|
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED March
14, 1996 |
NOTICE |
|
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2604
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN THE
INTEREST OF JOSEPH C. C.,
A
CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 18:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH
C. C.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Sauk County: ROBERT F. CURTIN, Judge. Affirmed.
SUNDBY, J.[1] Joseph C.C. appeals from an order entered
September 20, 1995, by the juvenile court of Sauk County waiving jurisdiction
over him. A hearing was held September
6, 1995, on the State's amended petition for waiver. At that hearing, the State relied on the amended petition to
establish prosecutive merit as to each of the five counts alleged. The State's waiver petition was based upon
an amended petition for determination of Joseph's status as a delinquent child
filed August 7, 1995. This petition
alleged five counts: burglary,
kidnapping, attempted homicide, infliction of great bodily harm, and
mutilation.
All
of these counts arose out of a single incident which began on July 29, 1995,
involving a juvenile, T.F.P. He told
the story that Joseph kidnapped him from his home, took him to Joseph's home
where Joseph broke both of his legs by twisting and jumping on them. Joseph admitted the basic facts related by
the juvenile, except that he claimed that after he threw T.F.P. on Joseph's
bed, he "blinked out" and when he awoke, T.F.P. was laying on the
floor complaining about his legs.
T.F.P.'s
injuries required surgery. Both legs
were broken above the knee; one knee was broken; the left lower leg was broken;
and the right ankle was broken.
According to the treating doctor, approximately one-third of T.F.P.'s
blood had drained into his legs and he was severely dehydrated. The doctor informed the police that T.F.P.'s
injuries were life threatening.
Joseph
presents two issues: (1) Did the
petition for determination of status establish prosecutive merit for all counts
alleged therein? (2) Did the trial
court rely on clearly erroneous findings in reaching its waiver decision? We conclude that the State was not required
to prove that each count of the petition had prosecutive merit, and that the
evidence was sufficient to establish prosecutive merit for the counts alleging that
Joseph intentionally caused T.F.P. great bodily harm and intentionally
mutilated T.F.P. Therefore, we conclude
that the petition for determination of status established prosecutive
merit.
Joseph
accepts that the trial court placed the weight of its waiver decision
"squarely upon the seriousness of the offenses as shown by the their
statutory classifications ...."
(Emphasis added.) He notes that
the trial court erroneously concluded that Joseph was accused of a class A
felony life imprisonment offense, but that attempted first-degree intentional
homicide is not a class A felony. We
determine, however, that the seriousness of the acts of intentionally causing
great bodily harm and mutilation support the trial court's decision to waive
its jurisdiction over Joseph so that he could be tried as an adult. Therefore, the trial court's statement that
Joseph was accused of a class A felony--attempted first-degree intentional
homicide--is irrelevant to our conclusion that the trial court did not
erroneously exercise its discretion.
Joseph
further argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that Joseph would
never get to Lincoln Hills if he were kept in the juvenile system because
"by the time we go through all of the machinery and have a trial on all
the factors ... and get processed[,] he would be eighteen by that
time." Joseph notes that under
§ 48.366, Stats., the
juvenile court could enter an order extending its jurisdiction to age
twenty-five for a delinquent act in violation of § 940.01, Stats.
As we have pointed out, we find that the seriousness of the acts of
intentionally causing great bodily harm and mutilation support waiver of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, we need not consider the consequences of or the dispositions
available to the trial court if it found Joseph guilty of attempted
first-degree homicide.
Further, the transcript
of the waiver hearing shows that the trial court was convinced that Joseph was
so dangerous that retaining him in the juvenile justice system was contrary to
his best interest and the best interest of the public. The court's principal consideration was
Joseph's violent acts, not how the law might classify those acts. The court stated that it could not imagine a
more serious set of circumstances:
[T]aking a boy, a thirteen-year-old boy, from his bed,
helping him to one's residence, ending up breaking his legs ...[,] punching him
in the face and choking him ... I just don't know how you can ... get much more
serious with respect to injuries to an individual and particularly to a thirteen-year-old
boy.
Perhaps
under a precise scenario, Joseph could have been retained in the juvenile
justice system until at least age twenty-one, but we conclude that the
seriousness of Joseph's offenses, regardless of the secure correctional
facilities available in the juvenile justice system, justified the juvenile
court's waiver of its jurisdiction over Joseph. See In re D.H., 76 Wis.2d 286, 308, 251
N.W.2d 196, 207 (1977).
For
these reasons, we affirm the order waiving the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over the delinquent.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.