PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 95-2642
†Petition for
Review Filed
Complete Title
of Case:
MESSNER MANOR ASSOCIATES,
a Wisconsin Limited Partnership,
JAMES P. MESSNER, General
Partner and Limited Partner,
LAURA LYNN MESSNER and
DEBORAH JEAN LOEBER,
Limited Partners,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,†
v.
WISCONSIN HOUSING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted on Briefs: May 29, 1996
Oral Argument:
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: September 18, 1996
Opinion Filed: September
18, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Waukesha
(If
"Special", JUDGE: ROGER P. MURPHY
so indicate)
JUDGES:
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Glen B. Kulkoski of Carr, Kulkoski &
Stuller, S.C. of New Berlin.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Lawrence Bensky and Timothy F. Nixon of
LaFollette & Sinykin of Madison.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED SEPTEMBER
18, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2642
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
MESSNER
MANOR ASSOCIATES,
a
Wisconsin Limited Partnership,
JAMES
P. MESSNER, General
Partner
and Limited Partner,
LAURA
LYNN MESSNER and
DEBORAH
JEAN LOEBER,
Limited
Partners,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WISCONSIN
HOUSING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County: ROGER P. MURPHY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Brown and Snyder, JJ.
ANDERSON,
P.J. Messner Manor Associates appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing all twelve of its claims against the Wisconsin
Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA). On appeal, Messner Manor argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing three of its claims.[1] We disagree, and therefore, we affirm.
The
essential facts are undisputed. Messner
Manor owns and operates an eighty-unit housing project in Menomonee Falls,
Wisconsin, subsidized through the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) housing assistance payments program as set forth in Section 8
of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1437, et seq. (1994), and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Messner Manor entered a housing assistance
payment contract with WHEDA, which HUD approved, under which HUD provides the
Section 8 rent subsidy to the partnership.
WHEDA administers the Section 8 rent subsidies.[2]
Messner
Manor was constructed between 1977 and 1978. Upon completion in September 1978,
the construction financing was replaced with permanent financing, through
WHEDA, as a forty-year note and mortgage totaling $1,625,356. Messner Manor also agreed to the terms of a
regulatory agreement, a pledge agreement and a housing assistance payment
contract. These contract documents
generally set forth the rules, regulations and terms for the operation of
Messner Manor as a qualified Section 8 housing project.
On
May 24, 1990, Messner Manor initiated this action against WHEDA. WHEDA denied the allegations, moved for
dismissal and counterclaimed against Messner Manor. In March 1991, WHEDA moved for partial summary judgment on eight
of the twelve claims on the pleadings.
The trial court granted the motion in part, dismissing four claims.
In
August 1993, WHEDA again moved for summary judgment on Messner Manor’s remaining
eight claims.[3] Messner Manor withdrew four of its claims
during negotiations. Subsequently, on
August 11, 1995, the trial court granted WHEDA’s motion as to the remaining
four claims; dismissed three of WHEDA’s counterclaims; and granted WHEDA’s
motion for summary judgment on its remaining counterclaim for attorney’s
fees. Messner Manor appeals. Other facts will be incorporated into the
opinion as necessary.
Messner
Manor argues that the trial court erred by granting WHEDA’s motions for summary
judgment. We review a motion for
summary judgment using the same methodology as the trial court. M & I First Nat’l Bank v.
Episcopal Homes, 195 Wis.2d 485, 496, 536 N.W.2d 175, 182 (Ct. App.
1995); § 802.08(2), Stats. That methodology is well known, and we will
not repeat it here except to observe that summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See
M & I First Nat'l Bank, 195 Wis.2d at 496-97, 536 N.W.2d
at 182; see also § 802.08(2).
As the material facts are not contested, only issues of law remain to be
determined.
EXCESSIVE INTEREST
Messner
Manor alleges that WHEDA has breached their agreement by charging a mortgage
note interest rate in excess of the figure directed by the terms of the note
itself. Messner Manor points to the
original bond yield underlying the mortgage which had an annual percentage rate
of 6.379%, but contends that this figure was incorrectly adjusted to 6.75% at
the closing.
