COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED DECEMBER 12, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1543-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES R. BROWNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Outagamie County:
JAMES T. BAYORGEON, Judge. Affirmed.
LaROCQUE, J. James Brownson, convicted of two counts of
failing to obey a special order of the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture,
Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP), appeals an order denying postconviction
relief.[1] He contends that a condition of his
probation barring his employment in the construction industry violates his
constitutional right to access to employment.
The DATCP Stipulation for Special Order No. 1524, dated June 24,
1981, was issued pursuant to Brownson's stipulation following an earlier 1981
conviction under Wisconsin's home improvement code. Brownson also claims that a prosecution based on a 1981
stipulation is invalid as either (a) outside the six-year statute of
limitations for actions on contract or (b) outside the time period for which he
could have been placed on probation following his 1981 conviction. Because the condition of probation is
reasonably related to protecting the public from fraud, and because the 1981
order remains valid, the order denying relief is affirmed.
The Stipulation for
Special Order No. 1524 was issued in 1981 pursuant to § 100.20(3), Stats.[2] The order incorporates a stipulation between
DATCP and Brownson that recites the fact that Brownson was convicted on
February 16, 1981, in Outagamie County Circuit Court of violating Wis. Admin. Code § Ag 110 relating
to home improvement violations, and that Brownson was placed on probation for
six months and ordered to make restitution.
Brownson further stipulated, as a condition to withholding further
sentence, to the entry of the special order in question. His stipulation accepted the terms of the
order governing Brownson's business practices in connection with the solicitation
and performance of contracts for the construction, repair or improvement of
residential and noncommercial property.
There was no expiration time expressed.
Brownson first contends
that because the order that led to his present conviction related to
residential and noncommercial construction, the condition of probation banning
participation in any form of building construction is unreasonably broad. Brownson's contention ignores the evidence
presented at the sentencing hearings.
A DATCP investigator
testified to department involvement with consumer complaints against Brownson
over a fifteen-year period. He
described the repetitious nature of the offenses involving many thousands of
dollars. At least twenty-four
violations on Brownson's record involved consumer fraud relating to construction
practices. He related Brownson's scheme
of contracting by use of false performance or pricing promises, his abuse of
the judicial process to delay and impede the consumers' attempts at civil
redress, and his characterization by one victim as the "Contractor from
Hell." Brownson's criminal record
includes twenty-nine convictions. He
served prison time, received probation and parole and yet persisted in his
illegal contracting practices. The
court heard testimony that Brownson attempted to avoid the legal restrictions
by the use of family members, corporations and "trust"
arrangements.
A sentencing court may
impose "any conditions which appear to be reasonable and
appropriate." Section
973.09(1)(a), Stats. The goals of probation are rehabilitation
and protection of the public. State
v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696, 700 (1976). Conditions of probation may impinge upon
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably
related to the legitimate purposes of probation. State v. Miller, 175 Wis.2d 204, 208, 499 N.W.2d
215, 216 (Ct. App. 1993). Conditions of
probation do not have to relate to the offense for which the defendant is
convicted as long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of probation. See id. at 208-09, 499
N.W.2d at 216.
Wisconsin has adopted
§ 3.2 of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Probation
(Approved Draft 1970), which sets forth appropriate conditions of
probation. Huggett v. State,
83 Wis.2d 790, 796, 266 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1978). Section 3.2 provides in part:
(c) Conditions may
appropriately deal with matters such as the following:
....
(iii)
maintaining steady employment or engaging or refraining from engaging in a
specific employment or occupation ....
The trial court could
reasonably conclude, in light of Brownson's startling recidivism, and his
persistent pursuit of loopholes, that a ban limited to residential construction
merely would invite a shift to illegal nonresidential construction practices.
Next, Brownson cites no
authority for the proposition that the 1981 order is not enforceable. The statute of limitations relating to
contracts has no application to enforcement of an order. The statutory limit on the length of
probation is inapplicable because the gist of the current offense is not the
violation of probation; it punishes the violation of a valid order. Finally, there is nothing onerous about an
order that essentially compels the subject to comply with the law.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1]
Section 100.26(3), Stats.,
provides:
Any person who violates s. 100.15 or 100.19, or who intentionally refuses, neglects or fails to obey any regulation or order made or issued under s. 100.19 or 100.20, shall, for each offense, be fined not less than $25 nor more than $5,000, or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year or both.
[2]
Section 100.20(3), Stats.,
provides:
The department, after public hearing, may issue a special order against any person, enjoining such person from employing any method of competition in business or trade practice in business which is determined by the department to be unfair or from providing service in violation of sub. (1t). The department, after public hearing, may issue a special order against any person, requiring such person to employ the method of competition in business or trade practice in business which is determined by the department to be fair.