COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED November 14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3058-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID T. POLK,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Rock County:
EDWIN C. DAHLBERG, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman, P.J., and Vergeront, J.
PER
CURIAM. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence,
David Polk pled guilty to and was convicted of possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver. The issue is whether
the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence found on Polk's person
when he arrived as a guest at a residence during the execution of a search
warrant. Because the search of Polk
violated the Fourth Amendment, we reverse.
The supreme court
recently held that the police may not search items worn by or in the physical
possession of a visitor during the execution of a warrant to search a private
premises. See State v.
Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 386, 549 N.W.2d 210, 211 (1996). The court explained that there is a
"proscription against the search of the person of an individual whose
search is not specifically authorized [by] the warrant." Id. at 397, 549 N.W.2d at 215.
It is undisputed that
Polk arrived as a guest at a residence being searched pursuant to a warrant
that allowed for the search of a residence and the people at the residence when
the police handcuffed him, searched him, and found cocaine. Under Andrews, the search
violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant did not authorize the search
of visitors arriving at the residence a substantial period after execution of
the warrant had begun. Id. The evidence stemming from the search,
including the evidence subsequently found in Polk's automobile, must be
suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment and remand for further proceedings.[1]
By the Court.—Judgment
reversed and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)(5), Stats.
[1] The parties concede that the search warrant was invalid and argue extensively about whether this court has adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). We do not address this issue because the search in question was not made in good faith reliance on an invalid warrant. Here, the search was not authorized by the warrant whatsoever.