COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED March 14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2839-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
CARL J. SWENEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PHYLLIS J. SWENEY,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Columbia County:
DANIEL S. GEORGE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Gartzke, P.J.,
Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Carl J. Sweney appeals from an order denying his
motion to reduce child support.[1] The issue is whether the trial court
erroneously exercised its discretion when it concluded that there was no
substantial change in circumstances.
Because we conclude that it did not, we affirm.
As part of the Sweneys'
comprehensive divorce settlement, Carl agreed to pay to his former spouse,
Phyllis, twenty-nine percent of his gross base earnings, exclusive of overtime
and bonus income, as support for the parties' three children.[2] At that time the parties contemplated equal
periods of physical placement. Two
years later, Carl moved to reduce child support, contending that he is entitled
to the rebuttable presumption of § 767.32(1)(b)4, Stats.,[3]
("statutory presumption") of a substantial change in
circumstances. He sought a reduction
because: (1) the child support
standards had been revised since the divorce; and (2) various factual
changes had occurred. The trial court
denied Carl's motion and he appeals.
Carl contends that the
trial court's analysis is fundamentally flawed because it failed to apply the
statutory presumption which would shift the burden of proving a substantial
change in circumstances to Phyllis.
However, Carl's criticism stresses form over substance. Despite its failure to expressly refer to
the statutory presumption, the court found facts and concluded that some of the
changes offset one another, and others were "no more onerous for one
parent than the other." Those
conclusions could only be reached because the court found that Phyllis rebutted
much of Carl's testimony. We conclude
that the court's failure to expressly refer to the statutory presumption in
light of its memorandum decision does not, in and of itself, constitute an
erroneous exercise of discretion.
Carl believes that he
should receive a reduction in his support payments because he is a shared-time
payer under the recently revised child support standards. Wis.
Adm. Code § HSS
80.04(2)(c). However, the evidence
shows that the amount of time the children spend with Carl has not changed
since the divorce. The trial court
noted that "a change in the administrative rules concerning child support
guidelines does not meet the criteria of demonstrating a substantial change of
factual circumstances." We agree
because revision of a support award generally is based on a change in factual,
not legal, circumstances. See Severson
v. Severson, 71 Wis.2d 382, 386, 238 N.W.2d 116, 119-20 (1976)
("The judgment entered on a certain state of facts is thus given the
effect of res adjudicata so long as that factual situation has not
materially changed."); § 767.32(1)(a), Stats.
Carl also testified
about the following factual changes:
(1) the children's expenses have increased; (2) he now
furnishes the oldest child with a car and insurance; (3) his employer now
requires him to contribute to his monthly health insurance premium;
(4) Phyllis's annual federal and state earned income credit has increased;
and (5) Phyllis's live-in friend contributes financial support to Phyllis
and the children. However, the trial
court concluded that Phyllis refuted some of Carl's contentions altogether, and
on the others, it concluded that these changes were not sufficiently
substantial to warrant a reduction in support.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[2] That comprehensive settlement agreement also precluded: (1) Carl from seeking child support payments from Phyllis; and (2) Phyllis from seeking maintenance. Phyllis also received a disproportionately large share of the marital estate as her property division.
[3] Section 767.32(1)(b)4, Stats., creates the rebuttable presumption of a substantial change in circumstances, justifying a revision in child support, if there is "[a] difference between the amount of child support ordered by the court to be paid by the payer and the amount that the payer would have been required to pay based on the percentage standard . . . ."