COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 30, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1565
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
JULIE A. HASLBECK,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
DARREN HASLBECK,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
FRANCIS T. WASIELEWSKI, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Darren Haslbeck appeals from an order modifying his child
support. The trial court agreed with
Darren's former wife, Julie A. Haslbeck, that Darren's bankruptcy discharge was
a substantial change in circumstances justifying a change in Darren's child
support. Darren argues that the trial
court erroneously exercised its discretion in modifying his child support and
that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution protects a party
from a modification of child support after the party's debts were federally
discharged in bankruptcy. We reject his
arguments and affirm.
I.
Background.
Darren and Julie were
divorced on August 26, 1993. They had
one child and were awarded joint custody.
On the parties' written agreement, the trial court held support open and
denied maintenance. Darren agreed to
assume his gambling debts approximating $19,550 and agreed to hold Julie
harmless with respect to these liabilities.
Otherwise, the property division was approximately equal.
In late 1993, Darren
filed for bankruptcy and his debts were subsequently discharged. Julie contested the dischargeability of the
debts. The creditors later deemed her
responsible for a number of them.
Julie's credit rating has also been damaged by the assumption of these
debts.
Julie later moved the
trial court for a modification of child support under § 767.32(1), Stats., arguing Darren's bankruptcy
discharge resulted in a substantial change in circumstances justifying the
modification. The trial court found
that Julie paid $736 installments per month in satisfaction of the debt discharged
in Darren's bankruptcy, and that she incurred attorney fees in connection with
the bankruptcy proceedings in excess of $5,500, which she paid in monthly
installments of $400. Additionally, the
trial court found that Julie earned approximately $3,300 per month and had
gross monthly rental income of $610 from a townhouse which had been awarded to
her in the property division. Finally,
the trial court found that she received a payment of $25,000 from a life
insurance policy upon the death of her grandmother, subsequent to the judgment,
and that she expects a distribution of $50,000 from the grandmother's
estate. Neither party disputes the
trial court's findings of fact.
The trial court agreed
with Julie's argument and further found it appropriate to deviate from the
percentage standards for child support under § 767.25(1)(m) and the shared
placement formula of Wis. Adm. Code
§ HSS 80. Hence, the trial court
ordered Darren to pay Julie $300 per month for the support of their child.
II.
Analysis.
Darren first argues that
the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in modifying his child
support. He contends that the trial
court should not have considered his bankruptcy discharge a substantial change
of circumstance and that the trial court should have considered the entire
financial circumstances of the parties when determining child support.
Whether to modify child
support is a question left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis.2d
128, 133, 501 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Ct. App. 1993).
A court properly exercises discretion when it applies the relevant law
to the facts of record and reaches a reasonable decision. Id.
“[W]here there has been a substantial or
material change in the circumstances of the parties or the children,” the court
may modify child support. Whether a
change in circumstances is substantial is a question of law, although we may
give weight to the trial court's determination. The burden of demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances
is on the party seeking modification.
Kelly
v. Hougham, 178 Wis.2d 546, 555‑56, 504 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Ct.
App. 1993) (citations omitted); see § 767.32(1), Stats.
The record clearly supports the trial court's
modification in this case. Darren's
discharge relieved him of his debts and diverted his frustrated creditors to
pursue payment from Julie. The trial
court found that Julie was obligated to pay $736 per month to satisfy these
creditors, and an additional $400 per month to pay legal fees incurred in her
challenge to Darren's discharge of his gambling debts. The trial court also noted that Julie had
placed the proceeds from her grandmother's life insurance policy into an
education fund for their child.
Further, the trial court concluded that Julie should not be obligated to
use her inheritance from her grandmother's estate to pay Darren's discharged
debts. The trial court clearly applied
the relevant law to the applicable facts and reached a reasonable conclusion
under Wisconsin law. See Eckert
v. Eckert, 144 Wis.2d 770, 777, 424 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Ct. App. 1988)
(stating trial court could properly consider the “consequences” of husband's
bankruptcy discharge as a substantial change justifying maintenance
modification). Thus, we reject Darren's
cursory arguments that the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion. Further, contrary to
Darren's contention, the record clearly shows that the trial court considered
the entire financial circumstances of the parties when it reached its decision.
Darren also argues that
the Supremacy Clause protects him from a modification of his child support
after his debts were federally discharged in bankruptcy. His argument is specious. We rejected this argument in Eckert,
holding: “[A] state family court may modify a payor spouse's support obligation
under sec. 767.32(1), Stats.,
following the payor's discharge in bankruptcy without doing `major damage' to
the `clear and substantial' federal interests served by the bankruptcy
code.” Eckert, 144 Wis.2d
at 779, 424 N.W.2d at 763 (citation omitted).
In short, a trial court modification of child support does not violate
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 772‑73, 424
N.W.2d at 760.
The order of the trial
court modifying Darren's child support is affirmed.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.