The
note states that the “annual percentage rate shall be the rate shown on the
schedule attached to this Mortgage Note ¼ referred to as ‘Schedule I.’” It further states that the interest shall be equal to the
effective interest cost WHEDA is required to pay on the notes or bonds issued
to make the mortgage. The annual
percentage rate on Schedule I, dated July 11, 1977, was 7.5%. This construction rate was in effect for
twelve months after the initial closing date, which was July 18, 1977.
The
construction loan rate was adjusted in the permanent financing to 6.75%, as
evidenced in the first amendment to Schedule I to the mortgage note. This occurred prior to the date of the
closing in September 1978. At the
closing, Messner Manor also received an amortization schedule with the 6.75%
figure, along with the other closing documents.
The parties agree that § 893.43, Stats., is applicable to this
issue. Section 893.43 provides that
“[a]n action upon any contract ¼ shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of
action accrues or be barred.” The
alleged breach, the incorrect adjustment of the percentage rate, occurred in
September 1978. The suit was filed in
May 1990, well beyond the six-year statute of limitations. Nevertheless, Messner Manor contends that
each month after May 1984 that it made payments at the higher interest rate
constituted breaches and those payments should not be time barred.
We,
however, are not persuaded that the adjustment of the annual percentage rate,
incorrect or not, constituted a breach.
In Wisconsin:
a
90-year line of precedent holds that in an action for breach of contract, the
cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from the
moment the breach occurs. This is true
whether or not the facts of the breach are known by the party having the right
to the action.
CLL Assocs. v. Arrowhead Pac. Corp., 174 Wis.2d 604, 609, 497 N.W.2d 115, 117 (1993)
(quoted source omitted). In addition, a
contract is enforceable if it expresses the essential commitments and
obligations of each party with reasonable certainty. Management Computer Servs. v. Hawkins, 196 Wis.2d
578, 594, 539 N.W.2d 111, 118 (Ct. App. 1995).
The minds of the parties must meet on essential terms. Id. at 594-95, 539 N.W.2d at
118.
Here,
the deposition testimony of James Messner evinces the meeting of the parties’
minds as to the annual percentage figure.
Messner had the following colloquy:
Q: The interest rate on the permanent financing, do you recall what that was?
A: Six and three-quarters.
¼.
Q: Schedule I and that has an interest rate in
there?
A: Of 7.5.
Q: Right.
A: That was readjusted to six and three-quarters.
Q: And do you recall when that was readjusted?
A: It was readjusted before the date of the
closing, because on the date of closing
we got an amortization schedule at six and three-quarters.
¼.
Q: Let me show what’s been marked as Exhibit
3. Is
that what you got on the day of closing, that Schedule
I to the mortgage note?
A: Right, either on the day of closing or right
there, but that’s what we got with a copy
of the amortization schedule.
Q: And is that your signature on Exhibit 3?
A: Right.
Q: And were you as far as your understanding when you signed this, were you agreeing to pay
interest of six and three-quarter
percent?
A: Um-hum, yes.
Q: Did you protest at the time the six and three- quarter percent?
A: I had no reason to at the time that I know of.
Q: Did you tell them that you thought that it was
an illegal interest rate?
A: No.
Q: Did you at some point come to the conclusion that it was illegal?
A: I wouldn’t say
it was illegal. I questioned it later, much later on.
The
evidence establishes that both parties understood the mortgage rate to be 6.75%
and not some lower figure. Indeed, both
parties acted in accordance with the terms of the contract, even after the
difference in terms was discovered.
Clearly, there was a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the
contract, including the mortgage rate.
This is true even though Messner Manor was unaware that the figure was
incorrect at the September 1978 closing. We conclude that the parties agreed to
the 6.75% figure, whether or not it was calculated correctly, and that payments
of the note at that rate did not constitute breaches of the agreement. Accordingly, Messner Manor’s claim for
excessive interest rate is time barred.
