COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED FEBRUARY 13, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2899-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. PRICE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Judge. Affirmed.
CANE, P.J. Christopher Price appeals a judgment
convicting him of disorderly conduct while possessing a dangerous weapon. The sole issue on appeal is whether Price
voluntarily waived his right to be represented by counsel at trial. Price argues that although he was not
indigent, the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry to determine whether
his decision to proceed without counsel was made knowingly and
voluntarily. The conviction is affirmed.
Price appeared before
the Outagamie County court commissioner for his initial appearance in response
to the State's criminal complaint charging him with disorderly conduct with a
dangerous weapon. The commissioner informed
Price of the charge and penalty associated with the crime and further informed
him of his right to an attorney. The
commissioner also asked Price if he would like additional time to talk with an
attorney. When Price declined this
offer, the commissioner informed him that he could seek the assistance of the
public defender's office and again offered him additional time to talk with an
attorney. Price again refused the offer
and pled not guilty with the understanding that he would be representing
himself at the scheduled status conference and jury trial. After failing to appear for the scheduled
status conference, Price appeared before Judge Harold Froehlich and informed
the court that he was representing himself and wanted to get the matter
resolved. The court continued the matter
for a jury trial.
Approximately six weeks
before trial, Price wrote a letter to the district attorney indicating that he
was representing himself because the public defender declared him ineligible
for appointed counsel. In this letter,
he also made an extensive discovery demand.
Price appeared at the jury trial without an attorney where Reserve Judge
Nick Schaefer explained the court procedures to Price. Price never asked for an attorney or an
adjournment to have his attorney present.
The jury found him guilty of disorderly conduct with a dangerous weapon.
In Price's post-trial
motions to Judge Froehlich, Price asserted that because the court failed to
make a proper inquiry, he never intelligently waived his constitutional right
to proceed at trial with an attorney and thus should have a new trial. Notably, Price does not argue that he did
not possess minimal competence necessary to conduct his own defense, such as
any physical or psychological disability that may significantly affect his
ability to communicate a possible defense to the jury. In a written decision, Judge Froehlich
denied the motion.
The right to legal
assistance in state criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by art. I, § 7, of the
Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Spencer v.
State, 85 Wis.2d 565, 570, 271 N.W.2d 25, 28 (1978). The determination whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). In ascertaining whether the accused is
voluntarily proceeding without counsel, the trial judge should examine him or
her regarding "the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses
to the charges ... and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the whole matter." Pickens
v. State, 96 Wis.2d 549, 562, 292 N.W.2d 601, 608 (1980). The accused should be "aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id. at 563, 292 N.W.2d at 608.
A review of the record
demonstrates that Price's statements and actions were consistent with a knowing
and voluntary election to proceed at trial without an attorney. At his initial appearance, the commissioner
informed Price that he had a right to an attorney and that the public defender
would appoint one for him if he qualified.
He was also offered the opportunity to adjourn the initial appearance in
order to discuss this matter with a public defender. Price declined this offer to adjourn the matter twice, pleaded
not guilty and demanded a jury trial.
Additionally, not only did Price receive a copy of the criminal
complaint stating the charge, probable cause and maximum penalty, the
commissioner again informed Price of the charge and its maximum penalty.
It is also apparent from
Price's letter to the district attorney demanding discovery that he
deliberately elected to represent himself knowing the complexities of the legal
system and after he had discussed the appointment of counsel with a public defender
who advised him that he was ineligible for appointed counsel. At no time does the record ever reflect
Price asking the trial court to appoint counsel for him or Price indicating
that he was unable to represent himself at the jury trial.
Before trial, the court advised Price on the
court procedures, and it is evident from the record that Price was aware of the
difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation. It is also evident that Price deliberately
elected not to hire an attorney and voluntarily proceeded to trial without
counsel. This court is satisfied that
the combination of Price's decision before the court commissioner to proceed
without counsel, his subsequent course of conduct where he repeated his
election to represent himself before Judge Froehlich and in his discovery
demand and his deliberate participation in the jury trial without retaining
counsel constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel at trial. Therefore, the conviction is affirmed.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.