COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October 31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2051-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LYNETTE K. FELBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Monroe County:
JAMES W. RICE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman, P.J., and Vergeront, J.
PER
CURIAM. Lynette Felber appeals from a judgment convicting her
of possession of less than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver. Section 161.41(1m)(h)1, Stats.
Felber pled guilty to the charge.
The issue is whether, at two separate times during the proceedings, the
trial court should have disclosed the identity of a confidential police informant. We conclude that the trial court properly
denied disclosure, and we therefore affirm.
Police searched Felber's
home pursuant to a warrant, and discovered inculpatory evidence. To obtain the warrant, they offered
information provided by a secret informant that Felber was selling marijuana
from her house. After her preliminary
hearing, Felber moved to compel disclosure of the informant, in order to attack
the search warrant in a suppression motion. She alleged that the informant was
a person whom the police could not have reasonably believed or relied on as a
credible witness. In support of the
motion, she submitted an affidavit pointing out inaccurate information
attributed to the informant in the application for the search warrant. The court denied the motion, finding that
Felber could not benefit from knowing the informant's identity.
At sentencing, after
Felber entered her guilty plea, she again asked for the informant's identity
for sentencing purposes. She based this
request on the fact that the presentence investigation report contained a
description of the informant's allegedly false statements in the search warrant
affidavit. The trial court denied this
motion as well and sentenced Felber to probation, with a six-month jail term as
a condition of probation.
Felber failed to present
substantial grounds for obtaining the informant's identity in order to attack
the search warrant. To challenge the
legality of a search warrant obtained on false statements made by a confidential
informant, a defendant must make a
substantial preliminary showing that the person executing the search warrant
affidavit knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false
statement essential to the probable cause finding. State v. Fischer, 147 Wis.2d 694, 699-700, 433
N.W.2d 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1988). Here,
Felber introduced no evidence that the police officer executing the affidavit
knew of any false statements by the informant, or recklessly disregarded that
possibility.
Additionally, Felber did
not show that the informant's false statements were essential to the probable
cause determination. According to
Felber, the informant falsely stated that Felber and her husband, Len, had sold
marijuana and cocaine for seven years, although they had lived together for
only four years, and that another
individual lived with the Felbers, although that person had moved out of the
Felber home over two years before.
However, the informant provided a substantial amount of other
information that Felber did not challenge, including an accurate description of
the premises, an accurate description of Lynette Felber's current employment
and Len Felber's involvement in another criminal proceeding, and the fact that
many vehicles came and went from the home, stopping for only a few
minutes. Those assertions were
independently verified by police department surveillance and
investigation. As a result, the warrant
application contained sufficient information to establish probable cause,
without considering the allegedly false statements in it.
Felber also failed to
demonstrate that she needed the informant's identity for sentencing
purposes. Triggering her request was
the description of the offense in the presentence investigation, which
summarized the informant's statements, including the alleged inaccuracies, as
reported in the warrant application.
However, the report plainly identified those statements as the
informant's version of Felber's dealings.
The report also gave Felber's contrasting version, and the
recommendation in the report does not refer to the informant's statements or
rely on them. There was much other
evidence of Felber's drug-selling activities, including her own admissions. Additionally, the sentencing transcript
contains no indication that the trial court relied on the informant's
description of Felber's activities when it imposed the sentence. Section 905.10(3)(b), Stats., authorizes the trial court to
disclose an informant's identity if that person's testimony might be necessary
to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. We accept the premise that the court may
also allow disclosure to fairly determine sentencing, but Felber failed to show
that disclosure was necessary for that purpose.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.