COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October 31, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1438-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KIMMY CHESSER,
Defendant-Appellant,
ANGELA L. HALE,
Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
CHARLES F. KAHN, JR., Judge. Affirmed
with directions.
SCHUDSON, J.[1] Kimmy Chesser appeals from the judgment of
conviction, following a jury trial, for disorderly conduct while armed, party
to a crime, contrary to §§ 947.01 and 939.05, Stats.[2] Chesser argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict.
He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. This court affirms.
According to the trial
evidence, on August 17, 1993, a dispute developed between neighboring
families. Some juveniles began fighting
and some adults, one of whom was Chesser, attempted to intervene. Several citizen witnesses testified that
Chesser ran into a house, came back outside carrying a stick, went back to the
house, returned with a knife, and brandished that knife while threatening
various persons involved in the fight.
Chesser testified and confirmed that he had retrieved a stick and
butcher knife from the house. He did,
however, dispute that he brandished the knife, claiming that he held it down by
his side. He also stated that after he
was outside with the knife for about five minutes, he “realized what in the
world am I doing,” and “ran back in the house to put the knife back in the
kitchen.” He also testified, “I got a
little loud, got a little disorderly.”
Chesser first argues
that the court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict at the
close of the State's case because “[n]owhere in the [disorderly conduct]
statute or in the jury instructions for this particular offense, is there any
mention of the continuing of a disturbance as being an element of the crime.” Therefore, he maintains, because he merely
continued a disturbance but did not “cause or provoke” a disturbance, he could
not be convicted.
Section 947.01, Stats., provides:
Whoever,
in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane,
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under
circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
The
trial court instructed the jury:
The
second element of this offense requires that the defendant's conduct under
circumstances as they then exist tended to cause or provoke a disturbance.
It is not necessary then that an actual
disturbance must have resulted from the defendant's conduct. The law requires only that the conduct be of
a type which tends to cause or provoke a disturbance under the circumstances as
they then existed.
This court reads nothing
in the statute or the jury instruction to require that one create or initiate a
disturbance to be guilty of disorderly conduct. Obviously, if that were so, countless offenders who join in a
fight could never be convicted despite their participation. This would make no sense. See State v. West, 181
Wis.2d 792, 796, 512 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Ct. App. 1993) (courts reject absurd or
unreasonable interpretations of statutes).
As each participant joins the fight, he or she “tends to cause or provoke
a disturbance” because, without such conduct, the fight might end. Although “fueling the flames” is not always
or necessarily as dangerous as igniting the fire, it certainly “tends to cause
or provoke” the conflagration.
Chesser also argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
[I]n
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking
in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the
appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite
guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes that
the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it.
State
v. Poellinger, 153 Wis.2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752, 757-758 (1990)
(citations omitted). Where there are
inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, it is the jury's duty to
determine the weight and credibility of the testimony. Thomas v. State, 92 Wis.2d
372, 381-382, 284 N.W.2d 917, 922-923 (1979).
This court will substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact
when the fact-finder relied on evidence that was “inherently or patently
incredible—that kind of evidence which conflicts with nature or with fully-established
or conceded facts.” State v.
Tarantino, 157 Wis.2d 199, 218, 458 N.W.2d 582, 590 (Ct. App. 1990).
Several witnesses
described Chesser's armed and threatening conduct. Chesser confirmed much of what they said and even conceded that
he was “a little disorderly.” The
evidence clearly was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed with directions.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
[2] The judgment of conviction reflects a conviction for endangering safety by use of dangerous weapon, party to a crime, contrary to §§ 941.20(1)(c) and 939.05, Stats. The full record confirms, however, that the trial court granted the State's motion to amend the charge to disorderly conduct while armed, and the trial proceeded on that basis. Therefore, while affirming, this court remands the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction reflecting the correct charge.