COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1915
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
MATERIAL SERVICE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHELS PIPE LINE
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent,
MILWAUKEE METROPOLITAN
SEWERAGE DISTRICT,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOHN J. DiMOTTO,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in
part and cause remanded with directions.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. In another of the myriad of cases arising out of the
Milwaukee deep tunnel construction project, Material Service Corporation sued
to recover amounts not paid for the sale of concrete pipes to Michels Pipe Line
Construction, Inc. Michels Pipe Line
counterclaimed for damages resulting from Material Service's delivery of
defective pipes. Prior to trial the
parties stipulated that Michels Pipe Line owed Material Service $186,550.12 for
the pipes. After a bench trial, the
trial court found that Michels Pipe Line was entitled to a credit of $31,734.34
and damages of $158,221.55. A judgment
for the net amount of $3,405.77 was entered in favor of Michels Pipe Line, and
Material Service appeals.
Material Service contends
that the trial court erred in holding that the terms and conditions in Material
Service's price quotation, including limitations on warranties and damages,
were not a part of the sales contract.
Material Service also contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding that a second delivery of pipes included defective
pipes. Further, Material Service
challenges various items included in the award of damages. Except for Material Service's challenge to
the award of damages for home office overhead and for lost profits, we reject
Material Service's arguments.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part and remand
the case to the trial court for entry of a new judgment.
FACTS
After the Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District announced that it was accepting bids for
construction of the portion of the deep tunnel identified as the North Shore -
6 collector system, Orville Burdick, Material Service's sales representative,
reviewed the bidding documents to determine if Material Service could provide
any of the concrete pipes required to line the tunnel. Material Service then prepared a price
quotation, good for thirty days from the bid opening, for the various sizes of
pipes required by the Sewerage District.
The quoted prices were net prices, F.O.B. job site, and subject to an 8%
escalation after three months. The
quote also advised that it was subject to the terms and conditions on the
reverse side of the document. Included
in the terms and conditions were a disclaimer of all warranties, a provision
limiting Material Service's liability for defective products to replacement or
return of the purchase price, and a provision rejecting liability for special
or consequential damages. The quotation
was sent to all contractors expected to bid on the Sewerage District project.
Michels Pipe Line
received the quotation and negotiated a discount of thirty percent off of the
quoted prices. Incorporating the
discounted prices into the bid it submitted to the Sewerage District, Michels
Pipe Line was the successful bidder.
Rather than digging a
trench to lay the pipes, Michels Pipe Line constructed the North Shore - 6 by
jacking the pipes into place. In this
procedure, a shaft for operations and equipment is dug to the ultimate depth of
the tunnel. A machine begins at the
shaft and bores the hole for the tunnel.
This machine is the leading edge of the construction. A jacking machine, which is stationary,
pushes the pipes into the hole created by the boring machine. As the boring machine advances, an
additional pipe is positioned on the jacking machine's launch pad and pushed
into the pipe ahead of it. Ultimately,
the first pipe pushed into place behind the boring machine will be the pipe at
the far end of the tunnel. A lubricant
is pumped between the earth and the pipes to reduce the friction between the
string of pipes and the ground.
Each concrete pipe has a
spigot end and a bell end. Neither end
is as thick as the body of the pipe.
The outer diameter of the spigot end is less than that of the pipe
itself, and the inner diameter of the bell end is greater than the pipe's. When the spigot end of one pipe is inserted
into the bell end of another pipe, the joint is flush both inside and outside,
provided the ends of the pipe are of uniform thickness and completely
circular. In the procedure used by
Michels Pipe Line, the spigot end was the leading edge and was jacked into the
bell end of the pipe ahead of it.
Because of the pressure from the jacking machine and the length of pipes
to be pushed, two steel rings embedded in the concrete reinforced the spigots.
Michels Pipe Line jacked
the pipes for the North Shore ‑ 6 in two runs. Consequently, it rented land to dig a
temporary, intermediate shaft. The
initial run, approximately three hundred feet on a curve, was completed without
problems using pipes supplied by Material Service. The pipes and operations in
the initial run are not at issue in this litigation.
