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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED MAY 7, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2620-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
KATHRYN A. PINTER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LINDA PINTER,
Defendant-Appellant,
PRINCIPAL MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
SUSAN PINTER and
RICHARD PINTER,
Defendants.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL J. BARRON, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. When Robert Pinter died, his wife Linda and his two
children by a prior marriage were the named beneficiaries of a life insurance
policy he carried through his employer, Tax Air Freight, Inc. Robert's ex-wife from his prior marriage,
Kathryn Pinter, sought a declaratory judgment requiring payment of the
insurance policy proceeds to her. She
contended that Robert had agreed as part of their divorce settlement to retain
her as the named beneficiary of the
policy until Robert's employment with Tax Air ceased. Kathryn contended that she was entitled to
the proceeds of the insurance policy because Robert, although disabled, was
still employed by Tax Air at the time of his death. The trial court agreed with Kathryn, and Linda appeals. Pursuant to this court's order dated November
2, 1995, this case was submitted to the court on the expedited appeals calendar. We affirm the trial court's order granting
Kathryn declaratory judgment.
The parties presented
this matter to the trial court on stipulated facts. Robert and Kathryn were married in 1963, and they divorced in
1992. At the time of the divorce, Robert
was employed as a truck driver by Tax Air, and he owned a life insurance policy
obtained through his employment.
Robert and Kathryn
entered a marital settlement agreement as part of the divorce proceedings. In the agreement, Robert agreed to:
[K]eep
in full force and effect the life insurance policies presently in existence,
with [Kathryn] named as sole beneficiary, until such time as his employment
with his present employer ceases.
The
marital settlement agreement further provided that if Robert's employment
should "cease within two (2) years of the date of judgment of
divorce," Robert would obtain comparable life insurance that would
"be in effect for at least two (2) years subsequent to the date of
judgment of divorce." Robert also
agreed to pay Kathryn maintenance and the cost of her health insurance for two
years from the date of divorce. The
judgment of divorce was entered on June 5, 1992, but the judgment provided that
the effective date of the divorce was April 21, 1992. The trial court incorporated the terms of the marital settlement
agreement into the final judgment.
Some time later, Robert
married Linda. On April 20, 1994,
Robert replaced Kathryn with Linda as the named beneficiary of his insurance
policy. Subsequently, Robert named Richard
and Susan Pinter, the children of his marriage to Kathryn, as additional
beneficiaries.
Robert was diagnosed
with cancer and ceased active employment with Tax Air in September 1994. From that time until his death on March 10,
1995, Robert received sick pay, vacation pay, or short-term disability pay from
Tax Air.
Kathryn commenced the
underlying action seeking a declaration that she should be paid the proceeds of
the insurance policy under the terms of the marital settlement agreement. Kathryn named Linda, Richard, and Susan as
defendants. Richard and Susan,
however, did not contest Kathryn's claim to the insurance proceeds.[1]
Linda opposed
disbursement of the proceeds to Kathryn.
She contended that, because of the serious nature of Robert's illness,
Tax Air never expected that Robert would be able to resume active employment
with the company. Thus, she contended
that Robert's employment with Tax Air had ceased and that he had been free to
replace Kathryn as the beneficiary of the policy under the terms of the marital
settlement agreement.
Second, Linda contended
that the insurance clause of the marital settlement agreement was
ambiguous. Specifically, she contended
that requiring Robert to maintain Kathryn as beneficiary until his employment
with Tax Air ceased was inconsistent with the provision that if his employment
with Tax Air ended within two years of the divorce, he was to maintain Kathryn
as the beneficiary of a comparable life insurance policy for only two years
from the date of the divorce. Linda
maintained that, when read as a whole, the only reasonable construction of the
life insurance clause was that Robert had been obligated to retain Kathryn as
the beneficiary of the policy for only two years from the date of divorce. Linda argued that further support for her
reading of the agreement was found in the fact that Robert's maintenance and
health insurance obligations expired after two years.
