COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JUNE 11, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 95-2371-CR
95-2372-CR
95-2373-CR
95-2374-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL D.J.
CROCHIERE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEALS from judgments
and orders of the circuit court for Marathon County: RAYMOND F. THUMS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Michael D.J. Crochiere appeals judgments convicting
him of four felonies and two misdemeanors and orders denying his postconviction
motions. He argues that his trial
attorneys were ineffective because they waived the preliminary hearing in
several felony cases, failed to file motions for discovery or inspection, and
did not move to suppress Crochiere's inculpatory statements. He also challenges the sentences imposed and
argues that his due process rights are violated by this court's standard of
review and that Wisconsin courts should be required to adopt sentencing
guidelines. We reject these arguments
and affirm the judgments and orders.
Crochiere was initially
charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery, three counts of bail-jumping,
two counts of burglary and misdemeanor theft.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
theft, misdemeanor trespass, two counts of bail-jumping, and one count each of
felony and misdemeanor theft. He was
sentenced to consecutive terms totaling ten years in prison to be followed by
five years' probation.
To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Crochiere much show that his counsel
performed deficiently and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Crochiere has established neither deficient performance nor prejudice
from his counsels' failure to have a preliminary hearing in each of the felony
cases, to move for discovery or inspection or to move to suppress his
statements. At his postconviction
hearing, Crochiere did not ask his trial attorneys to explain these
decisions. A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be reviewed on appeal unless trial counsel is
given an opportunity to explain strategic decisions. See State v. Machner, 92 Wis.2d 797, 804,
285 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1979).
Depending on the nature of the case, the client's communications with
his attorney and the practices of the district attorney regarding access to
police reports, counsel might reasonably waive the preliminary hearing and rely
on informal discovery. The record shows
no basis for challenging counsels' decisions on these matters and no basis for
suppressing Crochiere's statements.
Crochiere has established no prejudice from his counsels' decision. His attorneys reasonably pursued a strategy
of negotiated settlement that substantially reduced his sentencing exposure.
Crochiere argues that
the trial court improperly exercised its sentencing discretion by placing too
much emphasis on his juvenile record.
There is a strong public policy against interference with the trial
court's sentencing discretion. See
State v. Roubik, 137 Wis.2d 301, 310, 404 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Ct.
App. 1987). The trial court must
consider the gravity of the offenses, the defendant's character and the need to
protect the public. See McCleary
v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 274, 182 N.W.2d 512, 518 (1971). The weight to be given to each of the
factors is within the trial court's discretion. Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis.2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d
457, 461 (1975). Here, the trial court
placed substantial emphasis on Crochiere's juvenile record because it is highly
relevant to an evaluation of his character and the need to protect the
public. Crochiere's juvenile record
over the preceding six years shows a repeated failure to respond to treatment
and supervision and a tendency to blame others or external events for his
criminal behavior. Crochiere was only
eighteen years old at the time of his conviction. To ignore his juvenile record would require the court to ignore
almost everything that is known of him.
Finally, we reject
Crochiere's arguments that the standard of review applied by appellate courts
lacks precision and definition so as to violate his due process rights and that
Wisconsin courts should be required to adopt sentencing guidelines. This court has no authority to overturn
decades of rulings from the Wisconsin Supreme Court giving sentencing courts
substantial discretion when imposing sentence.
The Supreme Court has twice declined to promulgate sentencing guidelines
and the legislature has repealed the sentencing guideline law that had been in
existence prior to 1995. See In
re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis.2d 198, 200-01, 253 N.W.2d
793, 795 (1984). The legislature and
the Supreme Court have chosen to allow sentencing courts substantial discretion
to tailor the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crimes, the
defendant's character and need for rehabilitation and protection of the public.
By the Court.—Judgments
and orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.