Messner
Manor also cites Jensen v. Janesville Sand & Gravel Co., 141
Wis.2d 521, 415 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1987), in support of its “continuous”
breach argument. Jensen
is inapposite. Jensen
involved an alleged breach of a pension plan which entailed periodic payments. Id. at 526-27, 415 N.W.2d at 561. The issue before the court was whether the
company repudiated its contract by ceasing Jensen’s pension payments and
whether the failure to make each payment was a separate breach. Id. at 527-28, 415 N.W.2d at
561-62. In contrast, Messner Manor, which
is the promisor, has made all of its payments based upon the percentage rate
fixed in September 1978. This situation
does not involve a repudiation or a breach of the agreement and the two cannot
be reconciled.
EQUITY
CALCULATION
Messner
Manor further argues that § 234.07, Stats.,
does not bar WHEDA from recalculating its original equity to include, at a
minimum, $29,151.67 in additional construction costs which resulted from a
lawsuit involving the general contractor.
Messner Manor maintains that it “is not seeking to skirt the statute ¼ but rather is
claiming certain items should have been included at the time the determination
was made.” This argument ignores the
clear import and mandatory terms of the statute.
Section
234.07(1), Stats., provides in
pertinent part: “[T]he authority shall,
¼ establish the
entity’s equity at the time of making the final mortgage advance and, ¼ that figure shall
remain constant during the life of the authority’s loan with respect to such
project.” (Emphasis added.) The word “shall” is presumed mandatory when
it appears in a statute. WHEDA v.
Bay Shore Apartments, 200 Wis.2d 129, 141, 546 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Ct.
App. 1996). While under certain
circumstances we may construe “shall” as directory if necessary to carry out
the legislature’s intent, no room exists in this statute for such a
reading. Section 234.07(1) is
inflexible in its commands. Bay
Shore Apartments, 200 Wis.2d at 141, 546 N.W.2d at 485.
The
language of § 234.07, Stats., is
mandatory and obligatory on a limited-profit entity[4]
as well as on WHEDA; the statutory provisions step in and control and regulate
the mutual rights and obligations rather than the provisions of any contract
the parties may attempt to make varying therefrom. Bay Shore Apartments, 200 Wis.2d at 141, 546 N.W.2d
at 485. Therefore, we must look to the statute
to determine the rights and duties of the parties. Id.
We
are to avoid absurd or unreasonable readings of a statute. Id. at 142, 546 N.W.2d at
485. Messner Manor's argument that the
phrases in § 234.07(1), Stats.,
“the entity’s equity ¼ shall remain constant during the life of the
authority’s loan” allows for the correction of errors, whether they should have
been included in the original determination or came into existence years later,
is unreasonable and absurd. The statute
provides that the equity in a project “shall” consist of the difference between
the mortgage loan and the project cost.
It provides that the total project cost “shall” include certain items,
including construction costs, and that the equity figure “shall” be established
by the final mortgage advance. See § 234.07(1).
The
statute is clear. It does not permit
the mortgagor to knock on WHEDA’s door each time it incurs additional
expenses. Instead, an owner is required
to gather all of its known or anticipated costs at the time of the closing. We conclude that § 234.07, Stats., read as a whole, is clear and
unambiguous—the parties are responsible for determining the equity at the
closing and recalculation is explicitly prohibited.
INTEREST ESCROWS
Lastly,
Messner Manor maintains that it is entitled to receive the interest which has
been generated from its property tax and insurance escrow accounts which are
administered by WHEDA. Messner Manor
argues that there must be an explicit grant of authority for WHEDA to keep the
interest earned on escrow payments made by Messner Manor.
As
recognized by our supreme court, the legislature has granted WHEDA all the
powers “necessary or convenient” to implement its public purpose. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59
Wis.2d 391, 424, 208 N.W.2d 780, 801 (1973).
For example, WHEDA’s powers include, but are not limited to, making and
executing contracts; acquiring and disposing of mortgages or security
interests; acquiring leaseholds, real or personal property or any interest
therein; and under certain conditions, owning, holding, clearing, improving and
rehabilitating, and selling, assigning, exchanging, transferring, conveying,
leasing, mortgaging or otherwise disposing of or encumbering the same. Id. In addition, WHEDA’s debts are satisfied out of rents and
interest it receives from the property it acquires and the investments it
makes. Id.
