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COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED December
28, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2697-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS
GUZMAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Portage County: VIRGINIA A. WOLFE, Judge. Affirmed.
EICH,
C.J.[1] The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order
denying its request for the admission of expert testimony on "battered women's
syndrome" in this battery case.
The State sought admission of the evidence to explain the complainant's
recantation of her initial accusations against the defendant. The issue is whether the court erroneously
exercised its discretion in denying the state's request, and we conclude that
it did not. We therefore affirm the
order.
The
facts are not in dispute. Guzman was
charged with battery and criminal damage to property on the complaint of his
girlfriend, Diana R., who lived with him.
Diana R. told police that she and Guzman had been arguing when he
accused her of infidelity, grabbed her by the hair and threw her into a piece
of wooden furniture. Police observed a
reddened lump on her head and noted that items of furniture in the residence
had been broken.
The
next day, Diana R. recanted her accusations, telling police and prosecutors
that she had made a "mistake" in accusing Guzman. She said that Guzman had not grabbed her and
thrown her into the furniture, but that she had bumped her head when she
accidentally backed into a wall while they were embracing.
In
light of Diana R.'s recantation, the prosecutor wrote to the trial court and
defense counsel, stating that he intended to offer evidence from a "social
work counselor ... regarding the phenomenon of ... battered women's
syndrome" in explanation of Diana R.'s conduct.
A
hearing was held on the State's request and the prosecutor presented the
testimony of three witnesses as an "offer of proof" with respect to
the "battered women's syndrome" evidence he wished to introduce. He first questioned Diana R. at some length
about the events of the evening in question, and she consistently denied that
anything untoward had occurred between her and Guzman that night. She testified that she got the lump on her
head by accidentally backing into a wall.
And while she acknowledged that she was aware that Guzman had been
convicted of violent crimes and misdemeanors in the past, she denied that
Guzman had ever abused her or that she was afraid of him.
The
prosecutor then called the investigating police officer, who testified that
Diana R. had told him that she received the lump on her head at Guzman's hands
that evening, that she had been dating Guzman for three years, "and that
[she] and her family were tired of her mental and physical abuse." The officer stated that Diana R. had not
given "any specific examples of prior inciden[t]s of battery by Mr.
Guzman."
The
prosecutor called Cheryl Klawikowski, a "crisis counselor" at the La
Crosse Family Crisis Center.
Klawikowski stated that, in the course of her duties at the center, she
had counseled about 500 women who have been victims of family violence. Klawikowski testified that she has a B.A.
degree in psychology "with a human services emphasis which is counseling,"
and that, as a result of her training and experience, she has become familiar
with the condition known as battered women's syndrome.
Over
Guzman's objections, Klawikowski testified as to various behavioral aspects of
battered women's syndrome, including a tendency to engage in denial and to
recant accusations of abuse made against the abusive partners. According to Klawikowski, battered women's
syndrome is the result of "a history of violence" between the woman
and her partner.
The
prosecutor offered Klawikowski's testimony as an explanation of Diana R.'s
recantation of her initial accusations against Guzman, stating to the court
that her testimony was "essential" to the State's case. Guzman argued that there was insufficient
foundation for Klawikowski to testify as an expert on battered women's syndrome
and, further, that her testimony should be disregarded because there was no
evidence of a history of abuse between Diana R. and Guzman, one of the
foundations (according to Klawikowski) of the syndrome.
The
court agreed with Guzman and rejected the prosecution's offer of proof,
explaining its decision as follows:
I am going to deny that testimony coming
in. I will state at the outset that in
no way says what I do not believe there is such a thing as a battered women's
syndrome. I believe that it does
exist. I believe I have experienced it
numerous times in my work in law and the legal profession.
However, in this case I don't believe there is
sufficient evidence to give rise to the need for that testimony. We have a situation where there is no
dispute that [Diana R.] was in the midst of an argument with the defendant,
that she did call the police, that they responded. At that point that she was
very upset. I believe one officer said
she was hysterical.
I don't know that the only conclusion that
someone can draw from that is that that makes a situation of domestic
abuse. Her statement ... was that ...
she and her family were tired of the mental and physical abuse she has suffered
over the three years of dating. But I
think as [Guzman's counsel] questioned there were no specific examples, and
now, certainly, [Diana R.] denies even the event as she reported it that
evening.
I think recantations exist frequently. They don't only occur in domestic abuse situations. Given this record the court does not find
there is sufficient evidence for it to even open the door for the offer of the
additional evidence of battered women's syndrome.
.... I will rule
that we have not crossed the threshold for the battered women's syndrome to be
an area that the jury should have offered it as an explanation for the now
recantation.
