COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED MARCH 13, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2876
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
In the Interest of
Jason M.J.,
A Person Under the Age
of 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JASON M.J.,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of
the circuit court for Waukesha County:
KATHRYN W. FOSTER, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded with directions.
ANDERSON, P.J. The
State appeals from the juvenile court's orders dismissing a petition for waiver
of jurisdiction and entering into a consent decree. We conclude that the State had to agree before the juvenile court
could order a consent decree.
Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's orders.
A Petition for
Determination of Status—Alleged Delinquent Child was filed in the interest of
Jason M.J. on June 29, 1995. It was
alleged that he knowingly and unlawfully possessed, delivered and/or
manufactured controlled substances and knowingly and unlawfully maintained a
place which was resorted to by persons using controlled substances for the
purpose of using said substances, or which was used for manufacturing, keeping
or delivering controlled substances. A
Petition for Waiver of Jurisdiction of an Alleged Delinquent Child was also
filed, stating that Jason was seventeen and would turn eighteen on July 3,
1995, and listing various reasons why waiving juvenile court jurisdiction was
appropriate.
A waiver hearing was
held on September 7, 1995. The juvenile
court dismissed the State's waiver petition.
At a dispositional hearing in September 1995, the Waukesha County Department
of Health and Human Services recommended that the court enter into a consent
decree and Jason was also in favor of such a decree. The State, however, told the court that it would not enter into a
consent decree. The juvenile court
entered into a consent decree without the State's consent. The State appeals.
The State argues that
the juvenile court had no authority to order a consent decree without the
agreement of the person filing the petition, pursuant to § 48.32(1), Stats.
It states that the juvenile court chose to ignore the statute. In contrast, Jason asserts that a court
retains the authority to enter into a consent decree under § 48.12(2), Stats., 1993-94,[1]
with or without the agreement of the person filing the petition. He contends that under State v. K.A.P.,
159 Wis.2d 384, 464 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1990), § 48.12(2) is ambiguous. He states that “reasonable minds could
differ as to whether the legislature intended the agreement of the person
filing the petition in § 48.32, Stats., to the special and limited § 48.12(2),
Stats., consent decree situation.”
Whether the juvenile
court was required to obtain the State's agreement before entering into a
consent decree pursuant to § 48.12(2), Stats.,
requires the interpretation of statutes.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. K.N.K. v. Buhler,
139 Wis.2d 190, 199, 407 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Ct. App. 1987). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
look at the plain language of the statute in order to ascertain its
meaning. J.A.L. v. State,
162 Wis.2d 940, 962, 471 N.W.2d 493, 502 (1991). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being construed in two
different ways by reasonably well-informed persons. Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis.2d 552, 561, 313
N.W.2d 47, 51-52 (1981).
Section 48.32(1), Stats., addresses consent decrees and
provides in relevant part:
At any time after the filing of a petition for a proceeding relating to
s. 48.12 or 48.13 and before the entry of judgment, the judge or juvenile court
commissioner may suspend the proceedings and place the child under supervision
in the child's own home or present placement.
The court may establish terms and conditions applicable to the parent,
guardian or legal custodian, and to the child, including any conditions
specified in subs. (1d), (1g) and (1t).
The order under this section shall be known as a consent decree and must
be agreed to by the child if 12 years of age or older; the parent, guardian or
legal custodian; and the person filing the petition under s. 48.25.
This
statute provides that the consent decree must be agreed to by the person filing
the petition, which in this case is the State.
Section 48.12(2), Stats., provides in relevant part:
If a court proceeding has been commenced under this section before a
child is 18 years of age, but the child becomes 18 years of age before
admitting the facts of the petition at the plea hearing or if the child denies
the facts, before an adjudication, the court retains jurisdiction over the case
to dismiss the action with prejudice, to waive its jurisdiction under s. 48.18,
or to enter into a consent decree.
Section
48.12 provides for jurisdiction over children alleged to be delinquent.
Initially, we conclude
that neither § 48.32(1), Stats.,
nor § 48.12(2), Stats., are
ambiguous for purposes of this appeal.
Section 48.32(1) clearly states that before a court orders a consent
decree, the person filing the petition must agree. Section 48.12, on the other hand, is silent on this subject. Although Jason contends that § 48.12 is
ambiguous under K.A.P., we conclude that K.A.P.
applies to time limits and is not relevant to the subject of the present
appeal. See K.A.P., 159
Wis.2d at 389, 464 N.W.2d at 108.
We now address the
merits of the appeal. We agree with the
State that given the clear language of § 48.32(1), Stats., the juvenile court was without authority to enter
into the consent decree without the State's agreement. We must harmonize statutory provisions
whenever possible. See County
of Dane v. Racine County, 118 Wis.2d 494, 498, 347 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Ct.
App. 1984). A general rule of statutory
construction where two statutes relate to the same subject matter is that the
specific statute controls over the general statute. Kramer v. City of Hayward, 57 Wis.2d 302, 311, 203
N.W.2d 871, 876 (1973). In harmonizing
the two statutory sections, we conclude that § 48.32(1) is the specific section
governing consent decrees and requires that the juvenile court obtain the
petitioner's approval for the consent decree.
This specific language governs the more general language of § 48.12(2), Stats.
Additionally, we see no policy reason for not obtaining the petitioner's
consent in a situation occurring under § 48.12(2).
We remand to the
juvenile court with directions to vacate the consent decree and to dismiss the
case with prejudice.
By the Court.—Orders
reversed and cause remanded with directions.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.