COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 12, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1554
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
ROBERT BOWEN and
JUDITH BOWEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DANE COUNTY FARMERS'
MARKET, INC.,
a corporation, JOHN
OOSTERWYK, WILLIAM
WARNER, MARY
CARPENTER, LYNN BEDNAREK,
ALAN J. HOWERY, ALICE
PAUSER, GLENN
CLARK, TED BALWEG,
ANNE TOPHAM,
FRANK ROMANSKI, PAUL
GRIEPENTROG,
DAVID NEDVECK, MARK
OLSON,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
GERALD C. NICHOL, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman, P.J., and Robert D. Sundby, Reserve Judge.
PER
CURIAM. Robert Bowen and his sister, Judith Bowen, appeal from
a judgment awarding actual costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the
respondents, the Dane County Farmers' Market, Inc., its director Mary
Carpenter, and various members of its board of directors. The court concluded that the Bowens
commenced and prosecuted a frivolous action against the respondents. We also conclude that the action was
frivolous, and therefore affirm.
For a number of years
Robert Bowen sold bakery goods at the Dane County Farmers' Market. In June 1991 Carpenter suspended him for one
year because he sold a product banned by the City of Madison health regulations
and because he did not prepare at least 20% of the goods he offered for sale at
the market. Robert appealed to the
board of directors, which affirmed Carpenter's decision. At the appeal hearing, the board also found
a third violation of Farmers' Market rules because Robert was not personally
present at his stand during market hours.
Robert retained counsel,
who sued the respondents for breach of contract, tortious interference with
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and deprivation of due
process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The complaint also stated a cause of action on behalf of Judith for
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, based on
discrimination because of her association with Robert, who is disabled. She alleged that during telephone conversations
in January 1992, Carpenter intimidated her into dropping plans to apply for her
own stand to sell bakery goods.
The respondents moved to
dismiss. Because the parties submitted
evidence in support of and opposing the motion, the court treated the matter as
a summary judgment and dismissed all claims.
Later, the court imposed costs and reasonable attorneys' fees on the
Bowens and their counsel under §§ 814.025 and 802.05(1)(a), Stats., finding that with adequate
investigation by counsel, they should have known that they had no basis to
recover against the respondents.[1]
Section 814.025(3)(b), Stats., allows recovery of costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees against a party who knew or should have known that
the claim lacked any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law. Section 802.05(1)(a), Stats., imposes a requirement on
counsel for a party to reasonably inquire whether a pleading is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or good faith argument to extend,
modify or reverse existing law. If the
court determines that the attorney or party failed to make a reasonable
inquiry, the court may impose sanctions including costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
Determining what was
known or should have been known to a party is a question of fact. Stern v. Thompson and Coates, Ltd.,
185 Wis.2d 220, 241, 517 N.W.2d 658, 666 (1994). The ultimate conclusion about whether what was known or should
have been known supports a determination of frivolousness under
§ 814.025(3)(b), Stats., is
a question of law which we review independently. Id.
With or without
reasonable investigation by counsel, Robert should have known that he had no
viable claims against the respondents.
Robert has never offered evidence that he was innocent of the rule
violations that led to his suspension despite opportunities to do so on administrative
appeal, on summary judgment and on the respondents' § 814.025, Stats., motion. We must therefore regard his violation of
those rules as an undisputed fact. Also
undisputed is the plain language of the Farmers' Market written rules, which
impose a one-year suspension for two violations such as those Robert
committed. Because Robert knew or
should have known that he was properly found in violation of the rules and
properly punished for his violations, he should have known that all claims,
whether in contract, tort or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, lacked the necessary
factual basis.[2]
Robert also presented
claims based on the third citation he received at the board of directors appeal
hearing. However, it is undisputed that
the board imposed no punishment for that violation. Robert should have known that an act that has no practical effect
cannot form the basis for recovery.
Judith also had reason
to know that her claim had no merit.
She based it on 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E), which prohibits
discrimination against an individual because that individual associates with a
disabled person. Judith's allegations
and proofs do not go beyond the fact, however, that she had three phone
conversations with Carpenter during which Carpenter was rude and possibly
insulting. Judith did not show any
nexus between Carpenter's comments and a discriminatory event. Additionally, Judith offered no proof to
show that the phone conversations occurred after the effective date of the applicable
provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which was January 26,
1992. See Pub. L. No.
101-336, § 246, 104 Stat.
353 (1990).
The Bowens contend,
additionally, that the court erred by deciding the frivolousness issue without
an evidentiary hearing. A hearing is
unnecessary when the material facts are undisputed. Kelly v. Clark, 192 Wis.2d 633, 653, 531 N.W.2d
455, 462 (Ct. App. 1995). For Robert,
the undisputed material facts are that he violated rules of the market and was
punished as provided in those rules.
For Judith, the undisputed material facts are her failure to prove an
act of discrimination and when it occurred.
In each case the trial court properly made its determination without a
hearing.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Counsel for the Bowens has asked that the judgment be reversed as to him as well. However, he did not appeal the judgment, except on the Bowens' behalf. The subject of this appeal is limited to the Bowens' liability for costs and attorneys' fees.
[2] Robert claims a dispute of fact remains as to whether Carpenter complied with notice requirements in the rules before imposing his suspension. There is no evidence of record to support that assertion. The Bowens apparently chose not to include the evidentiary submissions on summary judgment in the appellate record.