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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 26, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1701
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
IN THE INTEREST OF
JAMES B.,
A CHILD UNDER THE AGE
OF 18:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JAMES B.,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from a nonfinal
order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: CHRISTOPHER R. FOLEY,
Judge. Affirmed.
SULLIVAN,
J. James B., a juvenile, appeals from a nonfinal juvenile court
order waiving him into adult court for criminal prosecution on one count of
substantial battery and one count of battery.[1] He presents two issues for this court's
review—whether the juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion in
granting the waiver petition because the court's decision is not supported by
the record, and because the court failed to specify factual findings in support
of its decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction. This court rejects James B.'s arguments on these issues and
affirms the order.[2]
On March 30, 1995, the
State filed a two-count delinquency petition charging James B. with substantial
battery and battery. The petition
alleged that James B. kicked and “stomped” on a juvenile victim's head while she
lay on the ground, and that he punched another juvenile girl in the face.
The State then filed a
petition to waive James B. into adult court.
After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition, finding that
the criminal law violations alleged in the delinquency petition occurred on or
after James B.'s sixteenth birthday; that there was “prosecutive merit to the
charges of Substantial Battery and Battery alleged against” him; and that
considering the “clear and convincing” evidential criteria pursuant to
§ 48.18(5), Stats., “it
would be contrary to the best interests of the child and the public to hear the
case” in juvenile court.
James B. first argues
that the juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the
waiver petition because its decision is not supported by the record. We disagree.
Whether to grant a
waiver petition is a matter within the discretion of the juvenile court and we
will not reverse the court's decision absent an erroneous exercise of that
discretion. See D.H. v.
State, 76 Wis.2d 286, 302-303, 251 N.W.2d 196, 205 (1977). “The proper exercise of discretion
contemplates an informed determination reached by the demonstrated application
of reason to facts and circumstances appearing in the record.” Id. at 303, 251 N.W.2d at
205. Subsections 48.18(5) and (6), Stats., set forth the criteria and the
process the juvenile court must use in deciding whether to waive a juvenile
into adult court:
(5) If
prosecutive merit is found, the judge, after taking relevant testimony which
the district attorney shall present and considering other relevant evidence,
shall base its decision whether to waive jurisdiction on the following
criteria:
(a) The
personality and prior record of the child, including whether the child is
mentally ill or developmentally disabled, whether the court has previously
waived its jurisdiction over the child, whether the child has been previously
convicted following a waiver of the court's jurisdiction or has been previously
found delinquent, whether such conviction or delinquency involved the
infliction of serious bodily injury, the child's motives and attitudes, the
child's physical and mental maturity, the child's pattern of living, prior
offenses, prior treatment history and apparent potential for responding to
future treatment.
(b) The type and
seriousness of the offense, including whether it was against persons or
property, the extent to which it was committed in a violent, aggressive,
premeditated or wilful manner, and its prosecutive merit.
(c) The adequacy
and suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for treatment
of the child and protection of the public within the juvenile justice system,
and, where applicable, the mental health system.
(d) The
desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court if the
juvenile was allegedly associated in the offense with persons who will be
charged with a crime in circuit court.
(6) After
considering the criteria under sub. (5), the judge shall state his or her
finding with respect to the criteria on the record, and, if the judge
determines on the record that it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child or of the
public to hear the case, the judge shall enter an order waiving jurisdiction
and referring the matter to the district attorney for appropriate criminal
proceedings in the circuit court, and the circuit court thereafter has
exclusive jurisdiction. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the judge shall presume that it would be contrary
to the best interests of the child and of the public to hear the case if the
child is alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the
child's 16th birthday and if the court has waived its jurisdiction over the
child for a previous violation.
The juvenile court
carefully set forth its specific findings in its oral decision at the juvenile
hearing. It found that because of James
B.'s older age, the juvenile justice system had no services available to him, see
§ 48.18(5)c; that the alleged acts were serious and violent acts
resulting in serious bodily harm to one victim, and physical harm to another, see
§ 48.18(5)b; that he had prior adjudications in the juvenile system, and
that his personalty, motives, and attitudes reflected unfulfilled potential, see
§ 48.18(5)(a); and that § 48.18(5)(d) did not apply in James B.'s
case. The record and the testimony
clearly supports the juvenile court's findings pursuant to § 48.18(5), Stats.
It properly determined, by clear and convincing evidence, to waive James
B. into adult court. The juvenile court
properly exercised its discretion in reaching its conclusion. See D.H., 76 Wis.2d at
302-03, 251 N.W.2d at 205.
James B. next argues
that the juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to set
forth its factual findings under the § 48.18(5) criteria. His argument, however, is amorphous and without
adequate citation to legal authorities.
Accordingly, this court need not address it. See Barakat v. DHSS, 191 Wis.2d 770, 787,
530 N.W.2d 392, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1995).
Nonetheless, this court notes that the juvenile court did address and
make specific findings with respect to the required criteria, and we can locate
no erroneous exercise of discretion on the part of the juvenile court. See D.H., 76 Wis.2d at
302-03, 251 N.W.2d at 205.
For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the order of the juvenile court.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.