COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-3034
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
In re the Marriage of:
ELIZABETH H. TAYLOR,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JAMES A. TAYLOR, IV,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Ozaukee County:
WALTER J. SWIETLIK, Judge. Affirmed
and cause remanded with directions.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. James A. Taylor, IV appeals from an order denying his
motion to reduce payments he makes to Elizabeth H. Taylor under a 1987 divorce
judgment. He argues that the circuit
court ignored the parties' agreement that the payments include child support
and therefore are subject to modification.
We conclude, as did the circuit court, that the payments are not subject
to modification, that no grounds under § 806.07, Stats., exist to relieve James of the terms of the stipulated
payments and that James' motion to modify was frivolous. We affirm the order and remand to the
circuit court for a determination of appellate attorney's fees and costs for a
frivolous appeal.
The divorce judgment
incorporated the agreement of the parties that James make monthly payments
which periodically increased based on the Consumer Price Index. The payments were $6650 starting in 1987 and
had increased to $8958 in 1995 when James filed a motion to modify them. The judgment designated the payments as IRC
§ 71 payments[1] and stated
that they were in lieu of maintenance and to be treated as a final division of
property. The payments continue until
Elizabeth's death or December 31, 1999, whichever occurs first. Maintenance was waived. Child support for the parties' two children
was "held open in that other provisions are contained herein in lieu of
said support."
James sought to modify
the payments on the ground that they constituted modifiable child support. He challenges the circuit court's finding
that the payments do not include child support as contrary to the undisputed evidence
that the parties intended the payments to include child support. He points to the fact that the payments
cease six months after the youngest child will have graduated from high
school. He contends that the circuit
court is required to "pierce through the Judgment's `§ 71' verbiage"
to ascertain the true nature of the payments.
Whether the facts as
determined fulfill a legal conclusion presents a question of law which we
review de novo. See Popp
v. Popp, 146 Wis.2d 778, 787, 432 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Ct. App. 1988)
(identity is a question of law). Here,
the payments were designated as § 71 payments. But there is more than the designation which demonstrates that
the payments were not merely modifiable child support.
The IRS code provides
that if a portion of a payment is fixed and designated as child support, that
amount is not deductible by the payor or included in the income of the
payee. 26 U.S.C. § 71(c)(1). Yet for every year since the divorce, James
has deducted the full amount of the payments.
The termination date of the payments was six months beyond the usual
termination date for support for a child and thus ensured the deductibility of
the payments for James. See 26
U.S.C. § 71(c)(2) (a payment is treated as child support if it is reduced at a
time clearly associated with a contingency relating to a child, such as leaving
school). Further, the payments
terminate upon Elizabeth's death. That
is a contingency which fits the definition of maintenance under 26 U.S.C. §
71(b)(1)(D).
Even accepting
Elizabeth's concession that the payments include a child support component, it
does not transform the entire payment to child support. No portion of the payment was fixed as child
support. Indeed, the circuit court
retained jurisdiction to make an order for child support.[2] The driving force behind § 71 payments is
the deductibility of the payments for the payor. James utilized this feature of the payments he made.
We conclude that the
payments are not child support. To the
extent that the payments are property division, they are not subject to
modification. Section 767.32(1)(a), Stats.
Further, the payments could not have been ordered by the circuit court
in the judgment of divorce but for the parties' agreement to settle their
financial affairs in such a manner. See
Ross v. Ross, 149 Wis.2d 713, 719-21, 439 N.W.2d 639, 642-43 (Ct.
App. 1989). James cannot seek
modification of the terms of the stipulation because both parties entered into
the stipulation freely and knowingly and the overall settlement is fair,
equitable and not illegal or against public policy.[3] See id.
James argues that a
reduction in the child support payments was justified under § 806.07, Stats.
We need not address this argument because of the conclusion that the
payments were not child support. James'
argument ignores that the parties' stipulation for § 71 payments was, in
essence, a contract between the parties.
See Kastelic v. Kastelic, 119 Wis.2d 280, 287, 350
N.W.2d 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1984).