Michels Pipe Line began
experiencing problems with the pipes in the second run almost immediately. Spigots cracked and did not fit correctly
into bells. Examination of the pipes
showed that the thickness of individual spigots was not uniform, and
examination of selected pipes revealed only one reinforcing wire ring in the
spigots. Witnesses testifying for
Michels Pipe Line claimed that the non-uniformity of the spigot edges caused
the defective pipes to shift slightly to fit into the bell of the preceding
pipe and that this shift led to stress and breakage. In addition, the tunnel went off grade. Michels Pipe Line's witnesses testified that the non-uniform
spigots also meant that the exterior joints were not flush, which caused a
plowing effect as the string of pipes was pushed forward. The plowing effect pushed the string of
pipes downward.
After seventeen pipes
were in the ground, Michels Pipe Line rejected the entire delivery of pipes for
the second run and required Material Service to manufacture new pipes to
replace the rejected ones. The seventeen
pipes already in place were pushed through the entire length of the tunnel and
removed at the end of construction.
While waiting for delivery of the replacement pipes, Michels Pipe Line
installed sheet bands in the seventeen pipes to reinforce the spigots for the
remainder of the construction.
When the replacement
pipes were delivered, Michels Pipe Line personnel inspected them. McLeod testified that a normal quantity was
rejected for cosmetic reasons (the interior or exterior was rough). A sample of the pipes was inspected for
spigot uniformity, and the internal and external diameters of the sampled pipes
were measured. No problems were
found. Once installed in the tunnel, however,
the replacement pipes fractured at a higher than normal rate. The Sewerage District ultimately required
significant repairs to thirty-one pipes or approximately thirty percent of the
pipes used.
When construction
recommenced, Michels Pipe Line first corrected the tunnel's grade. To raise the grade, workers split pipes to
gain access to the earth, shaved small amounts off of the top, and filled in
areas under the pipes. Initially,
Michels Pipe Line over-corrected the grade, and it reversed the procedure to
slightly lower the correction. After
the grade was corrected, the mining proceeded at a normal pace. Gordon McLeod, Michels Pipe Line's project
engineer, described the final product as a straight line at the correct grade.
Michels Pipe Line
refused to pay for the pipes used in the second run of the North Shore - 6, and
Material Service sued to collect the amount due. In addition to disputing the amount claimed, Michels Pipe Line
successfully sought damages for expenses it incurred as a result of the
delivery of the rejected pipes and for expenses it incurred to repair the
defective replacement pipes.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the trial
court's findings of fact, this court will not set them aside unless they are
clearly erroneous. Section 805.17(2), Stats.
We examine the record for any credible evidence upon which the court
could have based its decision. See Sumnicht
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis.2d 338, 360, 360 N.W.2d 2,
12 (1984). This court reviews the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the findings of fact. Id. Conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of the trial
court's findings of fact. Id. When more than one reasonable inference can
be drawn from the credible evidence, the reviewing court must accept the
inference drawn by the trial court. Id.
CONTRACT TERMS
Material Service
contends that the limiting terms and conditions of the price quotation are part
of its contract with Michels Pipe Line.
The terms included an express warranty that the concrete pipes would
satisfy a particular standard. All
other express and implied warranties, including warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose, were disclaimed. The terms and conditions also limited
Material Service's liability to replacement of the pipes or return of the
purchase price and excluded liability for any special or consequential damages.
Material Service argues
that its price quotation was an offer, which was modified by negotiations and
accepted without objection by Michels Pipe Line's purchase order. Material Service relies on § 402.207, Stats., which abrogates the common
law's “mirror-image” rule. The
“mirror-image” rule required that unless an acceptance of an offer mirrored the
terms of the offer, a contract was not formed.
Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 757 (Cal. 1977).
Michels Pipe Line
Counters that the quotation, even if an offer, expired before acceptance. Consequently, its purchase orders
constituted the offer, which Material Service accepted by performance. Michels Pipe Line argues that because the
purchase orders lacked provisions concerning warranties and remedies, the
default provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are read into the parties'
agreement. See §§ 402.314
(implied warranty of merchantability), 402.315 (implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose), and 402.715 (seller's liability for incidental and
consequential remedies), Stats.
The question presented
is what constitutes the offer in this case.
