COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED March 5, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1836-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BENTURA MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
STANLEY A. MILLER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Sullivan, Fine
and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Bentura Martinez appeals from a judgment of conviction
for eight counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of armed robbery,
and one count of burglary. See
§§ 940.2251(1)(b), 943.10(1)(a) & (2)(a) and 943.32(1)(a) & (2), Stats.
On appeal, Martinez
argues that: (1) the procedures used to identify him were impermissibly
suggestive and unreliable and should have been excluded from evidence; (2) his
right to confrontation and his right to present a defense were violated when
the trial court precluded his full examination of a witness; and (3) the trial
court submitted an unconstitutional flight instruction. We affirm.
At trial, Martinez
testified that on April 23, 1994, around 6:00 p.m., he left the home of a
family friend to visit a local tavern.
He consumed a few alcoholic beverages at the tavern and left at
approximately 7:30 p.m. for another tavern, where he consumed more alcoholic
beverages. He eventually returned to
the first tavern, staying there until approximately 2:30 a.m. He then went to his father's home to get
some sleep.
The victim's boyfriend,
Robert Reynolds, stated that on that same evening, he and the victim returned
to his home at 12:30 a.m. and eventually went to sleep. A few hours later, they were awakened in
Reynolds's bedroom by a man with a gun, later identified as Martinez. Reynolds was told to “look down” while Martinez
repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim.
After the sexual assaults, Martinez physically assaulted Reynolds,
taking his wallet and forcing him to open a closet safe where he took
approximately $700. Martinez then left.
The victim testified
that she had never seen Martinez before.
The victim described Martinez as an overweight Hispanic male in his
twenties. Reynolds, who had met
Martinez previously, identified Martinez after looking at fifty or sixty
photographs. The photograph selected by
Reynolds was then placed with three others for the sexual-assault victim to
view. From the four pictures, she chose
Martinez as her assailant. Thereafter,
the police department conducted a lineup that was viewed by both Reynolds and
the victim. The lineup consisted of
four Hispanic males, including Martinez.
At the time of the lineup, Martinez was twenty-six years old, stood five
feet eight inches tall and weighed 220 pounds.
The other three men were: (1)
twenty-four years old, five feet eight and 230 pounds; (2) twenty-four years
old, five feet eight and 180 pounds; and (3) eighteen years old, five feet five
and 156 pounds. Both the victim and
Reynolds again identified Martinez as the assailant at the lineup. At trial, Martinez moved for the suppression
of the identification testimony, alleging that the procedures used were unduly
suggestive. The trial court denied the
motion. A jury subsequently convicted
Martinez of the sexual assaults, burglary and robbery.
Martinez argues that the
procedures used to identify him were impermissibly suggestive and unreliable
and should have been excluded from evidence by the trial court. On appeal, a challenge to the suggestiveness
of identification procedures raises an issue of law that we review de novo. State v. Wilson, 179 Wis.2d
660, 682, 508 N.W.2d 44, 52–53 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
100, 130 L.Ed.2d 48 (1994). We accept a
trial court's findings of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous. Id., 179 Wis.2d at 682-683,
508 N.W.2d at 53. When examining a
challenge to pre-trial identification procedures, we initially decide if the
procedures were characterized by “unnecessary suggestiveness.” Fells v. State, 65 Wis.2d 525,
537, 223 N.W.2d 507, 514 (1974). If
such a situation exists, we must then determine whether “despite the
unnecessary suggestiveness, the `totality of the circumstances' show that the
identification was nevertheless reliable.”
Id.
The defendant has the
burden to prove that the identification procedures were impermissibly
suggestive. State v. Mosley,
102 Wis.2d 636, 652, 307 N.W.2d 200, 210 (1981). If the defendant fails to meet this burden, the inquiry is at an
end and the evidence is admissible. Id.
In this case, both the
photo array and the lineup were not unduly suggestive. As noted, Reynolds picked out a picture of
Martinez after viewing fifty or sixty photographs. The police then showed that picture along with three others to
the victim. Martinez argues that the
photo array shown to the victim was suggestive because he was the only Hispanic
depicted. There is no evidence in the
record, however, that Martinez was the only Hispanic in the photo array. The only evidence regarding this issue is
the victim's statement that the other three men in the photo array did not look
Hispanic to her. Further, all the photo
array participants reasonably resembled Martinez in almost all physical
characteristics, including that they all had beards.
The lineup procedure
used four participants, all clean-shaven Hispanic men dressed in identical jail
clothes. Martinez, too, was
clean-shaven. Martinez argues that the
lineup was impermissibly suggestive due to the differences in age, height, and
weight between him and the other participants.
