COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October 1, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
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No. 95-2931-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GILBERTO FLORES,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOHN A. FRANKE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Fine and Curley, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Gilberto Flores appeals from an order denying his
motion for postconviction relief. He
argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary
hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying without a
hearing his motion for postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. We affirm.
Flores was charged with
two counts of retail theft, two counts of obstructing a police officer, one
count of resisting a police officer, one count of battery to a police officer,
one count of bail jumping, and one count of felony escape. Flores agreed to
plead guilty to all counts and was sentenced.
Subsequently, Flores filed a postconviction motion, seeking to withdraw
his guilty pleas. The trial court
denied the motion, holding that Flores failed to provide the trial court with a
sufficient factual basis to set the matter for a hearing. Flores's counsel then failed to initiate an
appeal. After receiving successor
appellate counsel, Flores appealed the judgment of conviction and the trial
court's sentencing order. This court
summarily affirmed the trial court, noting that Flores had not made a proper
record in support of his motion. See
State v. Flores, Nos. 94-1376-CR, 94‑1377‑CR, 94‑1379‑CR,
94‑1380-CR, 94‑1769‑CR, unpublished summary order at 5 (Wis.
Ct. App. April 21, 1995).
Flores then filed
another postconviction motion arguing that his pleas were not constitutionally
taken because he did not understand the nature of the charges and was not
advised of the rights he was waiving by entering the pleas. Flores also alleged that his first appellate
attorney was ineffective because he failed to make a proper postconviction
record and failed to perfect Flores's appeal.
The trial court ordered
Flores to file a supplemental motion to “set forth by affidavit or other offer
of proof the particular information which he claims he failed to understand and
of which he should have been advised.”
Flores filed a supplemental affidavit in response to the trial court's
order. The trial court denied Flores's
motion without a hearing, ruling that the affidavit was merely conclusory. The trial court also ruled that Flores's
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be raised by petition
in the court of appeals. See State
v. Knight, 168 Wis.2d 509, 520, 484 N.W.2d 540, 544 (1992).
After sentencing, a plea
may be withdrawn only if doing so is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. State v. Booth,
142 Wis.2d 232, 235, 418 N.W.2d 20, 21 (Ct. App. 1987). A plea is manifestly unjust if it was not
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Giebel, 198 Wis.2d 207, 212, 541 N.W.2d
815, 817 (Ct. App. 1995). In order to
assure that a plea is so entered, the trial court is obligated by
§ 971.08(1)(a), Stats., to
ascertain that a defendant understands the nature of and potential punishment
for the charge and that a factual basis exists for a finding of guilt. State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d
246, 260-261, 389 N.W.2d 12, 20 (1986).
It must also ascertain that the defendant understands the constitutional
rights he or she is waiving. Id.,
131 Wis.2d at 270-272, 389 N.W.2d at 24-25.
To withdraw a plea, a defendant must first make a prima facie
showing of noncompliance by the trial court, and allege that he or she did not
understand the information that “should have been provided at the plea
hearing.” Id., 131 Wis.2d
at 274, 389 N.W.2d at 26.
Flores contends on
appeal that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because he did not
understand the nature of the charges to which he was entering the pleas and
that he was not advised that he was waiving his constitutional right not to
incriminate himself by entering the pleas.
He bases his argument on the following plea colloquy:
THE
COURT: So that you understand that by entering pleas of guilty to these
charges, all of these charges, what you're telling me, the Court, is that
you're guilty of what's contained in the criminal complaint.
THE
DEFENDANT: Yes, that's true.
THE
COURT: And you have read all of these criminal complaints and you
understand what you're charged with?
THE
DEFENDANT: Yes.
....
THE
COURT: You understand how the facts in each of those cases relate to
the charges made in those cases?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
The
State concedes, and we agree, that the above noted plea colloquy was
insufficient to meet the requirements of Bangert. See § 971.08(1)(a), Stats.
A prima facie showing of noncompliance with the mandatory
procedures, however, does not automatically entitle a defendant to either an
evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief.
As noted, a defendant must allege that he or she, in fact, “did not know
or understand the information which should have been provided at the plea
hearing.” Bangert, 131
Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d at 26.
Flores filed an
affidavit in support of his claim that he was not properly informed of the
nature of the crimes:
Due
to the inadequate plea colloquy between the Honorable Rudolph Randa and the
Defendant, the Defendant was not aware of the elements of each offense to which
he was pleading guilty. The trial court
never read, summarized, referred to statute, requested counsel to summarize,
nor in any other manner assured that Defendant knew or understood the elements
of: 1) battery to peace officer; 2)
retail theft; 3) obstruction of peace officer; 4) resisting arrest; or 5)
escape.
With
respect to Flores's claim that he was not properly advised of the
constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, Flores alleged
in his affidavit:
Moreover,
even though the trial court explained that Defendant was waiving certain
rights, it never mentioned three basic Constitutional rights which were being
waived: 1) the right not to incriminate
himself; 2) the right to present evidence in his own behalf; and 3) the right
to confront his accusors [sic]. Again,
knowledge of these rights cannot be assumed, since the trial court did not
adequately address defense counsel to determine whether counsel explained these
rights to Defendant.
Based
on the above affidavit, the trial court ruled that Flores had not alleged
sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing or to entitle him to
postconviction relief. We agree. Flores has not alleged, except in a
conclusory fashion, what he in fact did not understand regarding the nature of
the crimes or what he did not understand regarding the constitutional rights he
was waiving by entering the guilty pleas.
Without such allegations, the trial court was not required to grant
Flores an evidentiary hearing and properly denied his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas. See State v.
Saunders, 196 Wis.2d 45, 49-52, 538 N.W.2d 546, 548-549 (Ct. App.
1995).
Flores also argues that
he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He claims that counsel was ineffective for
filing an inadequately drafted postconviction motion and because he failed to
file an appeal from the trial court's order denying relief. Regardless of the validity of Flores's arguments,
his claims are moot because he received replacement counsel who brought a
second postconviction motion and two appeals.
Flores has had ample opportunity to develop his claims of error, and has
been given the direct appeal he claims that his prior appellate counsel did not
pursue.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.