The
court, responding to Guzman's counsel's questions, then stated that its ruling
was "that the ... expert testimony would not be relevant ..." and,
additionally, that the court did "not believe [Klawikowski] is qualified
to testify on the syndrome itself."
We
review trial court decisions on the admission or rejection of evidence for an
erroneous exercise of discretion. State
v. Alsteen, 108 Wis.2d 723, 727, 324 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1982). In Burkes v. Hales, we
discussed at some length the scope of our review of a trial court's
discretionary act:
A
court exercises discretion when it considers the facts of record and reasons
its way to a rational, legally sound conclusion. It is "a process of reasoning" in which the facts and
applicable law are considered in arriving at "a conclusion based on logic
and founded on proper legal standards."
Thus, to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in a particular matter, we look first to the court's on-the-record
explanation of the reasons underlying its decision. And where the record shows that the court looked to and
considered the facts of the case and reasoned its way to a conclusion that is
(a) one a reasonable judge could reach and (b) consistent with applicable law,
we will affirm the decision even if it is one with which we ourselves would not
agree.
It need not be a
lengthy process. While reasons must be
stated, they need not be exhaustive. It
is enough that they indicate to the reviewing court that the trial court
"undert[ook] a reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts" and
"the record shows that there is a reasonable basis for the ... court's
determination." Indeed,
"[b]ecause the exercise of discretion is so essential to the trial court's
functioning, we generally look for reasons to sustain discretionary
decisions."
Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis.2d 585, 590-91, 478 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App.
1991) (citations and quoted sources omitted).
We
have from time to time described the deference we owe to a trial court's
discretionary decision as "`"a limited right to be
wrong."'" State v.
McConnohie, 113 Wis.2d 362, 370, 334 N.W.2d 903, 907 (1983). This is so because we will uphold an
appropriate exercise of discretion even though we may ourselves disagree with
the decision. The test is not whether
we would have decided the matter differently; "it is enough that a reasonable
judge could have so concluded ...." Schneller v. St. Mary's Hosp.
Medical Ctr., 155 Wis.2d 365, 376, 455 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Ct. App. 1990),
aff'd, 162 Wis.2d 296, 470 N.W.2d 873 (1991). Thus, in reviewing evidentiary issues, the question on appeal is
not whether this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence,
would have allowed it or rejected it but only whether the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion in ruling as it did. Alsteen, 108 Wis.2d at 727,
324 N.W.2d at 428.
The
transcript of the trial court's decision leaves no doubt in our minds that the
trial court reasoned its way to a decision when it rejected the prosecution's
offer of proof. The court's remarks
indicate that it ruled that, given Klawikowski's testimony that battered
women's syndrome is based on a history of domestic abuse, and given Diana R.'s
denial of any such history in her relationship with Guzman, the threshold for
admission of testimony on the syndrome had not been met. The question is whether that decision is one
a reasonable judge could reach on the facts of the case and the applicable law,
and while we may have reached a different result had we been sitting as the
trial court in this case, we cannot say that its resolution of the matter
lacked a rational basis. It follows,
under the standards discussed above, that the court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion in denying the prosecutor's motion.
In
so deciding we reject the State's argument that State v. Bednarz,
179 Wis.2d 460, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1993), compels a different result as a
matter of law.[2] We discussed the admissibility of battered
women's syndrome testimony as an explanation for the victim's recantation of a
battery complaint against her boyfriend at some length in Bednarz,
concluding that, in appropriate cases, "[a] trial court, in its
discretion, may permit expert testimony concerning this subject matter as the
facts in the case warrant," and that the trial court did not misuse its
discretion in allowing such evidence in that case. Id. at 468, 507 N.W.2d at 172.
The
State argues that because the facts of this case are "dramatically
similar" to those in Bednarz, Bednarz controls
the outcome here: that because we affirmed the decision to allow such evidence
in that case, neither we nor the trial court may rule it out in this one. We reject the argument. As we have discussed above, the question in
any appeal of a discretionary ruling by the trial court is not whether we agree
or disagree with the result--or whether we think it is the right or the best
result--but simply whether, according to the standards we have discussed above,
the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in arriving at its
decision. The fact that, in some other
case, we upheld the trial court's exercise of discretion to allow evidence on a
certain subject under certain facts, does not mean that we must overturn a
court's discretionary determination to reject evidence on a similar subject on
similar facts in another case. And that
is because, under the law, we don't play "match the facts" in
reviewing discretionary decisions; we look, as we have said, to the reasons
underlying the court's decision, sustaining the decision if it is one a
reasonable judge could reach and reversing it if it is not. Under such a test it is not inconsistent to uphold
the trial court's exercise of discretion in allowing battered women's syndrome
evidence in Bednarz and upholding the trial court's decision to
disallow it in this case. In either
situation, we cannot say that the trial court's resolution of the issue lacked
a rational basis.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.