COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED February
22, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2359
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
In the
Matter of the Mental Condition of Thomas F.W.,
Alleged
To Be in Need of an Involuntary Mental Commitment:
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
THOMAS
F.W.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Marquette County: LEWIS MURACH, Judge. Dismissed.
EICH,
C.J.[1] Thomas F.W. appeals from an order committing
him to the Mendota Mental Health Institute for a period of one year[2]
and providing for "involuntary medication and treatment" during that
time, if deemed necessary by his treating doctors. The order was entered on January 4, 1995, and expired on January
4, 1996.
Thomas
F.W. argues on appeal that the involuntary medication provisions of the order
were improper because, contrary to the trial court's findings, the evidence was
insufficient to comply with the requirements of § 51.61(1)(g)4, Stats., which sets forth the criteria
for determining a patient's competency to refuse medication. Specifically, he claims that it was not
established that (a) he was "incapable of expressing an understanding of
the risks and benefits" of his medication, and (b) the "advantages
and disadvantages of, and alternatives to" the medication had been explained
to him. He also argues that the
commitment should have been limited to six months under § 51.20(13)(g), Stats., which provides a six-month
limitation for a "first," as opposed to a "consecutive,"
order of commitment.[3]
The
statutory standards for competency to refuse medication were discussed and
amplified in Virgil D. v. Rock County, 189 Wis.2d 1, 11-12, 524
N.W.2d 894, 898 (1994), where the supreme court held that "before a
circuit court can find that a patient is not competent to refuse medication, it
must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incapable
of expressing an understanding of the risks and benefits of, and the
alternatives to, the proposed medication or treatment." (Footnote omitted.) The Virgil D. court's ruling,
of course, subsumes the statutory requirement that the physicians have explained
the advantages and disadvantages of, and alternatives to, the proposed
medication. Thomas F.W.'s argument on
appeal is that the evidence adduced at the hearing was insufficient under those
standards.
The
State argues that the appeal is moot because the order appealed from expired on
January 4, 1996. A case is moot where,
among other things, it "`seeks a decision ... upon some matter which when
rendered ... cannot have any practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy.'" State ex rel.
La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis.2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d
460, 464 (1983) (quoted source omitted).
The rule exists because "[i]t is generally thought to be in the
interest of judicial economy not to continue to litigate issues that will not
affect real parties to an existing controversy." Id.
There
are several exceptions to the mootness rule.
A case that is otherwise moot may be taken up by the court: (1)
"[w]here the issues are of great public importance ..."; (2)
"where the constitutionality of a statute is involved ..."; (3)
"where the precise situation under consideration rises so frequently that
a definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts ..."; (4)
"where the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the
court to avoid uncertainty ..."; or (5) "where a question was capable
and likely of repetition and yet evades review because the appellate process
usually cannot be completed and frequently cannot even be undertaken within the
time that would have a practical effect upon the parties." La Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis.2d
at 229, 340 Wis.2d at 464 (quoted sources omitted).
Centering
his argument on the fifth exception, Thomas F.W. contends that a mootness
dismissal in this case would have the effect of mooting all challenges to six-
or twelve-month commitments because the appellate process cannot be completed
within that time. Thus, says Thomas
F.W., the issues he raises here "would always evade review because ...
the[y] would always be rendered moot."[4]
The
State agrees--as do we--that, in the normal course of the appellate process in
an overburdened court system, decisions within six months (or sometimes even a
year) from the date of the trial court's order may be rare.[5] But the exception is not based solely on
time; it contemplates the existence of a "question [that is] capable and
likely of repetition." La
Crosse Tribune, 115 Wis.2d at 229, 340 N.W.2d at 464. As we have said, the issues raised by Thomas
F.W. in this case are fact-driven and involve the application of accepted rules
to the facts of the case. There is
nothing to suggest that the arguments raised involve questions that are likely
of repetition.[6]
Finally,
we note that Thomas F.W. is presently the subject of a new commitment order,
issued on December 22, 1995, and based on a jury verdict finding him to be
mentally ill, dangerous and a proper subject for treatment.[7]
For
the reasons discussed, we conclude that Thomas F.W.'s appeal is moot, and that
none of the issues he raises come within the exceptions to the mootness rule
discussed in La Crosse Tribune and similar cases. We therefore dismiss his appeal.
By
the Court.—Appeal dismissed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] Technically, the order committed Thomas F.W.
to the custody of the Marquette County 51.42 Board, with initial placement at
Mendota "or such lesser restrictive environment as deemed appropriate by
the treating doctors," and "[t]hereafter, for the period of this
Order, the commitment shall be on an out-patient basis."
[T]he first order of commitment of a subject individual
under this section may be for a period not to exceed 6 months, and all
subsequent consecutive orders of commitment of the individual may be for a
period not to exceed one year.
[4] We agree with the State that the first four
exceptions to the mootness rule are inapplicable. The issues on this appeal relate to the application of specific
statutory and case law criteria to the facts of record. They present no constitutional challenge,
and Thomas F.W. has not otherwise persuaded us that the issues "are of
great public importance." Nor is
there anything in the record or in Thomas F.W.'s briefs to suggest that the
precise situation presented by his appeal "arises so frequently that a
definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts," or should be
issued to "avoid uncertainty" in the law. State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court,
115 Wis.2d 220, 229, 340 Wis.2d 460, 464 (1983).
[5] We note in this regard that Thomas F.W. did
not request expedited briefing and consideration of his appeal--an available
process invoked by this court in appropriate cases.
[6] In addition to his two challenges to the
involuntary-medication provisions of the order which, as we have indicated, are
governed by § 51.61(1)(g)4, Stats.,
and by Virgil D., Thomas F.W. argues that his one-year commitment
was invalid under § 51.20(13)(g), which provides that a "first order
of commitment .... may be for a period not to exceed six months, and all
subsequent consecutive orders of commitment ... may be for a period not to
exceed one year." He claims that,
although he had been under a prior commitment, the county failed to obtain an
extension in time and thus the commitment was not extended, but rather, the
instant proceedings became a "new" commitment. He asks that we "terminate his
commitment."
This,
too, is an argument resolved by application of established legal principles--in
this case the provisions of § 51.20(13)(g), Stats.--to the facts of the case. Nothing in Thomas F.W.'s contentions warrants application of any
of the exceptions to the mootness rule.
Indeed, his request for relief at the conclusion of this section of his
brief--termination of the commitment--already occurred on January 4, 1996, by
operation of the order itself.
[7] This order, obviously, is not part of the
record on appeal. It is, however, the
type of document of which we may take judicial notice. See Lumby v. Lumby, 116
Wis.2d 347, 349, 341 N.W.2d 725, 726 (Ct. App. 1983) (court of appeals may take
judicial notice of federal bankruptcy court records as matters "`capable
of accurate and ready determination' by th[e] court"). We note, too, that Thomas F.W. has not
objected to or commented on the State's reference to the order and its
inclusion in the appendix to the State's brief.