COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 7, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-2024
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
SOMMERS ESTATES
COMPANY,
a joint venture,
JOHN CARR,
individually and
as general partner of
KATERI INVESTMENTS,
a limited partnership,
and
ELMER SOMMERS,
individually
and as joint venturer,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF NEW BERLIN,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Waukesha County:
PATRICK L. SNYDER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Sommers Estates Company, John Carr, Kateri Investments
and Elmer Sommers (hereinafter, Sommers) appeal from an order dismissing their
action against the City of New Berlin.
The sole issue is whether their action is barred by a prior action
against the City. We conclude that the
doctrine of claim preclusion bars this action and we affirm the order of the
circuit court.
Sommers entered into
Subdivider's Agreements[1]
with the City for the development of a subdivision of single-family residences
named Sommerset Gardens. In April 1992,
Sommers filed a suit against the City for the excess cost of constructing storm
sewers. That action was dismissed and
the dismissal affirmed on appeal. Sommers
Estate Co., et al. v. City of New Berlin, No. 94-1119, unpublished slip
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1995).
This action was
commenced in September 1994 and alleged the taking of certain land without just
compensation, the City's breach of the developer's agreements, and fraudulent
conduct by the City regarding sanitary sewer charges, water main connection
charges and water fees. The circuit
court concluded that these claims arose out of the same transaction as the
first suit and that the claims could have been litigated in the first
suit. It dismissed the action.
Claim preclusion, or res
judicata, limits relitigation of issues that were or might have been
litigated in former proceedings. A.B.C.G.
Enters. v. First Bank Southeast, 184 Wis.2d 465, 473, 515 N.W.2d 904,
907 (1994). Whether the doctrine
applies under a given set of facts is a question of law which we review de
novo. Id. at 472, 515
N.W.2d at 906. For the first action to
bar a second action under claim preclusion, there must be an identity of
parties, an identity of causes of action or claims in the two cases, and a
final judgment on the merits in the one suit.
Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis.2d 541, 551,
525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (1995).
Here, there is no
question that the two suits involve the identical parties. A final judgment in the first action is in
place. Thus, the only issue is identity
of causes of action.
Wisconsin has adopted
the transactional approach to determining whether two suits involve the same
cause of action. Id. at
553, 525 N.W.2d at 728. If both suits
arise from the same transaction, incident or factual situation, claim
preclusion generally bars the second suit.
Id. at 554, 525 N.W.2d at 729. What constitutes the same transaction is to be determined
"pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
(1982)).
Sommers argues that
although both actions involve the same subdivision, this action is related to
different utilities—that is, sanitary sewer and water rather than storm
sewers. It also contends that the
causes of action are different because the first suit questioned the City's
exercise of discretion and this suit seeks damages for breach of contract,
fraud and unconstitutional appropriation of land.
Sommers ignores the
transactional concept. The prior action
was a claim for storm sewer overcosts despite a provision in the developer's
agreement that Sommers would pay for the approved drainage system. The claims here arise out of the same
negotiations with the City and the same agreements implicated in the first
action. Again, Sommers seeks
reimbursement of certain costs when the developer's agreement provides
otherwise. The claims are related in
time, space, origin and motivation. We
are not persuaded that each breach of the contract is a separate cause of
action under these circumstances.
Additionally, the claims made in this suit were known to Sommers at the
time the first suit was litigated.[2] The doctrine of claim preclusion extends to
issues that could have been litigated. A.B.C.G.,
184 Wis.2d at 473, 515 N.W.2d at 906.
Sommers argues that
because Wisconsin has a permissive joinder of claims statute, this action is
not barred simply because the claims could have been litigated in the first
suit against the City. We recognize
that Wisconsin does not require mandatory joinder of claims or compulsory
counterclaims. Stuart v. Stuart,
140 Wis.2d 455, 466, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 143
Wis.2d 347, 421 N.W.2d 505 (1988); § 803.02(1), Stats. However, the
statute does not operate to shield the application of claim preclusion. See A.B.C.G., 184
Wis.2d at 476, 515 N.W.2d at 908 (Wisconsin's noncompulsory counterclaim
statute overridden by common law compulsory counterclaims). While § 803.02(1) may not require the
joinder of all claims, the party who chooses not to join claims does so at the
risk that claim preclusion may bar the later assertion because the claims arise
out of the same transaction as that already litigated.
We conclude that
Sommers' present action shares an identity of cause of action with the first suit. This action is barred by claim preclusion.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[2] Sommers conceded that it was aware of the existence of the present causes of action when the first suit was filed against the City. The affidavit of John Carr, the general partner of joint venturer Kateri Investments, indicates that when the first suit was filed on the storm sewer charges, for various reasons a decision was made to not include other claims. It explains that only upon learning of the financial loss to be suffered by the investors was Sommers able to appreciate the increased costs resulting from the City's actions and the necessity of this action to recoup allegedly improper overcharges.