Chapter 402, Stats., does
not define the term “offer.” Thus, we
apply the common law to determine which document is the offer. Gulf States Util. Co. v. NEI Peebles
Elec. Prods., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 538, 549 (M.D. La. 1993). “An offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it.” Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 24 (1979).
Under the common law, a
price quotation may be merely an invitation to make an offer. Interstate Indus., Inc. v. Barclay
Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 868, 871-73, (7th Cir. 1976); Restatement, supra, § 26
cmt. c. Whether a price quotation
is an offer or an invitation to make an offer depends upon the intent of the
party making the quotation as manifested by the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Nickel v.
Theresa Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 247 Wis. 412, 416, 20 N.W.2d 117, 118-19
(1945). This presents a question of
fact. Relevant factors to be considered
by the finder of fact include the extent of prior inquiry, the completeness of
the terms of the suggested bargain, and the number of persons to whom the price
quotation is communicated. Restatement, supra § 26
cmt. c.
In its findings of fact,
the trial court found that the price quotation letter offered to sell pipes for
use in the North Shore - 6 and that the letter was sent to all contractors
expected to bid on the project. The
price quotation indicated that the prices were firm for thirty days from the
opening of bids. The first paragraph of
the general terms and conditions of the price quotation indicated that it was
an offer to sell or a contract for sale, but only on the terms and conditions
set forth. The trial court concluded
that the price quotation was an offer, and this conclusion was supported by the
evidence.
The trial court also found that Michels Pipe
Line did not accept Material Service's offer; rather, Michels Pipe Line
negotiated a new, independent agreement that provided for lower prices than in
the initial offer. Further, the court
found that more than thirty days after the bid deadline, Michels Pipe Line
issued purchase orders for pipes at the new, lower price. The purchase orders did not include any
limiting terms and conditions and did not refer to the quotation letter. The trial court concluded that Michels Pipe
Line did not accept Material Service's offer.
Consequently, Michels Pipe Line's purchase orders constitute the
contracts between Material Service and Michels Pipe Line.[1]
Again the trial court's
findings are supported by the evidence, and the court's conclusion flows from
its findings. It is uncontested that
the parties renegotiated the price for the pipes. Section 402.207, Stats.,
is thus inapplicable because Michels Pipe Line did not merely respond to the
quotation letter with its own purchase order.
Rather, the company responded by negotiating over price. The various sections of chapter 402, Stats., do not address this scenario,
and we again turn to the common law.
Generally, under common
law, a counter-offer acts as a rejection of the original offer. Restatement,
supra § 39, cmt. a. Although
it operates to continue, rather than terminate, negotiations, it terminates the
offeree's power to accept the original offer unless the counter-offer manifests
a contrary intention. Id.
§ 39(2) and § 39, cmt. a.
The trial court found that Michels Pipe Line's request for a discount
was a rejection of a material term of Material Service's offer, i.e., the
price, and a request for further negotiations.
After Michels Pipe Line issued its purchase orders, which became the
offer, Material Service did not attempt to reintroduce its limiting terms and
conditions into the contract.
Therefore, it did not disclaim implied warranties nor preclude Michels
Pipe Line's recovery of consequential and special damages.
DEFECTS IN REPLACEMENT PIPE
Material Service does
not contend that the rejected pipes were not defective. Its objection is to the trial court's
finding that thirty-one of the replacement pipes were also defective. The trial court found that the latter pipes
were defective because they cracked and had fractured joints even though they
were properly used by Michels Pipe Line.
Material Service
contends that there is no evidence to support the trial court's findings. It argues that witnesses testified that
Michels Pipe Line inspected the replacement pipes before they were used in the
tunnel. Although some pipes were
rejected for cosmetic reasons, Michels Pipe Line found no apparent fault with
the pipes that were used.
Witnesses testified that
the fracture rate of replacement pipes requiring significant repairs was
greater than would normally be expected.
While witnesses for Michels Pipe Line could not opine on the specific
reasons for the greater rate of fracturing, they testified unequivocally that
the fracturing did not result from inadequate lubrication or the way the pipes
were jacked. Michels Pipe Line's
witnesses disagreed with Material Service's expert, Michael Robinson, who
testified that a change in soil type and the “kinkiness” caused by raising and
then lowering the grade contributed to the fracturing of the replacement
pipes. Michels Pipe Line's witnesses
also contradicted testimony that it incorrectly placed gaskets on the spigots
and with testimony that questioned using a launch pad rather than a crane to
bring pipes together.
