PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 95-2088
†
Petition for Review Pending
Complete Title
of Case:
GORDON AHLGREN and
DOROTHY AHLGREN,
†
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY,
Respondent-Respondent.
Submitted on Briefs: November 13, 1995
COURT COURT
OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: December 5, 1995
Opinion Filed: December
5, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Pierce
(If "Special", JUDGE: Robert W. Wing.
so indicate)
JUDGES: Cane,
P.J., LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of
the petitioners-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Edward
F. Vlack of Davison & Vlack of River Falls.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of
the respondent-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of William
G. Thiel, corporation counsel, of Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C.
of Eau Claire.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED DECEMBER 5, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2088-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
GORDON AHLGREN and
DOROTHY AHLGREN,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Pierce County:
ROBERT W. WING, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
CANE, P.J. Gordon and Dorothy Ahlgren appeal an order
affirming the decision of the Pierce County Land Use Management Committee and
dismissing the Ahlgrens' petition for certiorari. We affirm the circuit court's order.[1]
The Ahlgrens own Lot 1
of the Assessor's Plat of the Gordon Ahlgren property in the Town of Clifton,
Pierce County. The Ahlgrens submitted a
certified survey map to the Pierce County Zoning Office and requested that Lot
1 be split into two lots. The request
was submitted to the committee, which rejected the Ahlgrens' request on the
basis that it is improper to divide a lot within an assessor's plat by means of
a certified survey map. The committee
determined that Lot 1 could be divided only by amending the assessor's plat
based on § 70.27(4), Stats.
The Ahlgrens filed a
writ of certiorari with the circuit court, asking that the court review the
committee's determination and order the committee to approve the proposed division
of Lot 1. The circuit court issued an
order that affirmed the committee's decision to deny the Ahlgrens'
request. The Ahlgrens now appeal.
The Ahlgrens raise two
issues on appeal: (1) whether dividing
a lot within an assessor's plat into two lots constitutes an amendment of the
assessor's plat; and (2) whether a certified survey map is a proper method to
divide a lot located within an assessor's plat. Examination of these issues requires this court to interpret §
70.27(4), Stats. Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law that we review de novo. State
ex rel. Frederick v. McCaughtry, 173 Wis.2d 222, 225, 496 N.W.2d 177,
179 (Ct. App. 1992).
Section 70.27(4), Stats., provides:
Amendments.
Amendments or corrections to an assessor's plat may be made at any time by the
governing body by recording with the register of deeds a plat of the area
affected by such amendment or correction, made and authenticated as provided by
this section. It shall not be necessary
to refer to any amendment of the plat, but all assessments or instruments
wherein any parcel of land is described as being in an assessor's plat, shall
be construed to mean the assessor's plat of lands with its amendments or
corrections as it stood on the date of making such assessment or instrument, or
such plats may be identified by number.
The Ahlgrens recognize
that § 70.27(4), Stats., details
the procedure for amending an assessor's plat, but contend that the section
"does not contemplate, and consequently does not regulate, the simple
division of a lot within an assessor's plat." The County argues that division of a lot within an assessor's
plat constitutes an amendment of the plat, even if the outside boundaries of
the plat are not changed.
At
issue is whether the word "amendment" in § 70.27(4), Stats., includes dividing a lot within
an assessor's plat. The aim of
statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and our
first resort is to the language of the statute itself. Northwest Wholesale Lumber v. Anderson,
191 Wis.2d 278, 284, 528 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Ct. App. 1995). If the words of the statute convey the
legislative intent, that ends our inquiry.
Id. We will not
look beyond the plain language of a statute to search for other meanings; we
simply apply the language to the case at hand.
Id.
The word
"amendment" is a nontechnical word and, therefore, it shall be
construed according to common and approved usage. See § 990.01(1), Stats. The common and approved usage of words in a
statute can be established by reference to a recognized dictionary. Hayne v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.,
115 Wis.2d 68, 73, 339 N.W.2d 588, 590 (1983).
According to Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 68 (Unabr. 1976), amendment can be defined as
the "act of amending esp. for the better," "correction of a
fault or faults," "reformation (as of one's life)," and
"the process of amending." Black's Law Dictionary 81 (6th ed.
1990) defines amendment as: "To
change or modify for the better. To
alter by modification, deletion, or addition." These definitions indicate, as the circuit court concluded, that
an amendment is a change, and it follows that because dividing one lot into two
lots is a change, the dividing process constitutes "amendment" under
§ 70.27(4), Stats.