Physical differences in participants do not make a lineup
suggestive. See Powell v.
State, 86 Wis.2d 51, 67, 271 N.W.2d 610, 618 (1978). The lineup need only be reasonably
fair. Id. The law does not require that lineups shown
to witnesses include near identical or look-alikes of the witness
descriptions. The trial court must look
to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification to
determine whether due process was violated.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972,
18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 (1967).
All the lineup
participants were Hispanic men around the same age. One participant was almost the identical weight and height as
Martinez. The remaining two were
slightly shorter and lighter. Again,
dissimilarities between individuals composing a lineup, standing alone, are
insufficient to establish impermissible suggestiveness. As observed in U.S. v. Lewis,
547 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111, 97 S.
Ct. 1149, 51 L.Ed.2d 566 (1977), “[p]olice stations are not theatrical casting
offices; a reasonable effort to harmonize the lineup is normally all that is
required.” Martinez also argues that
his lineup was suggestive because he has a tatoo on his arm that was exposed
during the lineup. The police
conducting the lineup made certain that the arms and hands of all the men in
the lineup were held behind their backs.
The tatoo on Martinez's arm, however, was briefly exposed. Martinez offers no proof that this made the
lineup unduly suggestive. There was no
evidence that the victim ever saw or was aware of the tatoo before viewing
Martinez in the lineup. As noted,
Martinez bears the burden of showing that the photographs and lineup were
unnecessarily suggestive. Martinez has
failed to meet that burden.
Next, Martinez contends
that the trial court erroneously limited his cross-examination. Martinez sought to ask Reynolds about his
alleged drug dealing activities.
Martinez also attempted to elicit evidence relating to the possible
presence of an African-American person in Reynolds's apartment, in an attempt
to argue that somebody else committed the crimes.
Unless otherwise
prohibited, relevant evidence is admissible.
Rule 904.02, Stats.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 904.01, Stats.
On cross-examination, the proper test “is not whether the answer sought
will elucidate any of the main issues in the case but whether it will be useful
to the trier of fact in appraising the credibility of the witness and
evaluating the probative value of the direct testimony.” State v. Lindh, 161 Wis.2d
324, 348, 468 N.W.2d 168, 176 (1991) (citation omitted). Cross-examination will not be allowed unless
there is a reasonable relation between the evidence sought to be introduced and
the proposition to be proved. Id.
The scope of
cross-examination is a question committed to the broad discretion of the trial
court. Id. This court will reverse a trial court's
limitation or prohibition of cross-examination if the ruling represents an
erroneous exercise of discretion. Id.,
161 Wis.2d at 348-349, 468 N.W.2d at 176.
This court will affirm if a reasonable basis exists for the trial
court's ruling. Id., 161
Wis.2d at 349, 468 N.W.2d at 176.
As noted, Martinez
sought to elicit evidence from Reynolds regarding Reynolds's alleged drug
dealing. The trial court excluded this
evidence as irrelevant. We agree. Evidence of alleged drug dealing had no
tendency to make more or less probable any fact of consequence to the
determination of his guilt or innocence.
See Rule 904.01,
Stats.
Martinez further claims
that the trial court erroneously excluded questions concerning hair found on
Reynolds's bed sheet. Martinez sought
to present testimony that a defense expert found two hairs on Reynolds's bed
that did not belong to Martinez, Reynolds, or the victim. The defense expert testified that the hair
belonged to an African-American of unknown sex. The trial court determined that this line of questioning was
irrelevant. We agree. There was no evidence presented to the trial
court that the assailant was an African-American male.
Finally, Martinez argues
that Wis J I—Criminal 172
regarding flight should not have been given because it impermissibly shifted
the burden of proof to him to persuade the jury that he did not flee. We disagree. Wis J I—Criminal
172 instructs the jury that if, from the evidence, it finds that the defendant
had fled, the jury could consider that fact.[1] Moreover, Martinez waived this issue by
failing to object to the instruction at trial.
See § 805.13(3), Stats.;
State v. Marshall, 113 Wis.2d 643, 653, 335 N.W.2d 612, 617
(1983). We do not believe that this is
an appropriate case to exercise our power of discretionary review. See § 752.35, Stats.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Wis J I—Criminal 172 provides:
Evidence of the conduct or the whereabouts of a person after a crime has been committed or after that person has been accused of crime are circumstances which you may consider along with all the other evidence in determining guilt or innocence. Whether or not evidence of such conduct or whereabouts in this case shows a consciousness of guilt, and whether or not consciousness of guilt shows actual guilt are matters exclusively for you, the jury, to determine and you must consider that there may be many reasons unrelated to guilt for such conduct. You must also consider that feelings of guilt do not necessarily reflect actual guilt.