Further,
Messner Manor’s contention again ignores the clear import of § 234.07(1), Stats.
The statute declares that a limited-profit entity which receives loans
from the authority “may not” make distributions, other than from funds
contributed to the limited-profit entity by stockholders, partners, members or
holders of a beneficial interest in the limited-profit entity, in excess of 6%
of its equity on a cumulative basis.[5] Id. The restriction allows no exceptions. Even upon dissolution, any surplus or excess of distributions
must be paid to WHEDA and not returned to the limited-profit entity. See Bay Shore Apartments, 200
Wis.2d at 144-45, 546 N.W.2d at 486-87.
We conclude that § 234.07(1) does not allow for the distribution of
interest from the escrow funds in excess of 6% of a limited-profit entity’s
equity on a cumulative basis.
Our
conclusion is supported by the regulatory agreement.[6] Provision 6 (c), Development Cost Escrow
Fund, requires:
[t]he interest earned on the Development Cost Escrow
Fund shall be used, first, to bring return on equity up to the permitted return
of six percent (6%) to the extent said return on equity is not earned from
operations, and, thereafter, to provide social services incidental to the
Development and, subject to the approval of [WHEDA], to provide for other
purposes benefiting the Development as proposed from time to time by Mortgagor.
¼ The Development Cost Escrow Fund shall remain
in existence for the entire period during which [WHEDA] is the Mortgagee of the
Development.
This provision does not allow Messner Manor to receive a
credit or disbursement for the interest earned beyond the statutory 6%
disbursement in compliance with § 234.07(1), Stats. Clearly, any additional interest is to be
used for improvements with the Development during the terms of the
mortgage. Thereafter, the surplus is to
be paid to WHEDA. See §
234.07(1); Bay Shore Apartments, 200 Wis.2d at 144-45, 546 N.W.2d
at 486-87.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
[1] Although Messner
Manor appealed the trial court's judgment, only three claims are addressed in
its brief-in-chief. The three claims
are as follows: Claim 8, Messner Manor
alleges that WHEDA has charged a mortgage note interest rate in excess of the
figure agreed upon by the parties; Claim 9, Messner Manor claims that its
equity was improperly determined and that it should be recalculated to include
subsequent expenses; and Claim 10, Messner Manor maintains that it is entitled
to receive the interest generated from its property tax and insurance escrow
accounts, which are administered by WHEDA.
[2] Under the
Section 8 program, HUD and the partnership establish fair market rents for the
units in the project. The partnership
agrees to rent to low and moderate income tenants in return for a Section 8
rent subsidy. The tenants pay up to
thirty percent of their income to the partnership for the market rent. HUD also pays the rent subsidy to the
partnership. WHEDA v. Bay Shore
Apartments, 200 Wis.2d 129, 134, 546 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Ct. App. 1996);
42 U.S.C.A. § 1437, et seq. (1994).
[3] In July 1992,
Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Northbrook) requested
intervention in this action to determine whether a policy issued by Northbrook
to WHEDA from February 1990 to February 1991 would require Northbrook to
provide coverage to WHEDA for injuries alleged in Messner Manor’s third claim
for relief. The trial court found that
Northbrook did not have a duty to defend or indemnify WHEDA on Messner Manor’s
third claim, thereby dismissing Northbrook.
[4] Section
234.01(8), Stats., provides in
pertinent part:
“Limited-profit entity” means any person or
trust which, ¼ by written agreement
with the authority, provides that:
(a) As a condition of acceptance of a loan
or advance under this chapter, the limited-profit entity shall enter into an
agreement with the authority providing for limitations of rents, profits,
dividends and disposition of property or franchises; ¼.
It is not disputed that Messner Manor is a limited-profit
entity, as defined in § 234.01(8).
[5] Messner Manor
concedes this much in its complaint wherein it states: “Specifically, the plaintiff James P.
Messner is limited to 6% of his initial capital investment in the project. The figure calculates at $10,836 per year,
and this is the only money he actually has received, and does receive, or ever
is to receive during the term of the mortgage.”