If there is conflicting
evidence, the trial court decides which to accept and which to reject. Here, the trial court concluded that Michels
Pipe Line followed proper procedures. If
the operations were proper and a higher than usual number of pipes developed fractures,
a reasonable inference is that the cause was inherent defects within the
pipes. The trial court is not required
to reject this inference simply because the defects were not apparent during
visual inspections or because witnesses could not identify specific defects.
CHALLENGES TO ITEMS OF DAMAGES
The trial court found
that Material Service's delivery of defective pipes delayed the completion of
the North Shore - 6 a total of thirty-nine days. Michels Pipe Line spent eight additional days on the project
investigating the initial defective pipes and applying steel reinforcing bands
to the defective pipes already in the tunnel.
Re‑mining the tunnel to correct the grade delayed the project
eleven days. Three additional days were
required to push the initial seventeen pipes out the other end of the
tunnel. Finally, Michels Pipe Line
spent an additional seventeen days patching fractures in the defective
replacement pipes.
The trial court awarded
Michels Pipe Line damages for labor costs, material costs, field service
supervision costs, equipment costs, home office overhead costs, and lost
profits for each type of delay. Michels
Pipe Line was also awarded the cost of renting the land for the intermediate
shaft for the additional thirty-nine days.
In determining the amount of each type of damage, the trial court
generally allowed the amounts claimed by Michels Pipe Line. The exception was for re-mining, where the
trial court found that the length of the delay was less than what Michels Pipe
Line claimed. Michels Pipe Line's
evidence regarding its damages followed the
cost-reimbursement method of payment contained in its contract with the
Sewerage District. The contract
provision applied to modification or change orders made by the Sewerage District
during construction.
Material Service
challenges the damages allowed by the trial court. Damages for breach of contract are recoverable to place the
non-breaching claimant in the same position it would have been in had the
breach not occurred. Schubert v.
Midwest Broadcasting Co., 1 Wis.2d 497, 502, 85 N.W.2d 449, 452
(1957). The claimant is not to profit
from the breach, however; it is merely to receive the benefit of the contract
as if the contract had been performed. Hanz
Trucking, Inc. v. Harris Brothers Co., 29 Wis.2d 254, 268, 138 N.W.2d
238, 246 (1965). Pursuant to
§ 402.715, Stats., a
non-breaching buyer may recover expenses reasonably incurred incident to the
breach (incidental damages) and any loss resulting from the particular
requirements of the buyer if the seller had reason to know of the requirements
at the time of contracting and if the loss could not reasonably be prevented by
cover (consequential damages).
To obtain incidental or
consequential damages, the claimant must present sufficient evidence to allow
the trier of fact to estimate damages with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Murray v. Holiday
Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis.2d 406, 432, 265 N.W.2d 513, 526 (1978). Mathematical precision or absolute exactness
is not required; a fair and reasonable approximation is sufficient. Id.
Material Service
contends that all damages for re-mining to correct the grade and for repairing
fractures in the replacement pipes are not recoverable. This includes the portion of the land rental
for days attributable to these activities.
Michels Pipe Line argues that these claims relate to the replacement
pipes, which it claims were not defective.
We have already concluded, however, that there was sufficient evidence
to support the trial court's finding that thirty-one of the replacement pipes
were defective. Additionally, we
concluded that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the
defects in the initial seventeen pipes caused the tunnel to go off-grade. Therefore, Michels Pipe Line may recover
damages for patching the replacement pipes and for correcting the grade.
Material Service
contends that there was no evidence to support charging it for any equipment
costs for the delays. Equipment
included the tunnel boring machine and the jacking machine, two cranes, a
loader, a pick-up truck, and small tools, as well as other items. Material Service argues that because Michels
Pipe Line owned, and did not rent, the equipment, recovery was limited to the
actual cost of operating the equipment, e.g., fuel and utilities. Michels Pipe Line did not present testimony
regarding actual costs. Rather, it
computed equipment costs using a cost reference guide identified in its
contract with the Sewerage District for that purpose, and Material Service
contends that this was impermissible.
