COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED April
18, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2468-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH
L. CHAMPION,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County: P. CHARLES JONES, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Eich, C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Dykman, J.
EICH,
C.J. Kenneth L. Champion appeals from
a judgment convicting him of multiple counts of burglary, robbery and false
imprisonment.
The
charges stem from two incidents in which Champion broke into the victims'
apartments, beating and robbing them, and he argues on appeal that the trial
court erred when it denied his motion to sever the two sets of charges. Specifically, he challenges the court's
determination that he would not be "substantially prejudiced" by
having the charges tried together. We
conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in
denying the severance motion and we affirm the convictions.
The
first set of charges alleged in the criminal complaint involved an elderly
couple, Bernita and Cyril Fahltersac.
According to the complaint, in the late evening hours of July 17, 1993,
Champion entered the Fahltersacs' residence through an unlocked door and,
confronting the couple, demanded money, threatened to kill them and robbed
them, beating and throwing the eighty-one-year-old Bernita Fahltersac to the
floor.
The
second set of charges arose out of a similar incident occurring approximately a
month later in the same general neighborhood.
According to the complaint, Champion gained entry to the residence of
sixty-six-year-old Elaine Meyer in the late evening hours of August 13, 1993,
where, after threatening to kill her and demanding money, he robbed and beat
her.
Prior
to trial, Champion, through his counsel, moved to sever the two sets of
charges, claiming that a joint trial would be prejudicial because the evidence
of the two offenses was "distinct and [did] not adequately overlap"
and, further, that he "may wish to testify on his own behalf as to one ...
and retain his right not to testify as to the other."
Before
any hearing was scheduled on the severance motion, Champion appeared in court
with his attorney seeking to withdraw the motion for "strategic"
reasons.[1] After hearing counsel's reasons for the
withdrawal and ascertaining Champion's understanding of and agreement with the
request, the court granted it.
Then,
on the eve of the trial, Champion sent a handwritten letter to the trial judge
stating that he wanted to "reinstate" the severance motion. The court notified the prosecutor and
defense counsel of the letter and, after holding a hearing on Champion's
request, ruled that it should not be granted.
The court concluded that: (1) Champion had knowingly and voluntarily
withdrawn the severance motion and would not be permitted to proceed pro se
in the case while also being represented by counsel;[2]
and, alternatively (2) he had failed to establish that he would be
substantially prejudiced by having the several charges tried together.
Champion
was tried and convicted of a total of six counts: burglary/battery,[3]
robbery and two counts of false imprisonment at the Fahltersac residence, and
burglary/battery and robbery at the Meyer residence. The trial court, adding repeater enhancements to all counts,
sentenced Champion to a net total of seventy-six years in prison.
Section
971.12(1), Stats., allows joinder
of charges when the crimes charged are of a "similar character" or
"constitut[e] parts of a common scheme or plan." Champion concedes that this
"initial" test was met. He
argues, however, that he was entitled to severance under § 971.12(3), which
states that "[i]f it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a
joinder of crimes ... the court may ... grant a severance ...," and that
the trial court erred in denying his motion.
A
motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Locke,
177 Wis.2d 590, 597, 502 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993).
Whether to sever
otherwise properly joined charges on grounds of prejudice is within the trial
court's discretion, and in making its decision the ... court must balance any
potential prejudice to the defendant against the public's interest in avoiding
unnecessary or duplicative trials.
State v. Nelson, 146 Wis.2d 442, 455, 432 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Ct. App.
1988) (citation omitted). We will not
find an erroneous exercise of that discretion unless the defendant is able to
establish that failure to sever the counts caused him or her "`substantial
prejudice.'" Locke,
177 Wis.2d at 597, 502 N.W.2d at 894 (quoted source omitted).
Where,
as here, the defendant claims that severance is necessary because he or she
will suffer prejudice if the counts are tried together, "`it is essential
that the defendant present enough information ... to satisfy the court that the
claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it intelligently to weigh the
[applicable] considerations ....'"
Nelson, 146 Wis.2d at 458, 432 N.W.2d at 122 (quoting Baker
v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
Champion's
pretrial severance motion was unaccompanied by any affidavits or other
evidentiary materials, and he did not testify at the motion hearing. As we have indicated above, the motion
itself claimed only very briefly--and very generally--that joinder would be
prejudicial because the two sets of charges were "distinct" and that
he might wish to testify as to one and not the other; his counsel did not argue
the issue to the court at the motion hearing.[4]
In
denying the motion for lack of any indication of prejudice, the trial court
quoted from Holmes v. State:
The defendant, opposing consolidation or urging
severance, is required to present enough information, including the nature of
the testimony he wishes to give on one count that would not be admissible on
the other count or counts, to enable the trial court to intelligently weigh the
opposing factors to be weighed and balanced.
Holmes v. State, 63 Wis.2d 389, 398, 217 N.W.2d 657, 662 (1974). The Holmes court went on to
conclude that the defendant in that case had not met that burden:
In the case before us, the defendant [offered] only his
statement of intention to testify on one charge only, and the very generalized
and conclusory statement that testimony by him on the one charge was essential
and testimony by him on the other would be highly prejudicial. If no more than that were required, control
as to consolidation or severance of charges would clearly pass out of the hands
of the trial court and into the complete control of the defendant.