The Ahlgrens oppose this
interpretation of § 70.27(4), Stats. First, they argue that the second sentence
of § 70.27(4) makes sense only if the word "amendment" is read to
include a change in the outside boundary of an existing assessor's plat, but
not a simple division of a lot within the plat. They explain, "Since it is not necessary to refer to any amendment
of the plat, a simple division cannot be an amendment because there would be no
way to distinguish the two new resulting parcels." We disagree. The plain meaning of the second sentence in § 70.27(4) is
that an assessor's plat, as originally ratified, includes all subsequent
amendments or corrections, and that when one references the plat, he or she
need not refer to each and every amendment that has been made. While the Ahlgrens have identified a
situation where omitting references to the amendments may not adequately
specify the lot to which reference is made, the statute does not prohibit one
from mentioning amendments when it would be helpful. By using the words "need not," the statute simply suggests
one may refer to a plat using its original name. We reject the Ahlgrens' argument that this sentence somehow
signals a legislative directive that amendment can mean only changes in a
plat's exterior boundaries.
The Ahlgrens also argue
that an attorney general's opinion supports their position because it indicates
that the purpose of assessor's plats is to eliminate uncertainties and
reconcile discrepancies in real estate descriptions that have arisen in the
past and presently hinder various local governmental functions. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 25, 26
(1972). The Ahlgrens argue that because
their request to divide is not based on a discrepancy in a real estate
description, they should not be required to accomplish this division using
§ 70.27, Stats.,
procedures. We disagree. There is nothing in the statute that
suggests one should independently assess every potential plat division to
determine whether following § 70.27 is necessary to effectuate the statute's
purpose. The statute clearly requires
that § 70.27 be used to amend an assessor's plat.
The Ahlgrens also argue
that under the attorney general's opinion, "it is clear amendments of the
outer boundaries of lots in an assessor's plat [are] different from an internal
division of a lot." We disagree. The relevant section of the attorney general's
opinion printed the question posed and the attorney general's response:
"What limitations are involved
concerning the amendment or correction of an assessor's plat of record? For example, [may] boundaries of lots within
the originally recorded assessor's plat be changed by such amendment or
correction?"
The
first part of this question is too general to allow a meaningful response. In response to the second part of the
question, however, it is my opinion that the boundaries of lots as shown within
the original recorded assessor's plat may be changed by virtue of an amendment
or correction adopted in compliance with sec. 70.27, Stats.
61
Op. Att'y Gen. at 29.
The Ahlgrens point out
that the attorney general used the word "may" when addressing whether
the § 70.27, Stats., process
could be used to change boundaries within a plat. At the same time, the attorney general, analyzing
§ 70.27(4), Stats.,
specifically stated that the plat must be prepared in full compliance
with all the provisions of § 70.27.
61 Op. Att'y Gen. at 28. The
Ahlgrens appear to argue that because the opinion unequivocally states that
amendments must comply with § 70.27, yet also states that boundaries
within the originally recorded plat may be changed using § 70.27, the
attorney general has indicated that changing the boundaries within the plat
does not constitute amendment. We are
not persuaded.
First, the attorney
general was not addressing whether changes in boundaries must be made
using § 70.27; he was responding to a question that asked whether § 70.27 could
be used to change boundaries within a plat.
Therefore, the attorney general may not have contemplated whether this
procedure was not only permissible, but also required. Second, attorney general opinions are only
persuasive authority. State ex.
rel. North v. Goetz, 116 Wis.2d 239, 244, 342 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Ct. App.
1983). Thus, even if the attorney
general's opinion conflicted with our reading of § 70.27(4), Stats., we would not be bound it.
We conclude that the plain
meaning of the word "amendment" in § 70.27(4), Stats., includes the process of
dividing a lot into two lots, because to divide a lot is to reform it, to
change it and to modify it. Thus, if
the Ahlgrens wish to divide their lot into two lots, they must follow the
procedures outlined in § 70.27.
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's order affirming the decision of
the Pierce County Land Use Committee and dismissing the Ahlgrens' petition for
certiorari.
The second issue the
Ahlgrens have raised is whether a certified survey map is a proper method to
divide a lot located within an assessor's plat. The Ahlgrens acknowledge that "an amendment or a correction
to an assessor's plat cannot be accomplished by certified survey
map." Because we have concluded
that the Ahlgrens' proposed lot division constitutes an amendment of the
assessor's plat, we need not address this second issue.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.