COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED July
31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1520
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MONICA
L. GRAHAM,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Marquette County: DONN H.
DAHLKE, Judge. Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
J. This is a single judge appeal
decided pursuant to § 752.31(2)(c), Stats. The State appeals from an order dismissing
its criminal complaint against Monica Graham for operating a motor vehicle
after suspension pursuant to § 343.44(1), Stats. The State
argues that criminal sanctions may be imposed on Graham pursuant to §
343.44(1), Stats., for this
violation. We conclude that criminal
sanctions could not be imposed, and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
The
facts are not in dispute. On May 14,
1992, Graham's license was revoked pursuant to § 344.14, Stats.
Graham's license was then suspended on January 18, 1994, for failure to
pay a fine or forfeiture. Graham's
license was again suspended on March 11, 1994, for her driving record. Next, Graham's license was suspended for failure
to pay fines or forfeitures on June 1, 1994, August 5, 1994, and August 17,
1994.
Graham
has not reinstated her license from any of those suspensions or
revocations. Finally, Graham was
arrested pursuant to § 343.44(1), Stats.,[1]
on October 16, 1994, for operating after suspension for the second time in five
years.
The State filed a
criminal complaint against Graham, and
the trial court dismissed the complaint.
The State appeals.
DISCUSSION
The trial court
dismissed the State's criminal complaint based on State v. Muniz,
181 Wis.2d 928, 512 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1994). The State argues that Muniz should be overruled
because it is irreconcilable with State v. Biljan, 177 Wis.2d 14,
501 N.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1993).[2] But the cases are not irreconcilable.
In
both Muniz and Biljan, the State sought a criminal
conviction against a motorist under § 343.44(2)(b), Stats., for operating a motor vehicle
after revocation.
Section 343.44(2)(b), provides:
1. Except as provided in subd. 2,
for a 2nd conviction under this section or a local ordinance in conformity with
this section within a 5-year period, a person may be fined not more than $1,000
and shall be imprisoned for not more than 6 months.
2. If
the revocation or suspension that is the basis of a violation was imposed
solely due to a failure to pay a fine or a forfeiture, or was imposed solely
due to a failure to pay a fine or forfeiture and one or more subsequent
convictions for violating sub. (1), the person may be required to forfeit not
more than $1,000. This subdivision
applies regardless of the person's failure to reinstate his or her operating
privilege.
In
Muniz, the court held that the only suspension in effect was a
five-year suspension for Muniz's failure to pay a forfeiture, and thus under
§ 343.44(2)(b)2, Stats., a
criminal remedy was not available. 181
Wis.2d at 933, 512 N.W.2d at 254. In Biljan,
the court held that the revocation was not based solely upon Biljan's failure
to pay a forfeiture, and therefore § 343.44(2)(b)2 did not apply. 177 Wis.2d at 22, 501 N.W.2d at 824. Thus, the cases are distinguishable.[3]
According
to § 752.41(2), Stats.,
"Officially published opinions of the court of appeals shall have
statewide precedential effect."
The published decision of any one panel of the court of appeals has
binding effect on all panels of the court.
See In re Court of Appeals, 82 Wis.2d 369, 371, 263
N.W.2d 149, 149-50 (1978); Ranft v. Lyons, 163 Wis.2d 282,
299-300 n.7, 471 N.W.2d 254, 260-61 (Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, the State's request that we overrule Muniz
must await another forum.[4] Because the trial court did not improperly
rely on Muniz, we affirm.
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[1] Section 343.44(1), Stats., provides that "[n]o person whose operating
privilege has been duly revoked or suspended pursuant to the laws of this state
shall operate a motor vehicle upon any highway in this state during such
suspension or revocation or thereafter before filing proof of financial
responsibility or before that person has obtained a new license in this state
...."
[2] This is the only issue which the State has
adequately briefed. We do not consider,
sua sponte, other issues which the State might have raised. Waushara County v. Graf, 166
Wis.2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16, 19, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 894 (1992).
[3] In a footnote to its brief, the State
argues: "Assuming the court
believes there is a substantive difference between a demerit point suspension
and a § 344.14 suspension that justifies the different holding in State
v. Biljan and State v. Muniz, Ms. Graham had a § 344.14
suspension and therefore State v. Biljan applies." The State, however, does not explain either
the substantive difference between a demerit point suspension and a
§ 344.14 suspension or why any difference would make Biljan
and Muniz distinguishable.
Consequently, we will not consider this issue. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646,
492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992) (we may decline to review an issue
inadequately briefed).
[4] The question of whether we have the authority
to overrule our own cases is now pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Cook
v. Cook, No. 95-1963 (May 7, 1996) (petition for review granted). However, unless and until the supreme court
decides that we can overrule our own cases, we are bound by prior precedent.