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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED April 9, 1996 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1909
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
DONALD H. MADAUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY
REVIEW COMMISSION
AND INTERNATIONAL
STAMPING COMPANY,
MIDAS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
WILLIAM D. GARDNER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Donald H. Madaus appeals from an order of
the circuit court, which affirmed the Labor and Industry Review Commission's
decision dismissing his discrimination complaint. Madaus claims that: (1) there is no substantial evidence to
support the finding that Madaus was not terminated on the basis of his
handicap; and (2) LIRC's decision was erroneous because it failed to
address the reasonable accommodation issue.
Because there is substantial evidence to support the finding that Madaus
was not terminated on the basis of his handicap and because it was not
necessary to address the reasonable accommodation issue under the facts of this
case, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Madaus was employed as a
tool and die maker for Midas International Corporation. Madaus failed to appear for work or call in
with an excuse for three consecutive days in May 1992. Because of prior problems with absenteeism
due to alcoholism, Madaus was working pursuant to a “last chance agreement”
which provided that he would be discharged in the future if he failed to
properly notify the company of a three‑day absence.
Robert Lees, Madaus's
supervisor at the time of the May incident, testified that when he was informed
of Madaus's absenteeism, he contacted Madaus.
Madaus told Lees that he had stopped taking his medication because it
did not mix with alcohol, and that he had blacked out for a couple of
days. Lees informed Madaus that he
would be considered discharged pending further investigation.
Several days later,
Madaus produced a letter from his doctor, Dr. Michael J. Logan, which
indicated that Madaus had suffered an acute dysphoria (depression), and that he
had “been unable to work or call in for that matter.” Dr. Logan admitted, however, that the conclusion that Madaus
could not “call in” was essentially “educated guesswork.” Dr. Logan also testified that he had
diagnosed Madaus with limbic brain disregulation, or alcoholism, and with
neural transmitter brain disregulation, which is a permanent and incurable
condition that makes people unusually susceptible to major depression. Dr. Logan indicated that the brain
disregulation disorder is controllable with anti-depressant medication.
Midas investigated
Madaus's excuse and concluded that it was not acceptable. Midas indicated that it discharged Madaus
because he violated the last chance agreement.
Madaus filed a complaint with the Equal Rights Division, which issued a
probable cause finding. The
Administrative Law Judge that heard the case, however, concluded that Madaus
was terminated because he violated the last chance agreement, not because of
the brain disregulation handicap. LIRC
adopted the decision of the ALJ. Madaus
petitioned the circuit court, which affirmed LIRC's decision. Madaus now appeals.[1]
II. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial
Evidence.
Our review is limited to
determining whether LIRC's findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. DILHR, 62 Wis.2d 392, 396, 215 N.W.2d
443, 445 (1974). If there is relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, we must affirm. Bucyrus-Erie
Co. v. DILHR, 90 Wis.2d 408, 418, 280 N.W.2d 142, 147 (1979) (citation
omitted). It is not required that “the
evidence be subject to no other reasonable, equally plausible
interpretation.” Hamilton v.
DILHR, 94 Wis.2d 611, 617, 288 N.W.2d 857, 860 (1980) (citation
omitted). If two reasonable, but
conflicting views can be drawn from the evidence, which view to accept is left
up to LIRC, not this court. Robertson
Transp. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 39 Wis.2d 653, 658, 159 N.W.2d
636, 638 (1968). Further, in reviewing
conclusions of law, this court will give great weight to an agency's conclusion
if “the agency's experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge aid
the agency in its interpretation.” Jicha v.
DILHR, 169 Wis.2d 284, 291, 485 N.W.2d 256, 258-59 (1992) (citation
omitted). We will uphold LIRC's
conclusions if they are reasonable. Barnes
v. DNR, 178 Wis.2d 290, 302, 506 N.W.2d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1993), aff'd,
184 Wis.2d 645, 516 N.W.2d 730 (1994).
Based on our review of
the record, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support LIRC's
finding regarding Midas's motivation for terminating Madaus. As noted, LIRC found that Midas's motivation
for termination was of a non-discriminatory nature. Specifically, LIRC found that Midas fired Madaus because he
violated his last chance agreement and not because of his brain disregulation
handicap.
There is substantial
evidence to support this finding.
Madaus admitted to his supervisor that he had stopped taking his
medication because it did not mix with alcohol. His supervisor testified to this fact at the hearing. There is evidence, via Dr. Logan's
testimony, that the medication would have controlled Madaus's condition so as
to prevent the depressive episode altogether.
Moreover, these factors lead to a reasonable inference that Madaus
freely chose to discontinue taking his medication and that but for this choice,
the May episode would not have occurred.
Further, there is no evidence that Midas was even aware of Madaus's
brain disregulation disorder when Madaus was discharged. We conclude that these factors constitute
substantial evidence to support LIRC's finding that Midas's motivation for
Madaus's termination was a non-discriminatory one. Accordingly, we affirm.
B. Reasonable
Accommodation.
Madaus also claims that
LIRC's decision should be reversed because it failed to address the reasonable
accommodation issue. Section 111.34(1),
Stats., provides: “Employment discrimination because of
handicap includes, but is not limited to: ... (b) Refusing to reasonably
accommodate an employe's or prospective employe's handicap unless the employer
can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's
program, enterprise or business.” The
circuit court concluded that the reasonable accommodation issue need not be
addressed until there has been a determination that the employment decision was
based on a handicap. We agree that this
is the correct interpretation of the law.
See Boldt v. LIRC, 173 Wis.2d 469, 478 n.1, 496
N.W.2d 676, 679 n.1 (Ct. App. 1992).
In the instant case,
LIRC determined that Madaus's handicap was not the basis of his dismissal. Accordingly, it was not necessary to address
the reasonable accommodation issue.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.