any § 631.01(1) facts and none of these facts were present in this
case.
We conclude that the
complaint need not recite such facts to state a cause of action. A claim that Fidelity is not susceptible to
a direct action claim because of restrictions of the statute is an affirmative
defense that must be alleged in an answer or by motion. The seventh circuit's decision in Utz
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1980) (interpreting
Wisconsin law), supports this position.
See also Scribbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
304 F.Supp. 1268 (E.D.Wis. 1969). In Utz,
the court dealt with a situation where the accident did not occur in Wisconsin
and the plaintiff did not allege that the insurance policy was issued or
delivered in Wisconsin. Id.
at 9. Under § 803.04(2)(a), Stats., the insurer is made a proper
party defendant only if the policy was issued or delivered in Wisconsin or the
accident, injury or negligence occurred in Wisconsin. The court held that the plaintiffs were not required to plead
facts relating to the place of issuance or delivery of the policy. Id. "The burden is not on plaintiff to make allegations or
present evidence about the place of issuance or delivery of the policy when
defendant has not raised the issue ...."
Id. We conclude
that, similarly, the plaintiff is not required to plead facts relating to the
place of issuance or delivery of the policy or any other facts under §
631.01(1), Stats. The insurer has the burden to allege an
affirmative defense and introduce evidence relating to the limitations of the
direct action statutes. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the
plaintiff need not plead facts under § 631.01(1) and Fidelity's claim is
an affirmative defense that must be alleged in an answer or by motion.
Fidelity also contends
that State v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 411, 37 N.W. 348
(1888), compels the result it urges. In
Citizens Ins., the insurance company was sued by the state for
failing to file various reports with the insurance commissioner. The complaint failed to allege that Citizens
was licensed to do business in the state.
Because doing business in the state was a prerequisite for the filing of
the required reports, our supreme court concluded that an essential element of
the complaint had been omitted and that the complaint did not state a claim
against Citizens. The state's complaint
was therefore dismissed.
We conclude that Citizens
Ins. is inapposite to our analysis.
First, Wisconsin has adopted notice pleading since that decision. Even so, Citizens Ins. stands
only for the proposition that the necessary elements to impose liability must
be contained within the complaint.
Because we conclude that Fidelity's claim that it is not susceptible to
direct action because of the limitations of the statute is an affirmative
defense and not a necessary element of the claim, Citizens Ins.
does not apply. Lyon's complaint
contains sufficient allegations to impose liability upon Fidelity. Fidelity's recourse was to file an answer to
the complaint and raise the affirmative defenses it now wishes to assert.
Finally, Fidelity argues
that even if the complaint states a claim, proof of one of the facts of §
631.01, Stats., is necessary to
support the judgment. We disagree. A plaintiff need not offer proof to rebut an
affirmative defense not asserted by the defendant. The complaint and affidavits were sufficient to support the
default judgment against Fidelity.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not erroneously exercise
its discretion when it granted default judgment against Fidelity.
Lyon contends that the
resolution of this issue against Fidelity is dispositive because Fidelity will
be the party called upon to satisfy the judgment based on its considerable
assets. We construe this as a concession
to dismiss Max as a party defendant based on our affirmance of the default
judgment against Fidelity. A plaintiff
can bring an action directly against the insurer without naming the insured as
a defendant. Biggart v. Barstad,
182 Wis.2d 421, 428, 513 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 1994). We therefore conclude that resolution of
Fidelity's liability is dispositive of the entire case and will not further
consider Max's liability. Accordingly,
we modify the judgment by dismissing Max, and as modified affirm the judgment
against Fidelity only.
By the Court.—Judgment
modified and, as modified, affirmed.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.
[1] On appeal Fidelity does not challenge the trial court's determination that Fidelity's failure to timely answer was not due to excusable neglect.
[2] Fidelity cites no authority for its position that the default judgment must be reopened under § 806.07, Stats., if the complaint fails to state a claim against it. Because we conclude that the complaint states a claim against Fidelity, we need not address whether this is sufficient to reopen a default judgment.