COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 11, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1958
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
PAUL KLUTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENERAL CASUALTY
COMPANY OF WISCONSIN,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MARK S. GEMPELER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Anderson, P.J.,
Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Paul Kluth has appealed from a judgment determining
that a business automobile liability insurance policy issued by the respondent,
General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, to R.K. Towing, Inc. did not
provide coverage for a motor vehicle accident in which Kluth was injured. The accident occurred when the vehicle being
driven by Kluth collided with a 1978 Chevy Malibu being driven by Michael
Clermont, who had been given the Malibu as a loaner vehicle by Ray Mierzjewski
when Clermont brought his own vehicle to R.K. Towing for repair work. Mierzjewski and his wife are the operators
and sole shareholders of R.K. Towing.
The coverage issue was
decided by the trial court after a jury trial on the liability and damages
issues. The trial court concluded that
coverage did not exist because it was not requested by either R.K. Towing or
Mierzjewski within thirty days of acquisition of the Malibu. In making this determination, the trial
court also found that Mierzjewski, rather than R.K. Towing, was the owner of
the Malibu at the time of the accident and that Mierzjewski's testimony that he
intended the vehicle to belong to R.K. Towing was incredible. Because the trial court's finding that
Mierzjewski owned the Malibu is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the judgment
determining that coverage did not exist under R.K. Towing's policy.
On review of a factual
finding made by a trial court without a jury, we will not disturb the trial
court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 Wis.2d 641, 643, 340
N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1983). The
trial court is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses, and
when more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible
evidence, we must accept the inference drawn by the trial court. Id. at 644, 340 N.W.2d at 577.
The parties stipulated
that the trial court could consider Mierzjewski's deposition testimony and
affidavit, along with the evidence presented to the jury, in deciding the
coverage issue. In his affidavit and
deposition testimony, Mierzjewski indicated that R.K. Towing obtained the
Malibu approximately two weeks before the accident as payment for towing fees
incurred when R.K. Towing towed the Malibu for its then-owner, Elizabeth
Lytle. Mierzjewski testified that the
vehicle was never sold or transferred to him and that he never intended to
acquire it personally. He indicated in
his affidavit that before the accident occurred, he sent an application for
title to the Malibu to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation "for
transfer of the car into my name and the company name, for use as a company
car," and that he intended to use the vehicle solely for R.K. Towing
business purposes.
Mierzjewski's testimony
was contradicted by the title application submitted by him to the Department of
Transportation in which he requested title solely in his own name. In the title application, he also listed his
home address rather than the business address of R.K. Towing. Based on the title application, the trial
court was entitled to find that Mierzjewski personally took ownership of the
Malibu, regardless of whether he kept it at the towing yard or acquired it in
exchange for towing services.
This conclusion was
corroborated by other evidence in the record.
While Mierzjewski testified that he intended to use the Malibu as a
loaner vehicle for people who brought vehicles to R.K. Towing for repair, he
admitted that he had never provided a customer with a loaner vehicle before
Clermont asked him for one and never did it again after loaning the Malibu to
Clermont, thus rendering suspect his claim that he intended to use the Malibu
for business purposes. The credibility
of his professed intention was also impaired by evidence that all of the other
vehicles listed in R.K. Towing's policy with General Casualty were tow or flatbed
trucks used in R.K. Towing's business operations, and title to those vehicles
was held by R.K. Towing.
Evidence also indicated
that before permitting Clermont to take the Malibu, Mierzjewski spoke to
Clermont's insurer to make sure that Clermont's automobile insurance policy
covered his use of the car. In
conjunction with evidence indicating that neither Mierzjewski nor anyone else
acting on R.K. Towing's behalf ever notified General Casualty that R.K. Towing
had acquired the Malibu prior to the time General Casualty received notice of
this action, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Mierzjewski had
taken personal ownership of the Malibu and did not consider it to be a vehicle
acquired by R.K. Towing and insured under R.K. Towing's policy.[1]
Because the trial
court's finding that Mierzjewski, rather than R.K. Towing, owned the Malibu at
the time of the accident is not clearly erroneous, we affirm its judgment
determining that the policy provided by General Casualty to R.K. Towing
provided no coverage for the accident.
Based on this disposition, we need not address the remaining arguments
raised in the briefs regarding coverage, the release or credit for payments
paid by another insurer. However, in
affirming the dismissal of the action against General Casualty, we also point
out that the appellant's brief was one of the poorest attorney-drafted briefs
this court has reviewed in a long time.
It contained numerous grammatical errors and was so disjointed as to
make it difficult to follow any logical argument being presented by
counsel. We trust that counsel will do
better in the future.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Mierzjewski testified that he did not notify General Casualty that R.K. Towing had acquired the Malibu before the accident because he believed he had thirty days from the date of acquisition and was waiting until he obtained a certificate of title from the Department of Transportation. He testified that he did not notify General Casualty of the acquisition of the vehicle after the accident because he believed Clermont's insurance covered the accident and because Clermont paid him for the value of the vehicle. However, even if these explanations are deemed plausible, the trial court reasonably was entitled to draw the alternative inference that Mierzjewski did not contact General Casualty regarding coverage for the Malibu because he had taken personal ownership of the Malibu and did not consider it to be a vehicle owned by R.K. Towing and insured under R.K. Towing's policy.