COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED APRIL 3, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2878-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SCOTT K. SCHAEFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
J. MAC DAVIS, Judge. Affirmed.
ANDERSON, P.J. Scott
K. Schaefer appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of cocaine,
contrary to § 161.41(3m), Stats. We conclude that the trial court did not err
in denying Schaefer's motion to suppress the evidence seized from him. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
According to the
criminal complaint, Police Officer Paul John Paikowski was dispatched to
investigate the report of a suspicious person operating a brownish-colored Ford
with the license plate KUD-747. The
operator of the described car had allegedly threatened someone with a gun while
in a municipal lot. The operator of the
car was said to have indicated that he possessed a gun while motioning to the
glove box inside of his car. Paikowski
located Schaefer and told him that he would be conducting a “pat-down”
search. Schaefer raised his arms out to
his sides and told Paikowski that he had permission to search him and the
vehicle.
During the pat-down
search, Paikowski felt a firm object in Schaefer's right front pocket of his
jeans which he believed was consistent with a bindle used to conceal
drugs. When Paikowski felt the object
he asked Schaefer what was inside his pocket and Schaefer replied that it was an
envelope containing pipe screens which he used to smoke marijuana on
occasion. Paikowski proceeded to put
his hand into Schaefer's pocket and felt two separate pliable-like bindles and
asked Schaefer what else was in his pocket.
Schaefer said that it was personal.
When Paikowski asked what he meant by “personal,” Schaefer said that he
had a small amount of cocaine for personal use. Paikowski then removed the objects from Schaefer's pocket where
he found pipe screens and cocaine.
Schaefer filed a motion
to suppress the physical evidence seized from him, claiming that the search and
seizure were unlawful and violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion. Schaefer subsequently pled no contest to the
criminal charges. A judgment of
conviction was entered against him for possession of cocaine. Schaefer appeals.
Schaefer argues that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized
from him. When we review a trial
court's decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence, the court's findings
of fact will be sustained unless they are contrary to the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence. State
v. Callaway, 106 Wis.2d 503, 511, 317 N.W.2d 428, 433, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 967 (1982). However, we
independently examine the circumstances of the case to determine whether the
constitutional requirements of reasonableness have been satisfied. Id.
Schaefer contends that
the search exceeded the scope of a Terry-type pat down. He states that clearly the purpose of the
search in this case was a pat-down frisk for weapons as opposed to a search
incident to formal arrest. As such,
Schaefer claims that Paikowski's pat-down search in which he could foresee the
possibility of coming across items of contraband was a direct violation of the Terry
search.
In Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that “[a] police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest.” In
order to execute a valid investigatory stop, Terry requires that
a police officer reasonably suspect, in light of his or her experience, that
some kind of criminal activity has taken or is taking place. State v. Richardson, 156
Wis.2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830, 834 (1990).
“Such reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id.
(quoted source omitted). It is an
objective standard: Would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?
Here, Paikowski acted
upon a report of a suspicious person who had allegedly threatened someone with
a gun. Based upon Schaefer's alleged
criminal activity, Paikowski's stop and pat-down search for weapons were reasonably
warranted.[1] Additionally, Paikowski conducted a proper
pat down which was limited to Schaefer's outer clothing. See id. at 146-47, 456 N.W.2d
at 837.
Next, we turn to whether
once Paikowski failed to locate any weapons on Schaefer's person, he could
search Schaefer's pocket for contraband.
Paikowski felt what he thought to be contraband in Schaefer's pants
pocket during the pat down for weapons.
Paikowski did not immediately reach into the pocket. Instead, he asked Schaefer what was in his
pocket and Schaefer answered that he had screens which he used to smoke
marijuana on occasion. Schaefer's
answer provided Paikowski with probable cause to believe that Schaefer could be
possessing contraband. When Paikowski
reached into Schaefer's pocket and felt another bindle, he asked Schaefer what
was in the other bindle. Schaefer
answered that it was cocaine. Schaefer
divulged this information to Paikowski when asked. Based on Schaefer's answers, Paikowski had probable cause[2]
to search his pocket and obtain the contraband. See id. at 146, 456 N.W.2d at 837.
As in Richardson,
the evidence in this case was in plain view in that it was realized through
Paikowski's sense of touch. The
evidence was inadvertently discovered during the pat down for weapons. “Though a pat-down provides no justification
to search for evidence of a crime, it does not mean that the police must ignore
evidence of a crime which is inadvertently discovered.” Id. at 150, 456 N.W.2d at 839
(quoted source omitted). We therefore
affirm the trial court.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Court concluded: “[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”
[2] “Probable cause requires that the police officer have facts and circumstances within his or her knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant has committed or is in the process of committing an offense.” State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128, 148, 456 N.W.2d 830, 838 (1990).