The trial court rejected
Linda's contentions. The trial court
held that the agreement unambiguously provided that Kathryn was to remain the
beneficiary of the insurance policy until such time as Robert was no longer
employed by Tax Air. The trial court
also determined that Robert's employment with Tax Air had never ceased. It noted that, at the time of his death,
Robert was receiving disability payments through Tax Air, and that, although
Tax Air had had no expectation that Robert would be able to return to work,
Robert would have been expected to return to work if his cancer had gone into
remission. Linda appeals.
As we have already
noted, the marital settlement agreement was incorporated by the trial court
into the final judgment of divorce. A
judgment is interpreted in the same manner as other written
documents. Jacobson v. Jacobson,
177 Wis.2d 539, 546, 502 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Ct. App. 1993). Construction of the document is permitted
only if it is ambiguous, and the determination of whether it is ambiguous
presents a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id. at 547, 502 N.W.2d at
873. Words or phrases in a contract or
judgment "are ambiguous when they are reasonably or fairly susceptible of
more than one construction." Weston
v. Holt, 157 Wis.2d 595, 600, 460 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 1990).
While we owe no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusion, we nonetheless agree with the
trial court that the life-insurance provision of the marital settlement
agreement is unambiguous. The plain
language of the clause provides that Robert was to retain Kathryn as the
beneficiary of the Tax Air life insurance policy until his employment with Tax
Air ceased. The clause is not
reasonably susceptible to Linda's interpretation that Robert could replace
Kathryn as the beneficiary after two years even if he remained employed by Tax
Air. Because there is no ambiguity in
the provision, there was no need for the trial court to take evidence on the
parties' intent in entering the stipulation.
Indeed, due to the lack of ambiguity in the provision, construction was
prohibited.
Linda contends next that
the trial court erred when it held that Robert's replacement of Kathryn as
the beneficiary was not permitted under the terms of the marital settlement
agreement because his employment with Tax Air had not "ceased." Linda maintains that because Robert
performed no work for Tax Air after September 8, 1994 until the time of his
death in March 1995, his employment with Tax Air was at an end, and that Robert
had therefore been free to replace Kathryn as the named beneficiary of the
policy.
To resolve this
question, we must again inquire into the meaning of the life-insurance
provision of the marital settlement agreement.
The clause provides that Robert was to maintain Kathryn as his
beneficiary under the life insurance policy until such time as his employment
with Tax Air "cease[d]".
In support of her
contention that Robert's employment with Tax Air ceased prior to his death,
Linda cites to two Wisconsin cases, Compton v. Shopko Stores, Inc.,
93 Wis.2d 613, 287 N.W.2d 720 (1980), and Fessler v. Fessler, 147
Wis.2d 1, 432 N.W.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1988).
Those cases discuss some of the circumstances under which a person can
be said to have ceased employment, but they are factually distinguishable from
the instant case. In large part, Compton
and Fessler discuss the proposition that severance payments to an
employee constitute a "complete manifestation of the termination of the
employment relationship" such that the employee can no longer be said to
be employed by the employer.
Although the cases are
distinguishable, the definition in those cases of what it means to cease or
terminate an employment relationship is useful and, we hold, dispositive. In the instant case, there never was "a
complete manifestation of the termination of the employment relationship"
between Robert and Tax Air. The record
contains affidavits of Tax Air's payroll manager, which indicate that Robert
was employed by Tax Air until his death on March 10, 1995. The affidavits indicate that, although
Robert was not "actively employed" in his capacity as a truck driver,
he was not terminated as an employee.
During his illness, Robert received disability benefits obtained by
virtue of his employment. The payroll
manager indicated that to have terminated Robert as an employee would have
resulted in the discontinuation of Robert's life insurance benefits,[2]
as well as his disability and health insurance benefits. The payroll manager stated that, although
she did not expect Robert to return to active employment, he was nonetheless
"considered, for insurance purposes, to be an employee." In addition, as Kathryn points out, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that if Robert had, against all expectations,
recovered from his illness, Tax Air would not have permitted his return to
active employment. Thus, at the time of
his death, Robert remained an employee of Tax Air.
Because Robert's
employment with Tax Air never ceased, he was never relieved of the
responsibility he undertook in the marital settlement agreement to retain
Kathryn as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.