Id. at 398-99, 217 N.W.2d at 662 (footnote omitted).
We
think that is the case here. It is
axiomatic that "[r]eview [of a severance motion] is limited to the state
of the record at the time the motion ... was made." Stomner v. Kolb,
903 F.2d 1123, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Wisconsin law). As we have noted above, whether to grant
severance is committed to the trial court's discretion, Locke,
177 Wis.2d at 597, 502 N.W.2d at 894; and we have often said that an appellate
court will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion where the complaining
party never asked the trial court to exercise its discretion in the first
place. State v. Gollon,
115 Wis.2d 592, 604, 340 N.W.2d 912, 918 (Ct. App. 1983). Here, the only basis provided by Champion
for the trial court's exercise of discretion was a broad and unsupported
assertion of prejudice and we cannot say that the trial court erroneously exercised
its discretion in denying the motion on that basis.[5]
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
Not
recommended for publication in the official reports.
[1] Champion's attorney explained that while he
and Champion initially believed it would be best to have the two incidents
tried separately, subsequent events--most notably a series of DNA tests--had
caused them to change their minds. His
attorney stated that he and Champion had counted on the tests to indicate the
presence of an unknown third party at the scene of one of the robberies, and
when the tests came back ruling out that possibility, "it ... change[d]
the defendant's view as to how to proceed in this ma[tt]er."
[2] The trial court relied on State v. McDonald,
50 Wis.2d 534, 539, 184 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1971), where the supreme court
rejected the defendant's claim that he should not be held to his counsel's
withdrawal of his own pro se suppression motion, stating, "In the
conduct of a criminal case, the trial court cannot satisfy both the client who
proceeds pro se and counsel who disagrees.... The accused has no more right to
control his attorney and the conduct of the trial than he has to dictate to his
surgeon how to perform the operation."
The court concluded: "The procedure contended for by McDonald, if allowed,
would give every defendant an opportunity to have his cake and eat it
too." Id. at 539-40,
184 N.W.2d at 889.
[3] Under §§ 943.10(1)(a) and 943.10(2)(d), Stats., one who intentionally enters a
dwelling without the owner's consent and with the intent to steal, and who,
"[w]hile in the burglarized enclosure commits a battery upon a person
lawfully therein," is guilty of a Class B felony.
[4] Champion's initial severance motion was
accompanied by a motion to suppress evidence related to his identification by
one or more of the victims. The
suppression motion was withdrawn along with the severance motion, and
Champion's subsequent ex parte letter to the trial court asked that both
motions be revived. At the hearing on
the motion, defense counsel limited his argument to the suppression issues,
never mentioning the severance motion or discussing what, if any, prejudice he
felt might arise in a joint trial.
[5] Because the type of prejudice that would
require severance does not occur where the same evidence that would be
admissible at the joint trial would also be admissible at the separate trial,
the test for failure to sever usually turns on an
"other-acts-evidence" analysis as discussed in Whitty v. State,
34 Wis.2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968),
and similar cases. That, too, is a
determination invoking the trial court's discretion, State v. C.V.C.,
153 Wis.2d 145, 161-62, 450 N.W.2d 463, 469 (Ct. App. 1989), and the trial
court was simply never provided with any factual basis upon which to exercise
that discretion.
Champion argues on appeal that he
was prejudiced with respect to the Fahltersac case when a photograph showing
Elaine Meyer after the reconstructive facial surgery she was required to
undergo as a result of her beating was admitted into evidence. He also argues that evidence of the
Fahltersacs' advanced age "could not but have affected the jury in
deliberating on the Meyer crime," and that joinder allowed the State to
improperly "reinforce" the Fahltersacs' "weak identification [of
him] with emotional evidence from the Meyer offense"--particularly the
playing of Meyer's 911 call reporting the burglary and assault. But he never objected to either Meyer's
testimony about her injury or the admission of the photograph--or to the
playing of the 911 tape. Nor did he
renew his severance motion when any of the evidence about which he now
complains was admitted. State v.
Nelson, 146 Wis.2d 442, 432 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1988), is particularly
appropriate here. In that case, the
defendant was charged with sexually assaulting two children on separate
occasions and the counts were tried together.
He claimed he was prejudiced by the joinder because it allowed allegedly
prejudicial evidence admissible only in one of the cases to be heard by the
jury empaneled to hear both. We
rejected the argument.
Nelson also argues
that the trial court's joinder ruling opened the door to prejudicial testimony
from one of the witnesses in the T.M. case....
Nelson argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to order
severance so that this testimony could be kept from the jury in its
consideration of the B.R. case. But he
never sought severance on this ground prior to trial and, when the witness's
testimony was offered, he failed to renew his earlier severance motion. As a result, he waived any error and we need
not consider the argument further.
Id. at 457, 432 N.W.2d
at 122 (citation omitted).