Michels Pipe Line's
ownership of the equipment does not mean that it did not incur expenses
connected with the equipment's use and availability during the delays. Expenses, such as wear and tear, fuel,
utilities, and maintenance, were incurred when the equipment was used to take
necessary corrective actions. Even while
the equipment was idle, Michels Pipe Line was deprived of the opportunity to
use the equipment elsewhere because it had to keep the equipment at the job
site for use when needed.
Material Service
correctly argues that it is not bound by the provision of the contract between
the Sewerage District and Michels Pipe Line regarding the cost reference
guide. Material Service is not a party
to the Sewerage District contract. We
do not, however, conclude that Michels Pipe Line's reliance on the cost reference
guide is insufficient evidence of its damages.
A claimant must present evidence of a fair and reasonable approximation
of its costs. Where reliance on a
particular cost accounting guide is an accepted industry practice for
determining the costs of using equipment, we see no reason why a claimant may
not rely on it for calculating damages, subject to evidentiary objections and
cross-examination. See Fehlhaber
Corp. v. State, 410 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (App. Div. 1978).
Ted Lewtas, a witness
for Michels Pipe Line, testified that the cost reference guide was regularly
used in the industry to determine the cost of owning and operating
equipment. The trial court could also
infer that the particular guide was acceptable within the industry from its use
in the Sewerage District's contract.
Thus, Michels Pipe Line presented evidence concerning equipment costs
attributable to Material Service's breach.
The evidence satisfied the reasonable certainty standard, and the trial
court could rely on it to set damages.
Material Service also
challenges the award of damages for field supervisory costs. This item included the salaries and benefits
for the project superintendent, the project engineer, and the assistant project
engineer.
Material Service invokes
the cost-reimbursement provision in the Sewerage District contract and argues
that it does not allow for recovery of field supervision costs. As we previously noted, Material Service is
not a party to the Sewerage District contract.
Therefore, whether Michels Pipe Line could recover field supervision
costs for change orders required by the Sewerage District is irrelevant to this
case.
Material Service also
objects to the field supervision costs because the three field supervisors did
not record what work they did each day and they could not identify any
particular work that they did on the thirty-nine days attributable to Material
Service's breach. Additionally, the
hours charged for one or more of the individuals on a given day often exceeded
the hours charged for laborers. The
field supervisors work was administrative and supervisory. For example, the project engineer was
responsible for decisions regarding setting up equipment although he did not do
the actual work himself. He also had
surveying responsibilities, and when the re‑mining occurred, he
calculated the adjustments to be made at each pipe, and the laborers did the
work. For all three individuals, a
major justification for claiming their salary and benefits as expenses was that
their duties were supervisory and they were required to be on site or available
until the tunnel was completed. Losses
caused by a breach of contract may include the loss of a salaried employee's
services on other projects where, because of the breach, the employee must
remain longer on the site of the project involved in the breach. State v. Service Elec. & Supply,
Inc., 106 Wis.2d 396, 403, 405, 316 N.W.2d 390, 394, 395 (1982); see
also District Concrete Co., Inc. v. Bernstein Concrete Corp.,
418 A.2d 1030, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Because of the
supervisory and administrative nature of their positions, we also cannot say
that the supervisors could not have worked more hours than the laborers on any
given day or on all days. The field
supervisors' responsibilities are to plan, schedule, and supervise. Presumably, the planning and scheduling of
particular tasks is undertaken before the work is done. Additionally, Michels Pipe Line did not
claim the same amount of time for each individual or the same number of hours
for each person every day. The
superintendent testified that he worked on two projects and probably spent more
time on the other. Conversely, the
assistant project engineer, who was responsible for paperwork, scheduling, and
other administrative details, testified that he was required to be on site
whenever work was occurring, and he did not testify that he worked on other
projects.
To support its claim for
field supervision costs, Weltin presented exhibits summarizing the wages and
benefits for the three individuals attributable to the delay. The summaries included the total hours
claimed for each person for each type of delay. The exhibits did not, however, itemize pay rates or the costs of
benefits for each individual, to which Material Service also objects. The summaries are adequate evidence to
support the trial court's findings on the issue of field supervision costs.
