COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October 23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3083-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DENNIS E. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Kenosha County: BRUCE E. SCHROEDER and MARY K. WAGNER-MALLOY, Judges. Affirmed.
Before Anderson, P.J.,
Brown and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Dennis E. Jones appeals from a judgment of conviction
of soliciting another to commit perjury, contrary to § 939.30, Stats.
He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion renewing
his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and seeking dismissal for
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction.
We affirm the judgment and the order.
Upon entry of a guilty
plea, Jones was convicted in Kenosha County Circuit Court of urging Jumard
Brooks to commit perjury in a Kenosha County criminal action. The Kenosha County case charged Jones with
armed robbery and firearm possession.
Brooks, a Racine County resident, received by hand delivery a lengthy
and unsigned letter suggesting that he commit perjury in the Kenosha County
matter. When the letter was sent, Jones
was jailed at the Racine County Jail on the Kenosha County charges because of
overcrowding in the Kenosha jail. Jones
argues that even though the perjury was to be committed in the Kenosha County
Circuit Court, venue was proper in Racine County because all events leading to
the charge occurred in Racine County.
The general rule is that
a guilty or no contest plea waives the right to raise nonjurisdictional defects
and defenses, including claims of constitutional dimension. State v. Olson, 127 Wis.2d
412, 418, 380 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Ct. App. 1985).
A guilty plea waives challenges to venue. Dolan v. State, 48 Wis.2d 696, 703, 180 N.W.2d 623,
626 (1970). However, waiver is avoided
if there are grounds to withdraw Jones's plea.
Jones suggests two reasons for permitting the withdrawal of his
plea: (1) trial counsel was deficient
for not challenging venue, and (2) his misunderstanding as to the effect of the
plea.
A claim of ineffective
trial counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance was deficient and
that counsel's errors were prejudicial.
State v. Giebel, 198 Wis.2d 207, 218, 541 N.W.2d 815, 819
(Ct. App. 1995). We recognize that the
right to a jury of the county where the crime was committed is a component of
the constitutional right to a fair trial.
State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis.2d 122, 142, 258 N.W.2d 260, 268
(1977). However, the denial of a
constitutional right without resulting prejudice does not afford relief. The dispositive question here is whether
Jones was prejudiced by venue in Kenosha County.[1] See Giebel, 198 Wis.2d
at 218, 541 N.W.2d at 819 (we need not address both components if the defendant
does not make a sufficient showing on one).
Jones does not offer
even one suggestion of prejudice from being subject to the prosecution in
Kenosha County. Nor can we conceive of
one. This was not a case of a notorious
nature and there was no possibility that Jones would have faced a biased
jury. Jones was already under the
jurisdiction of Kenosha County in terms of his physical placement and
availability for trial court proceedings.
The ability to investigate or secure witnesses is not affected by venue
where neighboring counties are involved.
It would be pure speculation to suggest that Jones would have been
offered a favorable plea agreement or received more lenient treatment in Racine
County. We conclude that Jones was not
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge venue and that his plea is
not invalidated by ineffective assistance of counsel.[2]
We turn to whether the
trial court erroneously exercised its discretion is denying Jones's presentence
motion to withdraw his plea based on an alleged misunderstanding of the
consequences of his plea. See State
v. Shanks, 152 Wis.2d 284, 288-89, 448 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Ct. App. 1989)
(a motion to withdraw a plea, filed prior to sentencing, is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court and we review for an erroneous exercise of its
discretion). A defendant has the burden
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a "fair and just
reason" for withdrawal of the plea.
State v. Canedy, 161 Wis.2d 565, 583-84, 469 N.W.2d 163,
171 (1991). Confusion and genuine
misunderstanding as to the consequences of the plea are factors as to whether a
fair and just reason exists to permit plea withdrawal. Shanks,
152 Wis.2d at 290, 448 N.W.2d at 266-67.
Jones asserted that he
believed he would be found guilty of the solicitation charge and that it would
be treated as a "read in" offense at the sentencing for the armed
robbery charge, but that he would not be sentenced on it. On the presentence motion, the trial court
found Jones incredible in his claim that he did not understand the consequences. We are required to give due regard to the
opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Section 805.17(2), Stats. At the
postconviction stage, a different trial court judge also determined that Jones
understood the consequences of his plea.
At the plea hearing,
Jones acknowledged his understanding that he faced forty-one years total
exposure on the solicitation and armed robbery convictions. He was told that he could receive up to
eleven years on the solicitation conviction and that the sentence could be
added consecutive to the sentence he would receive on the armed robbery
charge. The separate exposure from each
crime was stated on the record. The
finding that Jones's asserted belief was "facially untrue" is not
clearly erroneous. The trial court
properly exercised its discretion in denying Jones's motion to withdraw his
plea.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Although we agree with the State's analysis that venue was proper in either Racine or Kenosha County, we need not decide that issue. Jones was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge venue only if he was in fact prejudiced by venue in Kenosha County.
[2] The trial court did not conduct a Machner hearing on Jones's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the objection to venue. Jones asks this court to remand for a Machner hearing on the ground that he has made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. To be entitled to a hearing a defendant must allege facts which allow the court to meaningfully assess a claim of prejudice when ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged. State v. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d 303, 318, 548 N.W.2d 50, 57 (1996). We decline to remand because there has not been a prima facie showing of prejudice.