Although the business devastation he suffered may not have been
foreseeable and may justify a modification of child support based on a change
of circumstances, it does not affect contractual obligations. The fact that a settlement appears in
hindsight to have been a bad bargain is not sufficient by itself to set aside a
judgment. Spankowski v.
Spankowski, 172 Wis.2d 285, 292, 493 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 1992).
The circuit court
imposed a $2500 sanction against James for bringing a frivolous motion. James contends that the court's finding is
not supported by the record. He further
claims that the court focused on his subjective motivation for bringing the
motion to modify rather than applying the objective standard.
We first note that it is
not clear whether the circuit court's finding of frivolousness was made under
§ 802.05, Stats., or
§ 814.025, Stats. Elizabeth argues that under § 802.05 our
standard of review is deferential, whereas under § 814.025 our inquiry
involves a mixed question of law and fact.
Gardner v. Gardner, 190 Wis.2d 216, 247, 250, 527 N.W.2d
701, 712, 713 (Ct. App. 1994). In this
instance, we need not distinguish between the two provisions because the result
is the same under either provision.
If the record is
sufficient, we can decide as a matter of law whether a reasonable attorney
should have known that the action was without a proper basis in law. Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis.2d
484, 501, 471 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds,
168 Wis.2d 1008, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1251 (1993). The standard is an
objective one: whether the attorney
knew or should have known that the position taken was frivolous as determined
by what a reasonable attorney would have known or should have known under the
same or similar circumstances. Stern
v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis.2d 220, 241, 517 N.W.2d 658,
666 (1994).
A body of case law
explains that stipulations in divorce actions for provisions which are
otherwise beyond the authority of the circuit court to order are enforceable
and subject to "estoppel."
There is no reasonable argument that the periodic payments James
stipulated to were subject to modification.
His claim that the provision for the periodic payments was contrary to
public policy because it divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over child
support is patently frivolous in light of the express reservation of child
support jurisdiction. Thus, there was
no good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.
Additionally, James'
attempt to avoid the hard consequences of the stipulated payments while taking
advantage of the deductibility of such payments over many years is something
other than "creative lawyering."
It demonstrates the absence of plausible facts to support his
claim. "[A] claim cannot be made
reasonably or in good faith, even though possible in law, if there is no set of
facts which could satisfy the elements of the claim, or if the party or
attorney knows or should know that the needed facts do not exist or cannot be
developed." Stern,
185 Wis.2d at 244, 517 N.W.2d at 667.
The final issue is the
assessment of costs on appeal. We must
make a determination of whether an appeal is frivolous under Rule 809.25(3)(c), Stats.
We may make this determination as a matter of law. Stern, 185 Wis.2d at 252, 517
N.W.2d at 670. It follows that upon
affirming the trial court's determination that the motion was frivolous, the
appeal is frivolous as a matter of law.
See id. at 253, 517 N.W.2d at 671; Riley v.
Isaacson, 156 Wis.2d 249, 262, 456 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1990) (if
the claim is correctly adjudged to be frivolous in the trial court under
§ 802.05, Stats., it is
frivolous per se on appeal). Thus, we
remand to the circuit court with directions to determine the reasonable
appellate attorney's fees and costs incurred by Elizabeth and to be assessed
against James.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed and cause remanded with directions.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] This refers to 26 U.S.C. § 71 (Internal Revenue Code) which permits a payor of alimony or maintenance to deduct the payments and includes such payments in the recipient's gross income.
[2] For this reason, we summarily reject James' claim that the judgment is contrary to public policy because it removes the circuit court's jurisdiction over child support.
[3] James does not challenge the circuit court's findings that the stipulation was freely and knowingly entered into and that it is a fair settlement not contrary to public policy. Even if the payments included an amount for child support, a stipulation that support be maintained at a certain level despite a reduction in income is not contrary to public policy. Honore v. Honore, 149 Wis.2d 512, 518, 439 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Ct. App. 1989).