Material Service also
contends that the charges for the laborer's costs are speculative and not
capable of reasonable computation.
Again, Weltin prepared exhibits summarizing labor costs for each of the
four delays. The summary included each
laborer's hours and his wage rate.
Included in the wage rate were taxes and benefits. Material Service contends that because some
of the taxes and benefits have statutory or contractual maximum levels and
because the laborers were full-time employees, the maximum levels would have
been reached without the additional work attributable to the breach. It argues that because Weltin did not
address the effect of the maximum rates, the exact amounts of benefits
attributable to the breach is speculative.
Material Service does
not refer this court to where, in the record, this argument was made to the
trial court or where it solicited testimony supporting the assumptions
underlying its argument. From this, we
infer that this criticism of Michels Pipe Line's evidence is raised for the
first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
125 Wis.2d 437, 459, 373 N.W.2d 680, 691 (Ct. App. 1985).
The final elements of
damages challenged by Material Service are Michels Pipe Line's claim for home
office overhead and lost profits calculated at 19.7% of the labor, field
supervision, equipment, and material costs.
Material Service contends that the indirect overhead costs and lost
profits are not recoverable because there was no evidence that recovery of
these items was necessary to compensate Michels Pipe Line for the breach. We agree.
The percentage
calculation of home office overhead was derived from a Sewerage District audit
of Michels Pipe Line. The overhead
covered Weltin's and his assistant's salaries, accounting costs for the sewer,
water and tunnel division of the company, the division's yard and garage
facility, and office expenses. There
was no testimony that these expenses increased because of the delays
attributable to the defective pipes. If
a breach does not increase overhead expenses, the expenses are not recoverable
as damages attributable to the breach. See
Edward E. Gillen Co. v. John H. Parker Co., 170 Wis. 264, 282‑83,
171 N.W. 61, 68 (claimant may not recover for expense of salaried employee not
specifically hired for or assigned to project if claimant has other work and
employee not compensated for extra work caused by breach), rehearing denied,
170 Wis. 286, 174 N.W. 546 (1919).
Michels Pipe Line argues
in its brief that it obviously lost the opportunity to perform other jobs
during the time that it was required to remain on the site of the North Shore -
6. It fails, however, to cite to
evidence in the record to prove that other work was actually delayed. Therefore, recovery of overhead expenses
under a “lost opportunity” theory is not supported by the evidence.
We also conclude that
the evidence fails to support a claim for lost profits. Lost profits, if proven, are recoverable in
a breach of contract action. Thorp
Sales Corp. v. Gyuro Grading Co., 107 Wis.2d 141, 148, 319 N.W.2d 879,
882 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd 111 Wis.2d 431, 331 N.W.2d 342 (1983). Here, Michels Pipe Line's profit was from
its contract with the Sewerage District.
If Michels Pipe Line is “made whole” by the recovery of the actual
direct expenses it incurred because Material Service furnished defective pipe,
Michels Pipe Line will earn the profit it expected to earn under the Sewerage
District contract. Michels Pipe Line
does not cite to any testimony to refute this assumption; therefore, there is
no evidence that Michels Pipe Line lost profits because of the breach.
Consequently, we
conclude that the trial court's award of home office overhead and lost profits
to Michels Pipe Line was not supported by the evidence. These items totaled $15,615.15, and the
award to Michels Pipe Line on its counter-claim must be reduced by this amount. Consequently, we affirm the judgment in part
and reverse in part and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to
enter judgment consistent with this opinion.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Michels Pipe Line argues that because the purchase orders have all the essential terms of a contract and are unambiguous, a court may not look behind the face of the orders and consider extrinsic evidence. See § 402.202, Stats. This argument ignores Material Service's contention that the parties did not intend the purchase orders to be the final embodiment of the contract and that they were merely the acceptance of Material Service's offer. It also ignores § 402.207, Stats., which applies where merchants each use competing forms. While Michels Pipe Line argues that the parties treated the purchase orders as the whole contract, the testimony cited was not incorporated into the trial court's findings of fact. Accordingly, we do not rely on this theory.