COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED January
4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 95-2349-CR
95-2350-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN
G. VANCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from judgments of the circuit court for Vernon County: MICHAEL J. ROSBOROUGH, Judge. Affirmed.
SUNDBY,
J. In this appeal, we[1]
hold that when a traffic officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the operator of a motor vehicle has committed or is committing a traffic
offense within his or her jurisdiction, the officer may investigate that
possibility by pursuing the vehicle into an adjacent jurisdiction to make an
investigatory stop. We therefore affirm
judgments convicting Steven G. Vance of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence and operating a motor vehicle after revocation.
On
November 17, 1994, La Crosse County Sheriff's Deputy Daniel Brown heard the
La Crosse County dispatcher report to the Vernon County dispatcher that
defendant Steven G. Vance was under the influence at the Ten-Mile House in La
Crosse County and was possibly driving home to Viroqua in Vernon County. The dispatcher described Vance's car as a
larger, white vehicle. Brown
immediately drove to the Ten-Mile House where he observed a white Mercury
four-door in the parking lot. His check
of the vehicle's registration revealed that the vehicle was registered to
Vance. He went to a nearby telephone
and called the La Crosse dispatcher for more information. The dispatcher informed him that
La Crosse County had received an anonymous call stating that Vance would
be driving home from the Ten-Mile House and was under the influence. While making the call, Brown saw a vehicle
leave the Ten-Mile parking lot and proceed toward Viroqua. Brown pursued and caught up with Vance
several miles into Vernon County. He
observed Vance's vehicle cross the center line and swerve back to the shoulder
line. He stopped Vance's car, tested
him, and arrested him for operating under the influence.
These
facts are basically undisputed. The
State concedes that whether Brown's stop of Vance's vehicle met constitutional
and statutory requirements is a question of law which we decide de novo. See State v. Jackson,
147 Wis.2d 824, 829, 434 N.W.2d 386, 388 (1989).
We
conclude that Brown had a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying an
investigatory stop when he heard the communication from the La Crosse
dispatcher to the Vernon dispatcher and received additional information from
the dispatcher. Clearly, the anonymous
caller knew Vance and knew where he lived.
While that knowledge did not inculpate Vance, it lent weight to the
caller's opinion that Vance was under the influence. See State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128,
143, 456 N.W.2d 830, 836 (1990) (anonymous tip may create reasonable
suspicion); State v. Krier, 165 Wis.2d 673, 478 N.W.2d 63 (Ct.
App. 1991) (tip accurately predicting future behavior sufficiently
reliable). Deputy Brown would have
failed in his responsibilities had he not at least investigated the anonymous
tip.
We
do not accept Vance's argument that the State must justify Brown's stop under
§ 175.40(2), Stats., the
fresh-pursuit statute. That statute
provides: "[A]ny peace officer
may, when in fresh pursuit, follow anywhere in the state and arrest any
person for the violation of any law or ordinance the officer is authorized to
enforce." (Emphasis added.) The fresh-pursuit statute plainly applies
when the officer has begun pursuit to arrest a person for a violation the
officer has already observed.
If
statutory authority is necessary, § 968.24, Stats., supplies that authority. The statute provides:
After having
identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement
officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time
when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about
to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the
person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in
the vicinity where the person was stopped.
It
would be strange doctrine to hold that a police officer may not investigate in
an adjoining jurisdiction possible criminal activity which may have just
occurred in his or her jurisdiction, especially when that criminal activity may
be continuing and threatens the life and safety of others.
We therefore conclude
that Deputy Brown, because he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Vance had committed and was committing a dangerous traffic offense, could
satisfy that suspicion by making an investigatory stop of Vance's vehicle in an
adjoining county.
By
the Court.--Judgments
affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.